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Abstract 
This thesis examines the capacity of left-wing governments in Latin America to 
implement their policy preferences in the context of the current phase of 
globalisation.  In particular, it focuses on the policy area of privatisation. It addresses 
the debate concerning the extent to which increasing economic globalisation is 
forcing governments, regardless of their partisanship, to ‘converge’ upon a similar 
set of market-friendly economic policies. The thesis focuses on the ability of the left 
wing governments in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay to implement their preferences 
in the policy area of privatisation, and the role of domestic political institutions in 
either facilitating or impeding these governments from doing so, using a qualitative 
comparative case study methodology. It hypothesises that the configuration of 
political institutions is a significant factor in determining the capacity of a 
government to pursue distinct partisan policies. The thesis finds that although the 
three governments had similar policies towards privatisation, the divergence in 
outcomes was a product of the political institutional configuration in each state.  In 
particular, the level of executive power, and in the Uruguayan case, mechanisms of 
direct democracy, proved key determining factors. 
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Introduction 
The relevance of partisan politics in the current globalised era remains contested and 
misunderstood. This study argues that the focus on exogenous variables in explaining 
the ability of partisan, specifically left-wing governments to implement their 
preferences neglects an important internal variable: the configuration of political 
institutions. Left-wing governments continue to be important even in today’s 
globalised world, but this depends upon the institutional power they can wield over 
decision-making and the institutional design and path dependent effects of specific 
policies. It tests this argument by examining the ability of three left-wing 
governments in the developing world, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, through 
qualitative comparative case studies, to implement their preferences in the policy 
area of privatisation.     
 
Latin America Turns Left 
Latin America is turning left. The region has, in the last ten years, witnessed the 
political ascendancy and electoral successes of a diverse group of politicians that all 
are part of a general resurgence of left-of-centre political forces across the continent. 
The reasons for this wider pattern are not particularly complex, given the region’s 
unparalleled socio-economic inequalities (CEPAL, 2005). This revival of left-leaning 
politics in Latin America has inspired an impressive body of work concerned with 
the context, motivations, implications and apparent bifurcation of these leaders (see 
Lagos, 2008; Weyland, 2007; Seligson, 2007; Roberts, 2007; de la Torre, 2007; 
Castañeda & Morales, 2007; Lynch, 2007; Castañeda, 2006; Cardoso, 2006; 
Schamis, 2006; Cleary, 2006; Ramírez Gallegos, 2006; Panizza 2005). However, the 
relevance of all this scholarly interest is questionable if these left-wing governments 
are paralysed and constrained by exogenous forces once in power, as proponents of 
the ‘globalisation’ or ‘efficiency’ hypothesis would argue. According to this logic, an 
inexorable march towards increasing economic globalisation has ensured that 
governments of the left can no longer implement distinctive policies that differ 
substantially from governments of the right. What merits attention then, is the ability 
of these left-wing governments to actually implement their preferences once in 
power.    
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The Puzzle: How relevant is the contemporary left? 
Partisan theory assumes that the political orientation of the party in power matters. It 
also assumes that governments have the ability to implement their preferences (see 
Hibbs, 1992; 1977). In today’s globalised world, this assertion is being increasingly 
challenged. The literature offers two views: one is convergence driven by 
globalisation; the other is that under some circumstances left-leaning governments 
can effectively implement their policies. What circumstances has not been fully 
explored, in particular the role that domestic political institutions play in either 
impeding or facilitating left-wing governments in their attempts to implement their 
preferences. 
The ‘globalisation’ or ‘efficiency’ hypothesis argues that increasing 
economic globalisation is forcing governments, regardless of their partisanship, to 
internalise the preferences of mobile capital if they wish to remain competitive in 
global markets. This has the end result of forcing governments to ‘converge’ upon a 
similar set of economic policies, ultimately leading to a withdrawal of the 
government from the economy, reduced social spending, a shift in the burden of 
taxation from capital onto labour, privatisation, flexible labour standards and even 
lax environmental regulation (see Przeworski & Wallerstein, 1988; Ruggie, 1994; 
Rodrik, 1997; Burgoon, 2001). If governments deviate from this policy mix, the now, 
highly-mobile capital will simply move to a more favourable location. As this mix is 
considered to reflect policies of the right, increasing economic globalisation is 
presumed to constrain, if not eliminate, distinctive left-wing alternatives. As such, 
left-wing governments now have little ability to implement their preferences in 
capitalist democracies.     
 Those that reject this argument also reject the treatment of economic 
globalisation as the sole explanatory variable. Early studies contesting the concept of 
policy convergence contended that left-wing politics were far from meaningless in 
today’s world. In fact, they treated left-wing politics as an independent variable and 
found that, where governments were of the left, the effects of convergence, in areas 
such as social welfare spending and taxation reform, were lessened or even reversed 
(see Cameron, 1978; Hicks & Swank, 1992). The means by which left-wing politics 
resisted this convergence remained unclear, but it was thought that the answer lay in 
the relationship of these parties with labour. Later, more sophisticated studies 
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attempted to untangle this relationship and so began the incorporation of labour-
market institutions as an independent variable into this debate. It was now 
convincingly argued that where left-wing governments were allied with broad and 
encompassing labour movements, the effects of convergence, again in the areas of 
social welfare spending or taxation reform, would again be either significantly 
slowed or even reversed (see Garrett, 1998a). So, left-wing governments can 
implement their preferences. They matter.  
 However, the domestic-level mechanisms by which left-wing governments 
resist the pressures of convergence still remain under-developed. The focus still 
remains on exogenous variables to the detriment of a more complete understanding 
of the effects of domestic-level variables. While the role of labour in mediating 
convergence has been the focus of a number of studies, the role of political 
institutions still warrants attention. Generally, where studies have incorporated 
institutional variables, they have either been very generalised, such as democracy 
(see Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005), or very narrow institutional variables, such as 
party fragmentation (see Wibbels & Arce, 2003), or else they have been solely 
concerned with the effect of labour market and partisanship institutions (see Garrett, 
1998a). The links between globalisation, left-wing governments and policy outcomes 
still remains contested and unclear.        
 
The Argument: A neglected internal variable – political institutions 
This project aims to contribute to this literature, by attempting to further untangle the 
mechanisms that allow left-wing governments to implement their preferences in the 
face of economic globalisation. Specifically, it argues that this literature, by focusing 
on exogenous forces to explain policy outcome, has neglected crucial internal 
explanatory variables. The configuration of the political institutions in each state will 
mediate the effect of economic globalisation on policy outcomes. So, variation in 
policy outcome, among left-wing governments in different states with similar 
preferences, cannot simply be attributed to varying levels of exogenous forces. 
Variation in policy outcome will also be a product of the political institutions in each 
state.  
While strong and encompassing unions allied with the left-wing party in 
power will be important for demanding and providing support for specific policy 
outcomes, the ability of a left-wing government to achieve this policy outcome will 
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be primarily predicated upon the institutional control a government has over a 
particular policy. By institutional control, we are referring to the decision-making 
power of the government, embodied by a combination of executive power, control 
over the legislature etc; the ability of important players to veto initiatives, e.g. the 
judiciary; and the institutional design of policies and their path dependent effects. 
Taken together, the cumulative effect of these institutional variables will be either to 
help to enable a left-wing government to implement their preferences, by maximising 
their institutional control over a policy, or to hamper a left-wing government in 
implementing their preferences, by minimising the control this government can exert 
over this policy.        
Figure 1 below outlines a typology of this argument. Holding all exogenous 
variables constant, where the level of institutional control over policy is high and the 
union movement is cohesive and well-organised, a left-wing government with close 
links to labour will have a greater ability to implement their preferences, than one 
with low-levels of institutional control and weak links to a fragmented and 
disorganised labour movement. Even when institutional control over policy is high, a 
lack of co-ordination on the left due to a fragmented and disorganised labour 
movement with weak links to the party may result in muted preferences. Where 
labour is cohesive with strong links to the party, policy may be focused and 
preferences clear, but a lack of institutional control over policy will constrain a left-
wing government.     
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Figure 1: A typology of domestic-level variables 
  
 
Strong cohesive 
labour movement with 
strong links to party 
Weak and fragmented 
labour movement with 
weak links to party 
High levels of institutional 
control over policy 
Implementation of 
preferences (strong 
support) 
Muted preferences 
(weak support) 
Low levels of institutional 
control over policy 
Constrained preferences 
(strong support) 
Blocked preferences 
(weak support) 
 
 
Privatisation in the Southern Cone 
In October 2002, after three failed attempts, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the left-
wing Partido dos Trabalhadores, won the Presidential election in Brazil. In May 
2003, the little-known Néstor Kirchner, leader of the left-wing Frente Para la 
Victoria faction of the Partido Justicialista was elected to power in Argentina, while 
for the first time in Uruguayan history, a left-wing candidate, Tabaré Vázquez of the 
Frente Amplio, won the Presidential election in November 2004. All three ran on 
platforms that criticised the market-model of their predecessors and all three 
expressed similar preferences as regards privatisation during their election 
campaigns.1 So, these three countries provide a good opportunity to test the argument 
outlined above. What is more, as shall be demonstrated in chapter two, these three 
states, during the period in question, had similar levels of exposure to economic 
globalisation and are exposed to similar levels of influence from the international 
financial institutions. This allows for all exogenous variables to be held constant 
across the three states, increasing the analytical leverage of the study over the main 
explanatory variables. If the argument presented above is correct, we should expect 
                                                 
1
 Campaign pronouncements, programmes, statements and manifestos are predictive of government 
preferences, even in Latin America, and governments generally attempt to act consistently with these 
preferences (see Stokes, 2001: 176).  
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variation, if any, in policy outcome across these three states to be a product of the 
political institutions.2 
 
The Purpose of this Study 
The ability of contemporary left-wing governments to successfully implement their 
preferences remains contested. While recent scholarly work has gone some way 
towards untangling the relationship between economic globalisation, institutions and 
partisanship, this relationship still remains unclear, and the focus continues to be on 
exogenous variables to the detriment of internal factors. In studies concerned with 
this issue, scholars have incorporated different institutional variables (see Avelino, 
Brown & Hunter, 2005; Wibbels & Arce, 2003; Garrett, 1998a). Duane Swank 
(1998b, 2002, 2003), in his studies of the OECD states, has emphasised the 
importance of institutional configurations in providing opportunities, to those 
opposed to the policies associated with convergence, access to decision-making. Paul 
Pierson (1994, 1996, 2004) has argued that the effects of economic globalisation on 
welfare retrenchment in industrialised democracies, where it has occurred, has been 
mediated and nullified by the institutional design and path dependence of existing 
welfare policies.      
 This study builds on these works. This project contends that the configuration 
of political institutions in a state will either enable or hamper a left-wing government 
to pursue distinct partisan policies. It builds upon the works of Swank and Pierson by 
creating a framework of institutional policy-making that captures the importance of 
access and control over decision-making and also the effects of policy design and 
path dependence. So, left-wing politics still matter, although the mechanisms through 
which these governments may resist convergence remain under-developed.  
Most of the literature in this debate has also been focused on two policy areas 
only: welfare retrenchment and taxation shifting. This study proposes to widen the 
scope of this debate by testing the argument in, an as yet, unexamined policy area: 
privatisation. Privatisation is a good policy to choose as we have clear expectations 
concerning the relationship between economic globalisation and privatisation.  
                                                 
2
 Outcome will also be a product of labour cohesiveness and organisation, but according to the 
argument presented here, left-labour power will only be relevant when the left-wing party has high 
levels of institutional control over policy. So institutions are the primary explanatory variable.    
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 Finally, most empirical work in this literature has been focused upon the 
advanced industrial democracies (for exceptions, see recent work by Rudra, 2002; 
Wibbels & Arce, 2003; Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; and Avelino, Brown & 
Hunter, 2005). This project will further contribute to this literature by testing the 
argument in three developing-world, Latin American states. Not only will this 
broaden the scope of this avenue of inquiry by continuing to extend it to the 
developing world, but it will also provide a more rigorous test of the argument, as the 
effects of economic globalisation are presumed to be magnified in developing world 
states. 
  
The Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter one outlines the dichotomy in the literature concerning the effect of 
economic globalisation on the ability of contemporary left-wing governments to 
implement their preferences. It contends that while advances in understanding the 
links between partisanship, economic globalisation and institutions have been made, 
there remains a focus on exogenous variables to the detriment of a more nuanced 
understanding of the role of institutional variables. 
 Chapter two presents the methodological approach to be employed by this 
study in order to test the argument presented above. It proposes the research 
question, justifies the selection of the case studies, explores and operationalises the 
institutional variables and hypothesises on expected outcomes based on the theorised 
impact of the variables outlined.  
 Chapters three and four concern the first case study, Brazil. Chapter three 
process traces the evolution of privatisation policy in Brazil from the return to 
democratic rule until the election of Lula. Chapter four is the analytic narrative of the 
Lula presidency. Firstly, it establishes the preferences of Lula as regards privatisation 
during the election; secondly, it outlines the outcome of privatisation policy during 
Lula’s term in office; and finally, it analyses and explains this outcome in the context 
of the institutional and internal variables outlined in chapter two. 
 Chapters five and six deal with the second case study, Argentina. The 
structure of these two chapters exactly follows that of the Brazilian case study. 
Chapters seven and eight deal with the third and final case study, Uruguay, and 
again, these chapters exactly replicate the structure employed for Brazil and 
Argentina.  
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 In the concluding chapter, the results will be discussed in light of the research 
question. The findings of this study will be related to the broader literature on 
partisan politics and economic globalisation. The findings of this research will 
hopefully stress the need for this literature to incorporate more complete and nuanced 
institutional variables, regardless of policy type and regardless of country location. 
Finally, a possible research agenda based on the findings of this study will be 
presented and outlined.  
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Chapter One – The Literature on Globalisation and Partisan Politics 
Partisan theory assumes that the political orientation of the party in power matters. It 
also assumes that governments have the ability to implement their preferences (see 
Hibbs, 1992; 1977). Recently however, this conventional wisdom has been 
vigorously challenged. Increasingly, heightened levels of economic globalisation are 
been presented as drivers of an inexorable alteration in the traditional role of the 
state.3 A corollary to this argument is the issue concerning the extent to which 
economic globalisation has altered the role of those who operate within the state. 
There are two discernable schools of thought within this debate. One side of this 
debate (the first wave)4 generally contend that economic globalisation has caused an 
increase in the power of capital relative to labour and that governments, in order to 
combat the threat of capital flight, must adopt policies that internalise the preferences 
of capital. So, economic globalisation is leading to an inevitable policy convergence 
along market-friendly lines in order to satisfy capital. This has the effect of severely 
curtailing or eliminating the prospect for distinctive left-wing policies.5 As such, left-
wing governments are no longer assumed to be able to implement autonomous 
policies. The opposing side of this debate (the second wave) however, reject this 
argument, and claim that the effects of economic globalisation have been overstated. 
Furthermore, they claim that economic globalisation may actually encourage 
governments to implement policies that are congruent with left-wing policies, while 
others again argue that the above studies fail to take into account the role of 
institutions in mediating the effects of economic globalisation. So, left-wing politics 
still matter, although the mechanisms through which these governments may resist 
convergence remain under-developed.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to review the competing arguments in this 
debate, and place the current thesis within a relevant body of literature. The first 
section outlines the arguments presented by those who contend that economic 
globalisation has rendered partisan politics meaningless; the second section presents 
                                                 
3
 There are a huge range of authors who accept this point. For seminal contributions see Strange 
(1996) or Waltz (2000). 
4
 This chapter follows Kofman & Youngs (1996) in delineating those competing approaches in this 
debate as the first and second wave literature.  
5
 Empirical research has shown that the market-friendly reforms associated with this type of policy 
convergence are correlated with executives who represent the right rather than those on the left. See 
Biglaiser & Brown (2005). 
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the arguments of those who contend that left-wing politics still matter. The 
conclusion will demonstrate the value added of the current study.   
   
1.1 The First Wave 
The central tenet of the ‘globalisation thesis’6 literature is relatively simple, although 
those that support this position come from a wide variety of backgrounds and 
traditions. The general argument is as follows: increased economic interdependence 
has led to a shift in the power of capital over labour, which in turn means that states 
must now aggressively compete for these mobile asset holders (capital), to such an 
extent that it ‘constrains…the government’ (Gill & Law, 1989: 481). It is accepted 
that mobile asset holders prefer certain government policies over others, such as 
small government, little regulation, privatisation, reduced social welfare spending, 
flexible labour markets, low corporate tax rates and even lax environmental 
standards.7 If governments do not adopt these policies, then mobile asset holders will 
exercise their exit option, resulting in deleterious economic consequences for the 
state in question. So, all governments become forced into an inevitable policy 
convergence along market-friendly lines as a result of economic globalisation.8 It is 
important to note that there are two distinct groups within this literature: those that 
argue that economic globalisation is specifically undermining the ability of the left to 
introduce autonomous policies, and those that contend that economic globalisation is 
leading to an inevitable convergence regardless of partisan politics. This convergence 
is seen to centre on reducing government intervention and on liberating market 
forces, ‘thereby significantly circumscribing, if not eliminating, the prospects for 
distinctive left-wing policies’ (Garret & Lange, 1991: 540).9 The end result is that 
‘left-wing parties will continue to seek election and occasionally win power. 
However, these parties will have little in common with their predecessors in terms of 
articulating progressive options and pursing programmes different from the 
                                                 
6
 The general term used to describe the thesis that economic globalisation is forcing an inevitable 
policy convergence along market-friendly lines, thus reducing the relevance of domestic politics. See 
Swank (2002: 22-23). Garrett has also called this the efficiency hypothesis. That is, governments 
adopt market-friendly policies in order to be more competitive and efficient in the global market. See 
Garrett (1998a). It has also been labelled the ‘race to the bottom’ thesis (see Drezner, 2001).  
7
 That is, the ‘regulatory race to the bottom’ to remain competitive in international markets.  
8
 Others suggest that this convergence is political rather than economic in nature. International 
organisations promote common political and cultural practices eventually leading to a similar 
convergence. See for example, Boli & Thomas (1999), and Keck & Sikkink (1998). 
9
 Others have suggested that convergence may be a product of domestic electoral arrangements. See 
Jackman (1986).   
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conservative or establishment view’ (Kurzer, 1993: 252). Although capital flight is 
not a new problem for the left, the range of policy instruments available for dealing 
with this problem are far narrower than at any previous time (Berger, 2000: 51). 
Economic globalisation, the threat of capital flight and the inexorable policy 
convergence has ensured that ‘it hardly matters whether the left or the right win 
elections; the constraints of the internationalized economy will oblige either party to 
follow the same monetary or fiscal policies or else face a loss of national 
competitiveness and investment’ (Berger, 2000: 51).10     
 As Garrett (1998b: 793) has noted, the above argument is not a new one. 
Adam Smith (1776) suggested in The Wealth of Nations that capital mobility would 
restrain the growth and autonomy of the state, while Norman Angell (1910) argued 
that increasing international economic integration was eliminating the likelihood of 
war among states (see Garrett, 1998b: 793-795).11 A special issue of International 
Organisation in 1971 stressed that realist models could no longer adequately 
encapsulate the role of the state as a result of increased economic interdependence 
(Keohane & Nye, 1971). Robert Mundell (1963, 1964, 1968) and Richard Cooper 
(1968, 1972), in a series of works, examined the effect of international economic 
integration on the role of states, suggesting that greater economic interdependence 
could alter the context within which states operate.12  
 It is through three different mechanisms that economic globalisation curbs 
policy autonomy and fosters convergence (Garrett, 1998b: 791). The first of these, 
increasing trade competition, stipulates that large governments are simply not 
‘efficient’ in today’s global markets. Large governments necessitate large amounts of 
government spending, cushioning market mechanisms and distorting prices and 
wages. Government largesse must be funded from somewhere, usually through 
increased taxes or borrowing, but government borrowing raises interest rates, while 
increased taxes will depress economic activity (see Garrett, 1998b: 792). So, ‘as a 
result of these effects, output and employment suffer from public sector expansion’ 
and ultimately, trade competition must therefore ‘result in a rolling back of the public 
                                                 
10
 This argument follows the same thread as Gourevitch’s (1978) seminal work ‘The Second Image 
Reversed’ which suggested that domestic politics do not simply shape the international realm, but that 
the international realm may also shape domestic politics.  
11
 For a good overview of these early works see Garrett (1998b: 793-796).   
12
 Milner & Keohane (1996: 7-8) draw attention to many of these seminal studies. 
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economy’ achieved by reduced government spending, eliminating interventionist 
policies and the privatisation of state assets (Garrett, 1998b: 792).  
 The second mechanism, the multinationalisation of production, is predicated 
upon the exit-threat of highly mobile asset owners. Mobile asset owners, it is 
assumed, prefer a particular mix of government policies (low corporate taxation, 
flexible and de-regulated labour markets, cheap prices for former state assets etc.) 
and should they not be provided with this policy mix, they will simply pack their 
bags and move to a more favourable location. It is this exit-threat that forces 
convergence along specific policy lines (Garrett, 1998b: 792). Distinctive left-wing 
policies are no longer feasible. However, this argument has been countered (see 
Garrett, 1998a; Romer 1994) by those who suggest that interventionist policies may 
actually be of benefit to mobile producers, but even if this is so, mobile produces 
may still attempt to foster tax competition, forcing the burden of taxation from 
capital onto labour, vitiating redistributive objectives (see Rodrik, 1997).  
The final mechanism concerns the hyper-mobility of portfolio capital. The 
extent of financial market integration and the speed of capital movement within these 
markets act as a disciplinary force on governments. If the markets do not like 
particular government policies, capital will simply move and ‘engage in regulatory 
arbitrage’ (Drezner, 2001: 58; Garrett, 1998b: 792-793). So, governments are forced 
to engage in a ‘race to the bottom’ where distinct left-wing political alternatives are 
‘sacrificed on the altar of commerce’ (Drezner, 2001: 53). Increasing financial 
integration naturally leads to increasing capital mobility and under floating exchange 
rates, increases in capital mobility will restrict the efficacy of monetary policy and 
where currencies are fixed or pegged; the restrictions are magnified (see Milner & 
Keohane, 1996; Berger, 2000; Philips, 2005).13  
 The positions and backgrounds of those that support the globalisation thesis, 
as well as the arguments they make are, as stated earlier, diverse.14 The extreme end 
of this spectrum is represented by what Hay (2004: 33) has termed the ‘airport 
lounge/business school globalisation literature’ (see Leadbeater, 1999; Gray, 1998; 
Parker, 1998; Ohmae, 1996; Thurow, 1994, Levitt, 1983). This literature assumes 
that capital is perfectly mobile and that there is perfect competition in a perfectly 
                                                 
13
 This is according to the Mundell-Flemming theorem which states that under fixed exchange rates, 
increases in capital mobility renders monetary policy little more than a tool to maintain the exchange 
rate. See Mundell (1963). 
14
 See Hirst & Thompson (1996) for a good overview of these arguments.  
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open economy. Economic globalisation is a pre-determined end-point and this 
intractable situation is forcing all governments to converge along a similar set of 
identical market policies. As a result ‘one dominant economic system is emerging’ 
(Sachs & Warner, 1995: 1). All economies ‘tend toward common ways of producing 
and organising economic life’ and ‘where they do not converge, the explanation lies 
in distortions introduced by history’ (Berger, 1996: 1).  
This extreme is best embodied by Ohmae (1996), who argues that state 
functions have become paralysed as a result of globalisation, even going so far as to 
contend that the logic of economic globalisation dictates that regional economies, or 
centres where economic activity is concentrated (e.g. Singapore, Hong Kong etc.), 
should be represented at the international level rather than nation states. For Ohmae 
(1996: 4), economic globalisation has rendered ‘the traditional middleman function 
of nation-states and of their governments largely unnecessary.’ Not only is the role of 
partisan politics meaningless, but also the role of the nation state itself.  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, these arguments are not without their critics. They 
have been criticised for completely ignoring institutional variables (see Philips, 2005; 
Hay, 2004; Busch, 2000), for the highly deterministic nature of their argument (Hay, 
2004), and for their causal empiricism, exemplified by a highly selective use of 
evidence (Busch, 2000).         
 Przeworski & Wallerstein’s (1988) theory of ‘structural dependence of the 
state on capital,’ arrives at a conclusion similar to the one propagated by the 
literature described above, albeit one derived from a very different perspective. 
Drawing on Marxist theories, Przeworski & Wallerstein begin with the hypothesis 
that society in its entirety depends upon the allocation of resources chosen by capital 
owners, and as a logical extension of this contention, if ‘the entire society depends on 
the owners of capital, so must the state’ (1988: 12). Capital owners will only invest 
where they can maximise the returns on their investment. To achieve this, they 
search for states with little government intervention, little labour market regulation 
and low taxation ensuring that ‘governments face a trade-off between distribution 
and growth, between equality and efficiency’ (1988: 13). Traditional left-wing 
policies (interventionist government, large public sectors, regulated labour markets 
and high levels of taxation) will represent a lack of competitiveness to capital owners 
who can simply move to a more capital-friendly location (Wallerstein & Przeworski, 
1988: 1995).  
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Andrews (1994) builds upon the structural dependence thesis, and posits that 
capital mobility should be treated as a structural feature of the international system. 
He presents the ‘capital mobility thesis,’ which suggests that when capital is highly 
mobile across borders, the macroeconomic policy options available to states are 
‘systematically circumscribed’ (1994: 193).15 This occurs because internationally 
mobile capital will reward some state behaviour but punish others (1994: 193). 
Economic globalisation has ‘enhanced the capacity of capital asset-holders to evade 
the jurisdiction of unfriendly regulators’ (1994: 199). The new competitive pressures 
that states face in attracting capital are forcing them to adopt the same policies, 
rendering partisan politics at the domestic level, somewhat useless (1994: 199).  
Gill & Law (1989), on a similar wavelength, highlight the primacy of capital 
in understanding the shifting alternatives available to national governments as a 
result of economic globalisation. They argue that ‘governments are increasingly 
constrained by the economic policies of other states, as well as the investment 
decisions of internationally mobile capital’ (1989: 485). They cite the example of 
France in the 1980s under socialist Mitterrand. Previously, France under de Gaulle 
had taken a nationalist stand-point as regards foreign investment, but by the 1980s, 
globalisation and the economic realities it generated, forced Mitterrand to become 
more flexible towards foreign investment, even to the extent of welcoming and 
pursing Japanese capital (1989: 485). For Gill & Law, this example serves to 
highlight the fact that the structural power of capital has risen relative to labour and 
the state (1989: 487). As a result of the dominance of capital, they contend that ‘an 
elected socialist party with a radical programme would therefore be constrained in its 
policy choices by the nature of the business climate, not least because it would need 
tax revenues and/or loans to finance its ambitious spending plans’ (1989: 481). A 
variant of this argument is also shared by Mishra (1996), who posits that parties of 
the left are conclusively constrained from developing progressive policy, primarily as 
a result of the dominance or prevalence of the neoliberal rhetoric.  
Cerny (1996: 83), in common with the literature above, contends that as 
markets expand they subsume all types of political, economic and social processes, 
and the rise of capital brings into question the autonomy of the liberal democratic 
state in the contemporary world. The increase in capital mobility, the 
                                                 
15
 See also Cohen (1993) and Webb (1991) who both subscribe to variants of the ‘capital mobility 
thesis.’ 
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internationalisation of finance and the new drive for governmental austerity at the 
macroeconomic level are causing a transformation of domestic political actors, 
forcing left-wing governments to converge around market-friendly policies (1996: 
85). This process involves monetary orthodoxy and fiscal retrenchment on a wide 
range of issue areas including industrial policy, labour market policy, taxation, and 
the welfare state etc., a situation which forces left-wing political parties to adjust to 
these new realities (1996: 85). Pro-market ideology seeps downwards towards 
national institutions, policy makers and other actors: ‘A climate of embedded 
financial orthodoxy will permeate the budgetary process, with widening circles of 
government austerity reaching ever-increasing parts of the state’ (1996: 95). For 
Cerny (1996: 91), it is the internationalisation of finance and the rise of capital 
mobility that is the main reason for this ‘competition state.’ This process is rendering 
the state little more than ‘an enterprise association organised around serving the 
needs of financial capital’ (1996: 93). Cerny’s view regarding the ascendancy of 
capital leaves little room for partisan politics.         
Ruggie (1994) argues that the new hierarchies and priorities of the global 
market have destroyed the social pact that came into being after the Second World 
War. This pact is what Ruggie (1982) termed ‘embedded liberalism,’ that is, trade 
liberalisation combined with domestic measures that cushioned and compensated 
those that stood to suffer most from liberalisation. Ruggie (1994: 525) believes that 
the new world economy has now become ‘disembedded,’ leading to a loss of 
direction for national governments (1994: 525). This in turn, has provided the 
opportunity for pro-market ideologues to call for a rectification of the market/state 
role and to propagate the dominance of pro-market ideas (1994: 523). ‘Policy 
attitudes towards the new world economy have shifted in the direction of 
Neoliberalism’ (1994: 525), leaving left-wing political parties with little scope for 
redistributive polices. This ideational shift has been compounded by financial 
integration, which, from a Keynesian perspective, has forced governments to adopt 
fixed exchange rates in order to increase market confidence (Ruggie, 1997), but in 
doing so, macroeconomic autonomy is sacrificed at the altar of capital. 
Consequently, governments, if they wish to remain ‘efficient’ and competitive in 
global markets, can no longer compensate workers in the face of increasing 
liberalisation. 
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Compensation and redistributive programmes are funded primarily through 
progressive taxation, but mobile asset holders are simply unwilling, in the current 
international climate, to fund government redistributive programmes through high 
levels of corporate taxation (Rodrik, 1997). So, the only way to prevent capital flight 
and remain competitive is to shift the burden of taxation from capital, which is 
mobile, onto labour, which is immobile (Scharpf, 1991; Kurzer, 1993; Steinmo, 
1993). Eichengreen (1997: 378), warning of the ‘tyranny’ of the financial markets, 
argued that:  
Economic theory supports the notion that financial globalisation has 
shifted the burden of financing the welfare state onto labour…The 
most basic principle of the theory of tax incidence is that elastically 
supplied inputs into production escape the burden of taxes; try to tax 
them and they vanish. The international mobility of capital has just 
this effect of offering capital an exit option. It is not surprising that 
capital’s share of taxes paid in OECD countries has been trending 
steadily downward in recent years.   
Government’s fiscal policy is constrained by capital mobility, since taxes cannot be 
raised without reducing the competitive advantage of domestic producers. Large 
budgetary deficits, without the possibility of exchange rate adjustments, raise 
prospects of inflation and higher interest rates (Pierson, 1994; Esping-Anderson, 
1990; Rodrik, 1997). So, in the context of increasing economic globalisation, 
increased social spending will reduce competitiveness in the global market. It is 
simply not efficient.  
This ‘efficiency hypothesis’ is widely supported by empirical evidence.16 
Brian Burgoon’s (2001: 546) study indicated that trade openness does have an effect 
on welfare outcomes in the OECD states, but he does caution that openness ‘is far 
from the most important determinant of welfare efforts’ in these states. Garrett & 
Mitchell (2001), while they did find evidence to suggest that integration into global 
markets has not lead to a shift in taxation from capital onto labour in the OECD 
states, did find evidence suggesting that increasing trade liberalisation has resulted in 
lower government social spending in these same countries. Garrett (1999), in a 
global sample, found that trade integration has a consistently negative effect on 
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 The alternative argument to this ‘efficiency hypothesis’ has been labelled the ‘compensation 
hypothesis.’ See section 1.2.  
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aggregate social spending and that this is compounded by openness to capital 
markets. Scharpf and Schmidt (2000), examining change in welfare policies over 
three decades in 12 advanced industrial democracies, concluded that globalisation 
forced government after government to reduce the role of the welfare state. For 
Scharpf & Schmidt (2000: 335): ‘regardless of the political orientation of their 
governments, none of them (states) could fully defend the achievements of their post-
war golden age’ (2000: 335). In an interesting variant on this theme, Bailey, Rom & 
Taylor (2001) found evidence to suggest that as international competition increases, 
governments view spending on education as ‘redistributive’ and so reduce 
expenditure on education. 
Moses’ (1994) qualitative study analysed the demise of the mix of social 
welfare programmes and progressive taxation in Sweden and Norway. Moses (1994: 
126) came to a definitive conclusion: ‘social democratic institutions were designed 
for an environment that no longer exists. The conditions no longer exist because of 
changes that occurred beyond the regulatory reach of social democratic officials.’ 
Moses argues that the demise of the welfare state in the Nordic states was a direct 
consequence of increasing capital mobility. Specifically, fixing the exchange rate, in 
conditions of capital mobility, ensures that ‘economic policy autonomy, regardless of 
its specific ingredients evaporates’ (1994: 140). In the context of economic 
globalisation ‘domestic policy autonomy, of any variant, is costly’ while social 
democracy ‘is perhaps the most obvious victim’ (1994: 142).       
Recently, this avenue of inquiry has been extended to the developing world. 
Nita Rudra’s (2002) findings, based on a sample of 50 developing states, indicated 
that welfare spending in these states does indeed respond to greater trade flows and 
capital mobility. Rudra (2002: 435) argued that while labour could successfully 
defend their welfare benefits in developed states, the increasing number of low-
skilled workers, coupled with surplus labour populations, exacerbated ‘collective-
action problems’ in developing states, reducing labour’s ability to protect its welfare 
benefits and demand compensation. Consequently, the pressure of convergence is 
magnified in the developing world. Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo (2001), examining 
social welfare spending in Latin American states, concluded that the effects of trade 
openness clearly favoured the efficiency over the compensation hypothesis. They did 
discover however, that this is only in the context of social security transfers 
(specifically pensions). Increasing trade liberalisation did not appear to bring about 
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reductions in health and education expenditure (2001:554). Wibbels & Arce (2003: 
125) examining taxation in Latin American states, although their results were mixed, 
did uncover evidence to support the thesis that increasing economic globalisation has 
a ‘negative impact on the progressivity of tax policy.’ Interestingly, they concluded 
that taxation was increasingly shifted to labour where capital controls were high, 
indicating a unique, developing world policy trade-off (2003: 125-127).17 
Clearly, the empirical studies described above have been primarily concerned 
with external economic imperatives – increasing trade liberalisation, capital mobility 
etc. resulting in reduced social spending and corporate taxation in order to foster 
‘efficiency’ and therefore remain competitive in the international market. They are 
not particularly concerned with government partisanship per se, although logically, 
potential left-wing governments will be most affected by these eventualities. Large 
social welfare programmes and progressive taxation are more associated with 
governments of the left than with governments of the right.18 So, the cumulative 
effect of the efficiency hypothesis is to seriously circumscribe, if not completely 
eliminate, distinctive left-wing political strategies and polices.  
Other empirical studies have been directly concerned with government 
partisanship. Ross (2000) concluded that left-wing parties have had as great an 
impact on the demise of the welfare state as have had parties of the right. Castles 
(1998) and Huber & Stephens (2001) found little evidence that contemporary left-
wing governments expand the welfare state once in power. Charles Boix (2000), 
examining fiscal and monetary policy for a sample of OECD states, found evidence 
that while partisanship (left-government) and institutional differences between states 
do matter in the conduct of macroeconomic policies, these policies are severely 
constrained by the international context in which they are embedded. With increasing 
capital mobility, an autonomous monetary policy becomes harder and harder to 
pursue. Milner and Keohane (1996) co-ordinated a study taking into account the 
effect of institutions in mediating the potential effects of ‘internationalisation,’19 
focusing in particular on the effects that increasing internationalisation may have on 
left-wing government strategy and policy. They do find that economic globalisation 
                                                 
17
 Trade openness appeared to have little impact on taxation, whereas portfolio capital and foreign 
direct investment did (Wibbels & Arce, 2003: 125). 
18
 See Biglaiser & Brown (2005) 
19
 Milner & Keohane use the term internationalisation to describe the macroeconomic effects of 
economic globalisation. 
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has undermined the policy autonomy of national governments, although their 
conclusions could be considered rather cautious (1996: 256).20 They are in agreement 
with Andrews and suggest that capital mobility should be considered a structural 
feature of the international system (1996: 257), and with respect to left-wing 
governments, they posit that the net effect of this increasing internationalisation is a 
serious limitation on the policy autonomy and therefore efficacy, of left-wing parties 
in the global economy. For Milner & Keohane (1996: 18), ‘internationalisation will 
undermine the autonomy and efficacy of government macroeconomic policy. It will 
seriously constrain the behaviour of left-wing governments than of right-wing 
governments.’21    
Saskia Sassen (1996) also arrived at a more moderate conclusion to those 
who assume economic globalisation is leading to an inevitable universal policy 
convergence. For Sassen, institutional state capacities have not been obliterated, but 
they have been reconstructed and partly displaced into other institutional areas 
outside the realm of the nation state (1996: 29), resulting in a ‘privatised world of 
governance,’ whereby commercial arbitration and supra-national economic 
regulations will bypass national laws (2002: 66), leaving states with a reduced role in 
the global economy, ultimately ensuring that partisan politics begins to lose meaning. 
Like Milner & Keohane, she does caution that this position is not as black and white 
as it may appear. States still have an important role to play in the current era of 
globalisation, but this role is often as a provider of an institutional home for the new 
policy regimes dictated by economic globalisation (2002: 69).  
In addition, Alesina and Roubini (1992), taking the rational partisan model of 
the economy as a base,22 which suggests that left-wing governments expand the 
economy when they come into office, while right ring-governments contract the 
economy, examined this effect in small, highly trade dependent countries. Their 
                                                 
20
 Interestingly, they argue that this has resulted largely from rising capital mobility rather than trade, 
an argument that contradicts the prevailing wisdom in the compensation-efficiency debate. Much of 
the empirical work in this literature has found that while trade openness exerts an effect, the effect of 
capital mobility is negligible. See for example Burgoon (2001).   
21
 Importantly, Milner & Keohane (1996: 251-255) also suggest that institutions may have three main 
roles in mediating the effects of economic globalisation; by blocking price signals emanating from the 
international environment, by freezing coalitions and policies into place that would resist the 
convergence hypothesis, and by channelling different national responses to economic globalisation 
(1996: 251-255).  
22
 This model is derived from the literature on macroeconomic policy making, which shows that a 
rational partisan model of the economy is a powerful predictor of policy-makers behaviour. In this 
model, left-wing governments expand the economy when they come into office, while right ring-
governments contract the economy. 
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study found no evidence of rational partisan macroeconomic cycles, suggesting that 
very high levels of economic globalisation, significantly constrain distinctive left-
wing macroeconomic strategies (Alesina & Roubini, 1992). 
From the above literature, a clearly discernible common theme can be 
identified as regards the efficacy of left-wing politics in the face of economic 
globalisation, despite the variety, nature and quality of these arguments. The central 
argument of this literature is that as a result of increasing economic globalisation, 
governments must now compete for increasingly mobile international capital. 
Consequently, capital has increased in power relative to labour, due to the credibility 
of the highly mobile capital’s exit threat. Capital prefers a certain mix of government 
policies, concentrated along market-friendly lines, involving little government 
intervention or spending in the economy, a roll-back of the public economy through 
privatisation, flexible labour markets, reduced social welfare spending, and low 
levels of corporate taxation. If governments fail to provide policy along these lines, 
capital will simply exercise its exit option and move to a more favourable location. 
All governments, regardless of their political orientation, must converge along these 
policy lines. However, this policy mix is more congruent with the preferences of 
right-wing politics and as such, this inexorable policy convergence along market-
friendly lines significantly reduces, if not completely removes, the prospects for 
distinctive left-wing policies. In the context of economic globalisation therefore, left-
wing governments do not have the ability to implement their economic policy 
preferences.     
 
1.2 The Second Wave 
The core tenets of the globalisation thesis have been vigorously challenged in the 
form of the so called ‘second wave’ literature (see Kofman & Youngs, 1996; Hay & 
Marsh, 2000),23 and just as those that support the globalisation thesis do so from a 
variety of positions and backgrounds, so too do those that challenge this thesis.24 
Roughly speaking however, those that contest the wisdom of the globalisation thesis 
can be divided into three main groups, none of which are mutually exclusive. Firstly, 
there are those authors who contest the very notion that markets today are globalised 
                                                 
23
 The ‘second wave’ literature has also been labelled ‘sceptical.’ See Held et al. (1999).  
24
 Only in the area of monetary policy is it widely accepted that economic globalisation undermines 
the policy autonomy of national governments (see Garrett, 1998a, 1998b; Berger, 2000; Philips, 
2005). 
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or are in the process of becoming globalised. They argue that the international global 
economy is no more integrated and capital no more mobile than it has been during 
other periods of history. Secondly, there are those specifically concerned with the 
‘efficiency hypothesis’ who suggest that increasing economic globalisation may 
place pressure on governments to ‘compensate’ sectors of the population 
disadvantaged by increasing liberalisation. So, in order to cushion and compensate 
these sectors, increasing economic globalisation will actually encourage governments 
to increase social welfare spending and refrain from shifting the burden of taxation 
from capital onto labour. What is more, a strand of this literature has begun to 
untangle the institutional and partisan effects that may mediate the effect of 
economic globalisation and magnify compensation. Taking their lead from these 
authors, a third group contend that those who propagate the globalisation thesis 
neglect to take into account the specific configuration of national institutions or 
domestic political factors. They argue that in many instances, welfare retrenchment 
or alterations in the taxation regime can be laid at the door of domestic political and 
institutional factors rather than some external economic imperative, or alternatively, 
where the public economy has increased, this may be as a result of specific national 
issues, rather than increased uncertainty as a consequence of globalisation. 
Partisanship in this context still matters.  
So, the departure point for the second wave literature is those who have 
convincingly argued that the first wave grossly exaggerated the nature and extent, as 
well as the ‘qualitative novelty’ (Hay, 2000: 141) of economic globalisation (see 
Zevin, 1992; Berger & Dore, 1996; Hirst & Thompson, 1996; Evans, 1997).25 
Specifically, this literature has argued that today’s markets are no more ‘globalised’ 
than they were say, at the end of the nineteenth century (see Maddison, 1995; 
Krugman, 1995; Obstfeld & Taylor, 1997; Hirst & Thompson, 1996, Wade, 2000), 
that capital’s main loci of operation remains national economies (Hay & Watson, 
1998; Weiss, 1997), that the vast majority of international economic activity remains 
concentrated in a small number of developed world states (Wade, 1996; Frankel, 
1997), and that production for the domestic market remains the norm in all bar 
integrated city-states such as Hong Kong and Singapore (Krugman, 1994).26 By 
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 For an overview of the second wave see Hay & Marsh (2000). 
26
 It is important to note that not all second wave theorists are simply dismissing the effects of 
increased interdependence. They do acknowledge that this process has some effect on policy making 
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challenging the very existence of increased economic interdependence and by 
extension the increasing power of capital, this literature attempted to remove one of 
the core theoretical tenets of the first wave. Hirst & Thompson (1996) challenged the 
claims concerning the hyper-mobility of capital and suggested that contemporary 
patterns of trade and investment have become no more internationalised than in other 
historical periods. Indeed Hirst (2000), questioning the veracity of the first wave, and 
examining in detail the extent of openness, trade and foreign domestic investment in 
the developed world, argued that ‘the scope of national policy in the advanced world 
has not been diminished to the degree the globalisers believe,’ (Hirst, 2000: 20-28) 
leading him to the conclusion that ‘globalisation is a myth, un-sustained by the 
evidence’ (2000: 28). In this respect, this cross-section of the second wave literature 
has argued that economic globalisation is an exaggerated and poorly understood 
phenomenon and consequently, it has not led to the erosion of national policy 
autonomy. As such, left-wing politics still has considerable meaning and autonomy 
in today’s world.  
 Those that first proposed the ‘compensation hypothesis’ were not concerned 
with questioning the veracity of economic globalisation. They argued, in contrast to 
the ‘efficiency hypothesis,’ that increasing economic globalisation, manifest in the 
form of trade liberalisation, would actually lead to increases in government social 
spending (Cameron, 1978; Blais, 1996; Hicks & Swank, 1992). The foundations of 
the ‘compensation hypothesis’ are to be found in Karl Polanyi’s (1944) ‘double 
movement’ from his Great Transformations. Polanyi argued that industrialised 
societies, in the face of increasingly autonomous markets, which in the first place 
they themselves created, in turn implemented policies to cushion their societies from 
the dislocating effects of these same markets. Following a similar logic, the 
‘compensation hypothesis’ suggests that governments will increase social spending 
in order to offset the social costs of increasing trade liberalisation. They will cushion 
the effects of liberalisation for those sectors of society who do not stand to benefit 
from integration.27  Initial studies suggested that the positive effects of trade 
openness on social spending were related to the scope of collective bargaining within 
                                                                                                                                          
at the national level. Their main argument, however, is that these effects have been largely over 
exaggerated.  
27
 Theorems of international trade, Heckscher-Ohlin, Stolper-Samuelson and Ricardo-Viner suggest 
those sectors of society who benefit or lose from international trade will be defined by their stakes in 
the factors of production (see Berger, 2000: 49).  
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states, levels of union density and by the partisanship (left-wing) of the governments 
in power and opposition (Cameron, 1978: 1256; Hicks & Swank, 1992: 669-670), 
but the political links between trade openness and welfare spending still remained 
unclear.    
 However, a number of later studies supporting the ‘compensation hypothesis’ 
were to ‘go further than anyone else in disentangling the ties that bind openness and 
welfare effort, especially in analysing how labour market and partisanship 
institutions mediate the relationship between openness and welfare’ (Burgoon, 2001: 
515).28 These studies rejected the globalisation thesis and argued that domestic 
institutions (namely labour institutions), depending on their specific configuration, 
would mediate the effects of economic globalisation in different manners for 
different states. Garret and Lange (1991: 541), building on an earlier work (Garrett & 
Lange, 1989), examined social welfare spending and taxation policies in the 
advanced industrial democracies and argued that while the effects of economic 
globalisation have been substantial, ‘they have not eliminated partisan economic 
separation between the left and the right.’ Furthermore, Garret and Lange (1991) 
highlighted the importance of institutions in mediating the assumed and blanket 
policy convergence suggested by the first wave literature. Specifically, left-wing 
governments allied with broad labour movements have the potential to implement 
autonomous policy, which is consistent with policies of the left. They concluded that 
‘governments of the left – in alliance with powerful labour movements – have been 
able to maintain their traditional goals of redistribution, welfarism, and full 
employment’ (Garrett & Lange, 1991: 564). 29  
In a later study, Garrett (1996: 81-88) found ninety different effects of 
economic globalisation on public policy, yet he rejected the argument that left-wing 
politics is no longer relevant in the face of market forces. Garrett (1998b: 823), 
examining the effects of economic globalisation on the OECD states, concluded that 
governments that have persisted with interventionist policies have not been 
hamstrung by damaging capital flight. He did discover that the integration of 
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 In this discussion on the ‘compensation hypothesis’ I include studies on the burden of taxation. 
Generally this term refers to studies on social spending, but as others have pointed out, taxation is part 
of the ‘compensation hypothesis.’ Social spending is financed through taxation, and therefore the 
compensation hypothesis should be considered to encompass the social welfare-progressive taxation 
mix. See Wibbels & Arce (2003).   
29
 Hay (2000) characterizes this position as the dual convergence thesis, that is, two Pareto optimal 
frontiers in the face of economic interdependence.  
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financial markets does curtail policy to a greater extent than either trade or the 
multinationalisation of production,  however once again, Garrett’s analysis led him to 
the conclusion that the policies of left-wing governments are not undergoing an 
evitable convergence as a result of economic globalisation (1998b: 823).   
Garrett’s (1998a) pioneering Partisan Politics highlighted the importance of 
domestic political institutions in mediating the effect of economic globalisation. 
Garrett not only argued that trade openness may lead to an increase in social 
spending as governments compensate those sectors of society who do not benefit 
from integration, but he also suggested that international markets may, in fact, favour 
this outcome. Garrett’s argument is a relatively simple one. It is widely believed that 
greater economic interdependence will ‘favour’ a specific government model, 
comprised of deregulated free-market capitalism, with little social protection, 
government intervention or regulation in the economy. However Garrett, through an 
analysis of the advanced industrial democracies, contends that this is not necessarily 
the case. In fact, Garrett (1998a: 1) posits that in political economies where left-wing 
parties are allied with ‘broad and centrally organised labour movements,’ economic 
interdependence will favour this policy coherence and this will be reflected in solid 
macroeconomic outcomes. In this respect therefore, for Garrett (1998a:1), ‘the 
relationship between the political power of the left and economic policies that reduce 
market-generated inequalities has not been weakened by globalisation; indeed it has 
been strengthened in important respects.’ Conversely however, policy incoherence, 
or situations where left-wing parties are not allied with broad and encompassing 
labour market institutions, will not be ‘favoured’ by economic interdependence, 
resulting in poor macroeconomic outcomes (1998a: 9). 
Garrett rejects the assumption that left-wing government policies will 
ultimately lead to capital (mobile asset holders) exercising their exit option. Rather, 
he outlines two specific reasons why the opposite may be the case. The first is 
primarily concerned with the ‘new growth theory.’30 This theory posits that 
government spending on infrastructure and human capital (through welfare 
payments, education etc.) is actually beneficial to the economy, in that it provides 
and nurtures a healthy, productive and well-educated workforce. Garrett (1998a: 8) 
argues that asset holders can realise the benefits of such government spending and as 
                                                 
30
 See for example Romer (1994) 
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such, it is ‘unlikely to provoke capital flights in global markets.’ The second reason 
is more general, and relates directly to the institutional structure of the political 
economy. Where labour unions are broad and encompassing, Garrett argues that they 
will prevent isolated groups of workers from pushing up their wages through 
institutional wage setting, which is regulated by the encompassing labour union 
(1998a: 8-9). This wage setting, coupled with cooperation between capital and 
labour, will reduce instability and tension in the political economy, leading to greater 
productivity.31 So, for Garrett, ‘enduring cross-national differences in the balance of 
power between left and right remain’ (1998a: 10-11) and consequently the autonomy 
of left-wing policies has not been undermined by economic globalisation. The central 
point to draw from Garrett’s analysis is the importance of institutions, specifically 
the nature of labour market institutions in the political economy, in mediating the 
effect of economic globalisation.  
Building on Garrett’s work, other studies find evidence to support the 
‘compensation hypothesis.’ Allan & Scruggs (2004), employing quantitative 
techniques and examining the role of partisan politics in welfare state retrenchment, 
found little evidence of economic globalisation having an effect on welfare state 
reform (2004: 506). Their results did suggest that corporatist institutions may play a 
role in reducing welfare retrenchment (2004: 507), but they cast some doubt on the 
idea that pre-existing institutional arrangements necessarily constitute major barriers 
to change (2004: 509). Their study led them to the conclusion that ‘contrary to claims 
that partisanship no longer matters, we find that partisanship exerts a considerable 
effect on welfare state entitlements’ (2004: 497).  
Swank (1998a: 679), examining corporate tax burdens for OECD states in the 
1990s in the face of rising capital mobility, finds little change since the 1970s, 
although he could discern no tangible effect of partisanship on taxation. In relation to 
the impact of international capital mobility on corporate profits taxation, he 
discovered that ‘if anything, direct effects of globalisation of capital markets are 
associated with slightly higher business taxes, and to a degree the diminution of tax 
policy responsiveness to the conditions that underpin investment’ (Swank, 1998a: 
690-691). Other studies have reached similar conclusions (see Steinmo & Swank, 
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 Again, Garret (1998b) draws similarities between these arguments and those of Polayni’s (1944) 
double movement, the first a move towards laissez-faire capitalism driven by free trade, the other a 
move towards social protection to cushion the effects the of free-market capitalism.  
  - 18 -   
2002). Likewise, Garrett (1998a) concluded that economic globalisation does not 
diminish a government’s capacity to tax, nor even its options for progressive 
taxation. Social democratic governments allied with broad and encompassing labour 
movements are associated with bigger government and higher corporate tax rates. 
Although trade openness did appear to have an effect on social spending, Garrett & 
Mitchell (2001) did find that integration into global markets has not resulted in 
reductions in capital tax rates, or shifts in the burden of taxation from capital onto 
labour. Prakash & Potoski (2006) examining environmental standards across 108 
countries, found no evidence that increasing trade liberalisation was leading to a 
‘regulatory race to the bottom’ in order to maintain competitiveness.  
 It can be clearly seen that the focus of this literature has been on the 
advanced industrial democracies. Few empirical studies have expanded this issue to 
the developing world. Moreover, the vast majority of attempts to theorise this 
relationship in the state-economy interdependence debate have been overly reliant on 
the experiences of this small selection of states (Philips, 2005: 83). For Philips (2005: 
83), ‘this reliance has carried a range of implications for the theoretical lens through 
which state debates have been approached, and has imbued these debates with a 
range of biases.’ However, a small number of important recent studies have 
attempted to rectify this theoretical and empirical poverty.  
 The majority of these studies have shown that the effects of increasing 
economic globalisation appear to be magnified in the developing world. Kaufman & 
Segura-Ubiergo (2001), examining social welfare spending in Latin American states, 
found evidence in support of the ‘efficiency hypothesis.’ Increasing trade openness 
resulted in reductions in social security transfers. Nita Rudra (2002) discovered 
similar findings. Wibbels & Arce (2003) cautiously concluded that the mobility of 
portfolio capital and FDI did have a negative impact on the progressivity of taxation 
systems in Latin America. A recent study by Avelino, Brown & Hunter (2005) 
however, would appear to contradict some of these findings. Their study of social 
welfare spending in Latin America appeared to bolster support for the ‘compensation 
hypothesis.’ Trade openness (depending on how it was operationalised) did have a 
strong positive association with spending on social security and education in Latin 
American states, while financial openness appeared to have no impact (2005: 637).   
Even those that did find evidence for convergence in the face of increasing 
economic globalisation in the developing world, were cautious in their support for 
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the globalisation thesis. In fact, they all found evidence to suggest the importance of 
partisanship (left governments) in cushioning the effects of increasing integration. 
Kaufman & Sergura-Ubiergo (2001: 583) concluded that ‘popularly based 
governments32 in Latin America are an important force for the protection or 
extension of welfare transfer programmes.’ Nita Rudra’s (2002: 436) analysis 
showed that that there ‘are political factors (such as strong labour support and 
democracy) that can positively affect welfare spending in this era of globalisation.’ 
For Wibbels and Acre (2003: 132): ‘despite arguments that mobile capital would 
sweep all national politics before it and that politicians of the left, right and centre 
would all be impelled to bow to the demands of the markets, the political power of 
the left continues to have important implications for public policy, even in Latin 
America.’  
However, Garrett (1998a), the earlier works of Garrett & Lange (1989, 1991, 
1996) and consequently many of the empirical studies they have inspired, are not 
without their critics. In fact, Hay (2000: 138) has stated that Garrett’s argument in 
Partisan Politics ‘only marginally modifies the narrow economistic logic of more 
orthodox ‘globaloney.’’ It is specifically the issue of labour market institutions that 
Hay takes issue with. For Hay, the suggestion that left-wing governments coupled 
with broad and encompassing labour movements constitute a second pareto optima, 
does not necessarily refute the argument that partisan politics has been rendered 
meaningless by economic globalisation. In fact, Hay ponders whether such an 
argument is actually consistent with this view (2000: 139). Where previously the 
logic of economic interdependence summoned an inevitable path to market-friendly 
policies, Garrett’s argument suggests that this path is now bifurcated. Hay contends 
that the logic is no less inevitable and no less inexorable when it is considered that 
social democratic outcomes are dependent on social democratic institutions.33 For 
Hay (2000: 143), Garrett’s arguments constitute an ‘interesting variant on the 
prevailing orthodoxy rather than a rejection of it.’ So, in a state with no 
encompassing labour market institutions, such as Britain, social protectionism or left-
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 The term Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo use to describe social democratic, left-wing, centre left, or 
union based political parties 
33
 Garrett (2000) did reply to Hay’s critiques and constructed an analysis of European states without 
reference to his institutional typology. Interestingly, he does find evidence that fiscal policy has been 
constrained where governments commit to fixed exchange rates. Here, Garrett argues that this is not 
as a result of economic interdependence, but rather as a result of the project of European integration.  
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wing policies are no longer viable, summoning precisely the logic of no alternative 
that Garrett set out to challenge (2000: 145).  
 The third section of the literature contesting the globalisation thesis partly 
bases its insights on arguments borrowed from the two strands discussed above. 
These studies also reject the assumption that globalisation is the only independent 
variable to explain changes in social welfare policy. They argue that increasing 
demands for compensation may be more a product of a specific domestic factor, de-
industrialisation, the shift from manufacturing to non-tradable service industries, 
rather than increasing liberalisation (Iverson & Wren, 1998; Iverson & Cusack, 
2000). Domestic-level variables may have just as much explanatory power, if not 
more, than exogenous variables. 
On a similar note, ‘the new politics of the welfare state’ literature (Pierson, 
1996), also contests the idea that changes in welfare expenditure can be solely 
explained by economic globalisation. In fact, this literature highlights the importance 
of political institutions in nullifying or mediating the potential effects of increasing 
economic globalisation on welfare retrenchment. Pressures for retrenchment mostly 
emanate from socio-economic, particularly domestic-level issues, such as the ageing 
of the population, the maturation of welfare programmes or reliance on faulty 
economic policy tools (Notermans, 1993: 167). What is more, where retrenchment 
does occur, the extent of this retrenchment has nothing to do with any external 
economic imperative, but rather is a product of national institutional configurations 
and the path dependence of existing welfare state structures (Pierson, 2004). Those 
that advocated retrenchment could only achieve their preferences where the existing 
institutional structures were favourable to their goals and vice versa. Consequently, 
welfare retrenchment has proved resilient and change incremental (Pierson, 1994). 
For example, where partisan governments have been committed to preserving core 
features of the welfare state (Netherlands), institutional structures have allowed a 
range of reforms that have ensured that the central tenets of the old redistributive 
model remain (Levy, 1999). So, policy outcome has been primarily a product of 
domestic political battles that have occurred within and been shaped by, existing 
national institutional structures rather than some exogenous economic force (Pierson, 
1994, 1996, 2001, 2004).              
Campbell (2004: 129), using institutional theory to track the evolution of 
taxation systems, argued that economic globalisation is not leading to the 
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homogenisation of policy across nation-states. Rather, he convincingly contended 
that ‘divergence remains the rule rather than the exception because national 
institutions, which vary across countries, mediate the degree to which global 
pressures affect decision-making by states and private actors in ways that militate 
against convergence’ (Campbell, 2004: 129). Policy outcome is a product of specific 
institutional configurations and the path dependence of existing taxation structures. 
For Campbell, the idea of economic globalisation has been used by conservatives to 
create an ideological climate that suggests government intervention is futile and 
could hurt national competitiveness (2004: 170).34  
Duane Swank (1998b, 2002, 2003), building upon the theme of institutions 
mediating economic globalisation, examined how political institutions ‘provide or 
restrict opportunities for representation for those that are adversely affected by 
globalisation and for those ideologically opposed to – or materially harmed by – the 
common neoliberal responses to globalisation’ (2002: 6). The general argument: 
‘The domestic policy impacts of international capital mobility should vary 
substantially across specific configurations of national institutions’ (2002: 34). For 
Swank (2002: 39) the: 
[p]roponents of globalisation theory fail to take into account the 
broad array of domestic political actors whose material interests, 
concrete policy preferences, and ideological goals are threatened by 
internationalisation and attendant neoliberal reform programmes; 
they also say little about the roles of political institutions in shaping 
the relative political power of these pro-welfare state interests to 
resist neoliberal reform. 
When taking into account the role and nature of institutions it is viable and legitimate 
to argue that an alternative to dramatic and market-friendly social and labour policy 
reforms exist (Swank, 2002). Taken in this context, partisan politics still matters. 
All of these arguments reflect similar themes in studies concerned with 
national varieties of capitalism (Albert, 1993; Soskice, 1991; Streeck, 1997; Hall & 
Soskice, 2001).35 In this literature, the notion of an inevitable policy convergence has 
been challenged by detailed analyses of the divergence of government policies in the 
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 See also Block (1996) and Gilpin (2000) who make similar claims concerning the dominance of 
ideas that suggest there is no political alternative to increasing economic interdependence.  
35
 For an overview of some of this literature see Berger (2000) 
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face of increasing economic globalisation, as a result of different state capacities 
(Boyer & Drache, 1996; Weiss, 1998), domestic institutional structures and political 
party adaptations (Weiss, 2003, Clift, 2003).  
So, from the above literature, it is clear that there is an alternative position to 
the globalisation thesis. A number of common themes can be identified; the extent 
and nature of globalisation is exaggerated; increasing economic globalisation may 
actually lead to left-orientated policies due to compensation pressures; labour market 
and partisan institutions will magnify this effect, suggesting left-wing governments 
do matter; and the configuration and path dependence of political institutions will 
mediate the effects of economic globalisation by either providing opportunities for 
left-wing governments to achieve their preferences or by constraining these 
governments. Institutions can protect and insulate states from the ruinous ‘race to the 
bottom’ that is outlined in the globalisation thesis. As such, domestic politics still 
have significant policy autonomy in the context of economic globalisation. Even in 
the face of increasing economic globalisation, partisanship (left-wing governments) 
matter. 
 
1.3 Conclusion 
A review of the above literature clearly distinguishes dichotomous schools of thought 
on the effects of economic globalisation on partisan politics. One side contends that 
economic globalisation has rendered partisan politics meaningless, due to the risk of 
capital flight and a loss of national competitiveness and as such, has precipitated an 
inevitable policy convergence along market-friendly lines. The opposing side posits 
that the effects of economic globalisation have been overstated and exaggerated and 
other explanatory variables, particularly the partisanship of the government in power, 
will mediate the threat of convergence. Left-wing politics still matters. This literature 
review places the current thesis within a body of literature and provides a context for 
the main research question. 
 This study will contribute to the above debate in three ways. The study is 
focused upon the effects of political institutions and will add to other work in this 
vein in the literature. Scholars have moved beyond employing economic 
globalisation as the sole explanatory variable when examining the globalisation 
thesis. Early studies utilising left-wing politics as an independent variable found that, 
where governments were of the left, the effects of convergence were lessened or 
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even reversed. The means by which left-wing politics resisted this convergence 
remained unclear, but it was thought that the answer lay in the relationship of these 
parties with labour. Later, studies began to focus on labour market institutions to 
explain the efficacy of left-wing politics in mediating the impact of economic 
globalisation. However, the domestic-level mechanisms by which left-wing 
governments resist the pressures of convergence still remain under-developed. 
Studies have incorporated institutional variables, such as democracy (see 
Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005), party fragmentation (see Wibbels & Arce, 2003), 
or else labour market institutions (see Garrett, 1998a). Duane Swank (1998b, 2002) 
has emphasised the importance of certain institutional configurations in providing 
opportunities, to those opposed to or materially harmed by the policies associated 
with convergence, access to decision-making. Paul Pierson (1994, 1996, 2004) has 
argued that the effects of economic globalisation on welfare retrenchment, where it 
has occurred, have been mediated and nullified by the institutional design and path 
dependence of existing welfare policies. This research builds on these approaches by 
examining one policy area within a framework of institutional policy-making that 
attempts to capture the importance of access and control over decision-making and 
also the effects of policy design and path dependence. A qualitative study of this 
nature can help further shed light on the multi-faceted effects of political institutions 
on the policy process.  
Secondly, the vast majority of empirical studies in this debate have been 
concerned with the advanced industrial democracies, although some recent studies 
have expanded aspects of this debate to the developing world (see Rudra, 2002) and 
to Latin America in particular (see Wibbels & Arce, 2003; Kaufman & Segura-
Ubiergo, 2001; Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005). This research continues the effort 
of expanding this debate to the developing world, but so far, no studies have placed 
any serious focus on the role of political institutional variables in mediating the 
effects of economic globalisation in the developing world. As such, this study will be 
one of the first major attempts to decipher the institutional mechanisms that enable 
left-wing governments to resist convergence in the developing world. A study of this 
sort should provide us with a greater understanding of the role of left-wing 
governments in general, and in the developing world in particular.   
Thirdly, the empirical studies within this debate have focused on specific 
policy areas only: monetary policy or shifts in the burden of taxation and social 
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welfare spending and reform.36 No studies have utilised privatisation policy as the 
dependent variables in empirical studies. Privatisation is a good policy to utilise 
because we have expectations regarding the relationship between economic 
globalisation and privatisation. According to the globalisation thesis, increased 
economic integration, particularly for developing states, should lead to increased 
levels of privatisation. However, this thesis remains to be empirically tested. A study 
examining government intervention (privatisation) in the economy would be a 
significant contribution, as it would empirically widen this debate to other policy 
areas. 
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 Some interesting studies have begun to extend this literature to other areas. Prakash & Potoski 
(2006) examined the effect of economic globalisation on environmental regulations, Bailey, Rom & 
Taylor (2004) on education, Rodrik (1996) on labour standards and Prakash & Kollman (2003) on 
genetically modified organisms.  
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Chapter Two – The Research Design 
At the heart of this project is an interest in the conditions that may grant left-wing 
governments the ability to implement autonomous policies in the face of the 
‘convergence thesis.’ Specifically, this project is concerned with the role of political 
institutions in mediating this convergence. The previous chapter demonstrated that 
this research is grounded in a body of theory, but it is also possible from the 
discussion of this literature to identify a number of explanatory variables that may 
have an effect in mediating the policy convergence advocated by the first wave 
authors. This project intends to examine the mechanisms by which left-wing 
governments can implement autonomous policies in an era of economic globalisation 
by means of comparative case studies. In order to provide structure for these case 
studies, the project intends to utilise the analytical narratives approach.37  
The purpose of this chapter therefore, is to explain the research design. The 
first section will focus on the research question itself and the theoretical and real-
world contributions of this research. The second section will discuss the comparative 
approach and justify the selection of the case studies, while the third section will 
explain the methodology and the advantages of the analytical narratives approach. 
The fourth will identify the dependent and independent variables and outline the 
means by which the project will operationalise these variables. The final section will 
present the expected outcomes based upon the understanding of the explanatory 
variables.   
 
2.1 The Research Question  
Partisan theory assumes that governments have the ability to implement their 
preferences (Hibbs, 1992). However, the globalisation thesis posits that in this era of 
increasing economic integration, this is no longer the case. The initial scholarship in 
this debate, employing economic globalisation as the sole explanatory variable, 
argued that the increasing mobility of capital as a product of economic globalisation, 
was leading to a policy convergence along lines that internalise the preferences of 
this capital. This policy mix is congruent with the preferences of the political right, 
rather than the politics of the left. If left-leaning governments do not adopt this mix, 
they will face a potentially ruinous capital flight. So, left-wing governments would 
                                                 
37
 This is to prevent the case studies from becoming ‘just-so stories.’ See Bates et al. (2000: 700).   
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now appear to have little ability to implement their preferences (see Ohmae, 1996; 
Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1998; Ruggie, 1997). ‘Even if today there are still strong 
domestic incentives for governments to pursue distinctive partisan strategies, these 
interdependence arguments suggest that such incentives are now overwhelmed by 
international constraints’ (Garrett & Lange, 1991: 542).  
 Those that rejected this argument also rejected the focus on economic 
globalisation as the sole explanatory variable. Early studies contesting the concept of 
policy convergence contended that left-wing politics were far from meaningless in 
today’s world. In fact, they treated left-wing politics as an independent variable and 
found that, where governments were of the left, the effects of convergence were 
lessened or even reversed (see Cameron, 1978; Hicks & Swank, 1992). The means 
by which left-wing politics resisted this convergence remained unclear, but it was 
thought that the answer lay in the relationship of these parties with labour. In later 
studies, the focus now shifted to labour market institutions and it was convincingly 
argued that in situations of increasing economic globalisation, where left-wing 
governments were allied with broad and encompassing labour movements (left-
labour support), combined with compensatory pressures, the effects of convergence 
would be reversed (see Garrett & Lange, 1991; Garrett, 1998a). So, left-wing 
governments can implement their preferences.  
Empirical studies however, still challenge the efficacy of contemporary left-
wing politics even when taking into account the mechanisms described above (see 
Ross, 2000; Boix, 2000). Others have argued that another exogenous variable, the 
influence of the international financial institutions, may also place serious pressures 
on left-wing governments (particularly in the developing world) to adopt policies 
congruent with the globalisation thesis (see Wibbels & Arce, 2003; Avelino, Brown 
& Hunter, 2005). Swank (1998b; 2002) and Pierson (1996, 2004) have both 
highlighted the importance of political institutions, either by providing left-wing 
governments and those opposed to globalisation with access to decision-making 
structures, or as a result of path dependent effects that nullify or mediate the 
pressures for convergence.  
Evidently then, the focus has shifted from simply treating economic 
globalisation as the sole explanatory variable in examining policy convergence to a 
more nuanced approach incorporating other variables. However, the mechanisms by 
which left-wing governments resist the pressures of convergence remain under-
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developed and highly-contested. The purpose of this project is to further explore the 
role of other variables in helping or hindering left-wing governments achieve their 
policy preferences. Therefore, the main research question of this thesis is guided by 
the theory described above.38 Specifically, it seeks to discover, what ability do left-
wing governments have to implement policies that are congruent with their 
preferences in the context of increasing economic globalisation? If any, under what 
conditions can they implement policies that are congruent with their preferences? 
This question particularly seeks to unravel the effects of political institutions in 
mediating convergence, while simultaneously creating space for left-wing 
governments to implement policies that reflect their preferences. The overarching 
puzzle in this debate concerns the relevance of partisan politics in the contemporary 
environment, and an empirical study of this sort will contribute to a better 
understanding of the relevance of partisan politics in the political economy. 
   King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 15) highlight the necessity for a research 
question to make a ‘specific contribution to an identifiable scholarly literature,’ while 
at the same time being ‘important in the real world.’ This thesis aims to contribute to 
the existing scholarly literature in a number of specific ways. The contributions this 
study will make to the literature have been addressed in greater detail in the previous 
chapter. Firstly, the focus on exogenous variables in this literature has been to the 
detriment of a more complete understanding of the effects of domestic-level 
variables. In particular, the role of political institutions in mediating convergence 
warrants further attention. Some cross-country econometric studies have 
incorporated institutional variables (see Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005; Wibbels & 
Arce, 2003), as have some qualitative in-depth case studies (see Swank 2002, 
Campbell, 2004, Pierson, 2002).39 This study builds upon these works and examines 
how different institutional configurations affect the control of partisan actors over 
decision-making and result in vaired path-dependent effects. This purpose of this 
study is to further contribute to our understanding of how political institutions either 
provide opportunities for, or constrain, left-wing governments from achieving their 
preferences. Furthermore, utilising political institutions as an explanatory variable in 
econometric studies can often lead to issues of endogeneity in decisions of what to 
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 See Pennings et al. (2006: 20) and King, Keohane & Verba (1994: 14-19) on the importance of 
formulating a research question that is guided by a theoretical underpinning.  
39
 See King, Keohane and Verba (1994) and Pennings et al. (2006) for the benefits to be gained from 
detailed, rigorous and structured qualitative work.  
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take for granted and what to explain. These problems can be overcome in historically 
grounded, country-specific, research of the type proposed here (Spiller, Stein & 
Tommasi; 2003: 7). 
Secondly, previous studies have focused on the advanced industrial 
democracies (for exceptions see Rudra, 2002; Wibbels & Arce, 2003; Kaufman & 
Segura-Ubiergo, 2001 and Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005). The proponents of the 
convergence thesis suggest that we should witness this phenomenon in all parts of 
the world, yet there is still a dearth of research extending the claims of the first and 
second wave theorists to the developing world. What is more, no studies have placed 
any serious focus on the role of political institutional variables in mediating the 
effects of economic globalisation in the developing world. As such, this study will be 
the first major attempt to decipher the institutional mechanisms that enable left-wing 
governments to resist convergence in the developing world. This research is partly 
driven from the dissatisfaction with the current literature in this under-researched 
area.  
Thirdly, the empirical studies within this debate have focused on specific 
policy areas only, to the detriment of an understanding concerning the wider policy 
implications of the convergence thesis. No studies have utilised privatisation as the 
dependent variable in empirical studies. A study focusing on privatisation will widen 
this debate and contribute to a better understanding of the role of partisan politics in 
the political economy.  
 While the ‘political’ contribution of any study is essentially a societal 
judgement (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 15), the role of partisan politics in the 
context of increasing economic globalisation has significant ramifications for the 
developing world. In an era of increasing discontent within parts of the developing 
world with market-friendly policies, we have witnessed an increase in the number of 
left-wing parties elected to power. However, if the convergence thesis is correct, then 
this essentially vitiates electoral responses to this dissatisfaction with market-friendly 
policies. The shift to the left in Latina America has been heralded as a rejection of 
the dominant economic mode of governance. The ability of left-wing governments to 
implement policies that reflect their preferences in South America may have wider 
implications for electoral politics in general, and for the developing world in 
particular.  
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2.2 The Comparative Approach and Case Study Selection 
The Comparative Approach 
In order to answer the research question set out above, this project will employ a 
comparative approach across three case study countries.40 The comparative approach 
is not a method per se, but it is one of the most adequate ways to connect theory with 
what is actually going on in the world (Pennings et al. 2006: 5). Furthermore, ‘all 
social science requires comparison, which entails judgements of which phenomena 
are more or less alike in degree or kind’ (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 5). 
Comparison is an instrument to verify or falsify relationships between phenomena. 
For this we need ‘to reduce the complexity of reality and thus to control for variation 
– this is what the comparative approach allows for’ (Pennings et al. 2006: 23). 
Therefore, comparison is necessary in order to control the variables that make up the 
theoretical relationship (Sartori, 1991: 244). Comparative research must have an 
extensive theoretical argument underlying it, and a methodologically adequate 
research design to undertake it (Pennings et al. 2006: 20). This study follows these 
basic rules and therefore replicates the comparative approach. The research question 
is drawn from the extensive theoretical underpinning that is provided by the rich 
literature on the relationship between economic globalisation and partisan politics, 
and the methodology is the use of an analytical narrative across three comparative 
case studies with clearly defined and operationalised variables. The theory-guided 
question within any type of comparative analysis is ‘to what extent the political in 
terms of explanatory units of variation (variables), can indeed be accounted for and is 
shaped by the political actions in one social system compared to another’ (Pennings 
et al. 2006: 27). This approach and the attempts to explain it by systematic 
comparison distinguish the comparative approach from other approaches in the social 
sciences. 
 In the social sciences, debate continues to rage concerning if, when and how 
to compare (see Pennings et al. 2006; Lijphart, 1975). There are also a number of 
methodological problems to take into account when using the comparative approach 
(Collier & Collier, 1991).41 Two of the principal problems identified by Lipjhart are 
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 This is the closed universe of discourse, that is, the selection of two or more case at a few time 
intervals. See Pennings et al. (2006). 
41
 See Pennings et al. (2006) for a discussion of the three main problems facing the comparative 
approach. The first of these issues is whether the research question is embedded in the correct 
approach in terms of a variable-orientated design or a case orientated design. Secondly, there is the 
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simply ‘many variables, small number of cases’ (Lijphart, 1971: 685). Both are 
clearly interrelated, but the former is common to all social research, while the latter 
is peculiar to comparative research. Another problem stems from the distinction of 
what Collier and Collier (1991: 13) classify as ‘splitters’ and ‘lumpers.’ Splitters are 
quick to see contrasts between cases and to focus on the distinctive specific attributes 
of each case. This research is valuable in terms of generating new hypotheses and for 
providing basic data. The lumpers, on the other hand, are quick to identify 
generalisations and commonalities that contribute to grander theory. In the case of 
the lumpers, the danger is to generalise from cases that may not be conducive to such 
generalisations, due to unique, historical, social or political contexts (Collier & 
Collier, 1991: 14).42 A variant of this problem is to generalise from the best known 
case or cases. Generalisations of this nature all too often present a single picture, 
forming a composite that ultimately corresponds neither to the original case or cases 
on which the generalisations are based, nor to other cases to which is it applied 
(Collier & Collier, 1991: 14). As Collier & Collier (1991: 14) note, ‘what is too often 
missing is an analytic middle ground between splitters and lumpers that encompasses 
simultaneously a concern with similarities and differences.’ Such a middle ground 
‘employs the systematic examination of similarities and contrasts among cases as a 
means of assessing hypotheses’ (Collier & Collier, 1991: 14).  
 If one is to occupy such a middle ground, then it is crucial to recognise the 
fact that any claim that two countries are similar or different, does not in fact, 
definitively ‘assign to them the overall status of being similar or different cases’ 
(Collier & Collier, 1991: 14). For example, Uruguay and Argentina are often 
heralded as being very similar countries in terms of political processes and dynamics, 
but in reality, Uruguay’s party system has more in common with Colombia than with 
its Southern Cone Neighbour. This does not mean that Uruguay has more in common 
with Colombia than Argentina or vice versa. Rather, it simply means that ‘it shares 
with each important similarities and differences,’ ensuring that a methodological 
stance that adopts such a middle ground ‘recognises the contribution of both splitters 
and lumpers, but insists on a flexible application of a middle position that 
                                                                                                                                          
issue of whether or not causal or conditional explanations can be achieved by means of empirical 
corroboration. Thirdly, there is the issue whether or not comparisons are only meaningful by applying 
the longitudinal dimension and confining the relevant number of cases to be analysed.  
42
 Collier & Collier (1991:14) illustrate this by discussing Kenworthy’s (1973) article ‘The Function 
of the Little Known Case in Theory Formation or What Peronism Wasn’t.’ 
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acknowledges a diversity of similarities and contrasts among any combination of 
cases’ (Collier & Collier, 1991: 15).    
Consequently, Collier & Collier (1991: 15) recommend a ‘most similar and 
most different systems design.’ This approach is a combination of the ‘most similar 
systems design’ (Przeworski & Teune, 1970) and the ‘most different systems 
design.’ A ‘most similar’ design is intended to reduce variation in the context to the 
barest possible minimum by means of selecting cases that are by and large identical, 
except for the relations between variables under review that represent the research 
question (Pennings et al. 2006: 35). The logic of the ‘most different’ design approach 
is to compare countries that have no common features except for the outcome that is 
to be explained (Landman, 2003). These two approaches are ‘ideal types’ and the 
reality is that the matching and contrasting of cases that they posit is never perfectly 
achieved in any real analysis (Collier & Collier, 1991: 15). However, a combination 
of these approaches, through a ‘most similar and most different’ design is more 
empirically realistic, allows for an analytical middle ground between the splitters and 
lumpers, and ensures that ‘the context of analysis are analytically equivalent, at least 
to a significant degree’ (Collier, 1997: 40), while their differences ‘place parallel 
processes of change in sharp relief because they are operating in settings that are 
different in many respects’ (Collier, 1997: 40). In effect, it recognises that the three 
case study states, Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, share important similarities and 
differences. Causal inferences can be made by exploiting these similarities and 
differences when we attempt to explain the outcome. For these reasons, this project 
will employ the ‘most similar and most different’ design. 
 
The Countries Selected for Examination 
All of the above is contingent upon choosing appropriate case studies to answer the 
research question. For that purpose, three case studies are chosen: Brazil, Argentina 
and Uruguay. These three cases have been selected with the criteria of a ‘most 
similar and most different’ design in mind. Latin America is a particularly apt region 
to chose cases from, not only because it further extends the debate on the relationship 
between economic globalisation and the relevance of partisan politics to the 
developing world and challenges the long-standing focus of empirically investigating 
this debate through the lens of the advanced industrial democracies, but also because, 
in the last few years, the region has witnessed a broader trend ‘in which political 
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parties, that can broadly be characterised as being from the left and the centre-left are 
in power, have been in power or have good chances of gaining power’ (Panizza, 
2005: 716-717). The relevance of left-wing governments in the current era of 
economic globalisation and their ability to implement policies that are congruent 
with their preferences is a particularly salient issue, not only in Latin America, but 
for the rest of the developing world also. 
 The overall analysis of these three states may be considered a ‘most similar’ 
systems design. The three cases, located in the Southern Cone in South America, are 
geographically contiguous. Choosing countries from the same area can lend itself to 
the comparative method because of the cluster of characteristics that areas tend to 
have in common and that can therefore, be used as controls (Lijphart, 1971: 688), 
thus ensuring that being geographically contiguous acts as a natural control. 
Heckscher (in Lijphart, 1971: 688) has stated that ‘area studies are of the very 
essence of comparative government’ as while ‘the number of variables is still very 
large, it is at least reduced in the happy choice of area.’ Cox and Macridis (in 
Lijphart, 1971: 688) have also noted that the area concept will be of great value, 
since certain political processes will be compared against units within the area 
against a common background of similarities. Furthermore, they point to Latin 
America as an area that is particularly amenable to comparative studies. However, 
choosing comparable cases from the same region is not without problems. Lijphart 
(1971: 688) cautions that comparability is not a quality that is inherent in a case 
study, but is rather a quality that is imparted by the observer’s perspective. This is an 
important point to remember, and while choosing states from Latin America forms a 
natural control, the actual case selection must conform to the ‘most similar and most 
different design.’  
Among the countries of Latin America, these three have the longest history of 
urban, commercial and industrial development overall (Collier & Collier, 1991). All 
three were former colonies and have subsequently developed within similar regional 
and cultural contexts.43 All three attempted some form of autonomous industrial 
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 Both Argentina and Uruguay were colonies of Spain; Brazil was a colony of Portugal. However 
their experiences of independence were quite different. Following the Napoleonic conquest of Europe, 
Argentina and Uruguay came to independence through the military exploits of José de San Martín 
(1812-1817) in the former and José Artigas (1819-1830) in the latter. During this period, the 
Portuguese Royal Court fled to Brazil in 1808 to escape Napoleon, and following elite resentment of 
the Portuguese crown, they placed Dom Pedro, the prince regent, on the Brazilian throne in 1823 as an 
independent monarch. See Burns (1993) for more detail.    
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development through Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) in the 1960s and 
1970s and after all three endured periods of military rule, they turned to democratic 
systems of governance during the third wave of democratisation (see Huntingdon, 
1991).44 Furthermore, in the subsequent decade following democratisation, all three 
adopted liberalising reforms that were congruent with Neoliberalism.45 Also, all three 
have similar levels of economic development in terms of Gross National Income 
(GNI) per capita.46 Finally, all three have recently elected left-wing governments to 
power. Néstor Kirchner of the Partido Justicialista (PJ – Justicialist Party) was 
elected to power in Argentina in May 2003. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Partido 
dos Trabalhadores (PT – Workers Party), convincingly won the election in Brazil in 
October 2002, while for the first time in Uruguayan history, the left-wing candidate 
of the Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio (EP-FA - Progressive Encounter – 
Broad Front Party), Tabaré Vásquez, won the Presidential election in November 
2004. All three ran on platforms promising to reverse the market-friendly policies of 
their predecessors, with specific reference to halting all ongoing privatisations. 
 It is important to note that this project is not choosing a control case, that is, a 
case study that has a right-wing government during the same period. The reasoning 
behind this choice is relatively simple. The research question has been designed to 
examine left-wing governments only, and as Pennings et al. (2006: 10) state: 
The issue is to control for contextual or exogenous variation given the 
Research Question. For instance, if we wish to analyse the role of 
parties in government with regard to welfare statism, we could decide 
– on the basis of the research question – to restrict ourselves to a 
certain type of party or government. 
In this respect, the research question of this project is focused on the ability of left-
wing governments to implement policies congruent with their preferences. As such, 
three left-wing governments are chosen as case studies. 
                                                 
44
 For good general overviews of these periods see for example, Bulmer-Thomas (2003), Williamson 
(1992) or Bakewell (2004). 
45
 Although all three countries attempted stabilization measures and some market reforms earlier 
(under Alfonsín in Argentina, Sarney and Collor in Brazil, and Lacalle in Uruguay), governments did 
not pursue market reforms in a concerted way until Menem’s government in Argentina after 1989, 
Cardoso’s in Brazil and Sanguinetti’s and Batlle’s in Uruguay.  
46
 The Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (2005 est. Atlas Method) for Brazil is $3,550, 
Uruguay $4,360 and Argentina $4,470 (World Bank Statistics Database, 2007). 
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 The cases selected represent a ‘most different’ systems design on the basis 
that, as we shall see, they vary across two of the key independent variables, political 
institutions and labour support.47 They have similar levels of economic globalisation 
and are susceptible to similar levels of influence by the international financial 
institutions. This project is primarily concerned with the effect of political 
institutions in mediating the effects of the convergence thesis, so this ensures that 
economic globalisation and the influence of the IFIs can be held constant, providing 
greater leverage over the explanatory power of both political institutions and left-
labour power with respect to the convergence thesis.48  
 
Unpacking the Left in Latin America 
It is important to outline what the thesis actually means when it refers to left-wing 
politics. By left-wing, in the context of the three case study countries, the thesis is 
specifically referring to those political parties with strong historical links to their 
respective national labour movements and that exhibit the central characteristics of 
traditional left-leaning politics, such as an advocacy of redistributive social policies 
and economic nationalism, combined with a discourse that is frequently critical of 
market mechanisms. The left in Latin America, while far from homogenous, is 
different in many respects from its contemporaries in other parts of the world. Much 
of the literature on economic globalisation and the resulting constraints facing 
modern partisan politics focuses nearly exclusively on the left in Western Europe or 
in the advanced industrial democracies (see Garrett, 1998). However, the left in Latin 
America, due to its unique historical trajectory and development, is not easily 
comparable to the left in other parts of the part. What is more, the left in Latin 
America generally has a different perspective as regards the role of the state, state 
enterprises and privatisation, in comparison to its contemporaries in Europe (see 
Eley, 2002; Castañeda: 1993).  
 Although the ‘left’ is perhaps best defined with reference to the right, there 
are a number of common themes, preferences and objectives that are identifiable 
among the broad spectrum that encompasses the Latin American left. According to 
                                                 
47
 See King, Keohane & Verba (1994: 137-138) for selecting cases on the basis of the explanatory 
variables. As they state: ‘The best intentional design selects observations to ensure variation in the 
explanatory variable (and any control variables) without regard to the values of the dependent 
variables’ (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 140). 
48
 Discussed in greater detail in section 2.5 
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Castañeda (1993: 18), the left in Latin America traditionally has tended to stress 
national identity and sovereignty over economic integration (free trade, foreign 
investment etc.); social justice over economic performance (employment over 
efficiency, national control over strategic sectors of the economy over ‘free 
enterprise’ policies); income distribution over well-functioning markets; reducing 
inequalities over competitiveness; and social spending over controlling inflation. 
Although nearly two decades of structural reform and Neoliberalism has altered the 
reality in which the contemporary Latin American left operate, many of these 
themes, preferences and objectives continue to have resonance today (Clearly, 2006; 
Panizza, 2005). For Roberts (2007: 10), while the left today differs from its historical 
antecedents, the contemporary left takes ‘a critical perspective towards the 
organisation of society in accordance with the principles of market individualism.’ 
While the modern left in Latin America can also be defined by the practical 
acceptance of some of the principles of the neoliberal model, such as a sound fiscal 
policy, the importance of low inflation and the superiority of market mechanisms for 
setting prices, the central platform of the left remains increased state activity and 
ownership in the economy, and redistributive social policies designed to address the 
stark inequalities that exist in many Latin American societies (Panizza, 2005: 727: 
Roberts, 2007: 10). 
 In order to understand the unique relationship of the left in Latin America 
with economic nationalism and state ownership, we must trace the historical 
trajectory of the left’s development. The Wall Street Crash of 1929 signalled the 
death of Latin American liberalism and the economic model of primary commodity 
exporting (see Cortés Conde, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). The mix of ideologies 
competing to replace the vacuum left by liberalism began to coalesce around a 
number of key themes, including the need for state guidance and participation in the 
economy and the need to reclaim the natural resources of Latin America from 
‘foreigners.’ Indeed, as Williamson (1992: 328) notes, ‘ideologues of both right left 
advocated the break-up of the vast landed estates as well as the nationalisation of 
mining and petroleum companies.’ The shock of the great depression heralded the 
rise of economic nationalism in Latin America, and inspired the substantial growth in 
the state’s productive sector (see Evans, 1995; Thorp, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). 
It was during this period of state growth that the ancestors of the contemporary Latin 
American left first began to develop. The old-school Communist parties first began 
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to emerge in the 1920s. They were a product of urbanisation and industrialisation 
that had begun to occur in many Latin American states and these groups had their 
roots in the nascent working classes and organised labour movements of the 1920s 
and 1930s (Castañeda: 1993: 19). The second group, the nationalist or popular left, 
were linked to the ‘classic populist’ leaders who began to emerge in Latin America 
in the 1930s and 1940s (Castañeda: 1993) and these populist leaders, such as Getúlio 
Vargas in Brazil, Lázaro Cárdenas in Mexico, José María Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador 
and Juan Domingo Perón in Argentina advocated a strident economic nationalism, 
and often created corporatist economic structures that indelibly linked national 
labour movements to their political vehicles and patronage (Evans, 1995; Thorp, 
1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 2003). During this period of ‘natural corporatism,’ the 
number of state-owned enterprises began to grow rapidly and the state became the 
central dispenser of patronage (Williamson, 1992: 347). From the very beginning, 
economic nationalism, represented by the growth and importance of state enterprises, 
was intricately linked with the growth and development of the Latin American left 
(Castañeda: 1993).           
 The importance of the state for the left in Latin America was only heightened 
after the end of the Second World War, when ‘industrialisation was incorporated into 
a comprehensive nationalist theory of Latin America’s relations with the external 
world’ (Williamson, 1992: 333). The theory, first developed by Raúl Prebisch, and 
propagated by the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(ECLAC), stressed the developmental chasm between the industrialised nations of 
the world and the industrialising nations, by highlighting the significantly higher 
price for industrial products, compared to primary commodities, on the word market. 
As such, this would lead to an increasing gap in the balance of trade between 
industrialised states and those that relied on the export of primary commodities. 
Consequently, the primary commodity exporters were structurally dependent upon 
those few core industrialised states. The only method to rectify this situation: de-link 
yourself from the core and launch a programme of planned state industrialisation that 
would eliminate the need to import industrial products from abroad (see Prebisch, 
1950; Cardoso & Faletto, 1973; Frank, 1969).  
This theory served as the basis for the model of Import-Substitution-
Industrialisation (ISI), adopted by most Latin American States in some form or other 
until the debt crisis of the 1980s, and which triggered the further explosion in the 
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growth of the state’s productive sector (Evans, 1995; Thorp, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 
2003). The left jumped upon Prebisch’s theories and utilised them to reformulate 
Lenin’s theory of imperialism. International trade was intrinsically imperialistic and 
the only way to escape this imperialistic international structure was to support the 
development of large state industrial sectors (Williamson, 1992: 354), an idea that 
informed not only the political-military left that developed after the success of the 
Cuban Revolution, but also the reformist left of the 1970s and 1980s, with its base in 
organised labour and its crucial role in the processes of democratisation throughout 
the region (Castañeda: 1993; Panizza, 2005; Angell, 1996). As a consequence of this 
historical trajectory, by the early 1980s, the size and role of the state in Latin 
America far outweighed the size of the state in nearly all other regions of the world. 
What is more, the centrality of the state in Latin American economies, and its 
development alongside the left in Latin America, has ensured that the left has a 
unique relationship and affinity with state enterprises that is not replicated by other 
leftist political parties in other parts of the world.              
 Even today, we can witness the importance of state enterprises for the 
contemporary Latin American left. Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in 
Bolivia, Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, Fernando Lugo in Paraguay and Rafael 
Correa in Ecuador have all stressed the importance of the state in  rectifying the 
failings of the market, and all have either advocated, supported, or overseen the 
nationalisation of key economic sectors (see Chavez, 2007). While the Latin 
American left, as the left has in other parts of the world, developed an awareness of 
the inefficiencies associated with many forms of state intervention and state 
ownership (Panizza, 2005: 727), the relationship of the left in Latin America with the 
state, and the role ascribed to state enterprises, still differs significantly from that of 
the left in Western Europe and other parts of the globe (see Anderson & Camiller, 
1994; Eley, 2002).  
However, this is not to suggest that the left in Latin America is homogenous. 
As stated earlier, there are common themes that can be identified among the ‘new 
left’ in the region, such as an emphasis on state involvement in the economy and an 
advocacy of redistributive programmes (Panizza, 2005: 727: Roberts, 2007: 10), but 
there are also significant differences among the left across the region. A number of 
scholars have highlighted a bifurcation among the ‘new left,’ between the radical 
populists and more conservative social democratic reformers (Castañeda, 2006; 
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Cardoso, 2006). Others have rejected this typology and instead have stressed the 
complexity and diversity of the ‘new left’ (Ramírez Gallegos, 2006; Schamis, 2006; 
Corrales, 2006), while others still have highlighted the division between those with 
access to commodity revenues, which are then used to fund ambitious redistributive 
programmes, and those with no access to such funds (Weyland, 2007). In reality, 
there are those that have their roots in indigenous movements, such as Evo Morales 
in Bolivia and Ollanta Humala in Peru; those who display elements of classic 
populism (no institutionalised political party, redistribution based on resource 
revenues) such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and Rafael Correa in Ecuador; those 
who stress the importance of addressing the inequalities in their respective states 
above all else, such as Manuel López Obrador in Mexico and Fernando Lugo in 
Paraguay; and finally those from traditional left-leaning political parties with strong 
historical links to the labour movement.        
 It is this last grouping that concerns this thesis. The Frente Amplio in 
Uruguay, the Partido Trabalhadores in Brazil and the Frente para la Victoria in 
Argentina can all be considered as traditional labour-based left-wing political parties. 
Although inevitably, there are differences among these three political parties, in the 
context of the wider ‘new left’ throughout the region, they do have a number of core 
similarities. All three are considered the main left-leaning party in their respective 
states and all three have strong historical links to labour. The PT emerged from a 
serious of major strikes in the 1970s that undermined the military government and 
was widely seen as the only true ideological party in Brazil, with extensive links to 
‘new unionism,’ and since its inception in 1983, the Central Unica dos 
Trabalhadores (CUT) (see Branford & Kucinski, 2005; Flynn, 2005; Ellner, 2004). 
The Frente Amplio emerged at the beginning of the 1970s as a coalition of 
communists, socialists and Christian democrats with strong links to the union 
movement, opposed to the authoritarian and conservative government of the time 
(see Lanzaro, 2004; Garcé & Yaffé; 2004; Yaffé, 2002). Although the FpV emanates 
from the Peronist party and while the PJ is considered heterogeneous in the 
ideological realm, spanning Montonero guerrillas to ultra-nationalists, to neoliberals 
under Menem (see Stokes, 2003), this project follows Levitsky’s (2003) seminal 
study and treats the PJ as a labour based-party. The PJ has traditionally had very 
close and intricate links with the organised labour movement in Argentina; although 
this relationship was strained as a result of many of Menem’s labour reforms in the 
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1990s (see Murillo, 2001). It is also argued that Kirchner adopted a distinctive left-
wing strategy in comparison to other members of his party: Duhaldistas or 
Menemistas. He established movements within the PJ to promote his brand of 
leftism, firstly the Corriente Peronista, and subsequently his own parliamentary 
party, the Frente Para la Victoria.  
 
The Time Period 
The time period of the narrative under consideration incorporates the period after the 
election of the left-wing governments. Each case study will be preceded by a chapter 
charting privatisation policy after the return to democracy in each of the three states. 
Taking institutions as the main explanatory variable may lead to questions of 
endogeneity. However, as Spiller, Stein & Tommasi (2003: 7) argue, these problems 
can be overcome in historically grounded, country-specific research. So, the 
historical background chapter before each case study enables the narrative to process 
trace (see George & Bennett, 2005) the evolution of the political institutions in each 
state after the return to democracy. For the period after the election of the left-wing 
governments, the project is concerned with the first three years in power of these 
governments. Three years is a sufficiently long time for governments to implement 
their policy preferences.49 Part of the value-added of this study is to assess the ability 
of left-wing governments to implement policy over short time frames. As Garrett and 
Lange (1991: 563) have commented, what is lacking in this debate are studies that 
‘shed light on the effect that changes in government within individual countries over 
much shorter periods of time have had on economic strategies.’ There is also a public 
perception that a left-wing government would alter policies quicker, so accordingly, 
three years is a reasonable time frame.  
 
2.3 The Methodology: An Analytic Narrative 
In order to answer the research question and assess the impact of the independent 
variables, through three comparative qualitative case studies, this study will employ 
the analytic narrative approach. The motivation for employing an analytic narrative 
is rooted in the desire to combine elegant and parsimonious models of behaviour 
with rich empirical detail in order to generate transparent explanations of the process 
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 The time period chosen is also due to restrictions on the amount of data available. As these three 
leaders are relatively recently elected, it may prove difficult to access data post-three years in power.  
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under investigation. An analytic narrative is simply the combination of analytic tools 
with the narrative form. It is narrative in that it examines stories, contexts and 
accounts, while it is analytic in that it extracts ‘explicit and formal lines of reasoning, 
which facilitate both exposition and explanation (Bates et al. 1998: 10). The rationale 
behind the analytic narrative approach is to construct logically persuasive and 
empirically valid accounts that attempt to explain how and why events occurred. The 
application to history and narrative provides a rich empirical account that allows for 
process tracing and evaluation of the model (Bates et al. 1998: 13). 
 Obviously, analytic narratives are not the only means to provide structure to 
the case studies. A number of other excellent comparative methods exist that could 
also provide the project with structure and rigor, foremost among these, Charles 
Ragin’s (1987, 2000) Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), and the more recent 
Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).50 Both QCA and fsQCA were 
developed for the analysis of small and intermediate -N data sets (Rihoux & Ragin, 
2004: 2). Originally intended as a middle ground between case-orientated research 
and variable-orientated research (Ragin, 1987: 168-169), QCA is an extension of 
John Stewart Mill’s methods of inductive inquiry: the methods of agreement and the 
method of difference (Ragin, 1987: 15; Mahoney, 2000: 394). The method, 
ultimately concerned with identifying the necessary and sufficient conditions that are 
linked to a particular outcome, is grounded in Boolean algebra, the algebra of sets (as 
opposed to linear algebra, the basis of regression analysis) and seeks to unravel 
causal complexity by applying set-theoretic methods to cross-case evidence (Ragin, 
2005: 37; Rihoux & Ragin, 2004: 2). Set-theoretic relations concern explicit 
connections, as opposed to correlations, which address tendential connections 
(Ragin, 2000). The initial version of QCA required dichotomised variables, while the 
latter variant, fsQCA, allows for ‘fuzzy values’ between 1 and 0 that ‘describe the 
membership of a given case in the category formed by the variable’ (Schneider & 
Wagemann, 2006: 752), values that are assigned on the basis of theoretical 
knowledge and empirical evidence (Ragin, 2000; 150-170). The key tool for QCA is 
the truth table, which ‘lists the logically possible combinations of causal conditions 
(e.g. presence of presidential versus parliamentary form of government, 
presence/absence of party fractionalisation) and the outcome associated with each 
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 Other variants include Multi-Value Qualitative Comparative Analysis (MVQCA) (see Cronqvist, 
2004). 
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combination (e.g. whether democracies with each combination of conditions 
consolidate)’ (Rihoux & Ragin, 2004: 5; Ragin, 1987: 85-102).51 Truth tables 
examine specific combinations of causal conditions across cases in order to 
determine of they share the same outcome, the ultimate goal of which is ‘to identify 
explicit connections between combinations of causal conditions and an outcome’ 
(Rihoux & Ragin, 2004: 6).52 
 Both approaches have a number of advantages, and both are not without their 
critics. Carpenter (2000) critiques analytic narratives on the basis that there appears 
to be some confusion as to what narratives actually are, at least when they are not 
graced with formal models. For Carpenter (2000: 654), this confusion renders 
analytic narratives, at their most sophisticated, as ‘sequences of facts chronologically 
arranged.’ Jon Elster (2000) is even harsher in his critiques. He argues that analytic 
narratives fail to execute the programme that was proposed, that is, the application of 
formal theories to elucidate complex cases. Rather, they become guilty of the sin 
they are trying to avoid, becoming ‘just so stories.’ Bates et al. (2000: 700) recognise 
that this is a problem, but counter with the fact that all an analytic narrative can do is 
lay out the basis for the analytic decisions, and apply the criterion of falsifiability to 
the hypotheses. Elster (2000) also believes that the method suffers due to the lack of 
incorporation of independent evidence for intentions and beliefs. That is, how 
individuals construct understanding of their world. Again, Bates et al. (2000: 697) 
freely recognise this as a problem, but in their defence they argue that as yet, no 
model exists that can adequately capture the evidence for intentions and beliefs. 
Finally, Elster (2000) criticises the analytic narratives approach because of the 
attempt to generalise from small-N studies. This has always been a problem of social 
sciences (see King, Keohane & Verba, 1994), but for Bates et al. (2000: 702) the 
analytic narrative approach, if nothing else, at least attempts ‘to bring some 
analytical tools to the task of studying case studies, a question long of interest to 
political scientists.’ 
 On the other hand, for Seawright (2005) and Achen (2005), QCA represents 
nothing that is necessarily methodologically new. Rather, for them, QCA is a 
repackaging of statistical methods that ultimately reduces to regression analysis. For 
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 The number of causal combinations is a geometric function of the number of causal conditions (see 
Rihoux & Ragin, 2004: 6).  
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 The truth table is reduced and simplified through a bottom-up process of paired comparison that 
parallels the minimisation of switching circuits (Ragin, 1987, 2000).  
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Achen (2005: 31), Ragin, by constructing a quantitative methodology that mimics 
case study logic, has asked ‘Why can’t a man be more like a woman?’ Seawright 
(2005: 10) further criticises QCA on the basis that all variables (conditions) of 
interest have only two values, and argues that even fuzzy set QCA fails to eliminate 
the necessity to dichotomise variables. Furthermore, in dichotomising variables, 
QCA requires assumptions that are no less problematic than assumptions required to 
make causal inferences in regression analysis (Seawright, 2005: 26). The necessity of 
assigning scores to variables in QCA also assumes that the analyst is able to measure 
all variables correctly. A change in the score of a variable could lead to a significant 
change in the understanding of that variables causal relevance. As such, QCA does 
not allow any notion of measurement error (Mahoney, 2000: 397). QCA has also 
been criticised for its inability to make any allowance for missing variables 
(Mahoney, 2000: 395; Seawright, 2005: 29), while other problems associated with 
QCA include the issue of complexity, and limited diversity associated with the low 
number of cases (Schneider & Wagemann, 2006: 756-757). If too many variables are 
introduced into QCA, the result may become overly complex, to such an extent that 
they become ‘impossible to interpret in a theoretically meaningful way’ (Schneider 
& Wagemann, 2006: 757). 
 Despite these problems, both approaches are very useful analytic tools for 
comparative studies and indeed both share a number of similarities, for example, 
their emphasis on repeated iteration between theory and data (see Ragin, 1987; Bates  
et al. 2000). However, this study can only utilize one of these methods. 
Notwithstanding the excellent strengths of QCA, in particular its ability to analyse 
complex causation (Ragin, 1987: 2000; Rihoux & Ragin, 2004) and its provision of 
an ‘explicit and systematic’ process for considering counterfactual cases (Rihoux & 
Ragin, 2004), a major weakness of analytic narratives (Carpenter, 2000: 658), this 
study will employ the analytic narrative approach.               
 The analytic narrative approach lends itself to this project for a number of 
reasons. Analytic narratives generally refer to rational choice theory and game-
theoretic models in particular, but they can also be applied to other forms of theory, 
with a range of models serving ‘as the basis of analytic narratives,’ for example, 
‘those derived from the new institutionalism’ (Bates et al. 1998: 3). Rational choice 
theory, and game theoretic models as Margaret Levi (2004: 202) notes, ‘is only one 
of the flavours of analytic narratives.’ For example, Ira Katznelson (1997) uses the 
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label to describe her approach to large-scale macro-historical questions, while for 
Skocpol and Somers (1980), their preferred method is labelled ‘macro-analytic 
comparative history.’ This is most similar to what Levi (2004: 203) describes as 
‘causal narrative,’ a process by which the sequences and variables in an historical 
narrative are disaggregated in a way that allows cross-case comparisons. As an 
approach ‘analytic narrative is most attractive to scholars who seek to evaluate the 
strength of parsimonious causal mechanisms’ (Levi, 2004: 212), and it compels 
scholars to make causal statements and to identify a small number of variables. The 
model in this project and the variables within this model, are primarily drawn from 
new institutionalism (see Spiller, Stein & Tommasi, 2003; Mainwaring & Shugart, 
1997),53 and as such, analytic narratives provide a ready framework for such a model 
focused on political institutions. This makes the analytic narrative approach 
particularly suited to the structure of the current project. 
 As a corollary to the point regarding the compatibility of analytic narratives 
and new institutional models and therefore the suitability of this approach for the 
project, is the issue of causation. New institutionalism and analytic narratives are 
well-suited because they both share the same logic of causation. The main 
independent variables in this thesis are derived from new institutionalism, a variable-
orientated approach that adopts a strategy of causal inference based on insights from 
quantitative work (Mahoney, 2000), a strategy some scholars have long encouraged 
for qualitative work (see King, Keohane & Verba, 1994). Analytic narratives also 
share this logic of causation, and they explicitly attempt to follow the statistical rules 
of causal inference (Levi, 2003: 8; Bates et al. 2000: 696; King, Keohane & Verba, 
1994). However, the variable-orientated ordinal strategy of causal inference shared 
by new institutionalism and analytic narratives, differs from the logic of causation 
small-n researchers adopt when using nominal comparison (Mahoney, 2000: 406-
407). QCA is a case-orientated method of nominal comparison that does not base its 
strategy of causal inference on statistical rules, but rather ‘seeks out patterns of 
causality in which the association between cause and effect is in certain respects fully 
predictable’ (Mahoney, 2000: 407). Indeed, Ragin himself (1987, 2005) cautions 
against employing quantitative causal inference as a basis for informing small-n 
research. In effect, Ragin employs case-orientated causal inference as the basis to 
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 See also Spiller, Stein & Tommasi (2003: 11) who suggest that the transactions framework, upon 
which the institutional variables here are partly based, ‘speaks’ to the AN project. 
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inform quantitative work (Achen, 2005: 31). This thesis is variable-orientated 
research inspired by new institutionalism. The analytic narrative approach is also 
variable-orientated and process driven (Bates et al. 1998), and is informed by the 
same logic of causation as new institutionalism. QCA however, is a case-orientated 
approach that is driven by a different logic of causation. As such, the compatibility of 
new institutional models, analytic narratives and the purpose of this study is one of 
the reasons why the analytical narrative approach was chosen ahead of QCA or 
fsQCA. 
 Furthermore, the institutional model that is developed in this thesis is 
concerned with capturing the impact of path dependence on policy outcome, 
specifically the institutional design of privatisation programmes in the case study 
countries in the early 1980s and 1990s. A major strategic advantage of analytic 
narratives is that they allow the researcher to deal with dynamic processes that have a 
temporal dimension, and allow for the consideration of time-sensitive concepts such 
as path dependence (Levi, 2003: 21; Parikh, 2000: 679). Narrative accounts are much 
more likely to capture these elements. In the literature on the relationship between 
economic globalisation and left-wing governments, cross-sectional approaches have 
been repeatedly employed (see Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001; Wibbels & Arce, 
2003; Scruggs & Lyle, 2004). These studies have attempted to assess the effect of 
different institutions by means of this approach, but, for Parikh (2000: 679), ‘cross-
sectional approaches…are unable to deal with the sequence of decisions and events 
that must be analysed in order to explain the outcomes under investigation.’ 
Specifically, these approaches may fail to grasp dynamic processes, or time-sensitive 
concepts such as path dependence. Even many small-n comparative approaches 
cannot account for path dependence. For example, QCA is unable to incorporate a 
temporal or path dependent dimension into its models (Schneider & Wagemann, 
2006: 753).54 It is the ability of analytic narratives to incorporate such a temporal 
dimension that further lends this method to the current project. 
 Finally, analytic narratives are well-suited for (very) small-N studies (Bates et 
al. 1998, 2000) and as this project adopts only three case studies, this further 
supports the suitability of analytic narratives as a method for this project. Although 
QCA is often cited as a small-N method, it is perhaps best suited for intermediate-N 
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 Although recently, some scholars have attempted to add a temporal dimension to QCA. See Caren 
& Panofsky (2005).  
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research designs. Initially, QCA was designed as a means to ‘address large number 
of cases without forsaking complexity, (Ragin, 1987: 171) and of its more than 250 
applications, only one QCA study employs an N as small as five cases, and in fact 
only 6 per cent of all contemporary QCA applications employ 10 cases or less. The 
vast majority of applications employ between 10 and 80 cases (see Rihoux & Ragin, 
2004: 7). Indeed, for Schneider & Wagemann (2006: 775) QCA techniques are ‘one 
appropriate methodological tool for assessing complex causal theories – especially in 
mid-size N designs.’ 
 Despite the weaknesses and problems associated with analytic narratives, this 
method was chosen for this thesis. It is quite reasonable to assert that other methods 
could structure this project just as efficiently, but this thesis can only choose one 
method to guide the comparative approach adopted here and, for the reasons outlined 
above, the analytic narrative approach was selected.            
In order to provide substance for the narrative, the research drew from a 
number of primary and secondary sources, including books, regional, local and 
international newspapers, government reports, government decrees, resolutions and 
laws, union and employer organisation reports and data archives, industry reports, 
central bank reports, letters of intent signed with international financial institutions, 
economic and political datasets and political party websites, manifestos, speeches 
and pamphlets. Much of the core research for the narrative was collected during field 
research in Montevideo, Buenos Aires and São Paulo between June and September, 
2006. In Argentina, all data concerning laws, decrees and resolutions was drawn 
from information provided by the Dirección Información Parlamentaria (DIP) of the 
Argentine Chamber of Deputies in Buenos Aires. The offices of the Frente para la 
Victoria (FpV) in Buenos Aires also provided copies of manifestos and election 
materials, while archival research was conducted at the offices of La Nación and The 
Buenos Aires Herald. In São Paulo, the office of the Partido dos Trabalhadores 
provided access to party manifestos and materials from the 2002 election. In 
Uruguay, information concerning all government laws, decrees and resolutions was 
provided by the Información Parlamentaria of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies 
in Montevideo, supplemented by the electronic Sistema Información Parlamentaria 
database. Statistics and a number of reports were utilised from the Central Bank in 
Montevideo while archival research, both at their offices and at the Universidad de la 
República, was conducted for El Observador, Busqueda, and Crónicas. The offices 
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of the Frente Amplio in Montevideo provided all relevant election manifestos and 
campaign materials. In addition, in order to supplement patchy or scarce data and for 
useful background information, interviews were conducted with political scientists 
from the region, in particular from the Universidad de la República in Montevideo 
and the Universidad del CEMA in Buenos Aires. Where such information is utilised 
in the narrative, details of the scholar in question is provided. 
 
2.4 The Dependent Variable: Privatisation Policy 
Where capital is completely mobile and where states remove their trade and capital 
restrictions, monetary policy is severely curtailed. Governments are left with a choice 
between the money supply or the interest rate, and where currencies are fixed or 
pegged; the restrictions are magnified (see Garrett, 1998b; Berger, 2000; Philips, 
2005).55 However, the effects of increasing economic globalisation are thought to be 
far more pervasive than just monetary policy. The loss of monetary policy autonomy 
places pressures on fiscal policy also and this in turn, will have a restraining effect on 
other policy areas, precipitating ‘a race to the bottom’ in industrial policy, welfare 
spending, taxation, labour market reform, privatisation, environmental regulations 
etc. So far however, the literature has primarily focused on two specific policy areas: 
taxation and social welfare spending, and even within these policy areas there still 
remains disagreement as to the effect of economic globalisation and the role of other 
explanatory variables (see chapter one).56 
In an effort to move beyond the policy areas of social welfare and taxation 
reform, one of the motivations of this study is to extend the analysis of economic 
globalisation and the efficacy of left-wing governments to other policy areas. This 
study differs from previous empirical works in this literature by choosing 
privatisation policy as the dependent variable. According to the logic of the 
convergence thesis, the constraining effects of economic globalisation should extend 
to a variety of policy areas (Cerny, 1996), and privatisation policy should be no 
exception. We have a clear set of expectations regarding the relationship between 
privatisation and globalised markets. Increasing trade competition and the 
multinationalisation of production place downward pressures on the size of the 
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 The Mundell-Flemming theorem, see Mundell (1963).  
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 Although there have been some interesting variants. Prakash & Potoski (2006) examined the effect 
of economic globalisation on environmental regulations, Bailey, Rom & Taylor (2004) on education, 
Rodrik (1996) on labour standards and Prakash & Kollman (2003) on genetically modified organisms.  
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public economy and this leads to the privatisation of state assets (Garrett, 1998b: 
791-792). Big government stifles private investment and prevents wages and prices 
from reaching market generated equilibriums. Government spending must be funded 
by increased taxes, which not only discourages private investment, but also, due to 
the multinationalisation of production, provides mobile asset holders with an 
incentive to exit the national economy and move to a more tax-favourable location. 
Likewise, government borrowing to fund this increased spending increases interest 
rates, depressing entrepreneurial activity and eventually causing output and 
employment to suffer (Garrett, 1998b). If governments wish to be competitive in 
terms of trade, and continue to attract mobile asset holders, they must roll-back the 
public economy, and privatisation is a key element in this process.57  
Privatisation can also be a particularly effective means for developing world 
countries, with little else to offer investors, to attract mobile asset holders and remain 
competitive in the international market. Mobile asset holders will be attracted by the 
sometimes below market-value sale of potentially lucrative state companies, often in 
near monopolistic market conditions. Developing world governments can use the 
proceeds to invest in infrastructure, further enhancing their attractiveness to mobile 
assets, or to pay off existing debts, signalling economic stability and orthodoxy. The 
proceeds of large-scale privatisations reduce the need for government borrowing, 
removing upward pressures on interest rates. Conversely, and following the same 
logic, nationalisations will simply prove impossible. Capital and mobile asset holders 
will not invest in states where they fear expropriation.58 If nationalisation is a 
credible threat, capital will simply go elsewhere. So, there will be pressure on all 
governments, regardless of their political orientation, to privatise in order to remain 
competitive in terms of trade and the attraction of mobile asset holders. 
Nationalisation should prove out of the question. This however, has never been 
empirically tested, hence the motivation for using privatisation policy as the 
dependent variable in this study. 
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 Furthermore, the policy paradigm that the first wave advocates all governments are converging 
upon, could be described as Neoliberalism, although even this term is subject to heated debate (see 
Boas and Gans-Morse, 2006 for a good review of this issue). The blueprint for neoliberal reforms has 
been embodied in a ten point structural reform package commonly referred to as the Washington 
Consensus (Williamson, 1993). Of those ten points, one bluntly states: ‘State enterprises should be 
privatised’ (Williamson, 1993: 1333).    
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 Exceptions to this will probably be in high-earning commodity extraction industries, e.g. oil.  
  - 48 -   
 Specifically then, this project is concerned with the degree of change in 
privatisation policy after the election of left-wing governments in the case study 
countries selected. Partisan theory assumes that governments have the ability to 
implement their promises (Hibbs, 1992), but the globalisation thesis argues that this 
is no longer the case. If privatisation policy has changed according to the preferences 
of the left-wing government elected, then this would suggest that partisan politics 
still matter. If however, we find that the left-wing governments were unable to 
implement policy in this area congruent with their preferences it would suggest that 
partisan politics is no longer as relevant as traditionally believed. According to the 
prescriptions of the partisan thesis, left-wing governments should be expected to stop 
all on-going privatisations and refrain from initiating any further privatisations in all 
areas, or key strategic sectors (see Levy, 2001). In certain cases, though not always, 
they may even renationalise previously divested state enterprises. This dependent 
variable and the observations selected to operationalise this variable, follow the rules 
of King, Keohane and Verba (1994: 108).59 
 In order to operationalise this variable and correctly identify the degree of 
change in the dependent variable, if any, there are two distinct areas to examine. The 
first is the levels of privatisation within the economy. This can be observed simply 
through the number of state-owned enterprises that have been privatised, or 
alternatively re-nationalised, if that is the case, and through the overall proceeds from 
privatisation, as a gross figure and as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP).60 It is important to disaggregate between the two measures, as the simple 
count of privatisations may hide the fact that large-scale state enterprises have been 
sold, whereas the revenue figures will capture the scale of state divestiture. 
 Throughout this thesis, the operationalised dependent variable is often 
referred to as the policy outcome. By policy outcome, the thesis simply means the 
observable final policy that was implemented by government x in time t. Obviously, 
the design and ultimate implementation of a policy may differ significantly from the 
initial preferences of a particular administration, mainly as the result of a number of 
variables (in this instance, political institutions), that will constrain and channel these 
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 These three rules are as follows: The dependent variable should be dependent, thus removing the 
danger of endogeneity, the selected observations based on the dependent variable should ensure that it 
does not remain constant, and finally the dependent variable should represent the variation we wish to 
explain (see King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 108-109).  
60
 This data is readily available from the World Bank Privatisations Database, the IMF and from 
individual national accounts at the respective finance ministries. 
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preferences. Therefore, we can observe the initial desired policy outcome of a 
government (preferences), and actual final policy outcome (dependent variable). So, 
in terms of government spending, government x may wish to spend a specific amount 
on education in a specific year, but because of budgetary constraints etc., will 
actually only spend 75 per cent of that amount in that year. This is the policy 
outcome. In this case, the level of privatisations or nationalisations implemented 
during the first three years of each administration is the policy outcome we wish to 
observe. Clearly then, we should also expect different policy outcomes depending 
upon the partisanship of the government in power. As discussed above, the left in 
Latin America are concerned with redistributive social spending, progressive 
taxation and interventionist economic management. Specific policy outcomes such as 
these could generally be described as partisan supply-side polices. But as the 
literature has emphasised, there are numerous other factors that impede partisan 
governments from achieving their desired outcome. Therefore, it is necessary to 
establish what the policy outcome actually was.   
Likewise, when it comes to privatisation, there are specific partisan-supply 
side policies that we would expect from left and right governments, but we need to 
establish exactly what these are. Privatisations may occur in various forms that do 
not necessarily imply a reduction in the size or responsibilities of the state, ‘since 
privatisation may only change the form of government intervention concerning 
service provision, regulation and financing’ (Zohlnhöffer et al. 2008: 97; Levi-Faur, 
2005). Privatisations have many different facets: formal privatisation, re-
privatisation, public-private partnership, public-private enterprise etc. Formal 
privatisations refer to the complete or partial sale of a state enterprise. Re-
privatisation refers to the re-sale of a company that the state had already sold, but 
was forced to take over due to financial difficulties, while a public-private 
partnership, also called a functional privatisation, refers to a public service or 
business that is operated jointly by a state enterprise and one or more private 
enterprises. Alternatively, a new company, a public-private enterprise, where the 
state and private investors have joint ownership, may be established to operate a 
public service. A public-private enterprise may also be established by the partial sale, 
e.g. 40 per cent, of a state enterprise (see World Bank, 1993; Zohlnhöffer et al. 2008: 
97).  
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At the simplest level, right-wing parties can be expected to privatise all state 
enterprises while left-leaning parties can be expected to oppose all formal 
privatisations. These parties will face a major electoral incentive to do so because 
workers in state enterprises and public sector unions, who stand to lose most from 
privatisation, are a crucial constituency for the left (Zohlnhöffer et al. 2008: 102). At 
the opposite end of the spectrum lies nationalisation. Nationalisation was central to 
the left’s economic strategy in Latin American after the failure of liberalism in 1929 
(see Evans, 1995; Thorp, 1992; Bulmer-Thomas, 2003), and due to the unique 
relationship that the left in Latin America has developed with the state (see above), 
parties of the left in the region might be expected to attempt to regain control of 
strategic sectors. However, given the realities of the modern international political 
economy, and the necessity of all states to attract capital and foreign investment, 
nationalisation may be considered an extreme policy outcome in the context of the 
contemporary left. So, we have a continuum of a sort, with formal privatisations 
representing the most undesired outcome, and nationalisations at the other end of the 
spectrum representing the most desired, if not the most realistic, outcome. Within 
this continuum lie public-private partnerships, public-private enterprises and re-
privatisations.   
As stated above, the realities of the international political economy require 
states to attract much-needed foreign investment. Facing such pressures, the left, 
rather than endorsing formal privatisations but without the necessary funds, may be 
expected to resort to public-private partnerships or the establishment of public-
private enterprises for the provision of certain public services or the building of 
infrastructure (see Levy, 2001: 273).61 As regards re-privatisation, it may be 
expected that no government will oppose this, simply because re-privatisation merely 
divests the state of a financially burdensome company that the state was forced to 
administer. Also, the focus of government policy on this issue is important. It is 
necessary to identify the sectors that receive attention in any privatisation 
programmes such as infrastructure, public utilities or pension fund reform.62 Left-
wing governments may be expected to be more concerned with ensuring that key 
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 See Levy (2001) for a discussion on the ‘left-wing twist’ that may be given to privatisation policy, 
differentiating policy from the market-friendly convergence type and constituting a genuinely 
different partisan policy.    
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 This data is readily available through government pronouncements, policy documents, presidential 
decrees and bills introduced to the legislature.  
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sectors of the economy remain in state hands, including public utilities such as 
electricity, water or sanitation, vital resources such as oil and gas, and public 
transport, health services and social security and pension transfers. Certain 
infrastructure, banking and some industrial sectors may be of less concern to left-
wing governments (see Levy, 2001: 273-274).  
The measures chosen therefore, to operationalise the dependent variable are 
clearly observable, thus ensuring empirical verification or falsification. This ensures 
that the dependent variable maximises concreteness (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 
109).63      
 
2.5 The Independent Variables 
From the literature on economic globalisation and partisan politics, it is possible to 
identify four main explanatory variables that have been employed to examine the 
mechanisms by which left-wing governments may successfully implement their 
preferences. These four variables are: economic globalisation, political institutions, 
left-labour power, and the influence of the international financial institutions. 
 
Economic Globalisation 
In the era of Keynesian-policies post World War II, with capital controls and trade 
barriers, governments were able to use interest rates, the supply of money and 
exchange rates as a means to impose control upon their economies (Berger, 2000: 
53). As the international environment has changed, and as barriers to trade and 
capital have diminished, the ability of governments to introduce autonomous policies 
has been curtailed. Under fixed exchange rates, increases in capital mobility 
essentially vitiate an independent monetary policy (Garrett, 1998b). Likewise, 
floating exchange rates under complete capital mobility may reduce the efficacy of 
fiscal policy (Milner & Keohane, 1996: 17). So, the central tenet of the globalisation 
thesis contends that the increasing mobility of capital and openness of international 
trade severely curtails, if not eliminates, the ability of left-wing governments to 
implement their preferences. Increasing trade competition forces the removal of the 
state from the economy, while the increasing mobility of capital acts as a disciplinary 
force on government policy, leading to a policy convergence along lines that 
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 Concreteness refers to choosing observable concepts that can be readily identified and thus 
subjected to empirical verification or falsification (King, Keohane & Verba, 1994: 109-111).  
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internalise the preferences of this capital. This policy mix is congruent with the 
preferences of the political right, rather than the politics of the left. If left-leaning 
governments do not adopt this mix, they will face a potentially ruinous capital flight. 
So, left-wing governments would now appear to have little ability to implement their 
preferences (see for example Ohmae, 1996; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1998; 
Ruggie, 1997). Although the impacts of economic globalisation are contested it is 
reasonable to hypothesise therefore that economic globalisation will undermine the 
ability of left-wing governments to implement autonomous privatisation policies. A 
left-wing government in a state that is highly exposed to economic globalisation will 
have less ability to implement autonomous privatisation policies, than a left-wing 
government in a state that is not so highly exposed to economic globalisation.  
In order to provide conceptual clarity for the operationalisation of this 
variable, it is worth following Milner & Keohane’s (1996: 4) definition of economic 
globalisation as ‘the processes generated by underlying shifts in transaction costs that 
produce observable flows of goods, services and capital.’ However, while studies in 
the welfare compensation-efficiency debate have repeatedly found evidence that 
trade openness affects welfare spending, a number of these studies have also 
indicated that capital mobility has a smaller, if not negligible, effect on spending (see 
Avelino, Hunter & Brown, 2005; Rudra, 2002). Despite this, Kaufman & Segura-
Ubiergo (2001) appeared to find evidence that capital account liberalisation did 
compound the effects of trade openness on welfare spending; while Wibbels & Arce 
(2003) found that trade openness, in contrast to portfolio capital, FDI flows and 
capital controls, appeared to have no discernable effect on the capital tax ratio.     
Logically, we would expect privatisation to respond to a multifaceted 
conception of economic globalisation: trade openness, capital flows, and FDI flows. 
Increasing trade competition and the multinationalisation of production will place 
downward pressures on the size of the public economy, while the increasing mobility 
of capital will encourage developing world states to privatise state assets in an effort 
to attract this capital. So, in order to operationalise this variable, three composite 
indices of globalisation are utilised. These three indices all incorporate measures of 
trade openness, capital controls, FDI flows and capital flows, among others. Three 
different measures from the KOF Index of Globalisation are employed.64 The first, 
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‘Economic Globalisation,’ is a composite measure of actual flows and restrictions on 
trade and capital.65 The second, ‘Actual Flows,’ is comprised of a composite measure 
combining trade openness, FDI as stocks, FDI flows and portfolio capital. The third 
and final KOF measure, ‘Globalisation Index,’ is simply the overall value capturing 
the level of exposure of the three states to globalisation.66 In order to provide 
accessible, comparable figures for the three states during the period under analysis, 
the yearly values (2002-2005) for each of the three measures above are averaged (see 
Table 2.1).     
Two measures from the AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Index of Globalisation 
are employed.67 The first, ‘Economic Globalisation,’ again is a normalised composite 
measure capturing each state’s trade openness (imports plus exports as a percentage 
of GDP) combined with FDI flows (inward plus outward FDI as a percentage of 
GDP).68 The second measure, ‘trade integration,’ captures trade openness only. 
Again, the yearly values (2003-2007) for both measures are averaged in order to 
provide a reasonable composite measure capturing each state’s exposure to economic 
globalisation during the period in question. The last measure is taken from the 
Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.69 This is simply the overall 
ranking of each of the three case study states, based on their composite score of 
economic freedom, from a global sample of 157 countries.70 Again, the yearly 
rankings (2002-2007) for the three states are averaged.   
 Table 2.1 below, outlines all the measures utilised to assess the level of 
economic globalisation across the case study states. These different indices provide a 
composite measure for economic globalisation for the three states. They also clearly 
indicate that there is little substantial meaningful difference between the case study 
countries as regards their exposure to economic globalisation, during the period 
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 This measure includes: trade (as a percentage of GDP), FDI flows (as a percentage of GDP), FDI 
stocks (as a percentage of GDP), portfolio investment (as a percentage of GDP), income payments to 
foreign nationals (as a percentage of GDP), hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on 
international trade and capital account restrictions. 
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 Again this is a composite measure, combining the composite scores for ‘Economic Globalisation,’ 
‘Social Globalisation’ and ‘Political Globalisation.’  
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 Available at http://www.atkearney.com/main.taf?p=5,4,1,116  
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 For a critique of the methodology utilised to construct this index, see Lockwood (2004).   
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 Available at http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/index.cfm  
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 This composite ranking of economic freedom is arrived at by combining scores on business 
freedom, trade freedom, fiscal freedom, government size, monetary freedom, investment freedom, 
financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption and labour freedom. For more 
information on the methodology employed, see 
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/chapters/pdf/Index2008_Chap4.pdf.   
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before and after the election of these left-wing governments.71 The measures listed 
below represent the most popular and common measures of globalisation that are 
utilised in the literature. Therefore, the project will treat this independent variable as 
constant across the case studies. This has the advantage of providing added analytical 
leverage for the project to disentangle the effect of political institutions in mediating 
the convergence thesis.  
However, there is a caveat. In everyday reality, the pressures of exogenous 
forces (globalisation, the IMF, bond rating agencies etc.) are not necessarily constant 
at all times, across Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay. In fact, it is inevitable that there 
would be some variation in globalisation between Brazil, one of the largest 
economies in the world, and a small, open, trade-dependent economy such as 
Uruguay. So, although from a methodological perspective, this project will treat 
economic globalisation as a constant across the cases, in order to better reflect 
reality, throughout the three case studies, the narrative will keep globalisation in 
view at critical moments in order to assess how various exogenous forces in each 
state impact on policy.    
 
Table 2.1: Exposure to Economic Globalisation  
KOF Index of Globalisation Foreign Policy/Kearney Index of 
Globalisation 
 
Economic 
Index Overall 
(Avg. 2002-
05) 
Actual 
Flows 
Index 
(Avg. 
2002-05) 
Globalisation Index 
Overall 
(Avg. 2002-05) 
Economic 
Globalisation 
Measurement (Avg. 
2003-07) 
Trade Integration 
Measurement (Avg. 
2003-07) 
Economic 
Freedom 
Index – 
Overall 
Ranking 
(Avg. 
2002-07) 
Argentina 57.0 69.3 63.2 50.2 55.8 56.4 
Brazil 61.0 63.8 58.2 51.6 61.8 60.9 
Uruguay 64.7 66.4 60.2 --- --- 67.9 
Source: KOF Index of Globalisation, AT Kearney/Foreign Policy Index of Globalisation/Index of 
Economic Freedom 
 
 
Political Institutions 
Ever more frequently, the focus has turned towards political institutions in efforts to 
explain the mechanisms by which left-wing politics may resist the effects of 
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 To put these figures into context, Chile, for example, has an overall economic freedom index 
ranking (avg. 2002-07) of 78.0 and Venezuela (avg. 2002-07) 49.9. Chile’s FP/Kearney Economic 
globalisation measurement (avg. 2003-07) is 19.2, Costa Rica, 32 and Panama, 4.6. Chile’s Trade 
integration measurement (avg. 2003-07) is 35, while Costa Rica’s is 20 and Panama’s 8.2. The KOF 
Economic Index (avg. 2002-05) for Chile is 83.14, 76.52 for Panama and 48.98 for Guatemala. The 
KOF Actual Flows Index (avg. 2002-05) is 84.18 for Chile, 90.29 for Panama and 39.9 for 
Guatemala.   
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convergence. It was Garret & Lange (1991) and later Garrett (1998a), who first 
proposed the importance of labour market institutions in enabling left-wing 
governments to successfully implement their preferences. Cross-country econometric 
studies have found evidence that institutional variables impact upon the effects of 
convergence, although the variables utilised have tended to be very general, such as 
democracy (see Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005), or very narrow, such as party 
system fractionalisation (see Wibbels & Arce, 2003). Swank (1998b, 2002) has 
emphasised the importance of institutions in providing opportunities, to those 
opposed to or materially harmed by the policies associated with convergence, access 
to decision-making structures, while Pierson (1996, 2004) and Campbell (2004) have 
both argued that the effect of economic globalisation has been mediated and nullified 
by the policy design and path dependence of existing institutions. Even some of 
those who have found evidence of policy convergence (see Milner and Keohane, 
1996; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000) caution that their results may not be as conclusive 
as they seem, and stress the importance of taking into account institutions, and the 
varied impact these institutions may have on national reactions to economic 
globalisation. So, it is therefore plausible to expect that political institutions will 
mediate the effects of economic globalisation and policy responses accordingly. The 
configuration of these institutions will either constrain left-wing governments in the 
pursuit of their preferences or will provide them with an opportunity to pursue their 
preferences. 
 In operationalising the institutional variable, the project borrows from the 
‘inter-temporal transactions framework,’ which analyses the manner in which 
political institutions affect policy outcomes, developed by Spiller, Stein & Tommasi 
(2003) and Spiller & Tommasi (2003). This framework argues that ‘institutions do 
not affect outcomes directly, but rather through their impact on the process by which 
policies are designed, approved and implemented’ (Spiller, Stein & Tommasi, 2003: 
3). The study is designed to search for the effects of political institutions (explanatory 
variable) on a particular outcome (forward looking hypothesis), in this case 
privatisation policy (dependent variable). In doing so, hypotheses can be formulated 
to control the length of the chain of causation, ensuring that ‘interaction effects from 
other variables are less of a problem’ (Spiller, Stein & Tommasi, 2003: 11). In 
arguing that the institutions in place in each country determine the policy-making 
process, questions of endogeneity may arise. However, as Spiller, Stein & Tommasi 
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(2003: 7) argue, the questions of what to explain and what to take for a given, 
although providing a problem for ‘econometric work, are easier to answer in 
historically grounded, country-specific, research.’ As such, each analytical narrative 
will be preceded by a historical chapter that process traces the development of 
privatisation policy in each case study country (see George & Bennett, 2005). Four 
particular institutional variables, within which the policy-making process of 
privatisation occurs within each case study state, must be examined: 
• Executive Power 
• Legislative Support 
• Judicial Independence  
• Policy Delegation 
As each case study country boasts a presidential political system and as the 
project is concerned with the ability of left-wing governments to implement their 
preferences, the logical starting point for operationalising the institutional variable is 
executive power. Executive power simply refers to a strong or a weak president, that 
is, the President’s ability to ‘put their own stamp on policy’ and implement their 
preferences (Shugart & Mainwaring, 1997: 40). This particular variable refers to the 
‘constitutional powers’ available to the President, the extent of which ‘allows 
presidents to shape the policy output of the system regardless of whether they head a 
party or bloc of parties that controls a legislative majority’ (Shugart & Mainwaring, 
1997: 13). Shugart & Mainwaring (1997: 41) divide the President’s constitutional 
power into proactive and reactive powers. Proactive powers allow the president to 
establish a new status quo and are best embodied by decree power. Reactive powers 
on the other hand, allow the president to defend the status quo or prevent the 
legislature from establishing a new status quo. Reactive powers are embodied by the 
full and partial veto and the power of exclusive legislative introduction (Shugart & 
Mainwaring, 1997: 41-48). The particular combination of proactive and reactive 
powers available to the president will determine the extent of his/her constitutional 
power and consequently the degree to which the president can implement his/her 
preferences.   
 However, regardless of the extent of a president’s constitutional powers, the 
ability of the president to implement his/her preferences is also predicated upon the 
extent and unity of the president’s support in the legislature (Cox & Morgenstern, 
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2002: 453; Foweraker, 1998: 658-659), what Shugart & Mainwaring (1997: 13) term 
the president’s ‘partisan powers.’ Latin American legislatures are largely reactive 
bodies, but they are still important in the policy-making process (Cox & 
Morgenstern, 2002: 446).72 A president may have extensive constitutional powers, 
‘yet be stymied in effecting real change by a legislature in which his or her own party 
either holds a small minority of seats or, although holding a majority or large 
plurality, is deeply factionalised and undisciplined’ (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997: 
395). So, the greater the unity (discipline) and cohesiveness (single party majority, 
multi-party coalition, minority etc.) of the president’s support in the legislature, the 
greater the ability of the president to implement his/her preferences (Foweraker, 
1998: 657-659).73 This legislative support is dependent upon two variables: party 
system fragmentation and the level of party discipline, which in turn, are determined 
by specific institutional configurations (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). In a highly-
fragmented multi-party system, no party will hold a majority and so typically the 
president will be forced to forge unreliable governing coalitions. Conversely, a low 
number of parties will enable the president’s party to hold a majority or sizable 
legislative contingent increasing the cohesiveness of the president’s legislative 
support. In turn, the degree of party system fragmentation is primarily a result of the 
electoral rules within a state (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997). The degree of party 
discipline affects the extent to which presidents can rely on their party’s support for 
their initiatives or alternatively the extent to which the president must secure support 
from other parties or individual legislators (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997: 418). So, 
the higher the level of party discipline, the greater the unity of the president’s 
legislative support. In turn, party discipline is primarily determined by three features 
of the electoral system: the control over candidate nomination for election; control 
over the order of this nomination; and the possibility of accumulating votes among a 
party’s candidates (see Shugart & Carey, 1992: 174-178). The cumulative levels of 
party fragmentation and party discipline will determine the level of presidential 
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 See Cox & Morgenstern (2002) who argue that Presidents adopt a particular strategy depending 
upon their support in the legislature.  
73
 For a comprehensive discussion outlining the importance of unified legislative support for the 
executive in presidential systems and how multi-partism and party discipline impact on this support, 
see Foweraker (1998: 657-659).    
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legislative support, the level of which will in turn determine the president’s ability to 
implement his or her preferences.74             
The judiciary, particularly with respect to privatisation, can play an important 
role in the policy-making process, either as an ‘impartial referee’ enforcing political 
transactions by binding politicians to past agreements, or as a ‘policy player’ through 
its reactive measures (veto) or proactive rulings (Scartascini, 2007: 30-31). However, 
the extent to which the judiciary is an important veto player in the context of 
executive preferences is dependent upon the degree of judicial independence (Spiller, 
Stein & Tommasi, 2003: 24; Scartascini, 2007: 30; Feld & Voigt, 2003; 498).75 An 
independent judiciary forces the executive to take into account their preferences 
when making policy, rendering it very difficult for the executive to radically change 
existing policies, e.g., nationalising previously privatised state-owned firms. 
Alternatively, ‘if the judiciary responds to one of the other branches of government 
(executive in this case), then its actions would merely mimic the actions of that 
branch of government’ (Scartascini, 2007: 30), enhancing the ability of the executive 
to implement their preferences (particularly with regard to privatisation).      
The last institutional variable concerns policy delegation. Delegating policy 
to an independent bureaucracy, or implementing policy within an institutional and 
legal framework can create path dependent effects and ‘prevent future opportunistic 
behaviour’ (Spiller, Stein & Tommasi, 2003: 20). In the case of privatisation, 
delegating responsibility for this policy to an independent body can fortify a 
government’s commitment to the policy and prevent subsequent administrations 
from halting or significantly altering the policy (Scartascini, 2007: 39). Likewise, if 
privatisation occurs within an institutional and legal framework, this again increases 
the costs of halting this policy for subsequent administrations and renders 
nationalisation (particularly if the judiciary is independent) very difficult. So, when 
privatisation has been delegated to an independent autonomous body and when this 
has happened within the context of an institutional and legal framework, we would 
expect left-wing governments to have less ability to implement their preferences as 
regards this policy once in power and vice versa.     
                                                 
74
 The unity and cohesiveness of this legislative support can also be affected by federalism 
(particularly the federal governors). See Morgenstern (2002) and Scartascini (2007).  
75
 The characteristics of judicial independence include: budgetary autonomy, transparency of 
nomination process for the bench; stability and tenure of judges; and extent of judicial power (see 
Scartascini, 2007: 30).  
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The degree of executive power, party system fragmentation, judicial 
independence and policy delegation will ensure that left-wing governments in the 
chosen case study countries will either have high capacity to implement their 
preferences or low capacity to implement their preferences. 
There is significant variation in terms of these institutional variables across 
the three chosen case study states. As we are interested in searching for the effects of 
these explanatory variables (forward-looking hypothesis), it is this variation that 
allows us to hypothesise on expected outcomes. For example, Table 2.2 below 
indicates the varying levels of presidential legislative power across the case studies. 
As can be clearly seen from this table, the proactive and reactive powers of the 
President of Argentina are extremely high, while the proactive powers of the 
President of Brazil are high, but the reactive powers are, in general, rather low. As 
Shugart and Mainwaring (1997: 48-50) argue however, proactive powers are, in 
conventional terms, more important than reactive power, and so the overall 
legislative power of the Brazilian President remains high. The high level of reactive 
power and low level of proactive power of the Uruguayan President renders the 
executive with a medium level of overall legislative power in Uruguay.     
 
Table 2.2: Legislative Powers of Presidents  
Proactive 
Powers 
Reactive Powers  
Decree Power Package Veto 
Power 
Partial Veto 
Power 
Exclusive 
Initiative 
Level of 
Presidential 
Legislative 
Power 
Argentina High V. High V. High No V. High (1) 
Brazil High Low Low Yes High (2) 
Uruguay V. Low High High Yes Medium (3) 
Source: Shugart & Mainwaring (1997) and IADB (2006)  
 
 As can be seen from Table 2.3, Brazil’s open-list, proportional representation 
system combined with the ‘candidato nato’ obligation, has resulted in high levels of 
party fragmentation and low levels of party discipline (see Mainwaring and Shugart, 
1997; Morgenstern, 2000; Ames, 2002).76 On the other hand, Uruguay’s double 
simultaneous vote and closed-list proportional representation system has prevented 
the emergence of a multi-party system and engenders high levels of party discipline 
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 However, there are a number of scholars who argue that the informal structures and rules in Brazil, 
foremost of which is the President’s ability to control access to political and financial resources, 
actually serves to engender high levels of discipline on the floor among legislators. Consequently, this 
enables the executive to construct disciplined coalitions, so in reality, the level of Presidential support 
in Brazil may actually be higher than is commonly believed (Table 2.3) (see Figueiredo & Limongi, 
1995, 1999, 2000; Amorim-Neto & Santos, 2001).  
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(see Piñeiro, 2004; Andrés Moraes, 2004; Morgenstern, 2001; Buquet & Chasquetti, 
2005),77 while Argentina’s closed-list PR system, has resulted in a low number of 
effective parties (relative to Brazil) and high levels of party discipline (see Jones, 
1997; 2002; 2005; Morgenstern, 2002).78 Consequently, the level of presidential 
legislative support in Argentina and Uruguay is high in comparison to the low level 
of support in Brazil.    
 
Table 2.3: Level of Presidential Legislative Support 
 Effective 
Number of 
Legislative 
Parties 
President’s 
Party % share of 
seats in lower 
house (or 
national 
assembly)79 
Level of Party 
Discipline 
Level of 
Presidential 
Legislative 
Support 
Argentina 3.18 48 High High (1) 
Brazil 7.81 19 Low Low(3) 
Uruguay 2.7380 43 High High (2) 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2006), Jones (2002), Mainwaring & Shugart (1997) and 
Morgenstern (2001) 
 
In both Uruguay (see Aloisio & Arboleda, 2006; Bergara et al. 2005) and 
Brazil (see Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 2007; Alston et al., 2006; Mueller, 2001) the 
judiciary is considered to be independent of the executive and legislative branches. In 
Argentina (see Manzetti, 1999; Chávez, 2007) however, the judiciary is considered 
to be subject to executive manipulation. In Table 2.4 below, the varying degrees of 
judicial independence across the three case study states are illustrated according to 
two different indices.   
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 However, these same rules are also responsible for the factionalised party system in Uruguay. See 
for example Piñeiro (2004) or Andrés Moraes (2004).  
78
 After the Pact of Olivos in 1994, the image of the second major party, the UCR was severely 
tarnished and this led to the emergence of a third party, FREPASO (see Jones, 1997: 295). The UCR 
made something of a comeback at the end of the millennium and FREPASO was replaced as the third 
party by the ARI (see Jones, 2005).    
79
 This is the average from the two most recent elections as of 2005. See IADB (2005).  
80
 But the party system is highly factionalised.  
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Table 2.4: Judicial Impendence in Case Study Countries 
Country World Economic Forum 
Judicial Independence Scale81 
De Facto Judicial 
Independence82 
Ranking of 
Independence 
Argentina 2.17 0.333 Low (3) 
Brazil 3.14 0.494 High (2) 
Uruguay 4.83 n/a High (1) 
Source: Feld & Voight (2003) & World Economic Forum 
 
  As can be seen from Table 2.5, privatisation in Brazil occurred within a legal 
and institutional framework and was delegated to an autonomous body. This coupled 
with the creation of independent industry regulators in the privatised sectors and the 
high level to which civil servants are effectively protected from arbitrariness, 
politicisation, and rent-seeking, ensures that the degree of policy delegation in Brazil 
is high, compared with Argentina, where privatisation was carried out nearly solely 
at the whim of the Executive, and Uruguay where privatisation as a policy was never 
fully implemented.    
 
Table 2.5: Policy Delegation in Case Study Countries 
 Institutional and 
Legal Framework 
for Privatisation 
with Autonomous 
Body in Control 
Autonomy of the 
Bureaucracy  
Creation of 
Independent 
Regulatory 
Bodies 
Overall Level of 
Policy 
Delegation 
Argentina No Medium Medium Low (3) 
Brazil Yes V. High High High (1) 
Uruguay No Medium to high Medium Low (2) 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2006) 
 
Table 2.6 below, illustrates the combined effect of these institutional 
configurations, in terms of the capacity of the left-wing governments in the case 
study states chosen, to implement their policy preferences. In order to provide 
comparability across all four institutional variables, the presence (or absence) of each 
variable is simply ranked across the three case study states. In reality, not all 
variables are necessarily equally weighted, for example, the level of presidential 
power may be more important for an outcome than say the degree of policy 
delegation, but as an outcome will de determined by the cumulative configuration of 
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 World Economic Forum, available at 
http://www.insead.edu/v1/gitr/wef/main/analysis/choosedatavariable.cfm. Response of surveyed 
executives to the question: "The judiciary in your country is independent from political influences of 
members of government, citizens of firms" (1=no, heavily influenced; 7=yes, entirely independent).   
82
 Feld & Voight’s (2003: 503-504) variable is based upon a combination of eight objective variables 
such as effective average term of members of highest court, number of times supreme court judges 
have changed since 1960 etc.  
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these institutional variables, and in order to formulate working hypotheses, all 
variables are weighted equally.    
 
Table 2.6: Government Capacity to Implement Policy Preferences  
Case Studies 
Degree of 
Policy 
Delegation 
Degree of 
Judicial 
Independence 
Presidential 
Legislative 
Support 
Degree of 
Executive 
Power 
Capacity to 
Implement 
Preferences83 
Argentina Low (3) Low (3) High (1)  V. High (1) High 
Brazil High (1) High (2) Low (3) High (2) Low  
Uruguay Low (2) High (1) High (2) Medium (3) Medium 
   
Labour Support 
The organisation of national labour movements has a marked impact on the 
macroeconomic effectiveness of partisan supply-side policies and in turn, on the 
ability of governments to pursue them consistently (Garrett & Lange, 1991: 541). 
The impact of this variable stems from the assumption that the volatility and 
uncertainty of increased economic globalisation will fuel demands for welfare 
compensation, progressive taxation and increased government intervention. Left-
wing governments will be more susceptible to these demands due to their historical 
alliances with labour. Left-labour power is therefore considered to be the political 
strength of the left combined with the centralised organisational strength and 
mobilisational power of labour. In this respect, ‘interventionist strategies are more 
likely where leftist governments are allied with densely and centrally organised 
(encompassing) unions’ (Garrett & Lange, 1991: 541).  
What is more, Garrett (1998a: 8-9) has posited that increased social welfare 
spending may actually be attractive to mobile-asset holders as this will provide a 
healthy, well-educated, skilled workforce. Secondly, a high degree of left-labour 
power provides policy coherence, reducing the scope for isolated workers to press for 
wage increases, and this in turn reduces the potential for conflict in the economy 
between labour and capital. Capital will recognise this policy coherence and will not 
threaten to exercise its exit option, ensuring that left-wing governments allied with 
broad and dense labour movements may have the ability to implement their policy 
preferences.  
A number of studies have examined the effect of left-labour support in the 
advanced industrial democracies, but some recent studies, which are more pertinent 
to this project, have examined the effect of this variable in the developing world. 
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 This capacity is relative to the three case study countries. 
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Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) in their rather cautious conclusion, did find that 
‘popularly’ based governments protected social welfare spending in Latin America. 
Likewise, Wibbels and Arce (2003: 132) concluded that ‘the left in Latin America 
[allied with dense labour movements] continues to have policy preferences that are 
consistent with historical notions of equity,’ while Rudra’s (2002: 436) analysis 
indicated that strong labour and democracy can positively affect welfare spending in 
the developing world, even in this era of increasing economic globalisation.  
In relation to privatisation, it is expected that organised labour movements, 
especially public sector unions, would be opposed to privatisation and as economic 
globalisation increases, would demand that privatisation stop at least. So, labour will 
be an important constituency for supporting left-wing preferences as regards 
privatisation.84 It is expected therefore, that governments who command a high 
degree of labour support will have a greater ability to implement policies congruent 
with their preferences, with respect to left-wing governments who do not boast a high 
degree of labour support. 
 There are a number of different ways in which to operationalise this variable. 
Garrett (1998a) developed a composite figure for left-labour power based on the 
number of seats in the cabinet and legislature held by parties of the left, and trade 
union membership combined with the number of unions that organise workers (as an 
indicator of concentration). That is, the higher the union density and the smaller the 
number of unions that organise workers, the greater the propensity for collective 
action in labour market institutions (Garrett, 1998a: 13). Wibbels and Arce (2003: 
127) however, caution that data on the organisational concentration of Latin 
American union movements is extremely unreliable. In order to circumvent this 
issue, they used a measure of unionisation density combined with a measure of the 
militancy of labour-mobilising parties. Labour organisation, strength and power will 
be captured here by a measure of union density, the dominant level of unionisation, 
the number of peak organisations and the extent of leadership competition.  
There is also considerable variation across the three case study countries in 
terms of labour support. In general, labour union power and membership has 
decreased significantly in Latin America following the market orientated structural 
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 There may be problems of endogeneity with this variable. Privatisation, especially in Latin 
America, has reduced the power of labour. Conversely, nationalisation may increase the power of 
labour.  
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reforms that occurred there in the 1990s (see for example Murillo, 2001; Stokes, 
2001; Eaton, 2002). The left-wing governments in the three case study states are all 
allied to some degree with the labour movements in their country. The 
Confederacíon General de Trabajadores (CGT) has traditionally allied itself with the 
PJ in Argentina, while in Brazil, the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (CUT) allied 
itself with the PT throughout the 1990s. In Uruguay, the Plenario Intersindical de 
Trabajadores-Convención Nacional de Trabajadores (PIT-CNT) has allied itself 
almost exclusively with the Frente Amplio.  
As Table 2.7 shows, labour support in Argentina, across the operationalised 
measures, is quite high, relative to Brazil and Uruguay. Therefore, we would expect a 
left-wing government in Argentina to have a greater ability, due to its labour support, 
to be able to implement its preferences, relative to Uruguay, who in turn, we would 
expect to have a greater ability than a left-wing government in Brazil to implement 
its policy preferences.   
 
Table 2.7: Labour support across Case Study States 
 Left-
Labour 
Power 
Index85 
Union As % 
of 
Economically 
Active 
Population 
Dominant 
Level of 
Unionisation 
Number of Peak 
Confederations 
Leadership 
Competition 
Labour 
support 
Argentina 0.438 36.1 Industry Single No86 Medium to 
High (1) 
Brazil 0.194 29.0 Local Multiple Yes Low (3) 
Uruguay 0.341 20.9 Industry Single No Medium to 
High (2) 
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2006) and Inter-parliamentary Union, International 
Labour Organisation, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales, Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay 
 
The International Financial Institutions 
The role of the international financial institutions (IFIs) in encouraging convergence 
has generally been omitted as an independent variable from empirical studies 
concerned with the advanced industrial democracies. The reasoning behind this 
omission is simple: the IFIs hold little sway over the economic policies of the 
developed states, as they are not heavily indebted to these organisations and therefore 
susceptible to political pressure. However, developing world states are often heavily 
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 This is a composite measure, consisting of the percentage seats held by the left-wing party in 
parliament, combined with the overall union density. The figures for union density are the most recent 
that could be accessed.  
86
 Although the CGT remained the peak union confederation in Argentina, its leadership spilt in the 
1990s and again at the end of the millennium. See Murillo (2001) and Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi 
(2007).  
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indebted to these organisations and therefore, highly amenable to pressures for 
reform emanating from the IFIs (Avelino, Brown & Hunter, 2005; Wibbels and Arce, 
2003). Haggard and Maxfield (1996) outline the role of the IFIs in fostering 
convergence. When developing world states suffer balance of payments problems, 
they must fund their current account deficits through external borrowing. As the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Word Bank are the main lenders to the 
developing world, they turn to the IFIs in order to finance this gap (Haggard & 
Maxfield, 1996: 214). In return for these loans they must agree to follow the policy 
prescriptions and structural adjustment programmes of the IFIs, which necessitate the 
adoption of market-friendly policies congruent with convergence. For example, 
Wibbels & Arce’s (2003: 119) study of taxation in Latin America concluded that ‘the 
widespread prescriptions of international financial institutions, along with the 
fact…their governments must signal more clearly to markets than their advanced 
industrial counterparts, help explain why domestic political coalitions on the left 
would be far less able to resist burden shifting in Latin American nations than in 
advanced industrial democracies.’  
What is more, privatisation of state-owned assets is an essential part of 
structural adjustment programmes (Williamson, 1993; Hojman, 1994) and the IFIs, 
have actively and aggressively encouraged developing countries to embark on large-
scale privatisation programmes (Welch, 1993: Hojman, 1994).87 So, it is reasonable 
to expect therefore that left-wing governments with higher levels of multilateral debt, 
are thus more susceptible to external political pressure from the IFIs and therefore, 
they will have less ability to follow their policy preferences in the area of 
privatisation, in relation to left-wing governments with lower levels of multilateral 
debt. 
 Table 2.8 shows that the left-wing governments in the three case study 
countries paid off all remaining debt to the IMF during their terms. The majority of 
borrowing was done with the IMF and as it was the fund that held most sway over 
the decision to implement privatisation in the 1990s, the level of influence held by 
the IFIs as regards privatisation in these three states is now very low.88 This low level 
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 For example, the 2003 IMF economic standby agreement with Paraguay included the stipulation 
that the widely contested Privatisation Law 1.615 be reactivated in that state. 
88
 Multilateral debt for all three states still exists, but it remains very low as a percentage of GDP: 2.7 
per cent for Brazil, 7.8 per cent for Argentina, and 15.4 per cent for Uruguay (as of Quarter 1, 2007, 
IMF Statistics Database and Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank statistics on external debt). 
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of IFI influence would encourage the study to hold this variable constant, again 
providing added leverage in order to disentangle the effect of political institutions 
and left-labour power. However, the analytical narrative will be searching for 
evidence of IFI influence (particularly before the debt was repaid), although we do 
not expect to find anything significant. 
 As with the economic globalisation variable, there is again a caveat. Again in 
reality, it is unlikely that the influence of the IMF is constant, at all times, across all 
the cases. Furthermore, there are other actors in the international system who will 
also wield influence on government policy. For example, the major international 
bond rating agencies, such as Standard & Poor’s Rating Service (S&P) and Moody’s 
Investor Services (Moody’s), are increasingly emerging as key intermediaries 
between investors and recipients of foreign capital (Block & Valer, 2004; Sinclair, 
2005). A change in the sovereign bond rating of a state has important impacts on the 
market-determined credit spreads for developing countries, thus substantially raising 
the cost of acquiring capital by sovereign issuers (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007: 122). 
Bond ratings respond positively to trade liberalisation, but also to other market-
friendly reforms, such as privatisation (Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007). As such, a 
country badly in need of foreign capital may adopt market-orientated reforms in 
order to receive a ‘good’ investment-level bond rating. Consequently, the major 
credit rating agencies can exert significant influence on government policy, 
particularly in the developing world (see Biglaiser & DeRouen, 2007; Kaminsky & 
Schmukler, 2002). So, although this project will treat the influence of the IMF as a 
constant from a methodological perspective, in order to better reflect reality, at 
critical moments throughout all three narratives it will examine, not only the 
influence of the IMF, but the role and influence of these other actors also.       
 
Table 2.8: The Influence of the International Financial Institutions 
 Argentina Brazil Uruguay 
Action Taken December 2005 – 
Argentina paid off its 
entire US$9.8 billion 
debt with the IMF 
December 2005 – 
Brazil clears its entire 
US$15.5 billion debt 
with the IMF 
December 2006 – 
Uruguay pays off the 
remaining US$2.6 
billion it owes to the 
IMF 
Amount owed to IMF 
and Influence of IFI 
Variable 
0 (constant) 0 (constant) 0 (constant) 
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2.6 Expected Outcomes 
We can hypothesise expected outcomes on the basis of the variation across the key 
explanatory variables. Table 2.9 below, combines the variables across the three 
chosen case study states, and highlights the expected capacity of each left-wing 
government to implement their policy preferences. As can be seen clearly from this 
table, holding the effect of all exogenous variables, economic globalisation and the 
influence of the IFIs, constant, it is expected that a left-wing government in 
Argentina, due to its political institutional arrangements and level of labour support, 
will have a greater ability to implement their policy preferences, than the 
governments in Uruguay or Brazil. Likewise, it is expected that a left-wing 
government in Uruguay will have less ability than Argentina, but more ability than 
Brazil to implement their policy preferences. Finally, it is also expected that a left-
wing government in Brazil, again due its institutional make-up and level of labour 
support, will have less ability than either of the governments in Argentina or 
Uruguay to implement their policy preferences.      
 
Table 2.9: Aggregated Effect of Independent Variables 
Case Studies 
Countries 
Economic 
Globalisation 
Capacity to 
Implement 
Preferences 
(Institutions) 
Left-
Labour 
support 
International 
Financial 
Institutions 
Conditions 
Present to 
Mediate 
Convergence 
Thesis 
Argentina Constant High High Constant High 
Uruguay Constant Medium Medium Constant Medium 
Brazil Constant Low Low Constant Low 
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Chapter Three – The Evolution of Privatisation in Brazil 
The previous chapters placed this study within a theoretical framework and outlined 
the main research question. The first of the three chosen case studies is Brazil. In 
October 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT – 
Workers Party), convincingly won the Presidential election. Lula came to power on 
the back of an aggressive campaign that highlighted the social ills that plagued the 
Brazilian state. Lula attributed these social ills and the1999 devaluation of the Real 
to the free-market policies implemented by his predecessors. For Lula, privatisation 
was a cornerstone of these policies. However, when Lula became President, 
privatisation had already become a widely accepted and even institutionalised policy. 
 The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical context for the analytical 
narrative of Lula’s Presidency. This chapter will process trace the evolution and 
institutionalisation of privatisation policy in Brazil until the election of Lula in 2002. 
The first section will briefly outline the development and role of public enterprises in 
Brazil. The second section will discuss the implementation of privatisation policy in 
Brazil during the transition to democracy, while the third will highlight the 
acceleration of this process under the Presidency of Fernando Collor. The fourth 
section will examine the Presidency of Fernando Cardoso, under whom key 
institutional changes were enacted in relation to privatisation, while the final section 
will outline the extent and institutional legacy of the Brazilian privatisation 
experience by the time Lula came to power.   
 
3.1 The Origins and Role of Public Enterprise in Brazil 
The state has consistently played an extremely important role in Brazil’s 
development trajectory (Evans, 1979; Bresser Pereira & Carlos, 1983; Schneider, 
1991; Shapiro, 1994), to such an extent that ‘Brazilian capitalism can be defined as 
state capitalism’ (Goldstein, 1999: 675).89 Traditionally, the economic role of the 
state in Brazil could be classified according to two broad categories: the state as a 
regulator of economic activity, and the state as a participant in economic activity, 
primarily through the medium of public sector enterprises (Trebat, 1983: 10). This 
role was a product of the ‘developmentalist model’ of policy-making, instituted in 
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 For analyses about public enterprises in Brazil that attempt to understand their role as regards the 
nature of the Brazilian state, see for example, Evans (1979), Bresser Pereira & Carlos (1983)or Trebat 
(1983).  
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Brazil in the 1930s under Getúlio Vargas, and lasting more or less intact through the 
democratic populism of Juscelino Kubitscheck in the 1950s, through military rule in 
the 1960s and 1970s, until the first decade after the transition to democracy (Faro de 
Castro & Valladāo de Carvalho, 2003: 467-468). This model was characterised by 
the active role of the state in the promotion of economic growth through rapid 
industrialisation, a protectionist trade policy, the creation of regulatory and financial 
state structures, and ‘the direct participation of the state in production through the 
creation of public sector enterprises’ (Faro de Castro & Valladāo de Carvalho, 2003: 
468).  
 State enterprises grew in Brazil as a consequence of several different 
processes; in areas where the private sector lacked the interest or finances to invest, 
the state assumed the role of entrepreneur, e.g. the steel sector and Companhia 
Siderúgica Nacional (CSN);90 a number of enterprises were created or came into 
state hands due to a concern for ‘national security,’ e.g. state aircraft manufacturer 
Embraer; the verticalisation and diversification of the activities of the larger 
enterprises, e.g. Petrobrás and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CRVD) significantly 
expanded their activities through the creation of a large number of subsidiaries; the 
state has traditionally owned exclusive rights for the exploitation of natural 
resources, such as petroleum and iron ore and limited the participation of foreign 
investors in these areas, e.g. Petrobrás, the state-oil mega-conglomerate; and finally, 
the state gained control of a number of companies due to bankruptcy (Trebat, 1983: 
41-48; Pinheiro, 2000: 5-6; Goldstein, 1999: 675). All of these enterprises existed in 
two main forms: as empresa pública, in which the government owned 100 per cent of 
the company; or as empresa de economia mista, in which some private equity was 
permitted, but the government still maintained the controlling share (Trebat, 1983: 
36). 
 The end result of this uninterrupted growth of state enterprises for nearly four 
decades was the domination of the Brazilian economy by public companies. As 
Table 3.1 shows, the Brazilian state held a monopoly, or near monopoly, in a number 
of important areas. The scale and size of state firms grew steadily under the military 
dictatorship, especially during the boom years (1968-74), and by the end of the 
1970s, the vast majority of large enterprises operating in Brazil were owned by the 
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 In these cases, the state did not attempt to compete with the private sector, but rather attempted to 
nurture a triple alliance (tri-pé) with multinational corporations and local investors (see Evans, 1979). 
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state (see Table 3.2). Public enterprises accounted for only seven per cent of the 
nearly 7,000 firms operating in Brazil and only 18 per cent of total employment in 
1979. However, these same public enterprises accounted for 50 per cent of all capital 
invested in these 7,000 firms in the same year (Trebat, 1983: 56).     
 
Table 3.1: The Dominance of State Enterprises in the Economy 
Sector Dominance of 
Sector 
Air Transport ○ 
Commercial Banking □ 
Electricity ● 
Petroleum ● 
Railways ● 
Steel ● 
Telecoms ● 
Tobacco ○ 
TV Broadcasting ○ 
Urban Transport ○ 
Water Supply ● 
   ● fully or predominantly public sector; □ mixed sector; ○ fully or predominantly private sector 
Source: Goldstein (1999: 676) 
 
Table 3.2: Ownership of the thirty largest non-financial firms 
Ownership 1962 1967 1971 1974 1979 
Public  12 13 17 23 28 
Private 18 17 13 7 2 
Source: Trebat (1983: 59) 
 
By 1980, the state’s productive sector was a ‘black box,’ to the extent that the 
executive was unable to figure out the assets and liabilities of these companies 
(Tavares de Almeida, 1999: 435). These enterprises, through their domination of the 
Brazilian economy, had become important political actors in their own right. They 
had a direct effect on macroeconomic stability and fiscal balances (Tavares de 
Almeida, 1999: 435). In total, by 1980, it was estimated that nearly 700 publicly-
owned enterprises existed at the federal, state and municipal level. Although 
estimates differ, approximately 250 of these were owned by the federal government 
(see Table 3.3), 350 by state governments, and 100 by municipalities (Trebat, 1983: 
35).  
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Table 3.3: Economic Distribution of Federal Firms (date of creation)  
Sector Before 
1939 
1940-9 1950-9 1960-9 1970-5 1976-80 Total 
Mining and 
manufacturing 
2 5 4 14 24 16 65 
Transport and 
Communication 
4 1 3 8 19 5 40 
Electricity 11 1 5 3 6 0 26 
Finance 3 2 3 5 11 7 31 
Other 46 1 --- 9 28 5 89 
Total 66 10 15 39 88 33 251 
Source: Trebat (1983; 37) 
 
3.2 The Beginning of Privatisation and the Transition to Democracy 
The beginning of state retrenchment in Brazil can be partly attributed to the adverse 
economic conditions that faced the Geisel administration in 1974, particularly the 
unfavourable prospect of a deceleration of economic growth and harsh policies for 
adjusting to the increase in oil prices and the international recession (Pinheiro & 
Giambiagi, 2000: 7). Against this background, former Finance Minister Eugênio 
Gudin91 publicly observed: ‘We live, in principle, in a capitalist system. But 
Brazilian capitalism is more controlled by the state than in any other country, except 
for those under communist regimes’ (in Pinheiro, 2000: 8). This was followed a year 
later by a series of articles questioning the role of state enterprises in Brazil, under 
the title ‘Os Caminhos da Estatização’ (The Path to Nationalisation), published in O 
Estado de São Paulo, and by the ‘Campaign against Nationalisation’ mounted by 
private sector businessmen (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 8; Pinheiro, 2000: 8-9).92  
 The government reacted to these rumblings by adopting measures to 
strengthen the competitive position of privately owned Brazilian companies with 
regards to state enterprises and multinational firms (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 8). 
However, the worsening macroeconomic situation made control of inflation and 
external balance top priorities. The continued expansion of the state business sector 
was ‘inconsistent with the idea of stabilisation and even the idea of privatisation 
began to permeate government discourse’ (Pinheiro, 2000: 9). In March 1979, 
President Figueiredo recommended measures for ‘privatisation of the SOEs and 
services that are not strictly essential to correction of market imperfections or for 
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 These comments were made in an interview with the then, highly influential Visão magazine, which 
had elected Gudin as ‘Man of the Year’ in 1974.   
92
 Part of the business sector dissatisfaction arose from their exclusion on the Conselho de 
Desenvolvimento Econômico (Economic Development Council) from 1974 onward (Pinheiro, 2000: 
8).   
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meeting the needs of national security’ (Pinheiro, 2000: 9). This was followed by the 
National De-Bureaucratisation Programme and the creation of the Secretary for the 
Control of Public Enterprises (SEST) in order to establish stringent control over the 
expenditure of state-owned firms, but it was also to prevent further expansion in the 
state sector and to obtain a consolidated federal budget for the public sector (Tavares 
de Almeida, 1999: 436).    
 The previous expansion of state-owned firms came to an abrupt end, and 
shortly after the creation of the SEST, the Comissão Especial de Desestatização 
(Special Commission for De-Statisation) was established (Tavares de Almeida, 1999: 
437).93 This commission identified 140 companies that could be privatised in the 
short term, with 50 of these companies listed for sale. However, only 20 state 
enterprises were actually sold in 1981-1984, with eight absorbed by other public 
institutions, generating revenue of US$190 million (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 9). 
 Following the transition to democracy and the indirect election of the first 
civilian President in over twenty years, the Nova República under José Sarney 
continued to suffer from economic maladies. In 1981-89 per capita GDP rose 0.3 per 
cent per annum, the public deficit averaged 5.1 per cent of GDP, and inflation 
increased from 95 per cent to 1,783 per cent (Weyland, 1998: 67; Pinheiro & 
Giambiagi, 2000: 8). Sarney, in an attempt to deal with the deteriorating public 
finances and rampaging inflation, launched his Cruzado Plan in 1986, which 
attempted to deal with inflation by freezing prices. Sarney also adopted a hard line 
towards state enterprises and official rhetoric towards privatisation changed 
considerably (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 8-10).94 Sarney established the 
Privatisation Programme and replaced the Special Commission for De-Statisation 
with the Inter-ministerial Council for Privatisation (Tavares de Almeida, 1999: 438). 
The actual results of Sarney’s privatisation drive were rather dismal.   
 There was a lack of political will for privatisation, exemplified by the 1988 
constitution, which created a major institutional barrier for Sarney’s attempts at state 
divestiture. The Congressional Constituent Assembly (ANC), elected in the 1986 
general elections, convened in order to draft a new constitution to replace the 1967 
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 In Portuguese there is, like English, the verb to privatise. But, in order to avoid the actual word 
privatisation, the military governments chose Desestatização, a word which does not exist in the 
English language, but literally means, de-statisation.  
94
 Part of the reason for this hard line was the fact that during the early eighties, state companies were 
ordered to borrow heavily on foreign markets in order to help finance the current account deficit. As a 
consequence they had been severely affected by the 1983 devaluation, further hampering the state. 
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Constitution still in force (Faro de Castro & Valladāo de Carvalho, 2003: 472). The 
new constitution, reflecting the lack of support for privatisation, made strict 
distinctions favouring Brazilian firms to the detriment of foreign business, and it 
established public monopolies in oil, gas, telecommunications and coastal shipping, 
while creating barriers to foreign ownership in mining and electricity (Fleischer, 
1998: 121). As such, the ‘1988 Constitution was clearly a nationalising one’ 
(Pinheiro, 2000: 13).  
 Despite this, Sarney continued his legislative activity, creating the Programa 
Federal de Desestatização (Federal Programme of De-statisation) by decree.95 The 
aim was to broaden the scope of the privatisation programme to include all state-
owned enterprises, except for the public monopolies upheld in the Constitution 
(Tavares de Almeida, 1999: 438). It was no surprise when congress rejected 
Provisional Measure 26, which would have enabled Sarney’s decree, in 1989. So, by 
the end of Sarney’s Presidency only 17 privatisation processes had been completed, 
all in the manufacturing sector, generating revenue of US$549 million and transfer of 
debt of the order of US$620 million to the private sector (Velasco, 1999: 2).96 The 
World Bank described this first effort at privatisation in Brazil as a ‘classical 
example of failure’ (Treisman, 2003: 100).            
 There are a number of important points to note about this initial attempt at 
privatisation in Brazil. Firstly, the emergence of privatisation in Brazil as a potential 
policy was not the result of external pressure. By the late 1980s, the major 
requirement mandated by the multilateral lending agencies was structural adjustment 
and privatisation. These multilateral agencies were one of the few sources of capital 
available to Brazil at this time, but the Brazilian government demonstrated no 
interest in being bound to politically unpopular programmes of reform. In 1982, 
Brazil was forced to sign a letter of intent with the IMF, and since then, they have 
proved reluctant to agree to externally imposed reforms (Molano, 1997: 37-39; 
Valesco, 1999: 3). In 1988, privatisation was introduced in the agreements between 
Brazil and the IMF, but it did not become an iron-clad conditionality (Tavares de 
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 Decree 95,886, March 29, 1988. 
96
 Not all of the privatisations that occurred under Sarney were insignificant. Included in the 17 sold 
entities were Eletrosiderúrgica Brasileira (Sibra), the largest producer of ferro-alloys; Aracruz 
Celulose, one of the largest pulp and paper companies; and Caraíba Metais, the only copper smelter 
under state ownership (Velasco, 1999: 2).  
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Almeida, 1999: 451). Consequently, ‘multilateral lending agencies had little impact 
on actual Brazilian policies’ (Molano, 1997: 39).    
 Secondly, the decision to introduce privatisation onto the policy agenda was 
not ideologically motivated. It was necessitated by the economic conditions of that 
time (Pinheiro, 2000; Velasco, 1997: 1999; Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000). The 
priority of Brazilian Presidents, from the late 1970s onwards, was control of inflation 
and overcoming the foreign exchange crisis. Since state-owned enterprises 
comprised a considerable portion of domestic investment and consumption, some 
form of control over their expenditures and elimination of their deficits was crucial in 
order to stabilise the economy.97 The gradual move towards privatisation ‘was not an 
ideological about-turn on the developmental role of the state, but rather a change in 
the emphasis of economic policy, imposed by changes which were up to a certain 
point outside government control’ (Pinheiro, 2000: 10). 
 Thirdly, one of the most significant developments in this period was the 
importance of the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social 
(Brazilian Development Bank - BNDES) in the privatisation process. Indeed, the 
move towards privatisation was not only a product of the economic conditions at that 
time, but also a product of internal BNDES decisions (Valesco, 1997: 1999). Of the 
17 privatisations that did occur during the Sarney administration, 11 were of 
companies controlled by BNDESpar, a wholly owned subsidiary of BNDES, and two 
(those related to Siderbrás) were managed by BNDES as the privatisation agent 
(Valesco, 1999: 3). The decision to sell these companies was made because 
BNDESpar reported annual losses between 1982 and 1987, the vast majority of 
which could be attributed to these underperforming and bloated state enterprises 
(Valesco, 1999: 4). The bank, of its own volition, then decided to sell these 
companies and rid itself of this burden (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 10). The head 
of BNDES during Sarney’s reign, Marcio Fortes, together with Ignácio Rangel, one 
of the chief economists, recognised the benefits of privatisation in order to streamline 
and reduce the losses of the bank (Montero, 1999: 34; Werneck, 1991: 62). BNDES’ 
influence was to prove extremely important, as the procedures developed by BNDES 
became the model that was to be adopted under the future privatisation law (Pinheiro 
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 See Pinheiro (2000), who argues that privatisation, has been an essential element of all the Brazilian 
stabilisation plans. As such, privatisation and stabilisation enjoyed a symbiotic relationship in terms of 
Brazilian economic policy.  
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& Giambiagi, 2000: 10) and BNDES emerged as a potential autonomous institution 
that had the ability and expertise to manage privatisations.  
3.3 Privatisation under Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco 
It was with the surprise election of Fernando Collor de Mello in 1990 that 
privatisation finally became a standard policy instrument in Brazil. Collor, with no 
links to the main political parties, ran in the 1989 election on behalf of the newly 
created Partido da Renovaçāo Nacional (National Reconstruction Party – PRN), 
which lacked any sort of party structure (Valença, 2002: 116). Collor deliberately 
portrayed himself as a newcomer who would embark on sweeping reforms to save 
the ailing Brazilian economy and moralise politics (Weyland, 1998: 75). Collor’s 
campaign was centred on an anti-corruption platform and he promised to hunt out the 
‘maharajahs,’ the extremely rich and powerful managers of the huge state 
companies. His economic proposals focused on two main issues: trade liberalisation 
and privatisation of public sector enterprises (Valença, 2002: 118).  
Once in power, Collor adopted an imperial Presidential style and promised 
‘to kill the tiger of inflation with a single bullet’ (Faro de Castro & Valladāo de 
Carvalho, 2003: 477). In order to this, he needed to address the issue of the huge 
public sector in Brazil, which continued to have an inflationary impact on the 
economy.98 On the day after he took office, Collor launched an ambitious 
stabilisation plan. In the congress, nearly 2,000 draft amendments to the plan were 
proposed, but Collor, unwilling to accept any dilution of his reforms, hinted that he 
would revert to mass mobilisation if the legislature continued to thwart his initiatives. 
Eventually, by mid-April, his package was approved with little change, with the 
support of all the main parties (Valença, 2002: 115). The Collor Plan was the most 
drastic stabilisation plan in Brazilian history, confiscating financial assets above a 
low limit (approximately US$1,300) for eighteen months (Weyland, 1998: 75).99  A 
crucial element of this new economic package was Law 8,031, which established the 
Programa Nacional de Desestatização (The National Programme of Destatisation – 
PND) (Tavares de Almeida, 1999: 449). Part of the rationale for this programme was 
the hope that once the frozen savings were returned in eighteen months time, the 
public would use them to buy shares in the state enterprises that were being 
privatised (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 12). These reforms would ultimately 
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 Inflation was running at 84 per cent a month in the early 1990s (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 1999). 
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 An estimated US$40 billion in new Cruzados were frozen. 
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prepare the ground for the emergence of ‘economic pragmatism’ under Cardoso 
(Faro de Castro & Valladāo de Carvalho, 477).  
The PND established a clear and transparent legal and regulatory framework 
for state retrenchment.100 A special Privatisation Directive Committee (DC) was 
established in order to supervise the programme and provide some autonomy for the 
process, with the President of BNDES, Eduardo Modiano, at its head. The DC would 
also decide on key issues such as the methods and conditions of sale and the 
minimum auction price (Montero, 1999: 28).101 The BNDES was assigned the task of 
actually managing the PND. The BNDES is functionally independent, and the 
decision to place them in control of the PND was taken because in Brazil, ‘the 
predictable opposition to privatisation made it preferable to insulate technical 
decisions from political pressures’ (Goldstein, 1999: 682-683). Two consulting firms 
would propose an initial evaluation, the DC would decide upon a minimum price and 
every privatisation would then be audited from start to finish. It would also be 
closely monitored by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives, the judiciary, 
and the Federal Audit Court. Shares in the newly privatised firms could be 
purchased, not only in cash, but also with many different types of debt securities 
(Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 8).102   
Initially, the government was extremely optimistic about the success of the 
PND, promising forecasted revenues of US$9 billion by the end of the year. The 
reality, was however, rather different. Privatisation under the PND actually turned 
out be a lot more difficult than initially anticipated. The many safeguards in the PND 
for ensuring that the process was transparent and fair meant that each transaction 
took months to complete. Furthermore, the poor financial state of the companies 
proposed for privatisation also created a delay, as their accounts had to be placed into 
some form of meaningful order (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 17). Usiminas, one of 
the largest of the state steel companies, was chosen as the first company to be 
privatised under the PND. This was significant as the company was both profitable 
and technologically up to date, thus supplying credibility to the programme, but also 
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 Article 1 of Law 8,031 states the main purpose of the PND – 1. To change the federal strategic 
approach to economic policy through the transfer of activities unduly performed by the public sector 
to private initiative (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 1999: 15). 
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 The committee consisted of 12 to 15 members, nominated by the President, with only five of these 
members belonging to the government. They were subject to approval by Congress.  
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 These securities, which were mostly unpaid government debts, became commonly known as 
‘moedas podres’ (rotten or junk money) (Montero, 1999: 44).  
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indicating that privatisation had shifted from the state merely divesting itself of 
unprofitable and dying enterprises, to a concerted and focused effort to privatise 
(Velasco, 1999: 10). However, the government had to settle 37 different lawsuits 
concerning the sale of Usiminas  before it could be sold and this pattern replicated 
itself with other privatisation attempts right up to 1997, further delaying progress 
(Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 16). By October 1992, the PND had sold only 17 
firms, generating US$3.9 billion, a figure well-short of the initial government 
projection (Montero, 1999: 39).    
However, by the end of 1992, it appeared as if Collor’s reform attempts 
would be cut short. Mounting opposition to his imperial Presidential style, the lack of 
any party structure to support his initiatives, and the emergence of a corruption 
scandal, ultimately led to Collor’s impeachment in late 1992 and his forced 
resignation from the Presidency (Weyland, 1998: 79).103 Collor’s dramatic exit 
spelled problems for the PND, as Collor’s successor, Itamar Franco, the Vice-
President, had none of Collor’s enthusiasm for the programme. Franco had been a 
long-time defender of public steel and mining companies in his home state of Minas 
Gerais and he had actually opposed the privatisation of Usiminas (Montero, 1999: 
50). Franco replaced Modiano with Antônio Barros de Castro as President of 
BNDES, and Castro’s deputy, Marcos Vianna, took over the PND. Both had been 
key economists during the state-led development strategy of the 1970s (Montero, 
1999: 50). Initially, Franco attempted to freeze the PND for three months, during 
which all procedures of the PND were fully examined. But, mounting fiscal and 
inflationary pressure, together with the continued activity of BNDES staff supportive 
of privatisation, prompted Franco to continue the PND (Goldstein, 1999: 684; 
Montero, 1999). In December 1992, Franco signed a decree re-activating the PND, 
but with an emphasis on cash payment rather than debt securities (Montero, 1999: 
51).  
In 1993, the new Minister of Finance, Fernando Enrique Cardoso, launched 
his stabilisation programme, the Real Plan, which managed to bring inflation down 
from an annualised rate of 7,736 per cent in the first half of 1994, to 91.7 per cent by 
the second half of the year (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 14). Cardoso, together with 
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 The corruption scandal was focused on two main issues. Firstly, it emerged that Collor and 
members of his administration had moved large sums out of Brazil, days before they launched the 
Collor Plan, freezing all savings, and secondly, it emerged that key members of his administration 
were taking bribes from various groups. See Weyland (1998).  
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Pérsio Arida (the new head of BNDES who replaced Castro in 1993), spearheaded 
the preparation of Decree 362, which stipulated that all live money generated by 
privatisation be used to reduce public debt. The decree also allowed foreign investors 
to buy up to 100 per cent of the shares of public companies that were up for sale 
(Montero, 1999: 52).104 Decree 1,068 also changed the privatisation law to include 
all minority shares held by the state in a number of companies (Goldstein, 1999: 
682). Ironically, although Franco was initially hostile to privatisation, new 
privatisations under his administration generated US$2 billion, with 72 per cent of 
these sales now taking the form of cash (Montero, 1999: 53).  
By the end of the Collor/Franco reign, 33 companies had been privatised, 
with revenues of nearly US$8 billion, and transfer to the private sector of US$3.3 
billion in debt. The vast majority of the companies sold were in the manufacturing 
sector, with the revenues concentrated in the steel, petrochemical and fertilizer 
industries (Pinheiro, 2000: 16).  
 Again, there are a number of important points to note about this period of 
privatisation. There was considerable opposition to the PND during this period, led 
by the PT and Lula, and allied with the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (Central 
Worker’s Confederation – CUT), and the Central Geral dos Trabalhadores (General 
Worker’s Union – CGT) (Montero, 1999: 47). Lula was committed to strengthening 
the state and for him, the solution to the ailing Brazilian economy, was to rescue the 
state, rather than liquidate it. He promoted an end to privatisation and in specific 
cases, the nationalisation of banks, transport, education and health (Valença, 2002: 
127). In response, in early 1992, Modiano, the then-head of the BNDES, proposed 
the use of US$1.5 billion owed by the federal treasury for a forced savings scheme 
for severance pay called the Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço (Guaranteed 
Fund for Service Time – FGTS). This would enable the FGTS to be converted, at the 
discretion of workers, into moedas sociais (social money) and then into Certificates 
of Privatisation (CPs) at the banks with a 70 per cent discount.105 This would, 
according to BNDES, democratise the privatisation process (Montero, 1999: 47-48). 
By June 1995, more than 105,000 workers in the public sector had purchased shares, 
averaging 10 per cent of the total shares for each public firm up for sale. Labour 
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 Foreign investors were allowed to participate in privatisations under the PND, but the law 
stipulated that they could acquire no more than 40 per cent of any company, unless they received 
special prior approval from Congress (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 1999: 14).  
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 One of the debt securities utilised in the early phases of the privatisation process. 
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purchased US$290 million in shares, which, by 1995, were worth more than US$1 
billion (Montero, 1999: 48). This BNDES scheme had the desired effect of splitting 
the PT/CUT/CGT alliance against privatisation. For example, union leaders opposed 
the sale of Embraer in 1994, but rank and file members, wishing to gain from the 
FGTS, threatened to leave the union. Likewise, during the privatisation of Acesita, 
local leaders of the metallurgical union sided with the investors against the wishes of 
the national union, which opposed all steel privatisations (Montero, 1999: 49).  
The PND provided an institutional and legal framework for the policy of 
privatisation that continues to exist. Furthermore, BNDES, which is functionally 
independent of the government and now, head of the PND, continued to play an 
important role in the policy. Indeed, although Franco was initially resistant to 
privatisation, one of the reasons the policy continued was because of the ‘continued 
activities of proponents of privatisation in the BNDES’ (Montero, 1999: 52). This 
combination of the institutional framework of the PND and the autonomy of BNDES 
ensured that ‘despite significant political challenges to this policy constituency, the 
embedded autonomy of Brazilian privatisation guaranteed the continuation of the 
process’ (Montero, 1999: 54). This embedded policy structure proved sufficient to 
resist opposition from below (labour, Lula and the PT), and from above (Franco) 
(Montero, 1999: 54).  
 Secondly, the influence of international capital can also be witnessed during 
this period. As the failure of Collor’s first stabilisation plan became increasingly 
evident, the government began to rely on the PND as proof of its commitment to 
structural reform (Pinheiro, 2000: 16), ‘a sort of ‘seal-of-quality’ for economic 
policy, a sign of commitment to market orientated reforms… for attracting capital 
inflows’ (Pinheiro & Giambiagi: 2000: 14).  
 The appointment of Cardoso as Minster of Finance, and the subsequent 
success of the Real plan, was to have a significant impact in boosting his popularity 
during the electoral campaign of 1994. Cardoso, who had been convinced of the 
benefits of privatisations during his tenure as Minister, and instrumental in altering 
the PND to become more overarching, was to become responsible for instigating the 
largest and most aggressive phase in the Brazilian privatisation process during his 
two terms as President.  
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3.4 The Election of Fernando Enrique Cardoso 
The success of the Real Plan, and Cardoso’s resulting popularity propelled him to 
run in the 1994 election for the Partido de Social Democracia Brasileira PSDB 
(Power, 2002).106 The PSDB had traditionally allied themselves with Brazil’s 
socialist and left-wing parties, but in order to gain support in the conservative 
Northeast, they shocked the Brazilian system by announcing an electoral alliance 
with the right of centre Partido de Frente Liberal (PFL) (Power, 2002: 623-624).107 
This was one of the first indications that Cardoso and the PSDB were preparing to 
shift the traditional social democrat platform of the party to a more market-friendly 
platform.108 During the election, Cardoso successfully played on the fear generated 
by the increasing popularity of the left, particularly Lula and the PT (Weyland, 
1998), and frequently ridiculed the policy positions of these politicians as atrasados 
(backwards) (Power, 2002: 624).  
The resounding success of the Real Plan had endeared Cardoso to the 
electorate, and he won the election outright, avoiding a run-off (Power, 2002: 624). 
Cardoso’s economic policy was based on ‘economic pragmatism,’ a new perspective 
on policy-making that had emerged in the Brazilian state following the fiasco of the 
Cruzado Plan. Economic pragmatism was heavily critical of ‘economic populism,’ 
and continually questioned the inability of governments to deal effectively with 
inflation (Faro de Castro & Valladāo de Carvalho, 2003: 478). This policy gave 
emphasis to monetary stability and external constraints and a core tenet of this 
pragmatism was privatisation (Faro de Castro & Valladāo de Carvalho, 2003: 481; 
Goldstein, 1999: 685). 
      The performance of the Brazilian economy improved dramatically after 
the implementation of the Real Plan. During Cardoso’s first term in office, there was, 
on average, an annual inflation rate of 8.2 per cent, an expansion of GDP of 2.7 per 
cent per annum and an investment rate of 17.1 per cent of GDP (Pinheiro & 
Giambiagi, 2000: 16). The main achievement of the Real plan was the extraordinary 
price stability that it brought to the Brazilian economy.109 However, there was a 
downside to this low level of inflation. When Cardoso assumed office in January 
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1995, the government was in a rather precarious position, as without the ‘crutch’ of 
inflation, ‘deficits could no longer be finessed, and the election-driven deficits of 
most state governments came due in harsh real terms’ (Fleischer, 1998: 123). 
Realising that there may be some knock-on effects from the Mexican crisis, the 
Central Bank was forced to intervene in Brazil’s two largest state-owned banks, the 
Bank of São Paulo and the Bank of Rio de Janeiro and in 1995, instigated the 
emergency programme, Programa de Estímulo à Reestruturação e ao 
Fortalecimento do Sistema Financeiro Nacional (PROER), in order to rescue private 
banks. Once in power, the Cardoso government were facing progressively worse 
deficits (Fleischer, 1998: 123). One policy that could alleviate this pressure was 
privatisation, as this ‘would generate resources needed to sustain the Real Plan 
during this crucial transition period’ (Fleischer, 1998: 123). Cardoso wasted little 
time in instigating the longest, most important and most difficult phase of 
privatisations in Brazil. This phase was to have such a profound effect that it would 
inevitably ‘change the role of the public and private sectors in the economy to an 
extent not anticipated in earlier stages’ (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 18).  
 However, before Cardoso could begin this wave of privatisations, he needed 
to reform a number of political institutions. Firstly, in January 1995, provisional 
measure 841 replaced the Privatisation Directive Committee, with the National 
Privatisation Council (CND), which was to be permanently composed of five 
ministers, as well as by ministers with sector competencies, and the President of the 
Central Bank when privatisations in the financial sector were being discussed 
(Goldstein, 1999: 682). This in effect, brought the management of privatisation 
closer to the central government, although the PND and the role of BNDES remained 
intact (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 18). Secondly and more importantly, if Cardoso 
was truly to widen the scope of the PND, he needed to alter the constitution. As 
noted earlier, the 1988 constitution mandated for state monopolies in a number of 
key areas, and essentially served as an institutional barrier to any large-scale 
programme of privatisation.  
 The constitutional revision proposed to transfer to federal states the right to 
distribute gas directly or through a concession; to abolish Article 171 of the 
Constitution, eliminating any distinction between foreign and domestic owned firms; 
to modify Article 21 of the Constitution to allow private investment in 
telecommunications; and to alter Article 177 allowing private investors to operate in 
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the oil and gas industries (Goldstein, 1999: 682). Furthermore, the enactment of the 
Concessions Law (Law 8,987) regulating Article 175 of the Constitution, introduced 
new rules for the governing of public services. The most significant of these was the 
right of large consumers to choose their own suppliers, ending the local monopolies 
imposed by law (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 18). The amendments to the 
Constitution were quickly passed by the Chamber of Deputies and were ratified, with 
no changes, by the Senate after the July recess (Fleischer, 1998). At a crucial point in 
the Chamber deliberations on the revisions, there was a national strike by petroleum 
workers. This was to be of enormous benefit to Cardoso, who utilised this event to 
reduce opposition to his proposed constitutional amendments. As Fleischer (1998: 
124) notes: 
A well-organised media campaign painted the workers as enemies of 
the people, especially the lower classes and inflamed public opinion in 
favour of the reforms, while the government orchestrated emergency 
oil imports from Argentina and the armies occupied the refineries to 
secure them from ‘destruction.’ 
The state monopolies on telecommunications, subsoil resources, electricity, coastal 
shipping and gas distribution were essentially broken, while the monopoly in 
petroleum was severely damaged. Foreign investors were no longer discriminated 
against and were free to participate in forthcoming privatisations. The constitution no 
longer served as an institutional barrier to privatisation, and Cardoso was free to 
significantly widen the scope of the programme. 
 This was achieved with the delegation of privatisation to the state level, and 
the extension of the PND to other sectors.110 Once the sale of all the manufacturing 
state enterprises had been completed, privatisation was extended to public enterprises 
in mining, electricity, railways, ports, roads, telecommunications, water, sanitation 
and banking. During this period, ‘privatisation had to overcome a series of life or 
death obstacles’ (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 20) and was subject to intense 
negotiations among legislators (Velasco, 2006: 250-258).111 The process began with 
the sale of Light in 1996, one of the largest state enterprises in the electricity sector 
and reached its apogee with the sale of Telebrás in 1998, holder of the state 
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monopoly in telecommunications and the largest privatisation carried out in the 
world that year (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 20).112 
 At the same time, Cardoso and his government were moving to establish 
independent regulators in the areas that had been newly privatised. Following the 
approval of the General Telecommunications Law in 1997, the Brazilian 
telecommunications agency (Anatel) was established. In the electricity sector Aneel, 
the sector regulator was created, together with the Energy Wholesale Market (MAE) 
and the National Systems Operator (ONS), while Anp became the sector regulator 
for the petroleum industry (Pinheiro, 2000: 22-24). These three main agencies all 
have rules that provide the directors with stability of tenure, so they can be only be 
removed with judicial condemnation (Mueller, 2001: 636). They are considered 
independent, given that they have their own source of income, and they must follow 
rules that ensure their actions remain transparent.113 More importantly, as Mueller 
(2001: 637) notes, these agencies ‘were created by a specific coalition (Cardoso – 
PSDB/PFL) that…established their structure and process so as to assure outcomes 
favourable to groups that support the coalition,’ ensuring any subsequent 
administration would be hampered in altering regulatory policy.  
Privatisation had clearly entered a new phase, one that reflected a desire to 
substantially remove the state from the economy. The Asian Crisis in 1997 ensured 
that privatisation once again became a central policy issue for the government, and 
particularly for the success of the Real Plan (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 20-21). 
The amounts received as a result of the privatisation process had become macro-
economically significant for the first time and privatisation would also give Brazil 
the edge over countries that might become susceptible to speculative attacks in the 
wake of the Asian crisis. As such, ‘privatisation was seen as a kind of safety net or 
bridge to stability, affording the country some leeway for resolving its two main 
disequilibria, the current account and fiscal deficits’ (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 
21). By the end of Cardoso’s first term in office, the Brazilian state had divested 
itself of 136 state enterprises (Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2005), 
generating nearly US$75 billion in revenues (Tomic, 2006:58). By 1998 ‘the entire 
telecommunications and railway sectors, the largest ports, some of the main 
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highways, much of the electricity distribution and generation sectors, and some water 
and sanitation services had been transferred to private control’ (Treisman, 2003: 94).  
 Cardoso was able to run in the 1998 general election as a result of his earlier 
endeavours to revise the constitution to allow presidents to run for a second 
consecutive term (this amendment was passed in 1997). Cardoso replicated the 1994 
ticket and alliance with the PFL, and was elected with 52 per cent of the popular vote 
in the first round of elections in October 1998 (Power, 2002: 624-625). However, 
Cardoso’s second term was beset by economic woes. Rising interest rates as a result 
of the Asian Crisis placed severe pressure on government debt and this, coupled with 
the exit of US$30 billion belonging to risk-averse investors from the economy in 
1999, led to the devaluation of the Real (Heymann, 2001: 16; Bulmer-Thomas, 1999: 
731; Kaminsky et al., 2003: 51).114 This produced a change in outlook for the 
economy in general and for privatisation in particular. ‘The drop in government 
credibility, the contraction of the GDP, and a perception of increased risk all 
contributed to depress real asset values and make privatisation a difficult endeavour 
in 1999’ (Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 24). Consequently, the pace of privatisation 
slowed significantly, and there was a shift in priorities in terms of the utility of this 
policy. In particular, privatisation was utilised during the second Cardoso term as a 
means to strengthen the stock market through the use of large flotations in order to 
sell the shares of former state enterprises. During the sale of Petrobrás shares in 
August 2000, 337,000 individuals bought shares, a record in Brazil (Pinheiro, 2000: 
20).  
 By the end of Cardoso’s second term only 31 companies had been sold, albeit 
generating nearly US$17 billion in revenue. The majority of these privatisations were 
in the infrastructure sector (roads, water, sanitation, ports and electricity), with some 
in financial services and energy (Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2005; World 
Bank Privatisation Database, 2007). With the sale of the container terminal in Port 
Suape in 2002, Cardoso’s privatisation drive came to an end. In the space of eight 
years he had managed to privatise 167 state enterprises, and generate over US$90 
billion in revenue (Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2005; World Bank 
Privatisation Database, 2007), ensuring that Brazil’s privatisation programme was 
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one of the largest in Latin America (Tomic, 2006). Cardoso had significantly 
widened the scope of the existing PND, created independent regulators in a number 
of sectors to ensure policy continuity, and altered existing institutional arrangements, 
all in order to achieve this level of privatisation.     
 Several factors contributed to the success of Cardoso’s privatisation drive. 
Firstly, the success of the Real Plan in finally applying the brakes to inflation gave 
the government the political leverage it badly needed to ensure that the necessary 
constitutional revisions were passed by Congress. Secondly, when Cardoso widened 
the privatisation process beyond the federal level, the states saw in privatisation an 
important source of funding, which would become crucial in allowing them to reduce 
their debt to the federal government. Finally, the success of the privatisations carried 
out in 1991-1994 and the resultant increased efficiency of these firms, helped widen 
support for privatisation among the electorate (Pinheiro, 2000: 17-18).  
 Again, there are a number of important points to note about this period of 
privatisation. Cardoso, in altering the 1988 constitution, essentially removed the 
main institutional barrier to privatisation in Brazil. Furthermore, by the end of 
Cardoso’s tenure in government, the PND constituted a legal and institutional 
framework for privatisation, managed by BNDES, which enjoyed a significant level 
of autonomy from the government. The creation of industry regulators in 
telecommunications, electricity and petroleum, ensured that regulation remained 
favourable to those in support of privatisation (Mueller, 20001: 637). These actions 
have ensured that privatisation in Brazil now exists within an institutional framework 
that enjoys relative autonomy from the Executive (Mueller, 2001).  
 Although opposition to this period of privatisation was fierce, mainly from 
public sector worker’s unions allied with the PT, Cardoso continued to follow the 
divide and conquer method introduced by BNDES in the last phase of privatisation. 
He appeased them with short-term spending and higher salaries (Treisman, 2003: 
102), and continued to encourage workers to benefit individually from the 
privatisation process through the moedas sociais scheme. By 1999, almost 150,000 
employees had become shareholders in privatised enterprises (Treisman, 2003: 102). 
Cardoso reduced the support of the public sector workers among the general 
electorate by vilifying them. When the oil workers went on strike in May 1995, 
Cardoso fired the ringleaders and labelled them as ‘enemies of the people,’ a move 
augmented by a sophisticated media campaign (Treisman, 2003; Fleischer, 1998: 
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124). All this had the cumulative affect of ensuring that, ‘although various unions 
and the PT did protest privatisations actively, they were too isolated to have much 
effect’ (Treisman, 2003: 102).    
 Finally, the effect of economic globalisation and international capital can be 
clearly witnessed in this period in maintaining the importance of privatisation as a 
policy. Privatisation in Brazil had always been closely related to macroeconomic 
stabilisation (Pinheiro, 2000; Treisman, 2003), but with the onset of the Asian Crisis 
in 1997, privatisation acted as a sign of commitment to fundamental reforms to an 
already jittery market. Privatisation ensured that Brazil continued to attract large 
volumes of foreign direct investment, which, in turn, helped to finance the high 
current account deficit (Pinheiro, 2000: 19; Pinheiro & Giambiagi, 2000: 22).115  
 
3.5 The Legacy of Privatisation in Brazil 
After nearly two decades, a transition to democracy and the stewardship of four 
civilian Presidents, Brazil had divested itself of approximately 210 public enterprises 
at the federal and state level, in a process that had generated over US$105 billion 
(Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2005: 5). The entire telecommunications and 
railway sectors, the largest ports, the main highways, the majority of the electricity 
distribution and generation sectors, practically all the former state-owned enterprises 
in the manufacturing sector, and some water and sanitation services had been 
transferred to private control. More importantly, this process occurred within the 
framework of the PND, which now had institutional and legal backing and a 
manager, in the form of BNDES, that enjoyed relative autonomy from the executive. 
Independent regulators had been established in a number of sectors, and opposition 
to privatisation, mainly from the unions and the PT, had been neutralised through the 
use of a number of clever carrot and stick tactics. Privatisation had become generally 
accepted by both the policy-makers and the Brazilian electorate. 
 However, by 2002, approximately 50 state enterprises still existed at the 
federal level, with a further 200 at the state level.116 Brazil still controlled some 
enterprises in the electricity sector, some state banks, and the reinsurance monopoly, 
a large part of the sewage and water sanitation sectors, substantial assets in the oil 
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and gas sectors, together with the transportation and banking sectors. This is not to 
mention the outsourcing of activities in the public sector, such as mail, vehicle 
inspection, garbage etc. However, privatisation has completely altered the traditional 
role of the state in Brazil, and by the time Lula came to power in 2002, the majority 
of the large federally controlled enterprises had been sold, with an increasing number 
at the state level. In two decades, privatisation had become an integral part of 
Brazilian stabilisation and macro-economic management, a process which had 
evolved to such an extent, that it would be very difficult for subsequent governments 
to halt or reverse (Mueller, 2001; Pinheiro, 2000).   
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Chapter Four – Privatisation under Lula 
The victory of Lula and the PT in October 2002 was widely seen as a major 
departure from traditional politics in Brazil. The PT emerged from a serious of major 
strikes in the 1970s that undermined the military government and was widely seen as 
the only true ideological party in Brazil, with extensive links to ‘new unionism’ 
(Branford & Kucinski, 2005; Flynn, 2005). Lula had contested three elections before 
2002 and had contested all three on an anti-poverty, anti-elitist and anti-privatisation 
platform (Branford & Kucinski, 2005). His platform for 2002, while more moderate, 
still encompassed those three key elements and his victory was hailed as a victory for 
change. Indeed, Lula started his inaugural speech with the word mudança (change) 
and proposed an end to privatisations in Brazil (Flynn, 2005: 1222). The previous 
chapter demonstrated that privatisation in Brazil from the mid-1970s until 2002 
occurred within an institutional and legal framework. It remained to be seen whether 
Lula could actually change this policy. 
 This chapter is the analysis of privatisation policy during Lula’s Presidency. 
It will attempt to determine if Lula and the PT managed to completely halt or 
rollback privatisation once they were in power. It is divided into two main parts. The 
first part takes the form of a narrative and briefly outlines the 2002 election and the 
transition to power. This section is important as it will establish the motivations and 
preferences of Lula’s government. The second section of the narrative actually 
examines the policy of privatisation once Lula is in power. The second part of this 
chapter is the analysis, and this analysis is grouped around the independent variables 
identified in chapter two. The final section will present the conclusion. 
 
The Narrative  
4.1 The 2002 Election 
Lula and the PT traditionally opposed all privatisations in Brazil, and in previous 
election campaigns had advocated the re-nationalisation of privatised enterprises. In 
the initial stages of the 2002 Presidential election campaign, the position of Lula was 
not vastly different. Cardoso and his market-friendly policies were the subject of 
much of Lula’s scorn, with Lula claiming that Cardoso’s policies had left an herança 
maldita (accursed legacy), which was the root cause of the 1999 devaluation of the 
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Real (Samuels, 2006: 6).117 As such, privatisation had been a central component of 
Cardoso’s reforms and from the outset, Lula clearly displayed his hostility to this 
policy. Lula, who compared privatisation to economic rape,118 began his campaign 
by urging the Cardoso government to halt all planned privatisations in the electricity 
sector, scathingly claiming that the government should not ‘sell off electricity 
companies for the price of a banana.’119 In a letter to Folha de São Paulo, Lula 
threatened to review all privatisations in the electricity sector,120 before claiming that, 
if elected, he would renationalise all privatised electricity generating companies: 
‘The PT has already manifested its desire to nationalise Furnas if the government 
decides to privatise it. We will do the same with all privatisations.’121 Luiz Pinguelli 
Rosa, Lula’s main energy advisor,122 re-iterated Lula’s stance, proclaiming: ‘We are 
not planning on carrying out any privatisation if a Lula government is elected.’123  
 The PT’s programme for government, Concepção e Diretrizes do Programa 
de Governo do PT para o Brasil (Conception and Direction of the Programme for 
Government of the PT for Brazil), although a more moderate programme than 
previous years, clearly demonstrated that the PT would not be willing to follow the 
economic policies of Cardoso.124 Highly critical of Cardoso and his market model, 
the document was entitled ‘A Ruptura Necesária’ (the Necessary Break), and 
emphasised government intervention and poverty reduction as the cornerstone of PT 
policy (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2002a). In fact, the strengthening of the state and 
an increased role for the government was seen as complementary to poverty 
reduction. The document also clearly indicated the PT’s sentiments as regards 
privatisations:  
The programme of privatisation…debilitated the infrastructure, 
compromising the systemic competitiveness and growth potential of 
the economy. It provoked also, a rise in the price of essential public 
goods…In short, the programme of privatisation, sponsored by the 
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Federal government, was only good for the transference of wealth, 
accumulated by Brazil over decades, to private and foreign groups 
[Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2002a: parágrafo 6].  
It explicitly stated that ‘the programme of privatisation will be halted, and existing 
privatisations will be evaluated and audited, especially where there exists any 
indication of bad use of public resources, or in areas that relate to national strategic 
resources’ (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2002a: parágrafo 57). The PT programme 
suggested that Lula would attempt to modify the regulatory agencies in the newly 
privatised industrial sectors under Cardoso, and stated that ‘in areas where the 
presence of state-owned companies is still excellent (oil, energy, sanitation and 
banks), this presence will be conserved and consolidated’ (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, 2002a: parágrafo 57). This document was a stark refutation of 
privatisation, indicating that the PT would halt all privatisations, even suggesting the 
possibility of nationalisation. This was a position generally supported by the 
Brazilian electorate. Support for privatisation had dropped to just 33 per cent among 
the electorate by 2003, from a previous high of 51 per cent in 1998 
(Latinobarómetro, 2003).   
 However, following the release of the PT’s election manifesto, the markets 
displayed considerable nervousness with the prospect of a Lula government. Merill 
Lynch and Morgan Stanley downgraded Brazilian bonds from ‘marketweight’ to 
‘overweight,’125 and Fitch, the risk classification agency, lowered Brazil’s credit 
rating,126 while the Bovespa, the Brazilian stock index, fell to three-year lows.127 
Lula, in an effort to quell market anxieties, stated that he would not default on 
Brazil’s debts, and would honour Brazil’s commitments to foreign markets.128 In 
order to portray a more moderate image, the new ‘Lula Light,’ announced his 
ideologically diverse electoral coalition consisting of two left-wing parties, Partido 
Comunista Brasileiro (PCB) and Partido Communista do Brasil (PC do B), one 
centrist party, Partido da Mobilização Nacional (PMN), and one centre-right party, 
Partido Liberal (PL) (Flynn, 2005: 1234). He also chose wealthy businessman, José 
Alencar of the centre-right PL as his running mate.129 The PT’s programme for 
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government was edited, and the title ‘A Ruptura Necessária’ was dropped. However, 
the revised Programa de Governo do PT continued to clearly indicate that the PT did 
not support privatisation, scathingly arguing that: ‘The privatisations and the 
financial embrittlement of the State have debilitated the economic and social 
infrastructure, compromising the competitiveness and potential growth of the 
economy’ (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2002b: parágrafo 13). It still advocated 
government intervention in the economy, and explicitly blamed privatisations for the 
increase in poverty in Brazil, by raising utility tariffs among sectors that could least 
afford them (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2002b: parágrafo 21 & 22). Shortly 
afterwards, José Dirceu, the PT’s President and Lula confidant, reiterated the PT’s 
stance towards privatisation in an interview with the Financial Times: ‘Privatisations 
have been a complete failure. We will review them but that does not mean re-
nationalisation.’130 Lula suggested that he would probe controversial privatisations 
such as telecom firm Telebras and Cia Vale do Rio Doce131 and even José Alencar of 
the PL expressed concern about the pace and extent of privatisations of state-owned 
enterprises.132      
As the election drew nearer and a Lula victory began to look increasingly 
likely, the Bovespa continued to drop in value.133 During the election campaign, 
Brazil’s currency lost more than one-third of its value, its stocks lost more than half 
their value in dollar terms, and its sovereign bonds were trading at default levels.134 
Lula, in a last attempt to assuage investor confidence, wrote the Carta ao Povo 
Brasileiro (Letter to the People of Brazil). This three-page letter was conciliatory in 
tone, but contained no actual policy positions. It continued to criticise the market-
friendly policies of Cardoso: 
If at one time during the 1990s the current model was able to 
awaken hope of economic and social progress, today we are left 
with an enormous feeling of deception. Now after eight years of this 
model, the Brazilian people have determined that the fundamental 
promises have not been fulfilled and their hopes only frustrated. 
The dominant feeling in all classes and in all regions is that the 
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actual model has exhausted itself [Partido dos Trabalhadores, 
2002c: 1].  
Although the PT’s stance had moved from the wholesale re-nationalisation of 
privatised companies that it had advocated in the 1990s, they still clearly indicated 
that there would be no more privatisations under a Lula government and would even 
investigate the validity of existing privatisations, suggesting possible re-
nationalisation in extreme cases. 
Lula’s mixture of interventionist policies, criticism of Cardoso and toned 
down rhetoric ensured he gained the support of a wide swathe of the electorate, who 
had tired of the market-friendly model under Cardoso, and the resultant Real 
devaluation, energy crisis and social inequality, and in the run-off election on 
October 27th Lula became the President of Brazil, earning over 61 per cent of the 
vote giving him a 20 per cent lead over his rival, José Serra of the PSDB.  
 
4.2 Privatisation with Lula in Power 
Once Lula was elected, the markets continued their downward spiral in response to 
the uncertainty surrounding the new government’s economic proposals. Cardoso, in 
an effort to ensure a smooth transition and motivated by the threat of a financial 
crisis, established an Office of Government Transmission, and instructed all his 
Ministers to prepare a livro de transição (book of transition), for the incoming PT 
(Flynn, 2005: 1246). However, this ideal of a smooth transition was soon disrupted 
by Cardoso’s attempt to privatise a number of government banks. The banking sector 
was an area that Lula had categorically claimed would not be privatised in the 
election campaign. He had actually suggested that he would increase the government 
presence in this sector (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 2002a: parágrafo 57). Cardoso 
was planning to sell a minority stake in the Banco do Brasil,135 Brazil’s most 
profitable bank, and also the state banks of Santa Catarina, Maranhão, Piauí and 
Ceará.136 However, the Central Bank, which is responsible for the divestiture of 
financial institutions under the PND, largely ignored PT pressure and continued with 
the planned sales.137 The sale of these banks was, however, prevented before Lula 
assumed office. The Supreme Court granted an injunction to prevent the sale of 
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Banco de Estado Santa Catarina (Besc), due to its very low tender price,138 while the 
Central Bank decided to postpone the sale of Piauí state bank (Bep), due to 
injunctions filed by the state and worker’s unions.139 The auction for the Banco do 
Brasil continued, but, as a result of market uncertainty, there were no bidders 
forthcoming and the sale was shelved. In this initial transition period, Lula clearly 
demonstrated his aversion to privatisation.  
 Lula assumed office on January 1st 2003 and although his governing 
coalition, consisting of eight ideologically diffuse parties ‘was  one of the most 
fragmented coalitions ever formed in a democratic regime’ (Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 
2007: 72), it still failed to provide him with a legislative majority.140 Lula’s new 
cabinet reflected his desire to calm market jitters. Antonio Palocci Filho, an advocate 
of fiscal discipline and good relations with the IMF, was chosen as the new Finance 
Minister. Palocci, previously mayor of Ribeirão Preto, was the only PT municipal 
leader to have experimented with privatisation.141 In February, Palocci signed a letter 
of intent with the IMF that promised to ‘tighten fiscal policy further, targeting a 
primary surplus of 4.5 per cent of GDP in 2003’ (International Monetary Fund, 
2003a: 2). The IMF also continued to provide the government with instalments of a 
US$20 billion loan. As a result of political uncertainty, portfolio investment had fled 
the country in 2002, and the net capital inflow had declined from US$28 billion in 
2001 to US$12 billion by 2002.142 As such, the IMF loan was essential in order to 
shore up Brazil’s faltering financial system.Surprisingly, Lula also appointed a 
former PSDB deputy, Henrique Meirelles, as head of the Central Bank.143 However, 
despite this seemingly market-friendly shift, the new administration appeared to 
remain resolute when it came to privatisation. Luiz Pinguelli, Lula’s new 
appointment as head of the state electricity firm Eletrobrás, announced that there 
would be no more privatisations while Lula was in office,144 a sentiment echoed by 
José Dirceu, the PT’s Chief of Staff, and a member of Lula’s inner circle.145 
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 These sentiments appeared to be reflected in the actions of the government 
when Robert Jefferson, leader of the PT bloc in the Chamber of Deputies, announced 
the submission of a bill to congress ordering a review of the regulatory agencies 
created during the privatisations under Cardoso. Jefferson accused these agencies of 
having a parallel power with the government that ‘even the President can’t 
dismiss.’146 Lula also publicly criticised the agencies, blaming them for utility tariff 
hikes that were fuelling inflation, while holding back up to 50 per cent of the 
agencies’ budget in an effort to exert pressure on the heads of the agencies to 
resign.147 Lula, through medida provisória 144/03, proposed altering the regulatory 
model of the electricity sector. Specifically, this decree stipulated that ANEEL would 
no longer have the power to offer concessions; secondly, it would create two separate 
electricity markets, one where prices are set freely and a second government-
regulated market; and thirdly and more importantly, it proposed that the state 
electricity company, Eletrobrás, and its subsidiaries Eletronorte, Chesf, Furnas and 
Eletrosul would be exempt from the PND.148 The opposition immediately challenged 
this decree in the Supreme Court as it contradicted the PND, but the government 
managed to get it passed in Congress at the end of January 2004 before the court had 
finished their deliberations. It was only passed as Lula, six days earlier, had brought 
the PMDB into his governing coalition ensuring that he had the necessary majority in 
Congress. Lula submitted his final bill to reform the remaining regulatory agencies to 
Congress in April 2004, but this bill did not drastically reduce the power of the 
regulators.149 Moreover, it was praised by the World Bank as an advance on previous 
regulatory designs and was not considered ideological in nature (Lock, 2005: 55).  
 During this period when Lula was attempting to gain greater control in the 
electricity sector, AES, the US firm which bought Eletropaulo, one of Brazil’s main 
electricity generators in 1998, announced in January 2003 it would be unable to 
repay an US$85 million instalment of a US$1.2 billion loan it had received from 
BNDES to finance this privatisation.150 Amid rumours of re-nationalisation, and 
nervous trepidation on the parts of investors and portfolio markets, Luiz Pinguelli 
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Rosa, the Lula appointed head of Eletrobrás, suggested federalising the company,151 
while Dilma Roussef, Minister of Energy, told the Financial Times that ‘if they don’t 
pay, we’ll take the assets back.’152 After AES had missed another payment deadline, 
the government announced that it would take over control over Eletropaulo.153 
However, following a legal challenge filed by Eletronet, a subsidiary of AES in 
Brazil, a judge issued an injunction on May 29th, preventing BNDES from taking 
over the shares.154 In the face of a lengthy legal challenge, the government and 
BNDES agreed to a debt-for-equity deal in order to settle the matter.155 The Lula 
government, which had in the early days of the election campaign said it would 
renationalise companies in the electricity sector, when presented with a reasonable 
opportunity to do so, decided to forgo this measure.  
 While Lula’s legislative activities, attempting to reform the regulatory 
agencies and preventing the remaining state energy companies from being privatised, 
appeared to indicate that he was determined to halt privatisations in Brazil, the 
Programa Nacional de Desestatização (PND) continued to quietly operate. The 
previous delegation of privatisation to the PND somewhat protected this policy from 
Lula. Decree 1,068 of March 1994, authorised all minority shareholdings of any 
entities controlled by the federal government to be included in the privatisation 
process and accordingly, under this law the National Privatisation Council (CND) 
privatised the state’s interests in five firms in 2003. Brazil’s shares in Liasa were 
sold in June, while the state’s shares in Celpa, Enersul, Celpe and BeP were 
privatised in December of that year (Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2003: 
10). Meanwhile in September, the CND and ANEEL, the electricity regulatory 
agency, began the process of privatising seven electric transmission facilities across 
Brazil. The privatisation of electric transmission facilities, and the right of ANEEL to 
offer these concessions, had been included in the PND under Decree 4,426 of 
October 2002, and Decree 4,023 of November 2001 (Programa Nacional de 
Desestatização, 2003: 11). In February 2004, the CND began the privatisation of a 
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further fourteen facilities, 156 followed by the privatisation of nine more facilities in 
May.157 By November 2005, ANEEL had completed another auction, selling seven 
more transmission facilities throughout Brazil.158 The same year also witnessed 
ANEEL supervise the sale of the concession contract for the Campo Novos power 
plant, and the sale of the Cuiaba to Itumbiara transmission line for US$60 million 
(Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2005).  
Even the Transport Ministry began to consider privatisations. As a result of 
the recommendations of the CND, BNDES and also ANTT, the land transport 
regulator, the Ministry agreed to privatise eight lots of federal railroads in June 2005, 
amounting to nearly 3,000 kilometres of railway,159 while lines on the Rio metro 
system were sold for US$408 million (Programa Nacional de Desestatização, 2005). 
The privatisation of federal highways had begun under Cardoso, but was halted in 
2000, when the CND recommended revising the programme. Once this revision was 
finished in 2003, the CND recommended the next stage of the federal highways 
privatisation programme and Lula, lacking legislative support and desperately 
needing investment in infrastructure, agreed.160 The CND approved the model for the 
sale of nearly 3,000 kilometres of highway, and the management privatisation 
process began in April 2006.161 A further surprising move came in 2004, when the 
state water sanitation company Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de São 
Paulo was privatised for US$210 million. Water and sanitation were an area that the 
PT had specifically stated would not be privatised both in their manifesto and in 
campaign speeches.   
All this came amid an announcement by the Social Security Minister, Ricardo 
Berzoini, that ‘credit cooperatives and the private pension fund sector have been 
overlooked by previous administrations,’162 followed by the introduction of a pension 
fund reform bill to Congress that would allow private companies to operate in the 
pension sector.163 Pension reform was a priority for the government. The previous 
administration had managed to have amendments to the pension system passed, 
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before the Supreme Court deemed them unconstitutional. Furthermore, the PT had 
previously been one of the main sources of opposition to any reform of the social 
security system (Alston et al.2006: 69). However, by the time Lula arrived in power, 
the public sector deficit had grown to nearly US$14 billion164 and by 2002, about 3.5 
million public servants and dependents, a tiny proportion of the entire population, 
were absorbing R$39 billion in retirement benefits, an amount larger than the total 
federal health budget (Flynn, 2005: 1229). Lula proposed to cap retirement benefits, 
extend public sector service time, levy pensions to retired civil servants and limit the 
pensions to widows and orphans (Flynn, 2005: 1229-1230). Lula attempted to build a 
broad consensus for his reform through the Council for Economic and Social 
Development (CDES) and through negotiations with the twenty-seven governors,165 
but even the support of his own party began to look dubious as members of the 
radical wing of the PT began criticising the government’s proposed reforms before 
they had even been submitted to Congress.166 Worker’s unions also attacked the 
government, claiming that the creation of complementary pension funds would 
ultimately end up privatising public pensions,167 forcing Lula to seek support for his 
reforms among the opposition PSDB.168 
The financial markets reacted extremely favourably to Lula’s orthodox and 
conservative approach to economic management, and also to his proposed social 
security reforms. By the end of April, the benchmark C-Bond had risen to nearly 1.5 
per cent, contributing to a 4% reduction in Brazil’s country risk (the spread between 
Brazilian bond yields and comparable US treasuries – EMBI+).169 The markets 
favourable perception of the Lula administration was further bolstered with the 
successful issue of Lula’s first sovereign bond issue, and in response to the fact that 
demand for the sovereign exceeded the US$750 million issue threefold, the Bovespa 
index rose by 2 per cent.170 Within hours of the bond launch, Standard & Poor’s 
revised the sovereign’s long-term outlook to stable from negative, and Real 
strengthened on expectations of renewed foreign investment.171 In fact, by the end of 
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Lula’s first year in power, mainly as a result of his orthodox economic strategy, 
Standard & Poor’s upgraded the outlook on Brazilian bonds from stable to positive, 
and the Bovespa had reached a 43 month high.172  
Lula, reluctant to allow the CND to carry out any large-scale full 
privatisations and desperately needing foreign investment, unveiled his plans for a 
public-private partnership initiative. The generic concept of public-private 
partnerships first appeared in Brazil in 1996 under Cardoso and the pluri-annual plan 
of 1996-1999, and gained in importance between 2000 and 2003 when private 
partners accounted for nearly 28 per cent of all investments.173 Due to his lack of 
support in Congress, Lula issued a provisional decree on the issue in order to move 
the bill to the top of the legislative agenda,174 but in August 2004, Congress refused 
to deal with any of Lula’s executive decrees, and the situation was compounded 
when his own government allies refused to back his initiative. Their main complaint 
was the fact that the government had promised the allied parties R$874 million in 
order to fund their own projects, but Lula had only provided them with R$46 million. 
Eventually, in November, he instructed the finance ministry to release R$600 million 
in order to end the three month impasse in Congress.175 A month later the Senate 
approved the law followed shortly afterwards by the lower house.176 Under the new 
law, partnerships would be managed by specially created companies consisting of 
both private and public enterprises. More importantly, it mandated for the creation of 
a fundo garantidor (guaranteed fund), which would ensure a minimum return to 
investors on all projects.177 The states soon followed suit, with Minas Gerais offering 
250 kilometres of highway under the new programme, and Bahia tendering an 
underwater pipeline in the city of Salvador, despite virulent opposition from unions 
who viewed the public-private partnership bill as privatisation in disguise.178 Indeed, 
this was a sentiment echoed by industry observers. As one commentator noted: ‘the 
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PPP does not represent alternatives or even a retreat from the privatisation 
programme implemented in the 1990s.’179   
 However, the biggest surprise came in November 2003, when it was 
announced, much to the chagrin of the opposition and the left-leaning wing of Lula’s 
PT party that the privatisations of the state and federal banks, which Lula had 
opposed during the transition period, were to go ahead.180 The four banks were 
federalised in 1996 and according to the law under the PND were placed under the 
control of the Central Bank in readiness for their privatisation. The National 
Privatisation Council (CND) had already approved the privatisation of these banks 
under Resolution CND 24 of 2001. Furthermore, the sale of the state banks was also 
encouraged by a financial report released by Merrill Lynch that suggested that the 
sale of these banks, would not only be a positive development for Brazil, but would 
also represent good value for investors.181  The independent Conselho Monetaria 
Nacional (National Monetary Council – CMN), under Resolution 3,154 of December 
2003, established the procedures through which this stock would be sold (Programa 
Nacional de Desestatização, 2003: 17). So, they were ready to be sold even before 
Lula came to office. Consequently, on February 10th 2004, Bradesco, Brazil’s largest 
private bank, bought the Banco do Estado de Maranhäo (BEM).182 Despite 
opposition from labour unions and from members of the opposition and parts of the 
PT, the Central Bank announced its intention to continue privatising the Banco 
Estado do Ceará (BEC), Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina (BESC), and the Banco 
do Estado do Piauí (BEP),183 and shortly afterwards Bradesco purchased BEC at an 
auction held on the Bovespa stock market,184 while the Central Bank announced that 
the limit on foreign capital in the federal monolith Banco do Brasil was being lifted 
from 5.6 per cent to 12.5 per cent in preparation for its privatisation.185 Lula had 
strongly opposed the privatisations of these banks and on numerous occasions had 
made statements indicating that he would not privatise either BEM or BEC.186 
Furthermore, the PT’s election manifesto explicitly stated that ‘in areas where the 
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presence of state-owned companies is still excellent (oil, energy, sanitation and 
banks), this presence will be conserved and consolidated’ (Partido dos 
Trabalhadores, 2002a: parágrafo 57). However, although the unions and members of 
his own PT opposed his economic policies, the markets lauded his actions. Foreign 
investors began to return to Brazil in large numbers, and by the end of 2004, foreign 
investors had purchased some US$700 million in initial public offerings of shares in 
Brazilian firms, and some US$1 billion in corporate bonds issued by Petrobrás and 
the Banco do Brasil.187  
 More surprises were to follow when Finance Minister, Antonio Palocci, in an 
interview with the Financial Times announced that the government planned to 
submit a bill to Congress that would end the state monopoly in the reinsurance 
industry and would allow for the privatisation of the Instituto de Reseguros do Brasil 
(IRB).188 The privatisation of IRB had begun under Cardoso when its regulatory 
powers were handed to SUSEP in 1999 in preparation for privatisation. An auction 
was planned in 2000 that would have witnessed the privatisation of a 50 per cent 
stake in the company. However, this auction was prevented when a Federal Judge 
issued an injunction blocking the sale in response to a court petition filed by the PT. 
Although the bill was not actually approved until Lula’s second term, it does 
indicate, in something of a remarkable about-turn, the intent to privatise a major state 
asset, 189 something which Lula had sternly stated that he would not do.190  
 This was followed by the announcement in February 2005 that São Paulo 
state, controlled by Geraldo Alckmin and the PSDB, was planning to privatise one of 
their largest electricity companies, Companhia de Transmissao de Energia Eletrica 
Paulista (CTEEP).191 Under Cardoso, reforms had extended the PND to the state 
level, and delegated the responsibility for these privatisations to the state 
government. Despite Lula’s categorical claims that no major electricity company 
would be privatised in Brazil while he was President, there was little he could 
actually do. CTEEP was soon included in the state privatisation programme and in 
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June 2006 was sold to the Colombian firm Interconeccíon Eléctrica for nearly 
US$1.2 billion.  
In December of 2005, at a specially called ministerial meeting, Antonio 
Palocci announced that the government was to repay its entire US$15.5 billion debt 
to the International Monetary Fund.192 Lula, in a rather triumphal public 
proclamation, claimed: ‘we want to announce to the world: the time of colonisation 
of this country is finished.’193 More was to follow. Only a few days later, Antonio 
Palocci indicated that the government would be repaying the US$5.8 billion it owed 
to the Paris Club, officially freeing the country of any further obligations to 
multilateral creditors,194 precipitating a 12 point fall in the country’s risk.195   
 By the last year of Lula’s first term in office, nearly 3,000 kilometres of 
railways had been privatised, over 3,000 kilometres of federal highways, 37 
electricity transmission facilities had been sold, one major sanitation company, part 
of the Rio metro, the Campo Novos power plant, the São Paulo state-owned CTEEP, 
and two high-profile state banks. This was apart from the plans for a further two state 
banks to be sold, and the most profitable federal bank in the state to be prepared for 
privatisation. The process had also begun to end the state reinsurance monopoly of 
IRB, as well as introducing private funds to the pension sector, which was generally 
seen as a step towards the privatisation of public pensions. Granted, the national 
privatisation programme significantly slowed, but what makes this remarkable is that 
these privatisations occurred under the leadership of a President and party who had 
advocated wholesale re-nationalisation for over a decade, and the end of all 
privatisations in Brazil up to and after the election. The PT had campaigned on a 
platform in the 2002 election that specifically stated that there would be no more 
privatisations under a Lula government, something reaffirmed by the speeches of 
Lula and his closest advisors on numerous occasions. What is more, Lula’s 
conservative economic policies were well received by the markets. In 2006, foreign 
investment in Brazilian capital markets had increased by 91 per cent, the Bovespa 
index had climbed 32.9 per cent,196 market capitalisation rose by 37 per cent, and 
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IPOs of Brazilian firms jumped to 26, higher than any other emerging market 
exchange bar Shanghai and Hong Kong.197 
This thesis argues that the political institutional structure in each state will 
either enable a partisan government to implement their preferences, by increasing 
their institutional control over policy, or to inhibit a partisan government from 
implementing their preferences, by leaving them with little institutional control over 
the policy in question. The policy in question in this instance is privatisation and 
clearly, from the narrative above, we can see that in Brazil, while privatisation did 
slow significantly, it did not stop. Throughout this narrative, the constraining effect 
of the political institutional structure on Lula is clear. Lula’s decree power did enable 
him to protect the state electricity companies from privatisation, but this legislation 
only passed as it was during the brief interval (January to March 2004) when he had 
established a cohesive coalition. Cardoso had delegated the policy of privatisation to 
a number of autonomous institutions and consequently, the privatisation of 
infrastructure and the federal banks could continue. Lula’s strong executive power 
had the ability to curb the power of these institutions, but this was only functional if 
he could form a cohesive coalition but he was unable to do so. As such, Lula’s policy 
preferences were constrained by the institutional structure in Brazil. The next section 
will analyse the privatisations of Lula according to the independent variables 
identified in chapter two.     
 
The Analysis 
4.3 The Political Institutions 
The Brazilian political system is a Presidential system with three branches: the 
Executive, Congress and the Judiciary (Mueller, 2001: 623).The 1988 constitution 
defined the political institutions in Brazil and the powers of the political actors in the 
policy-making process. The driving force behind policies in Brazil is the strong set of 
powers conferred upon the Executive by the Constitution (Alston et al. 2006: 3). 
However, this does not mean that the Executive has unbridled powers. The multi-
party system forces Brazilian executives to forge unstable multi-party coalitions, to 
such an extent that the political system has been called ‘coalition presidentialism’ 
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(see Pereira & Mueller, 2002; Figueiredo & Limongi, 1999; Amorim-Neto, 1994; 
Abranches & Hudson, 1988).     
 
The Executive 
After more than twenty years of military rule, the 1988 Constitution was an attempt 
to move towards a more balanced political system, emphasising principles such as 
decentralisation, transparency, participation, social control and redistribution (Alston 
et al., 2006: 12). Although the constitution represented an attempt to break away 
from Brazil’s authoritarian past, a number of institutional arrangements suggested an 
element of continuity (Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 2007: 75; Alston et al. 2006: 13; 
Mueller, 2001: 623; Mainwaring, 1997: 65). Foremost among these was the 
presupposition of a strong presidency, including prerogatives such as medida 
provisória, veto power, the exclusive right to initiate legislation in certain areas, and 
the power to initiate new legislation (Alston et al. 2006: 13; Pereira, 2002: 11). As 
such, ‘the new constitution continued to allow incommensurate power to the 
Executive relative to other branches of government’ (Mueller, 2001: 623).  
 Article 62 of the 1988 Constitution allows Presidents, in cases of ‘urgency 
and relevance,’ to decree provisional measures with the force of law (medida 
provisória com força de de lei) (Pereira et al., 2005: 184; Mainwaring, 1997: 62), 
allowing the President to enact new legislation promptly and without congressional 
approval (Alston et al., 2006: 18). These decrees would have immediate legal effect, 
but would expire after 30 days if Congress did not convert them into law (Pereira et 
al., 2005: 184). In effect, the Executive previously used this instrument without 
restraint. Between 1998 and 2000, 4,422 decrees were issued and Congress rejected 
only 21 of them (Mueller, 2001: 623). If Congress fails to act on the decree within 
this timeframe, it automatically goes to the top of the legislative agenda; replacing 
items the Congress may currently have been debating (Alston et al., 2006: 18). This 
allows the Executive to force legislation onto the Congressional agenda. 
Furthermore, a number of quasi-constitutional initiatives by the Sarney Presidency 
set the parameters for the use of the medida provisória. The first was to self-
servingly interpret the requisite of urgency; the second was to observe few limits as 
to the policies that could be initiated or altered by decree; while the third was to 
reissue decrees that Congress did not consider within the 30 day timeframe (Pereira 
  - 104 -   
et al., 2005: 184), a practice that was generally tolerated by the Supreme Court 
(Alston et al. 2006: 19).  
 However, following major disagreements in Congress as regards the use of 
decree power, an agreement was reached with Cardoso in September 2001 that 
amended Article 62 of the Constitution (Pereira et al., 2005: 184; Alston et al. 2006: 
19). This amendment limited Presidents to a single reissue of a lapsed decree, and 
reduced ambiguity by specifying a list of areas in which decree power may not be 
utilised. These areas include criminal and electoral law, citizenship rights and 
judicial power.198 This has altered the executive\legislative relations that existed prior 
to 2001 and effectively amounts to a ‘partial rollback of Presidential decree 
authority’ (Alston et al. 2006: 19).     
 The President can resort to the ‘package veto,’ with which entire legislation 
can be rejected, or the ‘partial veto,’ whereby the President can approve articles of a 
bill that he may agree with, while rejecting articles in the same bill that he does not 
(Alston et al. 2006: 19; Mueller, 2001: 624). The 1988 Constitution allows for 
Congress to override this veto relatively easily, given that it only requires an absolute 
majority in the joint chambers (Alston et al. 2006: 19). The fragmentation of the 
Brazilian party system, however, has hampered opposition attempts to form a 
cohesive unit to override the veto (Mainwaring, 1997: 60-61). 
 The Constitution also specifically defines a number of policy areas such as 
budgetary and public administration matters where the Executive has the exclusive 
right to initiate legislation (Alston et al. 2006: 19-20; Mueller, 2001: 624). 
Furthermore, Article 10 provides the Executive, through the Mesa Diretoria 
(Steering Body) and Colégio de Líderes (Board of Leaders), a central role in the 
definition of the committee system (Alston et al. 2006: 20). The Executive, roughly 
speaking, has the power to determine the members of any committee and can even 
bypass the committee system by ‘strategically creating special committees to 
consider specific issues’ (Mueller, 2001: 624). Although there is obviously an 
element of self-selection in many committee appointments, ‘there is evidence of 
significant interference by party leaders in the process of appointing and substituting 
committee members’ (Alston et al. 2006: 20). Clearly, the Executive in Brazil has a 
central and powerful role in the legislative process. For example, between 1984 and 
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1999, 86 per cent of the laws promulgated in Brazil were done so on the authority of 
the executive, indispensable proof of the ‘centrality of this organ of the state in 
national political life’ (Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 2007: 75).  
As such, ‘it is no surprise that the executive has largely dominated the 
legislative process in Brazil’ (Pereira, 2002: 12). However, the Executive is far from 
omnipotent (Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 2007: 75). While the President may have 
recourse to very strong powers, support of the legislature is essential for the 
President’s legislative agenda.199 In fact, where presidents have attempted to use their 
powers to by-pass the legislature to implement unpopular policies, such as Sarney 
and Collor and privatisation, a lack of legislative support has stymied their initiatives 
(see Mainwaring, 1997: 91-98).  What is important then, is the degree to which the 
Executive can impose its preferences on Congress, a function of the unity of the 
governing coalition (Mueller, 2001: 623; Mainwaring, 1997).  
Lula, who had traditionally criticised the use of Executive power in Brazil, 
was forced to rely heavily on the powers granted to the Executive by the constitution. 
Due to the lack of unity within his own party and the ideologically diverse nature of 
his governing coalition, he found it very difficult to successfully impose his 
preferences upon Congress. In terms of privatisation policy, Lula had at his 
advantage a strong set of presidential powers, but this was offset by his poor support 
base in both houses. Due to this, he was forced to utilise his decree power 
excessively in order to promote his legislative agenda.  He issued medida provisória 
144/03 in his attempt to redesign the regulatory structure surrounding the electricity 
sector and to protect the state electricity firms from privatisation. Initially, the PT had 
hoped to introduce congressional legislation, but at this time, Lula’s coalition 
controlled only 41 per cent of the lower house, so in order to ensure his reform 
proposals had legislative priority he relied upon decrees (Tavares de Almeida, 2006). 
Although the legislature eventually approved his initiative,200 the new regulatory 
system is extremely precarious as it consists largely of decrees and executive orders 
rather than a congressional law and as such, can be easily challenged or altered.201 
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 Likewise, when Congress refused to consider his public-private partnership 
programme, Lula was forced to issue an executive decree to force it to the top of the 
legislative agenda. Even then however, Congress in August 2004, refused to consider 
any of his legislation, primarily because the parties in his own coalition refused to 
budge until they had been granted R$600 million that Lula had promised them in 
return for their support. Lula was forced to release the funds in order to confirm this 
support, but this took over three months rather than the constitutionally mandated 30 
days. As a result, the public-private partnership bill did not become law until January 
2005, nearly two years after Lula had first proposed it. During these two years, with 
no alternative programme to attract much-needed investment, the PND continued to 
quietly operate.  
 This lack of legislative support ensured that he could do little to halt the 
processes of privatisation that were already in motion, or had been set in motion due 
to the delegation of this policy under Cardoso. He could, theoretically, have halted 
the ongoing privatisations of the CND in early 2003 and the proposed privatisation of 
the state banks, but this was during the period when his coalition had only 41 per 
cent of the seats in Congress (and even then it was not guaranteed that all 41 per cent 
would support him). A presidential veto in the early stages of Lula’s presidency 
could easily have been overturned. He simply did not have the political support to 
curtail the power of the CND. Likewise, when São Paulo announced the sale of their 
state electricity company in 2005, a priority sector for Lula that he had struggled to 
protect, there was little he could do. Geraldo Alckmin of the PSDB was in control of 
São Paulo and the PSDB were also the largest opposition party in Congress, and any 
move against them would be fiercely challenged. All Lula’s government could do 
was to tacitly accept the privatisation. In fact, Lula used his veto power only once 
when it came to privatisation. A bill was presented to Congress in 2005 that proposed 
floating the state-run airline management company Infraero on the Bovespa, and 
Lula decided to veto this proposal.202  
 Although Lula had strong presidential powers, his lack of support in 
Congress and the fragmented nature of his coalition were serious obstacles to his 
initiatives. He used his strong powers to protect the state-owned electricity 
companies, but his lack of support ensured that there was little he could do to 
                                                 
202
 Valor Economico, September 20th, 2006 
  - 107 -   
completely halt the day-to-day actions of the CND, Central Bank or National 
Monetary Council, or indeed to prevent individual state governors from privatising 
their assets.    
 
Legislative Support 
Despite strong constitutional powers, the President, in order to successfully advance 
his/her legislative agenda needs co-ordinated, cohesive support within the legislature. 
A fragmented multi-party system, requiring the President to forge ideologically 
diffuse, multi-party coalitions, combined with low levels of party discipline however, 
hamper the Executive in this endeavour, ensuring that Presidents in Brazil ‘face 
constant and crippling difficulties in moving their agendas through the legislature’ 
(Ames, 2002: 213). The open-list proportional representation system, with a low 
threshold and high district magnitude has encouraged the emergence of Brazil’s 
multi-party system. As such, the President rarely holds an outright majority in 
Congress, and must forge some form of multi-party coalition in order to govern 
(Mueller, 2001: 635; Mainwaring, 1997: 69). Although the Executive has potential 
preponderance over the congress, typically, this preponderance will only be 
successful if a cohesive coalition is forged. In 2003, Brazil had an effective number 
of 8.5 legislative parties, among the highest in the world (Samuels, 2006: 26). The 
myriad party nature of the Brazilian system ensures that at least one party in any 
coalition will have interests in favour of privatisation,203 drastically reducing 
Executive discretion (Mueller, 2001: 635).  
The open-list and proportional representation system allows citizens to select 
candidates rather than parties. This ensures that voters are more attracted to a 
candidate’s personal qualities, encouraging candidates to develop links with his/her 
constituency rather than the party. This system also pits members of the same party 
against one another in direct electoral competition, which in turn, tends to promotes 
factions within parties. The Brazilian system allows unlimited re-election, and the 
candidato nato obligates parties to re-nominate incumbents, regardless of whether 
they towed the party line in the previous legislative term (Pereira, 2002: 8). This of 
course, reduces the reliance of legislators on the party leadership and these factors 
have the cumulative effect of severely undermining party discipline in Brazil 
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(Mainwaring, 1995, 1997; Ames, 1995, 2001, 2002; Figueiredo & Limongi, 1995). 
This is exacerbated by low levels of party loyalty and frequent party-switching. In 
addition, federalism has further dispersed power in an already fragmented party 
system. Loyalty to powerful governors or mayors rather than the federal party has 
further contributed to factionalism and discipline problems in some of the larger 
parties (Mainwaring, 1997: 83; Samuels, 2003).204    
 Recently, a number of scholars, rather than stressing the decentralising effect 
of electoral rules, have begun to emphasise informal institutional rules and structures 
that may serve to discipline individual legislators (Figueiredo & Limongi, 1995, 
1999, 2000; Meneguello, 1998; Nicolau, 2000; Amorim-Neto & Santos, 2001). 
Foremost among these structures is the President’s ability to control the distribution 
of political and financial resources, which in turn, ‘provides colossal electoral 
responses for those who have the chance to exploit them appropriately’ (Alston et al. 
2006: 20).205 Although individual legislators may propose amendments to the budget, 
it is the President who determines which amendments to accept. Evidence suggests 
that the President will reward those legislators who vote consistently in his favour, 
leading to pork-barrel politics (Alston et al. 2006: 20).206 The Executive can 
negotiate support on a vote-by-vote, deputy-by-deputy basis, in exchange for these 
clientelistic resources (Samuels, 2006: 17). For example, in a survey of 1,317 roll-
call votes taken in the Brazilian legislature, only in 33 cases did deputies actually go 
against the party line (Limongi & Figueiredo, 1999).207  
 The reality however, is that the Brazilian system is neither a centralising nor a 
decentralising one (Alston et al., 2006: 17; Pereira, 2002: 4-5). The electoral rules 
provide incentives for deputies to act individualistically, while the informal rules 
(fisiologismo - pork-barrel) also provide deputies with the incentive to support the 
Executive. For Samuels (2002: 316), deputies actively pursue pork-barrel because it 
serves their progressive ambition to further their future non-congressional career 
paths. So, as Pereira (2002: 26) argues: 
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Legislators must satisfy constituencies’ demands in order to survive 
politically. Simultaneously, the legislators are compelled to follow 
their party leader indication and thus to gain access to political and 
financial benefits, so that they can use them, in turn, to satisfy 
constituencies’ demands in order to have electoral returns. 
This institutional configuration ensures that the equilibrium point for a cohesive 
governing coalition rests on the Executive’s ability to distribute economic and 
political incentives to maintain the support of the coalition.   
After the 2002 election, the PT became the largest party in the Chamber of 
Deputies, but they still only had 17.7 per cent of the seats.208 Lula’s electoral 
coalition could only boast 25.3 per cent of the seats in the lower house, and 29.7 per 
cent in the upper house (Samuels, 2006: 13). This was well short of the 60 per cent of 
seats that was effectively needed to pass constitutional amendments and unpopular 
legislation. Lula’s first governing coalition encapsulated eight parties and did not 
give him a majority in either house, due to his refusal to include the PMBD 
(Samuels, 2006: 13).209 This earned Lula the dubious accolade of creating ‘one of the 
most fragmented coalitions ever formed in a democratic regime’ (Amorim-Neto & 
Coelho, 2007: 72). This coalition was ideologically diffuse and contained a number 
of parties (PTB and PL) who were nominal supporters of privatisation. Indeed, the 
constellation of this particular coalition was very similar to the one that had 
supported Cardoso and his privatisation drive in the 1990s (Tavares de Almeida, 
2006).  
For his first year in office, Lula led a minority coalition controlling only 41 
per cent of the seats in the lower house and as a result, he had very little control in 
congress.  The fragility of this coalition was soon exposed when Lula attempted to 
introduce social security reform legislation. He only managed to have this legislation 
passed by reaching out to the opposition PSDB and PFL, and this resulted in one of 
the left-wing parties in his coalition withdrawing from government and the PT 
expelling several members who had stubbornly opposed the legislation (Samuels, 
2006: 14). This severely eroded the modicum of legislative prowess that Lula already 
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commanded, and ensured his strong executive powers were virtually negated in his 
first year in office. Furthermore, when the Central Bank announced the sale of the 
Banco do Estado de Maranhäo, Lula’s strongest opposition came from within his 
own party. However, there was little he could do due to his precarious position in 
Congress.210 
In January 2004, Lula was forced to invite the PMDB into his government, 
ostensibly providing him with more than the 60 per cent of seats needed. For the first 
few months of the year it appeared as if Lula was finally able to boast a legislative 
majority, ensuring he could actively pursue his legislative agenda. This new coalition 
enabled him in January 2004, to pass his electricity sector reforms and to protect the 
state-owned electricity companies from privatisation, while avoiding the pending 
challenge to this legislation from the Supreme Court. However, it soon became clear 
that Lula had lost control of the Congress. In October and November 2004, the 
‘lower clerics’ boycotted Chamber activities, and effectively stalled government 
business (Flynn, 2005: 1225).211 However, despite including the PMBD in his new 
coalition, due to the proportionality of the distribution of portfolios, the 
government’s control of the legislature actually weakened (Amorim-Neto, 2006: 11-
16; Samuels, 2006: 15). The PT controlled only 29 per cent of the coalition’s seats 
but managed 60 per cent of the ministries compared with the 50 per cent of the seats 
controlled by the PMBD, PL and PTB who only held 12 per cent of the portfolios 
(Amorim-Neto, 2006: 16). For Lula, this ensured ‘his policies angered his leftist 
base, but the disproportional distribution of cabinet portfolios angered his partners to 
the right’ (Samuels, 2006: 15). As Amorim-Neto (2002: 76) has proved, Presidents 
who appoint more proportional cabinets tend to oversee more stable and unified 
coalitions. Lula failed to reach the necessary equilibrium point described above in 
order to establish a cohesive governing coalition by refusing to distribute the 
requisite political and economic benefits to his government allies.212    
This was clearly illustrated in August 2004, when Congress refused to deal 
with any of Lula’s executive decrees. His own government allies refused to back his 
initiatives, particularly his public-private partnership bill. Their main complaint was 
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the fact that the government had promised the allied parties R$874 million in order to 
fund their own projects, but Lula had only provided them with R$46 million. 
Eventually, in November, he instructed the finance ministry to release R$600 million 
in order to end the three-month impasse in Congress.213 This essentially delayed his 
public-private partnership bill by over a year. 
By 2005, discipline within the PT had broken down, Lula’s governing 
coalition was incredibly fragmented, and it appeared as if he had completely lost 
control of Congress. In January, at the World Social Forum, 100 members of the PT 
announced that they were leaving the party, among them 42 members of the 
Democracia Socialista tendência bloc, who moved to the Partido Socialismo e 
Liberdade (P-Sol) (Flynn, 2005: 1227). Indeed, between January 27th and February 
17th, 45 deputies switched parties, an average of two a day, further highlighting the 
lack of any party loyalty within the Brazilian legislature (Flynn, 2005: 1230-1231). 
In February, the government suffered its biggest defeat in Congress during the 
election for the President of the Chamber of Deputies,214 further underlining Lula’s 
inability to impose his preferences upon Congress.215 Luiz Eduardo Greenhalgh, the 
official candidate of the PT, was beaten by Severino Cavalcanti, an independent, by 
190 to 300 votes.216 This was the first time that a candidate backed by the President 
had failed to win the post, which is key in setting the legislative agenda in Congress. 
Sections of Lula’s own PT rejected the candidate, and a rebel wing even proposed an 
opposing PT candidate, further exacerbating fragmentation within the party.217 Not 
only had Lula lost control of Congress, but the appointment of Cavalcanti seriously 
undermined his ability to pursue his own legislative agenda.  
In May 2005, Lula vetoed a bill that would have granted congressional 
workers a 15 per cent pay rise. This created further damaging divisions within the PT 
and ensured that Lula lost an extremely powerful ally in Renan Calheiros, President 
of the Senate.218 All this came amid a vote at the PMDB’s national convention that 
favoured its formal departure from the PT-led government.219 An entire wing of the 
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PMDB favoured this move due to divergences between the PT and PMDB in the 
municipal elections in November 2004. Although the party remained in the coalition, 
it was now split, further weakening the governing coalition. For Samuels (2006: 16) 
this ‘illustrated that Lula could not even control the moderates within his own party, 
much less organise a coherent majority coalition.’  
 Lula’s refusal to distribute cabinet seats continued to cause controversy. 
Severino Cavalcanti, the President of the Lower Chamber, publicly accused the PT 
of unilateralism. Both Cavalcanti and other government allies contested that the PT 
had been extremely inflexible in accommodating other parties, seeking to concentrate 
power and govern alone.220 In fact, in what was the most damaging blow to the PT 
yet, it emerged in May 2005, that the reason Lula did not equitably distribute 
resources or posts was because he did not rely on the traditional, legal but inefficient, 
pork-barrel method to govern (Samuels, 2006: 16). Instead, the PT constructed its 
coalition not through pork-barrel, but through illegal monthly allowances 
(mensalão), and under-the-table campaign financing (caixa dois) (Samuels, 2006: 
17-18).221 The resultant corruption scandal further ruptured the PT and forced José 
Dirceu, Lula’s mentor and confidant, to resign from the administration. For Lula’s 
legislative agenda the results of this crisis were far-reaching.222 Essentially, Lula and 
his government were hamstrung, and it became a ‘government of cohabitation, 
dependent on the PSDB and the PFL’ (Flynn, 2005: 1235). For the remainder of 
Lula’s term not only was he reliant upon his coalition allies, but also the opposition.   
The corruption scandal, and Lula’s failure to provide sufficient pork-barrel 
for his allies, ensured that his own PT and his ideologically diffuse governing 
coalition were highly fragmented. Only for a brief three months in early 2004 did 
Lula ever fully control the Congress. It was during this period that he passed his 
legislation on the electricity sector and protected the national energy companies from 
privatisation. However, aside from this brief interval, Lula’s coalition was highly 
fragmented and as a result, he was unable to impose his preferences as strongly as he 
might have wished upon Congress.  
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Policy Delegation 
When Brazil started its privatisation programme there was an urgent need to signal to 
the market that that the government would not rescind the contracts or act 
opportunistically once the companies were sold (Mueller & Pereira, 2002: 79). 
Essentially, the government needed to make a credible commitment to privatisation. 
The main method to achieve this was to do delegate this policy to other institutions, 
which would remain relatively free of Executive interference. This would ensure that 
if an Executive came to power who held contradictory views on privatisation, this 
policy could be somewhat insulated.  
Law 8,031 established the Programa Nacional de Desestatização (The 
National Program of Destatisation – PND) (Tavares de Almeida, 1999: 18) The PND 
established a clear and transparent legal and regulatory framework for state 
retrenchment. A special Privatisation Directive Committee (DC) was established in 
order to supervise the programme and provide some autonomy for the process, with 
the President of BNDES at its head.223 The DC would also decide on key issues such 
as the methods and conditions of sale and the minimum auction price (Montero, 
1999: 28). When Cardoso came to power, he did alter the PND somewhat. 
Provisional measure 841 replaced the Privatisation Directive Committee with the 
National Privatisation Council (CND), which was to be permanently composed of 
five ministers as well as by ministers with sector competencies and the President of 
the Central Bank when privatisations in the financial sector were being discussed 
(Goldstein, 1999: 682). The PND, and the appointment of BNDES to run the 
programme, effectively delegates the day-to-day decisions concerning privatisation 
to an autonomous institution. For example, when Itamar Franco came to power in 
1992, he initially froze the PND for three months, during which all procedures of the 
PND were fully examined. But, mounting fiscal and inflationary pressure, together 
with the continued activity of BNDES staff supportive of privatisation, prompted 
Franco to continue the PND (Goldstein, 1999: 684; Montero, 1999). 
Consequently, in early 2003, the PND continued to operate. Minority shares, 
railroads, roads and electricity transmission facilities were privatised as they had 
been included in the PND as a result of a medida provisória issued by Cardoso, and 
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the PND merely followed the existing decree orders. Lula could have perhaps have 
halted this activity, but in the first year of his Presidency he was politically weak and 
lacked majority support in Congress. Also, Cardoso’s reforms of the PND had placed 
the privatisations of financial institutions in the hands of the Central Bank and the 
National Monetary Council. It was their decision to forge ahead with the state bank 
privatisations during the transition period despite PT opposition.224 Likewise, it was 
their decision to re-initiate proceedings to privatise these banks once Lula came to 
power, and they oversaw the sale of the Banco do Estado de Maranhäo and the 
Banco Estado do Ceará. Furthermore, Cardoso also extended the PND to the state 
level, and it was solely São Paulo’s decision to privatise CTEEP. The PSDB, the 
largest opposition party in Congress, controlled São Paulo and Lula could not afford 
to challenge the decision to sell the state-electricity company. The same situation 
occurred when São Paulo also decided to sell the Companhia de Saneamento Basico 
do Estado de São Paulo.  
The BNDES also continued to have an important role.225 They continued to 
manage the privatisation programme and to recommend certain sectors to the CND 
for privatisation. For example, in 2005, BNDES produced a report which 
recommended that Brazilian port authorities privatise all dredging works at their 
ports.226 Furthermore, BNDES, through BNDESpar, was solely responsible for the 
decision to begin privatising Brasiliana de Energia and Telemar.227 Both these 
companies belonged to BNDESpar, and the decision to ready them for privatisation 
was purely an internal BNDES decision, a situation similar to the early privatisations 
in the Sarney period.       
Secondly, the creation of regulatory agencies in a number of sectors intimated 
to the market that the government was making a credible commitment to 
privatisation. The main motivation for the regulatory agencies was ‘the government’s 
need to tie its own hands, providing a commitment to reassure investors, and thus 
guarantee a successful privatisation programme’ (Mueller & Pereira, 2002: 67). They 
are important as they are political actors with strong influence over the policy-
making process in important sectors of the economy and ‘their design provided them 
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with considerable policy-making clout and a high degree of independence from the 
Executive and Congress’ (Alston et al. 2006: 37). Since 1997, ten regulatory 
agencies have been created in Brazil: ANEEL (electricity), ANP (oil), ANATEL 
(telecommunications), ANTT (land transport), ANTAQ (water transport), ANS 
(private health insurance), ANVISA (health and sanitary surveillance), and ANA 
(surface water resources) (OECD, 2005: 114). Mueller (2001: 635) argued that an 
important institutional restraint on a new Executive expropriating existing contracts 
or halting privatisations is built into the structure and process of the regulatory 
agencies at the time they were created. For Mueller (2001) and Mueller & Pereira 
(2002), Cardoso designed the main regulatory agencies (ANEEL, ANP, ANATEL), 
so as to favour the policy of privatisation.  This ‘deck-stacking effect of the 
administration will restrain the ability of a new Executive to drastically alter policy’ 
(Mueller, 2001: 636). The main powers of the agencies include the power to set 
tariffs, and the power to grant the concessions through which the right to provide a 
public service is conferred to the private sector. The rules that were developed at the 
inception of the agencies ensure stability for the directors, as they can only be 
removed with judicial condemnation.  The directors are appointed by the President 
and approved by the Senate, and their mandates were staggered so they were non-
coincidental (Alston et al., 2006: 37-38; Mueller & Pereira, 2002: 82). A new 
Executive would have to wait a number of years before they could appoint a director. 
For example, Lula attempted to replace the market-friendly director of ANATEL, 
Luiz Guilherme Schymura, with his own representative, Pedro Jaime Ziller. 
However, this move was successfully challenged by the opposition PSDB in court 
and ANATEL remained for nearly a year without a director until a suitable 
replacement could be found.228 
 One of Lula’s first goals was to reform the regulatory model surrounding the 
electricity sector. The focus on the electricity sector was mainly a product of the 
dissatisfaction with Cardoso’s model that arose in Brazil following the energy crisis 
of 2001. After heated legal and legislative challenges, Lula did succeed in reforming 
this sector, but he maintained the independence of the regulators in the other sectors. 
As such, ANTT were free to submit proposals for the privatisations of the railway 
lines and federal highways to the PND. Likewise, ANEEL, before the success of 
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Lula’s reforms, could continue to offer concessions on the electricity transmission 
facilities, maintain utility tariffs and protect concessionaires. 
 As a result of Cardoso’s decision to delegate the policy of privatisation to 
numerous independent and autonomous agencies, the PND could continue to operate 
relatively peacefully. Lula had the power at his disposal to curb these bodies and 
agencies, but he lacked the necessary political support in Congress to do so. Policy 
delegation of privatisation under Cardoso ensured that while Lula significantly 
slowed down the PND, privatisations already approved could effectively continue 
mainly as a result of the path dependent effect of previous policy design.    
 
Judicial Independence 
In Brazil, it is generally accepted that the judiciary is independent of the Executive 
and the Legislature (Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 2007: 75; Alston et al., 2006: 27; 
Mueller, 2001: 624).229 The court is composed of eleven judges, appointed for life 
terms by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The composition of the court 
changes very slowly, so typically each President can only appoint a small number of 
judges who may hold interests in their favour (Mueller, 2001: 624). However, due to 
the rule requiring mandatory retirement for judges once they reach the age of 70, 
Lula was able to appoint three new Supreme Court judges in the first six months of 
his Presidency (Alston et al., 2006: 25). Once the Supreme Court has made a 
decision, Congress and the Executive have no recourse to appeal or alter this 
decision. In effect, they must pass a new law. ‘The Supreme Court is afforded 
considerable insulation from the other branches of government by this rule’ (Mueller, 
2001: 625).230 The 1988 constitution further removed potential leverages of political 
control over the Court, by establishing that the annual budget of the judiciary was to 
be elaborated by itself and the courts have the sole power to appoint lower court 
judges (Amorim-Neto & Coelho, 2007: 75; Alston et al., 2006; Mueller, 2001: 
625).231 In November 2004, Lula did manage to pass a judicial reform bill. This bill 
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stated that decisions reached by eight of the eleven judges had to be followed by the 
lesser courts.232  
The Supreme Court has on numerous occasions contradicted the interests of 
the Executive and Congress.233 In 1996, with the social security system in tatters, 
Cardoso attempted to tax retired workers. The survival of the government depended 
upon solving the social security crisis and this tax appeared to be a means to achieve 
this, albeit a highly unpopular one. The Executive managed to pass this initiative 
through Congress, but a number of workers brought the issue to the Supreme Court 
who duly declared the measure unconstitutional, much to the chagrin of the 
government and its supporters in Congress (Alston et al., 2006: 26; Mueller, 2001: 
625-626). This even prompted calls from Cardoso’s supporter to alter the 
Constitution. Castro (1997: 153), in a study of 1,247 Supreme Court judgments, 
discovered that the courts ruled in favour of private interests versus public interests 
in 75 per cent of cases demonstrating that even in routine business the Court ‘has 
ruled against the initiatives of the government.’ What this serves to demonstrate is 
that, as Mueller (2001: 627) argues: 
Investors who purchased public service concessions through the 
privatisation programme could have an expectation that the 
Supreme Court would uphold the concession contracts in an 
unbiased manner with high probability. Should the circumstances 
arise that the government would attempt to implement policy that 
went against these contracts, both the investors and the government 
could predict relatively safely that the Court would uphold these 
contracts. 
The independence of the Supreme Court from the Executive, and the Court’s 
adherence to the concession contracts, ensured that Lula would be unable to pursue a 
policy of nationalisation. If he did, the concessionaire would revert to the Supreme 
Court, who in all likelihood would uphold the concession contract. This is because 
the Court, despite its many failings, views cases purely legalistically (Alston et al., 
2006: 27).  
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This is exactly what happened in the case of the AES-owned Eletropaulo 
when the firm was unable to meet its debt repayments to the BNDES. When the 
BNDES moved to take control of the firm, Eletronet, a subsidiary of AES in Brazil, 
brought the case to court and as a result, a judge issued an injunction preventing 
BNDES from taking over the company. In the face of a lengthy and costly legal 
challenge, the government and BNDES agreed to a debt-for-equity deal in order to 
settle the matter. The court also proved important in protecting the design of the 
regulatory agencies. When Lula dismissed the Cardoso-appointed head of ANATEL, 
Luiz Guilherme Schymura, and attempted to replace him with the former trade 
unionist, Pedro Jaime Ziller, the PSDB challenged this move in court as it 
contradicted the rules created to protect the regulatory agencies.234 As a result, the 
court prevented Ziller from assuming the role as head of ANATEL. The agency 
actually remained for nearly a year without a director until the more market-friendly 
Plinio de Aguiar, who had previously been head of ANATEL, was appointed to the 
post. Lula’s attempt to reform the regulatory framework for the electricity sector was 
also challenged by the PSDB and it was only as a result of his new governing 
coalition in early 2004 that the reforms were passed before the Supreme Court could 
challenge them. His bill to reform the other agencies was submitted to Congress in 
April 2004, but this bill did not drastically reduce the power of the regulators mainly 
because the judiciary would challenge any deviations from the regulatory law.  
 The independence of the Supreme Court ensured that nationalisation without 
sufficient monetary compensation was impossible once Lula came to power. The 
judiciary also acted as a significant barrier in his attempts to reform the regulatory 
agencies, and replace the existing heads of the agencies with his supporters. As such, 
it acted as a significant check on the Executive’s power.    
 
4.4 Labour support 
Since its inception in 1983, the Central Unica dos Trabalhadores (Central Workers 
Union – CUT) has been closely linked to Lula and the PT (Ellner, 2004: 24). Lula 
himself was a former trade unionist and leader of the metalworkers union of São 
Bernando do Campo and Diadema (Flynn, 2005: 1222). Although the CUT and the 
PT were closely linked, there was never any formal links between the two and the 
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PT, unlike other labour parties, is not funded by union contributions (Branford & 
Kucinski, 2005: 29).235 The CUT did however formally endorse Lula’s candidacy in 
the 1989, 1994, 1998 and 2002 elections (Branford & Kucinski, 2005). While the 
CUT is the de facto umbrella organisation of the Brazilian trade union movement, 
unionism in Brazil however, is far from united (Cook, 2002). The growth of rival 
unions, such as Central Geral dos Trabalhordores (General Workers’ Union – CGT) 
and Força Sindical, together with the labour reforms and divisive privatisations of 
the Cardoso era, further weakened and fragmented the Brazilian labour movement 
(Boito, 1998). 
 In 1991, shortly after Collor came to power, conservative members of the 
Brazilian labour movement established Força Sindical to act as a counterweight to 
the representation of the CUT. Força Sindical brought together a huge mass of small 
unions with fewer than 500 members each.236 The union leaders, rather surprisingly, 
espoused support for market-friendly policies rooted in a general political 
conservatism (Boito, 1998: 73-74). The effect of this new union was to draw support 
from CUT and decisively split the labour movement in Brazil. Furthermore, the 
privatisations carried out during Collor and Franco’s reign exacerbated the divisions 
within the labour movement. The CGT, CUT and the PT were active in opposing 
these initial privatisations, but in response to this, BNDES established the FGTS 
scheme, which allowed workers to participate in the privatisations (Montero, 1999: 
47-48).237 By June 1995, more than 105,000 workers in the public sector had 
purchased shares, averaging 10 per cent of the total shares for each public firm up for 
sale (Montero, 1999: 48). This BNDES scheme had the desired effect of splitting the 
PT/CUT/CGT alliance against privatisation. For example, union leaders opposed the 
sale of Embraer in 1994, but rank and file members, wishing to gain from the FGTS, 
threatened to leave the union. Likewise, during the privatisation of Acesita, local 
leaders of the metallurgical union sided with the investors against the wishes of the 
national union, which opposed all steel privatisations (Montero, 1999: 49).  
 When Cardoso came to power, the influence of the union movement 
continued to decline. Liberalisation and privatisation particularly affected the auto 
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and textile sectors, as well as banking and the civil service. Increased unemployment 
in these traditionally highly unionised sectors severely reduced union membership 
levels and consequently, union influence (Cook, 2002: 18). By 2001, only 23.6 per 
cent of the labour force held trade union membership, while 26 per cent of all 
employed workers had union membership (Martin, 2006). Cardoso also attempted to 
undertake extensive labour reforms and despite his best efforts, the corporatist 
provisions of the constitution remained, although they were significantly watered 
down (Cook, 2002: 17-23). Força Sindical became willing to accept many flexible 
provisions in their collective agreements, and became the de facto union ally of the 
Cardoso government. They supported labour reform and privatisations and further 
undermined the cohesiveness of Brazilian labour (Cook, 2002: 19). Public sector 
worker’s unions allied with the PT continued to oppose Cardoso’s proposed 
privatisations, but Cardoso continued to follow the divide and conquer method 
introduced by BNDES. He appeased them with short-term spending and higher 
salaries (Treisman, 2003: 102) and continued to encourage workers to benefit 
individually from the privatisation process.  
 The CUT endorsed Lula in the 2002 election, and when Lula won the 
election, one-third of his cabinet were former activists in the CUT (Flynn, 2005: 
1252) and nearly two-thirds of the PT’s congressional representatives had links to 
unions or social movements (Branford & Kucinski, 2005: 47). However, by this 
stage, labour support in Brazil had been significantly weakened. Union membership 
had declined, the labour movement was fragmented between the CUT and Força, 
and the employee participation scheme during privatisation had further divided the 
unions. More importantly, those former CUT trade unionists now in power with Lula 
came from a small nucleus that had their roots in the famous Clubes de Investimentos 
(Investment Clubs) from the Collor era that had actively supported and participated 
in the privatisation process in the nineties (Flynn, 2005: 1251-1252). This was 
exemplified during the sale of the Banco do Estado de Maranhäo, when the 
government continued the divisive tactics employed during Collor’s tenure by 
offering 10 per cent of the bank’s shares to employees.238 Lula even introduced 
legislation that would deregulate the labour market and reform ‘corrupt’ trade 
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unions.239 Unions continued to actively oppose privatisations and were specifically 
active during the sale of the state banks and the Rio metro line.240  
Ironically, rather than a PT government strengthening left-labour power, it 
exacerbated tensions and heightened divisions. Fragmentations within Lula’s own PT 
caused further tensions among the labour movement. As such, labour support in 
Brazil was divided and somewhat rudderless and had little impact in preventing 
privatisations from continuing.    
 
4.5 Conclusion 
Lula was elected in 2002 with a mandate to change the market-friendly model 
adopted under Cardoso. Part of this mandate was a categorical pledge to halt all 
privatisations in Brazil. Once in power, Lula did manage to significantly slow down 
the PND begun under Cardoso, but nonetheless, privatisations did continue. More to 
the point, privatisations continued in sectors (banking and electricity) where Lula had 
specifically stated his intention to halt privatisations. The reason for this was clearly 
a confluence of institutional factors that shaped policy once Lula was in power. The 
Executive has extremely strong powers in Brazil, but this power is a function of the 
Executive’s ability to control Congress. Controlling Congress requires a cohesive 
governing coalition (necessary due to the multi-party system in Brazil), and the 
adoption of pork-barrel politics to satisfy this coalition. Lula did use his executive 
power extensively to force the legislative agenda and his decree power enabled him 
to protect the state electricity companies from privatisation, but this legislation only 
passed as it was during the brief interval (January to March 2004) when he had 
established a cohesive coalition.     
 In general however, it was a self-replicating cycle of institutional factors that 
ensured he was unable to implement his preferences and halt privatisation. Cardoso 
had delegated the policy of privatisation to a number of autonomous institutions. 
Lula’s strong executive power had the ability to curb the power of these institutions, 
but this was only functional if he could form a cohesive coalition, but electoral rules 
and his inability to achieve the required equilibrium as regards pork-barrel prevented 
him from doing so. Policy delegation ensured that privatisation could continue while 
the judiciary could successfully prevent him from completely overhauling these 
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institutions or engaging in a policy of nationalisation, even if he had of so wished. 
Therefore, as hypothesised in Chapter Two, Brazil would be the least likely of the 
three case studies to halt all privatisations due to the configuration of the specific 
political institutions in place in that country.  
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Chapter Five – The Evolution of Privatisation in Argentina 
The second of the three chosen case studies is Argentina. In April 2003, Néstor 
Kirchner of the left-wing Frente Para la Victoria (The Front for Victory) was elected 
President. Kirchner, like Lula, campaigned on a platform that attacked the economic 
policies of his predecessors, particularly privatisation. When Kirchner assumed 
office, privatisation had been an acceptable policy for over a decade. In fact, so large 
was Argentina’s privatisation programme that it was labelled as ‘one of the broadest 
and most rapid in the Western Hemisphere (World Bank, 1993: ix).  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical context for the analytical 
narrative of Kirchner’s Presidency. This chapter will trace the evolution of 
privatisation policy in Argentina until the election of Kirchner in 2003. The first 
section will briefly outline the development and role of public enterprises in 
Argentina. The second section will discuss the implementation of privatisation policy 
in Argentina during the transition to democracy, while the third will examine the 
Presidency of Raul Alfonsín. The fourth section will examine the Presidency of 
Carlos Menem, while the fifth section will briefly examine the 2001 crisis. The final 
section will outline the extent and legacy of the Argentine privatisation experience 
by the time Kirchner came to power. 
 
5.1 The Development of State-Owned Enterprises in Argentina 
The expansion of state enterprises in Argentina is the result of a series of decisions 
made in response to varied economic imperatives, rather than as a result of a 
coherent strategy for the state sector in the economy (Enrique Andrieu, 1999: 282). 
Before World War II, public enterprises in Argentina had little role in the economy, 
but after the war, with the development of an alliance between a nationalistic military 
and the working class when Perón assumed power in 1946, import substitution 
industrialisation became the central platform of economic policy, leading to a large 
increase in state ownership (Goldstein, 1998: 59; Alexander & Corti, 1993: 1; 
Enrique Andrieu, 1999: 283). Once Perón was in power, the military instigated a 
campaign pushing for the nationalisation of what they perceived as vital strategic 
sectors (Goldstein, 1998: 59) and Perón, with access to large foreign reserves 
accumulated during World War II, used this money to nationalise the telephone 
company, the electricity industry, railroads and several bankrupt private industries 
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(Alexander & Corti, 1993: 1; Molano, 1997: 90). The surpluses produced by the 
agricultural sector were utilised to subsidise industrial expansion and major public 
companies were established under Perón in the gas, power and steel sectors 
(Alexander & Corti, 1993: 1; Molano, 1997: 90). The government significantly 
increased the scope of its interventions, but no central holding was ever established 
to manage the proliferation of state enterprises (Goldstein, 1998: 59). Because of 
this, no definitive survey was ever carried out to map the extent of state enterprises in 
the Argentine economy, but from a number of different sources, it can be estimated 
that by the 1966 military coup, the state-owned or held a minority interest in some 
560 enterprises (see Table 5.1).    
 
Table 5.1: Extent of State Enterprise in Argentina (Early 1960s) 
Ownership Banco Nacional de Desarrollo & 
National Bank for Savings and 
Insurance 
At Federal, State and 
Municipal Level 
Total 
Enterprises 
Share  >20% ≤20%≤15% <15% Non-
Financial 
Sector 
Financial 
Sector 
 
Total 97 39 130 260 37 563 
Source: Alexander & Corti (1993), Di Tella (1983) and Enrique Andrieu (1999) 
 
Following the ousting of Perón in 1955, a number of state enterprises were 
either closed down or privatised under the government of President Frondizi 
(Alexander & Corti, 1993: 2), but when Perón returned as President in 1973, he 
adopted expansionist economic policies and once again enlarged the public sector 
(Murillo, 2001: 131). In order to maintain low levels of unemployment, he absorbed 
large numbers of workers into the state enterprises (see Table 5.2) (Di Tella, 1983). 
Perón also established the Corporación Nacional de Empresas del Estado (National 
Corporation for State Enterprises - CNEE) in an attempt to provide unified 
management for the enormous public sector, but the formation of the CNEE 
‘constituted more of a declaration of intent, rather than a real political instrument’ 
(Di Tella, 1983, 175), and it was eventually disbanded after the appointment of 
Alfredo Gómez Morales as Minister of Economy in 1974 (Di Tella, 1983: 180),   
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Table 5.2: Percentage Variation in Employment in State Enterprises 
Year Variation in Employment in State Enterprises 
(Each Year as Base Year) 
1967 -3.53 
1968 -5.61 
1969 -2.83 
1970 -1.27 
1971 -0.37 
1972 2.32 
1973 10.89 
1974 20.33 
1975 5.29 
1976 0.99 
Source: Di Tella (1983) 
 
 Because no effective survey of state ownership has ever been carried out in 
Argentina, it is impossible to state with certainty exactly how many state enterprises 
actually existed before the 1976 coup. However, taking into account the 560 
enterprises in state hands at the beginning of the 1960s, and accounting for closures 
and privatisations that occurred under successive military governments, it has been 
generally estimated that by the beginning of the Alfonsín administration some 400 
state enterprises were in existence in Argentina, holding monopolies or near-
monopolies in areas as diverse as gas, steel, mining, oil, electricity, air travel, 
railroads, port management, postal services, water, sanitation, roads and banking 
(Manzetti, 1999: 72; Corrales, 1998: 26; Molano, 1997: 92).       
 
5.2 The Beginning of Privatisation: José Martínez de Hoz  
Although there were incidental privatisations in the 1960s, the beginning of 
privatisation in Argentina can be traced to the return of military rule in 1976 and the 
appointment of José Martínez de Hoz as Minister of the Economy (Müller & Rapetti, 
2000; Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001). By 1976, mainly due to the expansionary economic 
policies of Perón, the economy was in recession, with the fiscal deficit constituting 
15.1 per cent of GDP, wholesale price inflation peaking at 499 per cent and the 
external public debt crisis placing enormous fiscal restraints on economic policy 
(Molano, 1997: 79; Müller & Rapetti, 2000: 1; Murillo, 2001: 131). Fiscal discipline, 
together with liberalising reforms and attempts at privatisation, modelled on General 
Augosto Pincohet’s policies in Chile, became the core tenet of de Hoz’s economic 
programme (Corrales, 1998: 25; Goldstein, 1998: 60). Martínez de Hoz attempted to 
liberalise the financial and foreign exchange markets, considerably reduce the tariffs 
on imports and undermine the bases of the populist coalitions created under Perón 
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(Müller & Rapetti, 2000: 3-5).241 The role of state-owned enterprises also began to 
change. Consumer tariffs were left low to avoid inflation, and when external sources 
of financing for the private sector began drying up due to an increase in the 
perception of Argentina’s country risk, state enterprises, as in Brazil, were used as 
lines for external credit (Goldstein, 1998: 60).  
Furthermore, there were widespread staff rationalisations in state-owned 
enterprises, and lucrative (and often bloated) sub-contracts with the private sector 
were curtailed, while oil exploration was opened to private domestic firms in 1977 
(Müller & Rapetti, 2000: 3; Goldstein, 1998: 60). Although Martínez de Hoz wished 
to conserve the nucleus of state-owned enterprises in the industrial and service 
sectors, he did initiate a process of privatisation (Müller & Rapetti, 2000: 3-4). A list 
of state-owned enterprises created by the Inter-ministerial Commission for 
Privatisation, coupled with companies in which the Banco Nacional de Desarrollo 
(National Development Bank - BANADE) held a minority stake or shareholding, 
were considered eligible for sale (Ministerio de Economía y Producción, 2007). Law 
22,177 of March 1980 attempted to create a legal framework for this process, and 
this initiative led to the re-privatisation of a number of small or medium sized firms 
that had previously come under state management due to bankruptcy (Müller & 
Rapetti, 2000: 3-4).242  However, as a result of fervent opposition from a wide variety 
of actors, privatisations were extremely limited and due to the fact that the new firms 
found themselves in a monopsony market situation, the hoped for gains in efficiency 
failed to materialise (Molano, 1997: 79).  
Opposition to Martínez de Hoz’s privatisation initiatives came from an active 
and strong anti-privatisation coalition consisting of the patria contratistas,243 the 
rent-seeking private sector, and the Peronist controlled labour unions (Corrales, 
1998: 35). Ironically, after the military coup of 1976, a number of high-ranking 
military leaders who had been given control of state enterprises, joined this coalition, 
further impeding government attempts at reform. They actively lobbied for the 
removal of Martínez de Hoz and ‘ultimately precluded the government from enacting 
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any meaningful reduction in state-owned enterprises. By 1982, even the technocrats 
in office had given up their efforts to shrink the state’ (Corrales, 1998: 36).   
During this period there were also two major nationalisations of companies in 
a critical condition and in fact, the nationalisation of Italo alone, constituted more 
than all other privatisations combined (Müller & Rapetti, 2000: 3; Goldstein, 1998: 
60). Financial liberalisation increased interest-rate differentials between Argentina 
and the rest of the world and this, coupled with high interest rates and an 
appreciation of the domestic currency, placed enormous pressure on manufacturing 
firms in the import competing sector, forcing firms to acquire dollar denominated 
debt to keep afloat (Murillo, 2001: 131-132). Foreign debt grew three times between 
1978 and 1981 (Murillo, 2001: 132), and the share of total public expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP rose from 27.6 per cent in 1971-75 to 38.7 per cent in 1981-83. 
The external debt of state-owned enterprises had reached a massive US$12 billion 
(approx) by 1982 (see Table 5.3) (Goldstein, 1998: 60-61).   
With the Mexican debt moratorium and the subsequent debt crisis, the 
government was forced to take over a number of struggling banks, ensuring ‘reserves 
dwindled as it tried to sustain the financial system’ (Murillo, 2001: 132). The 
military government decided to divert attention from the economic woes of the state, 
and generate an upsurge in nationalistic sentiment by invading the Malvinas/Falkland 
Islands in April 1982, provoking a war with the United Kingdom. Following the 
defeat of the Argentine armed forces, and the ultimate de-legitimation of the regime, 
the military government was forced to accept a democratic transition and elections 
were called for October 1983.244     
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Table 5.3: Foreign Debt by Company in Argentina in 1980 
Company US$ millions 
YPF 2,906.0 
GAS 452.3 
YCF 118.0 
Water and Electricity 1,496.6 
SEGBA 661.2 
Hidronor 281.6 
FFAA 439.5 
Airlines 515.5 
AGP 33.0 
Elma 663.5 
ENTel 293.0 
Encotel 9.3 
Total 7,869.5 
Source: Manzetti (1999: 82) 
 
5.3 The Election of Raul Alfonsín: Reluctant Privatisation 
The first Argentine election in over a decade surprisingly returned Raúl Alfonsín, of 
the social democratic Unión Cívica Radical (Radical Party – UCR), as the new 
civilian President (Manzetti and Dell’Aquila, 1988: 3; Murillo, 2001: 132).245 When 
Alfonsín took office, he found himself in a precarious position. Not only was he 
tasked with consolidating democracy in Argentina after half a century of political 
turmoil, but the country was also in the throes of its deepest economic recession 
since the 1930s (Manzetti and Dell’Aquila, 1988: 3). Although GDP growth had 
actually marginally increased by 2.8 per cent, inflation had peaked at 343 per cent 
and unemployment had grown to 4.2 per cent by 1983 (Murillo, 2001: 132).  
The primary concern of Alfonsín and his Economy Minister, Bernardo 
Grinspun, was to combat inflation and they initially adopted a heterodox stabilisation 
programme, a policy that conflicted with the IMF plan for stabilisation (Molano, 
1997: 91; Manzetti & Dell’Aquila: 1988: 3). Alfonsín was reluctant to implement 
privatisations, as this policy was considered too closely associated with the military 
regime, and also contrary to the social democratic ideology of the UCR (Corrales, 
1998: 25-26).The new measures increased government revenues by 18.6 per cent, but 
the main problem was still the level of fiscal spending (Molano, 1997: 91). By the 
end of 1983, Argentina could no longer repay its principal debt or even make timely 
interest payments and the lack of available external credit forced Grinspun to sign an 
agreement with the IMF in September (Manzetti & Dell’Aquila: 1988: 4). The 
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stringent measures requested by the IMF prompted Grinspun and the Central bank 
Governor, Enrique García Vásquez, to resign. They were replaced by Juan 
Sourrouille and José Luis Machinea respectively, although this new team did not 
significantly alter the economic policy of their predecessors. This breach of the 
September agreement led to the IMF suspending all loans and by spring 1985, 
Argentina was on the verge of hyperinflation (Manzetti & Dell’Aquila: 1988: 4).246 
Alfonsín was finally forced to reject this heterodox stabilisation plan, paving the way 
for the return of privatisation onto the Argentine policy agenda.   
The government began to realise that it could not continue to service the 
external debt, let alone subsidise domestic capital, without a considerable reduction 
of public sector spending (Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 5). As had happened in Brazil 
under Sarney, Alfonsín began to consider privatisation, not as a result of any 
ideological about-turn, but simply as a response to fiscal imperatives. Privatisation 
had been initially considered in 1984, when Alfonsín created a commission whose 
purpose was to analyse and report upon the financial health of all existing state-
owned enterprises, and recommend which state companies could be divested through 
the re-activation of Law 22,177.247 A concerted effort to privatise state enterprises 
only occurred when Sourouille launched the ‘Austral Stabilisation Plan’ in June 1985 
to combat the spectre of hyperinflation (Molano, 1997: 91). The Austral Plan was 
essentially ‘an anti-inflationary programme aimed at economic reform’ (Manzetti & 
Dell’Aquila: 1988: 5). Following the signing of a letter of intent with the IMF in July 
1985, the third and fourth phases of the programme contained a number of structural 
reforms, (Manzetti & Dell’Aquila: 1988: 8-15). Privatisation was integral to these 
proposed reforms. As part of this process, the Directorio de Empresas Públicas 
(DEP) was created, in order to divest Argentina of burdensome companies, enabling 
debt repayments and reducing public sector deficits (González-Fraga, 1991: 78; 
Goldstein, 1998: 65). The Ministry of Growth was also established in order to 
provide incentives for private firms to invest in areas traditionally monopolised by 
state enterprises, such as oil, ports and natural gas (Manzetti & Dell’Aquila: 1988: 
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15). Initially, the programme was slow to start and in 1988, only Austral, a small 
domestic airline carrier, was sold for US$28 million.248 
By 1988, Argentina had plunged into a deep recession, with the fiscal deficit 
accounting for nearly 21.8 per cent of GDP, the balance of payments deficit 
widening to US$1.4 billion and interest payments on commercial bank debt going 
into arrears (Molano, 1997: 92-94), and in April 1988, the government had no choice 
but to suspend all service payments on debt to creditors (Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 4). 
In this economic climate, the government was desperate for short-term revenue, so it 
decided to carry out two major privatisations: the state telephone company ENTel, 
and the state airline Aerolíneas Argentinas. The sale of both it was hoped, would 
ease fiscal pressure (Molano, 1997: 94).  
However, when these plans were publicly announced, just as had happened 
during the de Hoz era, a large anti-privatisation coalition began to mobilise against 
the sales. Alfonsín sent his privatisation package to Congress on January 2nd 1989 
and fearing that it would be rejected, opened the topic up for public debate. Public 
support for the sale of ENTel jumped to 85 per cent, but the Peronist bloc, allied with 
the anti-privatisation coalition and under the leadership of Eduardo Menem, decided 
to reject all three of the proposed privatisation programmes (Treisman, 2003: 95; 
Corrales, 1998: 34; Molano, 1997: 99).249 Alfonsín’s attempts at privatisation were 
stymied before they could even properly begin and by the end of Alfonsín’s tenure, 
only four state enterprises had actually been transferred to private hands (Treisman, 
2003: 95).           
There are a number of important points to note about both these early 
attempts at privatisation in Argentina. Firstly, as occurred in Brazil under Sarney, the 
initial decision to move towards privatisation under Alfonsín was not the product of 
an ideological re-evaluation, but rather was brought about due to fiscal constraints 
and the pressure to control inflation. As in Brazil (see Pinheiro, 2000), early 
privatisation attempts were an integral part of stabilisation plans, and later 
privatisations in Argentina were to have ‘the primary objective of price stabilisation’ 
(Machinea et al. 2003: 4).  
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Secondly, while the initial privatisation forays in Brazil were not subject to 
external pressure, in Argentina they were heavily influenced by the International 
Monetary Fund. The enormous levels of Argentine debt forced Alfonsín to turn to 
the IMF on a number of occasions. After the failure of the Austral Plan to rectify the 
country’s economic problems, Alfonsín and Sourouille were forced to sign a new 
letter of intent with the IMF in 1985 that ultimately led to the decision to implement 
structural reforms including privatisation and the creation of the Directorio de 
Empresas Públicas (Manzetti & Dell’Aquila: 1988, 15). 
Thirdly, privatisations during the military period were essentially halted as a 
result of a large and mobilised anti-privatisation coalition and during Alfonsín’s 
tenure, this coalition, consisting of the military, business leaders, members of the 
Radical party and most importantly, labour allied with the Peronists, once again 
managed to prevent any privatisation programmes from taking root (Goldstein, 1998; 
Treisman, 2003; Murillo, 2001; Molano, 1997; Corrales, 1998). Alfonsín alienated 
the military by instigating tribunals to punish military officers guilty of human rights 
abuses during the ‘dirty war’ (Manzetti, 1993: 188). This coupled with defence 
budget cuts ensured that the military were unwilling to support any of Alfonsín’s 
initiatives (Goldstein, 1998: 65).250 Opposition to Alfonsín’s plans came not only 
from the rent-seeking patria contratistas or capitanes de la industria who benefited 
enormously from lucrative contracts with the public sector, but also from other areas 
of domestic industry, who feared that privatised state firms would provide unfair 
competition to their own businesses (Corrales, 1998: 30; Treisman, 2003: 95). One 
effective tactic they employed to prevent privatisations was to simply refuse to buy 
the firms that were up for sale (Corrales, 1998: 28). Large industrialists, in the form 
of the Industrial Union of Argentina (UIA) together with the Grupo de los 9 refused 
to support the government’s privatisation initiatives (Goldstein, 1998: 68).  
The most virulent opposition to privatisation came from labour allied with the 
Peronist opposition. Alfonsín had attempted to dismantle the traditional link between 
the Peronists and the Confederación General del Trabajo (General Worker’s Union – 
CGT), and this initiative galvanised the unions and Peronists into action (Molano, 
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1997: 89).251 While the Peronists had cooperated with the Radicals on a number of 
legislative issues, they now began to systematically oppose all Radical legislation on 
privatisation. At the same time, the unions launched thirteen paralysing general 
strikes and called more than 2,300 smaller strikes between 1984 and 1988, leading to 
a total loss of 95 million days (Goldstein, 1998: 65). Meanwhile, the Peronist-
controlled Senate ensured that every piece of legislation relating to privatisation 
introduced by Alfonsín was defeated (Molano, 1997: 98). This large anti-
privatisation coalition ensured that ‘most of Alfonsín’s privatisation deals died in 
Congress, at the negotiating table, or in the streets’ (Corrales, 1998: 34).                
      
5.4 The Election of Carlos Menem 
It was not until the election of Dr. Carlos Saúl Menem of the Peronist Party as 
President on May 15th 1989, that privatisation finally became a standard policy 
instrument in Argentina. Menem set out to ‘privatise everything that was 
privatisable’ (Corrales, 1998: 27), and under Menem’s leadership, ‘a massive 
privatisation programme virtually reversed the tide of state ownership that had 
overrun the country throughout the twentieth century’ (Llanos, 2001: 74). Menem 
had campaigned in the 1989 election on traditional Peronist doctrine, emphasising 
economic nationalism and strong state regulation (Manzetti, 1999: 71).252 While 
Menem avoided concrete details concerning his policy, his Peronist rhetoric appealed 
to the large working class and members of the middle class (Manzetti, 1999: 71), and 
on polling day the Peronists not only gained the presidency but also control of both 
houses of Congress (Molano, 1997: 100). 
 Argentina during the 1989 election campaign was a country in the midst of an 
economic depression, with high interest rates and a large external debt. By July, 
Argentina was in the grip of hyperinflation with the inflation rate running at almost 
200 per cent per month, prompting a serious social crisis and frequent food riots 
(Goldstein, 1998: 66; Menin & Cerdá, 2006: 11; Treisman, 2003: 94). It now 
appeared as if the Alfonsín administration was facing the possibility of another 
military coup, without the resources to withstand it (Molano, 1997: 100). Alfonsín, 
realising his government could not survive and continue to protect the nascent 
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democracy, offered to resign and on July 9th 1989, five months before the 
constitutionally mandated date of succession (December 10th), Carlos Menem 
assumed power (Menin & Cerdá, 2006: 11). Menem, assuming power in the midst of 
a veritable economic meltdown, called for the resignation of Congress and new 
elections, but the Radicals, fearing a humiliating electoral defeat, refused (Molano, 
1997: 100). In order to convince Menem to assume power early, the Radicals, who 
still held a plurality in the lower house, agreed to support any legislation presented 
by Menem in the remaining six months of the Congressional term, including any 
legislation that would confer special decree powers on the President in order to deal 
with the economic crisis (Treisman, 2003: 98; Molano, 1997: 100). It was this 
extraordinary deal that granted Menem the enormous executive power to purse his 
policy of privatisation. 
 Once in power, ‘in the most stunning policy reversal in Argentina’s modern 
history, Menem reached the conclusion that turning the economy around no longer 
rested in the traditional populist, nationalistic, redistributive approach. The key to 
success was instead the establishment of a free-market economy…worthy of 
Thatcher and Reagan’s applause’ (Manzetti, 1999: 71). Menem began to move 
towards market-friendly reforms, with the intention of rapidly combating 
hyperinflation and to restrain the exorbitance of the public accounts (Menin & Cerdá, 
2006: 11).253 The first indication of Menem’s economic direction came with the 
appointment of Miguel Roig, a senior executive from the powerful Bunge y Born 
food export conglomerate as Minister of the Economy, (Molano, 1997: 2) and the 
incorporation of several members of the market-friendly Unión del Centro 
Democrático (Union of the Democratic Centre - UCEDE) into his administration 
(Murillo, 2001: 135).254 Menem was desperate to gain credibility in the eyes of the 
business community, particularly considering his Peronist past, and one of the main 
methods he utilised to signal his commitment to a reformist course was through 
privatisation (Gerchunoff et al. 2003: 8; Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 12).  
 Forty-six days after assuming office, Menem initiated his privatisation 
programme by demanding approval from Congress for the State Reform Law and the 
Law of Economic Emergency (Manzetti, 1999: 72). Both these laws were highly 
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significant as they concentrated power in the hands of the Executive and placed the 
Executive, rather than Congress, in complete control of the process of privatisation 
(Llanos, 1998: 749, 753). The Law of Economic Emergency was directed at the 
cleansing of the public sector, specifically by conferring upon the President the right 
to suspend industrial promotion subsidies and tax breaks (Llanos, 2001: 76; 
Manzetti, 1999: 72). The State Reform Law on the other hand, was concerned with 
privatisation, and Article 1 declared a state of emergency in the public sector, while 
the appendix also contained a list of state enterprises, which the Executive would 
have full power to privatise immediately.255 Most importantly however, Articles 15 
and 18 granted to the Executive a number of legislative functions that ultimately 
‘delegated to the Executive the power to privatise through decrees, and unlimited 
discretion on the means and criteria to be implemented’ (Manzetti, 1999: 72).  
The State Reform Law ensured that privatisation policy in Argentina would 
be initiated by executive decrees rather than law, enabling Menem to implement 
privatisation ‘without major institutional interference’ (Llanos, 2001: 76). Because of 
the economic conditions of the time which led to the agreement reached between 
Menem and the Radicals, Congress through the State Reform Law and the Law of 
Economic Emergency, delegated to the Executive an inordinate amount of power 
that replaced law with delegated executive decrees (Llanos, 2001: 71). Within two 
months of taking office, ‘Menem had established the legal instruments for expediting 
privatisation without any independent oversight’ (Manzetti, 1999: 72-73).256  
 The first stage of Menem’s privatisation programme was launched in 
conjunction with the IMF sanctioned Bonex stabilisation plan (Molano, 1997: 81), 
beginning with the sale of ENTel, and followed by Aerolíneas Argentinas, a number 
of YPF (state oil company) drilling operations and refineries, 10,000 kilometres of 
roads, six radio stations, two television channels, a chemical company, and a food 
and detergent manufacturer.257 Menem was able to achieve all this as a result of the 
decree power delegated to him by Congress (Rubio & Goretti, 1996: 448).  
In order to combat the very real threat of hyper-inflation, in 1991, the new 
Economy Minister, Domingo Cavallo, launched the Convertibility plan which, based 
upon stringent fiscal control, initiated a range of structural reforms and fixed the 
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value of one dollar at the value of one Argentine peso (Manzetti, 1999: 73; 
Goldstein, 1998: 62; Murillo, 2001: 135).258 In conjunction with this new 
stabilisation plan, the second stage of Menem’s privatisation programme began 
(Llanos, 2001: 77),259 and in this respect ‘privatisation was no longer an ad hoc 
policy but was incorporated as an integral part of the administration’s economic 
plan’ (Manzetti, 1999: 73). Cavallo made explicit his intention to depart from the 
first stage through more rigorous planning of privatisations, improvements in the 
actual procedures and also to increase legal guarantees for investors (Llanos, 2001: 
77). Also during this stage, Executive-Congress relations changed, mainly due to the 
fact that the Radicals now returned to the traditional role of opposition (Llanos, 
1998: 755), and the government wished to expand the privatisation of state 
enterprises beyond the list mandated for in the appendix of the State Reform Law 
(Llanos, 2001: 78).  
During this period Menem submitted ten new privatisation bills to Congress 
widening the State Reform Law to a number of new areas, and Congress in an effort 
to re-assert their authority, attempted to amend all of these bills during their passage 
through the house (Llanos, 1998: 755).260 However due to the concentration of 
executive power, Menem still had the ability to re-amend these bills according to his 
wishes through the use of the partial veto (see Table 5.3). Nonetheless, this particular 
period of privatisation was characterised by ‘intense negotiations’ with legislators 
(Treisman, 2003: 98-99). However, these ten bills only served to widen the existing 
State Reform Law to incorporate other potential areas of privatisation, and ‘even 
under Cavallo, privatisations were implemented via the so-called decrees of necessity 
and urgency’ (Manzetti, 1999: 92). By the end of his first term in office in 1995, 
Menem had sold nearly 140 state enterprises, generating US$18,446 million in 
revenue, in diverse areas that included the majority of the state oil industry, all 
passenger and cargo rail operators, the entire gas industry, the principal generation, 
distribution and transmission facilities of the electricity industry, the 
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telecommunications industry, the national airlines, the major state petrochemical and 
chemical plants, the ports, radio and television channels and a chunk of the national 
pension system (Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 12; Murillo, 2001: 142). 
     
Table 5.3 - Privatisation Bills in Menem’s First Term  
Privatisation Bills Approval Congressional 
Amendment 
Partial Veto 
Ministry of Defence Assets Yes Yes No 
AHZ (defence) Yes Yes No 
Electricity Industry Yes Yes Yes 
Gas Industry Yes Yes Yes 
YPF (oil industry) Yes Yes Yes 
Cattle Market Decree ----- ----- 
Ports Yes Yes Yes 
Banks Yes Yes No 
Pensions Yes Yes Yes 
YPF (2nd round) Yes Yes No 
Source: Llanos (2001: 86; 1998: 750)     
 
Following a number of secret meetings between Raul Alfonsín and Menem in 
November 1993, the pair signed an agreement, the Pact of Olivos, in which Menem 
managed to secure Alfonsín’s backing to allow Menem run for a second consecutive 
term. In return, Menem agreed to a number of reforms that ‘Alfonsín felt would limit 
the power of the president, benefit the UCR, and restore Alfonsín to a more 
prominent role in Argentine politics’ (Jones, 1997: 291). So, as a result of the 1994 
amendment to the constitution, Menem was now free to run for a second consecutive 
term in the 1995 elections, and the success of the Convertibility Plan in taming 
inflation had endeared the electorate to Menem’s economic package. Furthermore, in 
1994 the Tequila Effect and the general fear of instability ‘helped Menem to get re-
elected in 1995, under the idea that the President and his team were the best pilots in 
stormy waters’ and Menem won the Presidential election with nearly 48 per cent of 
the vote (Bambaci et al. 2002: 76).261 Added to this, in the legislative elections, the 
Peronists secured a majority in both the lower and upper houses, but this advantage 
was offset by an increase in conflict within the Peronists themselves as internal 
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competition to secure the candidate for the next Presidential election in 1999 began 
(Llanos, 2001: 92).262  
Once elected, Menem continued his policy of privatisation, and so began the 
third stage in this process, a stage that was characterised by increased conflict 
between the Executive and the Legislature (Llanos, 1998: 759). As in the second 
stage, Menem initially attempted a more consensual approach when implementing 
privatisations and submitted five bills to that end to Congress during this period 
(Llanos, 1998: 759-765; Llanos, 2001: 92-96). As can be see from Table 5.4 
however, Congress was less willing to support Menem’s privatisation programme 
and actually rejected three of the proposed five bills and in response to this lack of 
support, Menem simply bypassed Congress by exercising his Executive power. Even 
in those cases where the legislature accepted the proposed bills, but with 
amendments, Menem used his partial veto power in order to bring them back into 
line with his own policy. Consequently, due to the hostility of Congress towards his 
reforms, particularly after the 1997 legislative elections, in this stage of privatisation, 
Menem increasingly relied upon his decree powers (Llanos, 1998: 765).  
During Menem’s second term in office, he privatised a further thirty-two state 
enterprises, generating revenue of nearly US$23 billion and by the time Menem 
finally left office in 1999, he had managed to sell 165 state-owned enterprises, 
generating over US$40 billion in revenue, earning nearly US$15 billion in foreign 
exchange, and transferring US$25 billion to both internal and external debt titles 
(Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 13).263 Menem, within a very short period of time, had 
privatised nearly 90 per cent of all state enterprises in Argentina (Tresiman, 2003: 
94).    
Table 5.4 – Privatisation Bills in Menem’s Second Term 
Privatisation Bills Approval Congressional 
Amendment 
Partial Veto 
Post Office No (delegated decree) ---- ---- 
Nuclear Plants Yes Yes Yes 
Airports No (necessity and 
urgency decree) 
---- ---- 
Yacyretá dam No (administrative 
decree) 
---- ---- 
Mortgage Bank Yes Yes Yes 
Source: Llanos (2001: 93) 
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One of the major factors that enabled Menem to implement privatisation so 
quickly and so effectively, was the 1989 hyperinflation crisis, which ‘helped forge a 
political agreement between the two major parties’ (Bambaci et al., 2002: 80). This 
agreement led to the delegation of significant powers to the Executive, which Menem 
utilised cleverly in order to circumnavigate political opposition in the early stages of 
privatisation (Bambaci et al., 2002: 80; Rubio & Goretti, 1996: 447-448). In the 
context of this crisis and the debilitating prospect of continued hyperinflation, 
privatisation was presented as an integral part to the solution of this problem 
(Gerchunoff & Cánovas, 1995: 483; Gerchunoff et al. 2003: 8; Machinea et al. 2003: 
4). Privatisation was also utilised as a signal to international capital that Menem had 
left his Peronist past behind and was committed to a reformist course (Gerchunoff et 
al. 2003: 8; Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 12).  
 Secondly, the role of the international financial institutions in placing 
pressure on the government to privatise is also clearly evident. Menem, in contrast to 
Alfonsín’s heterodox stabilisation programme, launched an IMF-sanctioned plan in 
the form of the Reforma del Estado and within a month, following the suspension of 
all loans to Argentina under Alfonsín, the IMF approved a new US$150 million loan 
package (Molano, 1997: 96). For the IFI’s, privatisation permitted the re-
establishment of service payments on the country’s external debt, and as such 
reflected ‘the interest of external creditors’ (Azpiazu & Schorr, 2001: 10). 
Privatisation was also an integral part of the Brady Plan negotiations, which 
facilitated Argentina’s return to international finance (Azpiazu & Basualdo, 2004: 3; 
Menin & Cerdá, 2006: 8).264 As such, ‘the multilateral lending agencies played a 
significant role in guiding Argentina toward privatisation’ (Molano, 1997: 96). 
 Thirdly, Menem, like Martínez de Hoz and Alfonsín before him, also faced 
strong opposition to privatisation from a number of important actors, but Menem 
cleverly used privatisation, through patronage, negotiation and sometimes force, as a 
means to neutralise this opposition (Azpiazu & Basualdo, 2004: 2; Gerchunoff et al. 
2003: 16; Etchemendy, 2001: 5). As Molano (1997: 101) argues: ‘While privatisation 
was an end in itself to the other national executives in the Southern Cone and the 
Alfonsín administration, the Menem administration used privatisation as a means to 
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garner the approval of key interest groups.’ Etchemendy’s (2001: 1-2) supports this 
view, arguing that market transformation in Argentina was ‘founded on coalitions 
cemented in more or less formal bargains with a variety of sectoral interests anchored 
in the old model.’  
In order to overcome the opposition of the patria contratistas, who had 
benefited enormously as a result of lucrative contracts with the public sector, and 
opposition from other rent-seeking indigenous industry, Menem began to involve 
them in the privatisations on highly preferential terms (Treisman, 2003: 97).265 
Suppliers of state enterprises were given preference in their sale, with the state often 
assuming the enterprise’s debt, and in many cases oligopolistic or monopolistic 
conditions were preserved for years (Treisman, 2003: 97). These benefits convinced 
the patrias to part with their lucrative service contracts in exchange for the 
opportunity to become the new owners of cheap state enterprises (Treisman, 2003: 
97).  
In the case of the military, shortly after his inauguration, Menem issued over 
200 pardons to military officers and personnel who had been convicted of human 
rights abuses under Alfonsín (Molano, 1997: 103; Treisman, 2003: 97). When he 
announced the privatisation of the national defence industries (DGFM), he promised 
the military that they would benefit from these sales, primarily in the form of 
increases in officers’ salaries and also through the purchase of much-needed 
equipment (Molano, 1997: 103; Treisman, 2003: 97). The military, which had 
provided such strong opposition to privatisation under Martínez de Hoz and 
Alfonsín, soon fell in behind Menem’s reforms.  
While individual legislators opposed Menem’s reform policies, particularly 
privatisation, he actually received ‘surprisingly little intra-party resistance’ 
(Levitsky, 2003: 149).266 Those who did oppose Menem were ‘compensated’ through 
the windfall generated by the Convertibility Law and provincial bosses were 
provided with pork and excused from replicating the economic reforms being carried 
out at the national level (Levitsky, 2003: 155-156; Treisman, 2003: 98-99). Levitsky 
(2003) convincingly argues that Peronist acquiescence to the Menem reforms is best 
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understood within the context of the PJ party structure. Due to the lack of secure 
tenure patterns and routinised career paths, PJ leaders, wishing to preserve or 
advance their careers, have a strong incentive to ‘bandwagon’ with the winning side 
and PJ party leaders in the non-Menem camp opportunistically established alliances 
with Menem despite their opposition to his liberalising reforms. The weakly 
institutionalised nature of the PJ and PJ leadership bodies meant that internal critics 
were largely unable to use party vehicles to critique or question Menem’s neoliberal 
strategy (see Levitsky, 2003: 144-185) and as a result, there was only a minor 
splinter in the party, with eight legislators defecting who would ultimately join 
Frepaso (Murillo, 2001: 137).  
The last group with the potential to provide major opposition to privatisation 
in Argentina was labour, but Menem, in a manner similar to both Franco and 
Cardoso in Brazil (see chapter three), utilised both carrot and stick tactics in order to 
neutralise this opposition. The Confederación General del Trabajo (General 
Worker’s Union – CGT) was the ‘most prominent labour federation and a pillar of 
political power in Argentina’ and since the time of Perón, it had also become a 
bastion of Peronist power (Molano, 1907: 89). However, privatisation caused a 
division within the CGT between October 1989 and March 1992, and the 
government manipulated the competition among factions by rewarding the loyal 
segment of the union, CGT-San Martín led by Saul Ubaldini, in order to induce 
defections from the rebel CGT-Azopardo, led by Jorge Triaca (Murillo, 2001: 142-
150).267 This split in the union, coupled with depressed labour market conditions 
particularly in manufacturing, significantly weakened the bargaining position of the 
unions (Goldstein, 1998: 67). On the political side, Menem dismantled the labour 
arm of the PJ, the ’62 Organisations’ and abandoned the traditional, but informal 
mechanism of placing union members on the party lists, the tercio, and without these 
institutional channels, union influence in the party quickly eroded (Levitsky, 2003: 
24-25). This weak position and lack of patronage for the CGT-Azopardo led to its 
leaders modifying their demands and they had slowly moved towards the pro-
privatisation position of the CGT-San Martín by the end of 1991 (Murillo, 2001: 
151).  
                                                 
267
 A small group of unions did split from the CGT in order to create the Congress of Argentine 
Workers (CTA), which eventually participated in the creation of Frepaso (see Murillo, 2001: 137). 
  - 141 -   
Menem also employed a number of strong-arm tactics to neutralise labour. 
When FOETRA, the only major union associated with the Radicals, called a strike to 
protest against the proposed privatisation of ENTel, Menem dissolved the union by 
force and its headquarters were physically taken over by the police (Goldstein, 1998: 
67). When workers from the railway and oil industries went on strike, ‘Menem fired 
many of them, prosecuted ringleaders, and even threatened at one point to call out 
the military’ (Treisman, 2003: 96). But the carrot was also evident. During the 
election, Saul Ubaldini joined Menem’s team, while after the reunification of the 
CGT, Jorge Triaca was appointed as Minister of Labour, and Julio Gullian, leader of 
the telephone workers, was appointed as Secretary of Communications (Molano, 
1997: 89) In return for their support, the unions were also allowed to maintain their 
main sources of power: the regulation of collective bargaining and Obras Sociales 
(Bambaci et al.,2002: 82).268 Most importantly however, as the BNDES had in 
Brazil, Menem introduced a scheme whereby the workers could participate in 
purchasing some of the newly privatised enterprises. The Programa de Propiedad 
Participada (PPP) enabled workers to buy up to ten per cent of the shares in 
privatised firms, and this scheme also provided a further incentive to the unions, as 
workers had to nominate a legal entity to act as their representative in these 
transactions (Gerchunoff et al. 2003: 16). Because of these tactics, and because of 
the partisan loyalty of the unions to a Peronist President, Menem managed to 
successfully neutralise the opposition of labour to privatisation in Argentina 
(Murillo, 2001: 149-150).              
 The final and most important to note, is the institutional context within which 
privatisation occurred under Menem. In Brazil, privatisation was carried out within 
the context of a comprehensive legal and institutional framework. In Argentina in 
contrast, privatisation was carried out under the auspices of the State Reform Law, 
which due to the severity of the economic problems at this time, delegated a large 
amount of power to the Executive (Bambaci et al.,2002: 80; Rubio & Goretti, 1996: 
447-448). This created a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive, and 
privatisation was carried out nearly entirely at the discretion of the President, and 
primarily implemented by means of executive power in the form of delegated 
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decrees, decrees of urgency and necessity and administrative decrees, bypassing 
Congress and all other state institutions.  
The entire Menem administration ‘is characterised, from an institutional 
perspective, by a concentration of power in the hands of the Executive’ (Rubio & 
Goretti, 1996: 443). Between 1853 and July 1989, only 35 decrees of necessity and 
urgency were ever issued by Argentine Presidents, but between July 1989 and 
August 1994, Menem issued 336 decrees of urgency and necessity in order to 
implement his reforms (Rubio & Goretti, 1996: 444, 451). As such, the policy of 
privatisation in Argentina remained very much in the hands of the President and was 
a product of the high-level of Executive power in this state. Menem could not even 
be checked by the courts. At the beginning of Menem’s Presidency a law was 
introduced that increased the members of the Supreme Court from five to nine, and 
as a result of this move, Menem was able to appoint his political allies to the bench 
(Helmke, 2005: 144; Bambaci et al., 2002: 78-79; Manzetti, 1999: 93). This 
favourable disposition of the Supreme Court was clearly evident when, in 1990, 
Deputy Moisés Fontela asked a federal judge to halt the sale of Aerolíneas 
Argentinas, due to the questionable legality of the decree used to begin this 
privatisation. The Supreme Court, in an unprecedented move called per saltum 
procedure, assumed jurisdiction over this case, and ‘within a few minutes…ruled 
against Fontela’s request’ (Helmke, 2005: 147-148; Manzetti, 1999: 93).269 The early 
and quick privatisation of some national symbols (telecoms, gas, air transport and 
highways) ensured that these newly privatised industries were left with weak 
regulation (Murillo & Finchelstein, 2004: 140; Bambaci et al., 2002: 77; Goldstein, 
1998: 69-70).  
Therefore, in contrast to events in Brazil, privatisation was not carried within 
a comprehensive legal and institutional framework, but rather remained a function of 
executive discretion, nor was this policy delegated to an independent body, but 
remained in the hands of the Executive, and the creation of regulators to guarantee 
investor security in Brazil, was in many cases, sorely lacking in Argentina.          
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5.5 The 2001 Crisis 
By 1999, the rigidity of the Convertibility Plan had left the government with few 
reserves in the event of hard times and following the 1995 Mexico crisis and 
subsequent Tequila effect, this lack of reserves meant the government could do little 
to soften the loss of investor confidence in developing world markets, a situation 
exacerbated by the Asian Crisis of 1997 and the devaluation of the Brazilian Real in 
1999 (Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 8-9).  The national debt, denominated in 
dollars, tripled between 1992 and 1999, but Argentina, hailed as an example of free 
market reforms, had access to easy credit to finance the widening fiscal deficit 
(Ocampo, 2003: 22-25). In the midst of rising dissatisfaction with growing levels of 
poverty and stagnant growth, Fernando de la Rúa, of the Alianza por el Trabajo, la 
Justicia, y la Educacíon270 won the 1999 Presidential election (Grugel & Pia 
Riggirozzi, 2007: 9), but once in power, was faced with the prospect of cutting 
government spending in the midst of a depression in order to tackle the budget deficit 
(Bambaci et al. 2002: 86).  
 In early 2000, the government began implementing spending cuts and tax 
increases, but the increases inadvertently drove the economy further into stagnation 
(Saxton, 2003: 10). De la Rúa brought Cavallo back as Minister of Finance in March 
2001 (Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 9), but Cavallo was able to do little to solve 
the economic problems. As Bambaci et al. (2002: 86) comment: 
He fiddled with tariffs and, fatally, with the currency board itself, so 
that the peso was pegged for exporters half to the dollar, half to the 
euro. This was, in itself, a good idea, but the timing was disastrous. 
By raising the idea of devaluation, it spooked foreign investors. They 
demanded a higher risk premium for holding Argentine bonds, 
driving up interest rates and deepening the recession. 
Amidst a general lack of confidence in the economy, a run to the banks was triggered 
(Bambaci et al. 2002: 87) and by late 2001, capital flight had reached 6 percent of 
GDP, and the government found itself unable to meet debt payments (Kaminsky et 
al., 2003: 63). On November 30th, $1.3 billion fled the banks and the central bank’s 
net reserves slumped by $1.7 billion.271 The government effectively froze bank 
accounts on December 1st in a last ditch effort to prevent money leaving the banking 
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system. In November 2001, the IMF withdrew its support for the government and the 
capital flight continued at an alarming rate (Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 9). The 
crisis spilt out into the streets and 20 people were killed in clashes with the 
government, eventually forcing Cavallo to resign, followed closely by De la Rúa 
(Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 9). During this period, De la Rúa continued to 
privatise, but due to the fact that the major and most valuable state companies had 
previously been sold, the generated revenues could do little to prevent the growing 
budget deficit. During this period, De la Rúa sold four railways stations, the water 
service for Buenos Aires and Neuquen Airport.272 
 It was not until Peronist Eduardo Duhalde assumed office on January 1st 2002 
that the government managed to reassert some control over the economy (Menin & 
Cerdá, 2006: 22; Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 10).273 On January 6th Duhalde 
introduced the law of Emergencia Pública y Reforma del Regimen Cambiário,274 
which unpegged the peso from the dollar, triggering a burst of inflation (Azpiauzu & 
Basualdo, 2004; 40). Following intense negotiations, a 70 per cent reduction in debt 
to private creditors was agreed upon, and the IMF consented to a US$3 billion loan 
deal in January 2003 (Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 13). Once the economy began 
to stabilise, Duhalde resumed privatisations in early 2003, mainly in the area of 
infrastructure. Duhalde, mainly in an effort to keep tariff prices low to combat 
inflation, through Decree 293 established a formal procedure, the Comisión de 
Renegociación, for the renegotiation of contracts with companies who had purchased 
privatised public services (Menin & Cerdá, 2006: 22). This was a clear example of 
how the policy of privatisation, and investor security, remained very much in the 
hands of the Executive.  
By 2003, real GDP had fallen by 28 per cent, real wages by 23.7 per cent, 
while unemployment had increased to 23.6 per cent. In 2002, the poverty rate 
doubled to 60 per cent, while growth contracted by 4.4 per cent, setting the scene for 
the 2003 election and the victory of the left-wing candidate, Néstor Kirchner.275       
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5.6 The Legacy of Privatisation in Argentina  
By the time Kirchner won the Presidential election in 2003, Argentina, roughly 
within the space of a decade, had divested itself of approximately 180 state 
enterprises and generated over US$44 billion in revenue. The entire 
telecommunications, gas, oil, steel and railway sectors, the largest ports, the main 
highways, the state television and radio stations, the majority of the electricity 
distribution and generation sectors, practically all the former state-owned enterprises 
in the manufacturing sector, and some water and sanitation services, not to mention 
the vast majority of the military monolith DGFM, had been transferred to private 
control. Importantly however, unlike Brazil, where privatisation occurred within the 
context of a comprehensive legal and institutional framework, privatisation in 
Argentina primarily occurred at the discretion of the Executive. This policy had not 
been delegated to an independent body capable of operating freely from political 
interference, and the haste with which early privatisations were carried out meant 
that guarantees of investor security were lacking, and regulation of some of the 
newly privatised industries remained weak. Menem had neutralised opposition to 
privatisation from the patria contratistas, Peronists, the military and labour by 
building a pro-privatisation coalition through patronage, force, and pork-barrel.  
 By 2003, when Kirchner came to power, some 5 to 10 per cent of state-
owned enterprises still remained, including a small number of banks, and some 
former military companies, not to mention service provision in terms of water, 
sanitation and toll roads in different parts of the country, coupled with the large 
number of enterprises that still remained in state hands at the provincial level. 
Nonetheless, Menem’s privatisation drive, within a single decade, had completely 
altered the role of the Argentine state, and this initiative remains one of the largest 
and fastest privatisation programmes ever instigated, one that completely redefined 
the nature of the Argentine economy. 
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Chapter Six – Privatisation under Kirchner 
The 2003 elections in Argentina were held as the country was gradually emerging 
from the worst economic crisis it had suffered in recent memory. Amidst fears of 
voter apathy and abstention, the little-known Néstor Kirchner of the Frente Para la 
Victoria wing of the Partido Justicialista won the Presidential election. Kirchner’s 
platform for the 2003 election was based upon a harsh critique of the market-friendly 
policies implemented in Argentina in the 1990s under Menem, and advocated a 
greater role for the state in the economy and a rejection of privatisations (Sanchez, 
2005: 462-463). Kirchner promised change and began his acceptance speech by 
claiming that ‘a new era is about to begin.’276 The previous chapter documented the 
extent and size of the Argentine privatisation programme, and it remained to be seen 
whether Kirchner could actually introduce a new direction for this particular policy. 
This chapter therefore, is the analysis of privatisation policy during 
Kirchner’s Presidency. It will attempt to determine if Kirchner managed to 
completely halt privatisation once he was in power. It is divided into two main parts. 
The first part takes the form of a narrative and briefly outlines the 2003 election. This 
section will establish the motivations and preferences of Kirchner’s government. The 
second section of the narrative actually examines the policy of privatisation once 
Kirchner is in power. The second part of this chapter is the analysis, and this analysis 
is grouped around the independent variables identified in chapter two. The final 
section will present the conclusion. 
            
The Narrative 
6.1 The 2003 Election 
In December of 2001, the first candidates for the Presidential election in 2003 began 
to emerge amidst growing social unrest, voter apathy and anger towards the political 
classes (Vives Segl, 2006: 112; Sanchez, 2005: 461).277 The Peronist Partido 
Justicialista (PJ) was highly fragmented and appeared as if it would not unite behind 
a single leader for the elections. The former governor of Buenos Aires, Carlos 
Ruckauff, the governor of Córdoba, José Manuel de la Sota, the former governor of 
Santa Fe, Carlos Reutemann, former President, Carlos Menem, short-term President, 
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Adolfo Rodríguez Saá, and the governor of Santa Cruz, Néstor Kirchner, all emerged 
as potential PJ candidates (Vives Segl, 2006: 112). The lack of unity within the party 
was primarily a product of the intense political rivalry that existed between two PJ 
heavyweights: the former President Carlos Menem, and the current interim President 
Eduardo Duhalde.278 Duhalde had opted out of running in the 2003 election, but he 
actively sought a surrogate candidate who he perceived would be easily malleable 
(Sanchez, 2005: 461). Initially, he favoured the former racing-car driver, Carlos 
Reutemann,279 but eventually, Duhalde and his influential political machine in 
Buenos Aries decided to throw their weight behind the little-known governor of 
Santa Cruz, Néstor Kirchner (Sanchez, 2005: 461).280 Due to increasing social unrest, 
Duhalde decided to bring forward the date of the election to April 27th 2003 and at 
the same time, tendered his resignation to become effective on May 25th, six months 
ahead of the constitutionally mandated date (Vives Segl, 2006: 111).   
 Traditionally, the PJ had chosen their presidential candidate through party 
primaries, but Duhalde, fearing that Menem’s support and control within the party 
would lead to the defeat of his candidate, sparked an intense political wrangle to 
prevent these primaries from occurring (Vives, Segl, 2006: 110; Sanchez, 2005: 
461). Internal party elections were not held and the PJ, for the first time in its history, 
agreed to let three different candidates run for President. As none of the candidates 
were allowed to use PJ symbols, all three were forced to establish new political 
movements within the PJ itself: Menem created the Frente por la Lealtad, Rodríguez 
Saá headed the Movimiento Nacional y Popular, while the left-wing Néstor Kirchner 
became the Presidential candidate representing the Frente para la Victoria (FpV) 
(Vives Segl, 2006: 110; Sanchez, 2005: 461). In total, eighteen candidates announced 
their intention to run for the 2003 election, ensuring that this election would be one 
of the most hotly contested since Argentina’s return to democratic rule. 
 Néstor Kirchner was the least well-known of the three PJ candidates. 
Kirchner had been governor of the oil-rich province of Santa Cruz for eleven years, 
and while governor had utilised a mix of interventionist policies and state investment 
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in the economy in order to maintain fiscal balance and low levels of poverty (Vargas 
Llosa, 2004: 73; Sanchez, 2005: 462).281 As a youth, Kirchner had been a member of 
the left-wing Montenero revolutionary group, and was one of the few dissenters 
within the ranks of the PJ who had criticised Menem’s economic model in the 1990s, 
particularly the privatisations. He also supported the establishment of the Corriente 
Peronista, a political space within the party for those who did not subscribe to the 
market-friendly policies of Menem (Vargas Llosa, 2004: 73; Sanchez, 2005: 462). 
 During the election campaign, Kirchner scathingly attacked the market model 
of Menem, claiming that ‘people cannot bear any more austerity. They have sold 
everything. Some want to go back to that economic model of exclusion, austerity and 
unemployment.’282 Privatisation was an essential component of Menem’s policies 
and Kirchner clearly displayed his preferences towards this policy from the outset. 
He called for an end to all future privatisation contracts, particularly with regard to 
utilities283 and suggested that ‘there is a need to recuperate the instruments of the 
state, the essential macroeconomic tools for driving Argentina. It is not a question of 
nationalising everything, but regaining strategic control.’284 In an interview with El 
País, Kirchner stated that ‘he would recover the railways, the petrol rents and the 
commercial airlines,’285 while also stating that if elected he would ‘analyse the 
[privatisation] contracts.’286 Kirchner urged the Duhalde government to renegotiate 
the contracts of privatised rail services287 and this coupled with his call to ‘recover 
the railways,’ prompted the government to commission a report investigating the 
state of the nation’s rail services,288 and forced the Production Minister, Aníbal 
Fernández, and Kirchner’s campaign manager, Alberto Fernández, to clarify that he 
was not talking of nationalisation, only for Kirchner to rebuke them, claiming that he 
needed no interpreter for his words.289 When questioned about his views on the 
Duhalde government’s possible privatisation of the state-owned banks, Kirchner 
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responded: ‘We need a strong Banco Nación, not a privatised one.’290 He was also 
highly critical of the privatisation of the state-oil company, YPF, under Menem and 
called for greater state-involvement in the energy sector.291 
 Kirchner’s 152 page Plan de Gobierno (Plan for Government) and the FpV’s 
Plataforma Electoral (Electoral Platform), both clearly indicated his preferences as 
regards the economy and the policy of privatisation. Highly critical of Menem’s 
market-friendly policies, the platform accused Menem of engendering the 2001 
economic crisis by ‘dismantling the national productive sector,’ and ‘selling the 
national patrimony’ (Frente Para la Victoria, 2003a: La Economía). It also proposed 
a ‘neo-Keynesian plan of public works to generate a strong and immediate growth in 
the levels of employment and production, through the construction of housing, the 
provision of drinkable water and the expansion of infrastructure’ (Frente Para la 
Victoria, 2003a: La Economía). The Plan de Gobierno promised to construct a 
‘national capitalism,’ and it proposed to halt and review all privatisations, ‘in order to 
recover the wealth for the Argentine peoples’ (Frente Para la Victoria, 2003b: 
Estado). While the document stated that it was not suggesting nationalisation, it 
advocated a renegotiation of all privatised utility contracts, so that the ‘state would 
have control over these macroeconomic instruments’ in order to direct the efficient 
usage of these services (Frente Para la Victoria, 2003b: Estado). It also proposed 
greater state involvement in the rail and commercial airline industries, the recovery 
of the ‘golden share’ in the state oil company and the creation of a new hydrocarbon 
law to regulate the petroleum industry, while explicitly rejecting the privatisation of 
any of the remaining state banks (Frente Para la Victoria, 2003b: Estado).  
Kirchner’s pro-statist and anti-privatisation stance was a position generally 
supported by the Argentine electorate. By 2003, only 15 per cent of the Argentine 
public were satisfied with the market economy, while support for privatisation had 
dropped to just 12 per cent among the electorate, from a previous high of 32 per cent 
in 1998 (Latinobarómetro, 2003). Consequently, in the first round of voting on April 
27th, Menem won with 22.2 per cent of the vote, with Kirchner second, garnering 
21.9 per cent of the vote, ensuring both qualified for a second round election to be 
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held on May 18th (Sanchez, 2005: 465-466).292 The prospect that Kirchner might 
actually win the run-off election sent jitters through the financial markets, with share 
prices on the Argentine Bolsa plummeting by 8.6 per cent in one day and initiating a 
run on the sale of Argentine sovereign bonds.293 Kirchner, in response to this turmoil 
and in an attempt to calm the markets, announced that he would re-appoint Roberto 
Lavagna as Minster of the Economy, a respected economist and former Minister of 
the Economy under Duhalde.294  
However, it soon began to appear as if a second round election would not be 
necessary. Even before the first round results were known, polling had indicated that 
58 per cent of the Argentine electorate would not vote for Menem under any 
circumstances, and while his first round voters would constitute a definite core in the 
second round, it became apparent that Menem would face a resounding defeat by 
Kirchner, with polls indicating that Kirchner, buoyed by the anti-Menem sentiment, 
commanded about 70 per cent of the vote (Vives Segl, 2006: 114-115: Sanchez, 
2005: 470). After days of uncertainty, Menem finally announced on May 14th that he 
was pulling out of the second round, forcing the legislative assembly to rule that the 
candidate with the second highest total, Néstor Kirchner, was the winner and 
therefore by default, the new President of Argentina (Vives Segl, 2006: 114-115: 
Sanchez, 2005: 470-471).  
 
4.2 Privatisation with Kirchner in Power 
Néstor Kirchner was inaugurated as President of Argentina eleven days later on May 
25th 2003. From the outset, it appeared as if Kirchner was facing a number of serious 
obstacles in his ability to govern successfully. Menem’s final act in the 2003 
elections forced Kirchner to enter the Casa Rosada with the lowest electoral mandate 
in Argentinean democratic history.295 Furthermore, although the Peronists had a 
majority of the seats in the Senate and a near majority in the lower house,296 the 
decision to allow three different PJ candidates to run for President had bitterly 
divided the party. Kirchner, elected under the aegis of Eduardo Duhalde who 
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controlled the powerful Buenos Aires section of the party, would have to rely upon 
Duhalde’s support in order to get any legislation through the lower house, leading to 
widespread speculation that he would be little more than a Duhalde puppet.297 To 
exacerbate issues, Kirchner had also inherited a country which had defaulted on 
debts worth some US$77 billion, and an economy that was still suffering the legacies 
of the 2001 crisis.298 The economic situation, the impatient clamouring of creditors 
and the IMF to receive payment on the defaulted debt and capital markets that had 
remained jittery since the first round elections, fuelled further speculation that 
Kirchner would be hamstrung while in office. Added to this, companies that had 
purchased privatised utilities during Menem’s tenure were placing intense pressure 
on the new government to allow a raise in tariff prices. During the 2001 crisis, the 
Economic Emergency Law converted the tariffs of all privatised utilities into 
devalued pesos and froze them at this level.299 This law was utilised by Duhalde to 
impose the rate freeze on privatised utilities, and no move had been made on this 
issue by the time Kirchner came to power.300 The IMF had included the introduction 
of tariff hikes as an essential part of any agreement regarding the defaulted debt.301   
 When Kirchner announced his new cabinet just days after Menem pulled out 
of the run-off election, the composition of this cabinet appeared to reflect the 
impediments that Kirchner was facing. The twelve posts were shared out between 
members of the PJ who were loyal to Duhalde (Duhaldistas), and members of 
Kirchner’s inner circle from Santa Cruz,302 while the decision to re-appoint the 
economically conservative Lavagna as Economy Minister was widely interpreted as 
an effort to placate the financial markets and the IMF.303  
However, once in office, Kirchner soon appeared intent on asserting his 
authority and implementing his preferences regardless of any obstacles. In his 
acceptance speech he continued his campaign rhetoric vowing that he would not be 
‘a prisoner of the big corporations,’304 while in his inauguration speech he called for 
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a central role for the state, and rebuffed IMF pressure by stating that the government 
would not restart debt payments at the ‘price of the hunger and exclusion of 
Argentines.’305 Within days, in a move designed to distance himself somewhat from 
Duhalde, he began a purge of high-ranking police officers in the Duhalde controlled 
province of Buenos Aires, before turning his attention to the military, where he 
replaced 52 senior officers.306 His next move was to tackle the ‘automatic 
majority’307 of the Menem-friendly Supreme Court, urging Congress to investigate 
the Menem-appointed judges for corruption and conflicts of interest.308 Impeachment 
processes began in June against the President of the Supreme Court, Julio Nazareno, 
eventually forcing his resignation a month later.309 At the same time, Kirchner issued 
a decree which would transform the manner in which justices were selected for the 
Supreme Court, ostensibly in a move to reduce executive interference in the 
process.310 Kirchner, in order to cement his own support base in Congress and reduce 
his reliance upon Duhalde, adopted what became known as the ‘transversal strategy,’ 
a process that involved winning support from the non-Kirchner aligned sections of 
the PJ and other parties (Vives Segel, 2006: 118). It was a strategy that was to prove 
relatively successful.311 
  With regard to privatisation, Kirchner appeared no less determined to assert 
his authority and implement his preferences. On July 4th, he issued Decree 311, 
which established the Unidad de Renegociación y Análisis de Contratos de Servicios 
Públicos (UniRen – The Commission for the Renegotiation and Analysis of Public 
Service Contracts).312 The commission would be directed by Lavagna’s economy 
ministry and the planning ministry of Julio de Vido, and its mandate was the analysis 
and possible renegotiation of 63 utility concessions that were privatised in the 1990s 
in areas such as electricity, gas, water, telecommunications, roads, rails, ports and 
mail.313 Specifically, the commission would be responsible for investigating the 
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impact of these contracts on the economy in general, the level of investment, the 
quality of service, public access to these services and the profits generated by these 
privatised utilities.314 As he issued the decree creating UniRen, Kirchner also 
introduced a bill to Congress that proposed extending the deadline for the 
renegotiation of utility contracts until December 2004, whereupon Congress would 
then have 90 days to accept or reject the revised contracts. This law would also 
enable the executive to renegotiate the contracts without congressional 
interference.315 This was extremely significant, as it meant that not only was 
Kirchner scrutinising utilities that had profited from privatisation in the 1990s, 
something he had proposed to do during the election, but also that the earliest 
possible date whereby tariff hikes would even be considered would now be March 
2005.316 This move established a relationship between Kirchner and the privatised 
utility companies that was to become fraught with acrimony. Kirchner was indicating 
that he was unwilling to bow to the pressures of the IMF or the privatised utility 
companies to raise tariffs immediately. In fact, at the end of July, Kirchner’s 
administration signed a letter of intent with the IMF that although committed the 
government to a consolidated primary surplus of 2.5 per cent of GDP, contained no 
mention of utility tariffs (International Monetary Fund, 2003b).       
Further exacerbating tensions with the privatised utilities, Kirchner appointed 
Daniel Azpiazu of the Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLASCO) as 
a special technical advisor to the commission. Both FLASCO and the Instituto de la 
Central de Trabajadores Argentinos (CTA) were to provide technical assessments on 
the regulation of privatised utilities and provide analyses as regards the benefits of 
the existing contracts.317 Both FLASCO and Azpiazu were well known for being 
highly critical of the privatisation process under Menem,318 and had produced a 
number of damning reports which had attacked this process for engendering much of 
the social inequities within Argentina (see for example Azpiazu, 2002; Azpiazu & 
Schorr, 2001).319 Then, in July, in a clear demonstration of his statist tendencies, 
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Kirchner established a new state-owned passenger carrier by decree, Lineas Aereas 
Federales (LAF).320  
In September, Kirchner’s administration signed a 36 month stand-by 
agreement with the IMF, that allowed Argentina to refinance the amortisation of the 
principal due to the fund over three years (International Monetary Fund, 2003c: 1), 
enabling Kirchner to begin dealing with bilateral creditors.321 The IMF placed 
pressure on the administration to adopt a conventional re-structuring programme but 
Kirchner held fast, and eventually the fund reluctantly agreed that mandatory fiscal 
and monetary targets would only apply for six months.322 As part of this agreement, 
the IMF insisted that the government finish negotiations with privatised utilities and 
allow tariff hikes, but the September letter of intent rather ambiguously stated that 
‘the government will act pursuant to the provisions of Law 25,561 (emergency law 
allowing renegotiation of contracts)’ (International Monetary Fund, 2003c: 13).323 
Twenty-three privatised utility companies, in an attempt to step up the pressure on 
the Kirchner government, also lodged claims worth US$16 billion with the World 
Bank’s International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),324 
arguing that they should be compensated by the Argentine government for 
‘pesification,’ the subsequent rise in their dollar-denominated debts, and the refusal 
of the government to allow tariff increases.325 Also Argentina’s refusal to adopt a 
conventional re-structuring programme sent share prices on the MerVal plummeting 
by 3.66 per cent.326 
Despite this pressure, Kirchner remained resolute, refusing to allow any 
increases in utility rates and continuing his combative stance towards the privatised 
utilities, stating that he ‘won’t negotiate under pressure from anyone.’327 After an 
electricity blackout in Buenos Aires, Kirchner accused the privatised electricity 
companies of engineering the blackout in order to place pressure on the government, 
and a week later, Julio de Vido of the Planning Ministry, announced that the firms 
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involved, Edenor and Edesur, would be fined for this blackout.328 Indeed, when 
Daniel Scioli, the Vice-President, suggested that he would be in favour of a utility 
rate increase in an interview, Kirchner publicly rebuked him by dismissing German 
Perez of the tourism ministry and eleven members of Perez’s staff as they were all 
appointed by Scioli.329 Likewise, when Lavagna told an assembly of businessmen 
that he was in favour of perhaps allowing some tariff hikes, the Interior Minister, 
Aníbal Fernández, was quick to announce to the press that there would be no utility 
tariff increases until all negotiations were finished, and warned that any company not 
fulfilling its obligations would have its contract rescinded.330 Issues begun to come to 
a head in October, when Kirchner accused the privatised companies of using the 
issue of tariff raises as a smokescreen to disguise the fact that they had failed to 
invest in the services they had purchased. Kirchner announced that ‘from now on 
they [privatised utility firms] are going to have to fulfil their obligations. Argentines 
will not be extorted.’331   
 Following a series of staggered gubernatorial and legislative elections during 
October and November, Kirchner’s support base was significantly strengthened with 
most gubernatorial candidates backed by Kirchner winning their elections.332 As a 
result, the PJ could now boast a majority in both houses, including a quorum in the 
lower house.333 This accumulation of political and institutional power significantly 
strengthened Kirchner’s ability to pursue his preferences and, after months of 
tension, Kirchner issued a decree at the end of November rescinding the contract of 
Grupo Macri334 to run the national postal service Correo Argentino.335 The postal 
service was privatised under Menem in 1997, and Kirchner’s excuse for rescinding 
the contract was a product of the analysis of UniRen, which documented the fact that 
the company had run up a debt of over $450 million pesos and had failed to meet 
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semi-annual royalties to the state, agreed to in the 1997 contract.336 Initially, it was 
announced that a new state enterprise, Correo Official de la Republica Argentina 
(Corasa), would run the postal service for six months before it was to be re-
privatised.337 However, within three months, the government announced that it was 
considering nationalising the postal service, with Cabinet Chief Alberto Fernández 
stating: ‘We need to get away from false dogmas. Not everything that is private is 
good, nor everything that is public bad.’338 Consequently, Corasa remained in state 
hands, successfully posting profits of $99 million pesos between November 2003 and 
November 2004.339 
 The successful nationalisation of the postal service provided Kirchner with 
momentum and in January 2004, shortly after he lambasted utility companies once 
again for failing to maintain adequate investment levels,340 Kirchner announced that 
he was cancelling the contract of the French defence firm, Thales Spectrum, to 
operate the Argentine radio-electric spectrum.341 Thales had purchased the 15 year 
concession for US$500 million in 1997, granting the firm the right to operate 
airwaves used by mobile phone companies, radio and television stations.342 The 
decision to cancel the contract and nationalise the radio spectrum was sparked by an 
article in the French news magazine, Le Point, in October 2003 that suggested that 
the purchase of the concession by the French firm in 1997 was plagued with 
corruption. It also alleged that Thales had paid up to US$25 million in bribes to 
Argentine officials to win the contract.343 Kirchner issued a decree cancelling the 
contract and nationalising the service on the basis of these corruption allegations and 
also because Thales had failed to invest the requisite $300 million pesos in the 
service that they were obligated to do.344 Kirchner issued the decree claiming that 
control of the radio-electric spectrum was ‘an integral function of the state,’345 a 
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sentiment echoed by Alberto Fernández, who stated: ‘This service can’t be conceded 
to the private sector. The results of the privatisation have not been positive.’346  
 In May 2004, the government introduced an energy bill to the legislature that 
reflected Kirchner’s desire to increase the role of the state in the economy. The 
central component of this energy plan was the establishment of a new state-owned 
energy company, Empresa Nacional de Energia (Enarsa).347 This bill was introduced 
in the face of a looming energy crisis, which Kirchner argued was due to a lack of 
investment from privatised energy companies.348 Enarsa’s activities would involve 
exploration, as well as distribution and transport, which would place the company in 
direct competition with the former Argentine oil company YPF.349 The energy plan 
also included a state investment scheme designed to expand the country’s energy 
infrastructure, and the imposition of higher taxes on gas and oil exporters.350 Taken 
as a whole, this new energy plan was viewed as significantly increasing state 
involvement in the energy sector.351 
  Following a report on the metropolitan railways by the Secretary of Transport 
in May 2004 that indicated that more than one person a day was killed on trains in 
Buenos Aires during 2003, Kirchner now turned his attention to those companies 
who had purchased rail concessions during the 1990s.352 After repeated warnings 
from the government to the rail operators to improve safety and service,353 Kirchner 
signed Decree 798 in June, rescinding the contract of Metropolitano to operate the 
San Martín rail line.354 Metropolitano, owned by Argentine businessman Sergio 
Tasselli, had purchased the 30 year concession to operate the railway lines between 
Buenos Aires and the surrounding areas in 1994.355 Kirchner rescinded the contract 
due to the company’s failure to improve conditions on the San Martín line.356 Control 
and operational management of the line was handed to the newly created Unidad de 
                                                 
346
 The Financial Times, January 27th, 2004.  
347
 Clarín, April 30th, 2004.  
348
 As Argentina began to economically recover under Kirchner, there was an increased demand for 
energy from the industrial sector, but supply could not meet this increased demand, due to a lack of 
investment by energy firms since pesification and a reduction in hydroelectric power caused by very 
dry weather conditions. See World Markets Analysis, May 12th, 2004.  
349
 Clarín, May 9th, 2004.  
350
 World Markets Analysis, May 12th, 2004. 
351
 The Financial Times, June 22nd, 2004.  
352
 La Nación, May 13th, 2004. 
353
 La Nación, May 13th, 2004.  
354
 Clarín, June 24th, 2004.  
355
 Clarín, June 24th, 2004.   
356
 La Nación, June 24th, 2004. 
  - 158 -   
Gestión Operativa Ferroviaria de Emergencia (UGOFE – The Emergency Rail 
Operational Unit), run by the state and the concessionaires on the other Buenos 
Aires’ lines.357  
 Shortly after the Metropolitano affair, the Argentine Communications 
Secretariat announced that it was revoking the satellite licence held by Nahuelsat 
S.A. The consortium purchased the licence in 1999 and had proposed to launch a 
satellite servicing Argentina by 2003.358 However, they had failed to invest the 
US$200 million necessary to do so and for this reason, their contract was 
rescinded.359 A new state controlled enterprise, Empresa Nacional de Soluciones 
Satelitales (Arsat S.A.), owned by the state and the provincial governments, was 
established to assume control of the licence.360 The Communications Secretariat 
resolution that cancelled the contract and nationalised the licence stated that this was 
a ‘resource that should be used in the public interest.’361  
 Riding high approval ratings, Kirchner entered 2005 eager to consolidate his 
position and began by tackling the issue of Argentina’s debt. During the previous 
summer, Kirchner had suspended the September 2003 agreement with the IMF, due 
to his refusal to meet the demands of the fund, particularly concerning the issue of 
tariff increases.362 In January, Argentina finally issued its offer to holders of the 
US$81 billion worth of bonds on which the country defaulted in 2001. Creditors 
were presented with a choice of sixteen different bonds in six currencies, but the 
offer itself was barely above thirty cents for every dollar that was invested.363 
Creditors were given until the end of February to accept or reject the thirty cents in 
the dollar offer, with the Argentine government vowing not to pay a cent to those 
that rejected this deal.364 Despite the paucity of the offer, nearly 78 per cent of 
creditors accepted the deal by the end of February, freeing the Kirchner 
administration from one of the largest debt defaults in history.365 The decision of the 
government to address the defaulted debt also raised confidence in the markets and 
                                                 
357
 Unidad de Gestión Operativa Ferroviaria de Emergencia, ¿Qué es UGOFE? Available at 
http://www.ugofe.com.ar/.  
358
 La Nación, August 24th, 2004.  
359
 La Nación, August 24th, 2004.  
360
 El Cronista, August 27th, 2004.  
361
 Resolución 188/2004, Boletín Oficial, 18/08/2004, No. 30465.  
362
 The Economist, March 5th, 2005.  
363
 The Economist, January 15th, 2005. 
364
 The Economist, January 15th, 2005. 
365
 The Economist, March 5th 2005.  
  - 159 -   
after an announcement that nearly 78 per cent of creditors were participating in the 
swap, the MerVal index shot up by 3.21 per cent.366  
 The IMF continued to place enormous pressure on the government, not only 
to resolve issues with the privatised utilities, but also to formulate some type of plan 
for dealing with those creditors that did not participate in the debt swap.367 However, 
Kirchner, needing access to funds and unwilling to agree to the IMF conditions, 
instead turned to his left-wing counterpart in Venezuela, Hugo Chávez, and 
following negotiations, Venezuela agreed to purchase US4500 million of Argentine 
sovereign bonds once the new paper to be issued as a result of the recent swap is in 
circulation.368 
 The New Year also witnessed Kirchner continuing to target privatised utility 
companies, fining the water company, Aguas Argentinas, and the power supplier 
Edenor, for ‘unjustifiable cuts in service.’369 Kirchner, citing the Rossati doctrine,370 
also urged the companies to drop their cases against Argentina at the World Bank 
and to submit their cases to an Argentine court.371 In March, Kirchner even called for 
a national boycott of Shell oil after the company raised fuel prices by 4.2 per cent.372 
Kirchner’s combative rhetoric and aggressive actions proved popular with the 
electorate, and a poll conducted shortly after the Shell affair, indicated that 78 per 
cent of Argentines believed that foreign-owned utilities should be nationalised.373 
However, Kirchner’s interventionist policies and the hostile business environment 
convinced a number of utility companies that it was time to leave, culminating in 
Electricité de France’s (EDF) announcement that they were going to sell their 90 per 
cent share in power company Edenor.374 Despite Lavagna’s attempts to calm 
investors by stating that he was not in favour of re-nationalisation in an interview 
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with the Financial Times,375 EDF were soon followed by Gaz de France, France 
Telecom and Vivendi.376  
 Compounding problems, in May, the World Bank’s arbitration tribunal, 
ICSID, ordered the Argentine government to pay US$133 million in compensation to 
US firm CMS Gas Transmission for the process of pesification and the subsequent 
tariff freeze.377 Kirchner refused to pay, and demanded that all companies withdraw 
their claims from the ICSID as a perquisite to signing new contracts, which would 
include the long-awaited tariff increases.378 This decision did set the tone for a 
slightly more conciliatory relationship however, with companies such as Telefonica 
and Gas Natural withdrawing their claims from the ICSID.379 Consequently, for the 
first time since Kirchner assumed office, progress was made on the utility contracts 
and by November, UniRen had signed 23 letters of understanding with 
concessionaires.380 
 Despite these problems, mid-term legislative elections held in October 
resulted in a resounding victory for Kirchner, with the Frente Para la Victoria wing 
of the PJ now holding 108 of 257 seats in the lower house, and 40 of 72 seats in the 
upper house.381 In total, the PJ had a clear majority in both houses. With his political 
and institutional power consolidated, Kirchner, in a clear sign of the direction he 
wished his economic policy to take, dismissed his Economy Minister Roberto 
Lavagna and Finance Secretary, Guillermo Nielson. Relations between Kirchner and 
Lavagna had begun to sour over economic policy, particularly over the issue of 
utility rate increases and expropriations.382 Lavagna was replaced with Felisa Miceli, 
who previously had worked in the state-owned Banco de la Nación, and who was 
considered to be more supportive of Kirchner’s economic policies.383 However, the 
replacement of Lavagna with Miceli was not favourably received by the markets, 
with the MerVal tumbling by 4.5 per cent on the announcement of the news.384 
Riding the crest of his popular support, Kirchner, in his last action of the year, 
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announced on December 15th 2005 that his government would repay its entire debt of 
US$9.8 billion to the IMF, freeing the country of any further obligations to the fund. 
385
  
 With this consolidation of power and with the issue of the defaulted debts 
addressed, Kirchner was now in an even stronger position to pursue his preferences 
and in March 2006, following numerous disputes with the company, he issued 
Decree 303, cancelling the contract of water firm Agua Argentinas and 
renationalising the service.386 The company, controlled by French firm Suez, won the 
concession to provide water to Buenos Aires and the surrounding province in 
1993,387 and Kirchner cancelled the contract citing the company’s failure to meet its 
contractual obligations.388 The decree also mandated for the establishment of a new 
state enterprise to run the water service, Aguas y Saneamientos Argentinos (AySA), 
in which the state would hold a non-transferable 90 per cent stake, with the 
employees owning the remaining 10 per cent.389 Shortly after this move, it was 
announced that the Argentine government were in negotiations to increase their share 
in Aerolineas Argentinas (AA) from 1.21 per cent to 20 per cent.390 AA, owned by 
the Spanish group Marsans, was one of the most infamous and unpopular 
privatisations during Menem’s tenure and had occurred with questionable legal 
authority (see chapter five). The new state share in the company would grant the 
government greater control of AA, by providing it with a board-level veto.391    
  In February 2007, Kirchner submitted to the legislature a bill, which proposed 
the reform and partial re-nationalisation of the Argentine pension system. In 1994, 
Argentina partially privatised its pension system by establishing a mixed public and 
private, two pillar system.392 Under the old system, employees had three months to 
choose between the public system and the private Administradoras de Fondos de 
Jubilaciones y Pensiones (AFJPs). If employees did not make this choice within the 
required timeframe, they were automatically assigned to a private AFJP, and were 
subsequently prohibited from switching back to the public system.393 The new law 
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proposed to allow all 12 million affiliates of the private AFJPs 180 days to switch to 
the public system, should they so wish. This option would then be provided to AFJP 
customers every five years. Furthermore, if an employee fails to choose a pension 
scheme within the required three month timeframe, they would now automatically be 
assigned to the public rather than the private system.394 By June, nearly 500,000 
Argentines had switched back to the state-run pension scheme.395   
  Kirchner also announced the re-nationalisation of the small shipyard 
Tandanor, which had been privatised in 1991396 and the nationalisation of the 
Buenos Aires’ Hospital Francés, after the charity who ran the hospital went 
bankrupt.397 Following the temporary closure of a Buenos Aires rail line, angry 
commuters set fire to the Constitucion station and looted nearby shops. In response, 
Kirchner urged the rail operators to address the service deficiencies on their lines, 
warning that otherwise ‘the state is going to give a swift kick where it counts.’398 
Following further commuter protests, Kirchner decided to act and revoked the rail 
concessions for Metropolitano General Roca SA and Metropolitano Belgrano Sur. 
Both these companies were owned by Sergio Tasselli, and this move followed 
Kirchner’s earlier decision to rescind Metropolitano’s contract to run the San Martín 
line.399 Both the Belgrano and General Roca lines were re-nationalised and handed 
over to the state-run UGOFE for management.400 
 Kirchner, like Lula in Brazil, had advocated the end of all privatisations and 
even suggested the possibility of re-nationalisation in Argentina. In Brazil, although 
privatisations significantly slowed, they did not stop. In contrast, by Kirchner’s last 
year in office, no privatisations had occurred.401 In fact, not only did privatisations 
stop, but Kirchner had also created two new state enterprises that would directly 
compete with previously privatised state firms, he had re-nationalised the Argentine 
postal service, cancelled and nationalised a US$500 million contract to run the radio-
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electric spectrum in Argentina, re-nationalised three major rail lines, a shipyard, a 
satellite licence and a hospital, returned to state hands a major water provision 
service and partially re-nationalised the Argentine pension system (see Table 6.1).402 
What is more, the Argentine economy grew at over 7.5 per cent per annum between 
2003 and 2006, although this is partly explained by the increase in agricultural 
exports and market prices.403 However, throughout Kirchner’s tenure, Argentina’s 
credit rating languished well below investment grade. In June 2005, Standard & 
Poor’s improved its rating for Argentina’s long-term debt from SD (Selective 
Default) to B-, while the country’s short term rating moved from SD to C.404 In 
September 2007, these ratings were raised once more, long-term debt to B+ and 
short-term debt to B, ratings still well below investment grade, and S & P refused to 
countenance any further ratings increase because of what they perceived to be the 
excessive concentration of power in the hands of the executive and Kirchner’s 
unorthodox approach to economic policy-making.405 
Both Lula and Kirchner expressed similar preferences concerning 
privatisation before they were elected, but in one instance, privatisation continued, 
while in the other, not only did privatisations halt, but there was also a series of re-
nationalisations, as well the establishment of new state enterprises. So what explains 
this difference? This thesis argues that the political institutional structure in each 
state will either enable a partisan government to implement their preferences, by 
increasing their institutional control over policy, or to inhibit a partisan government 
from implementing their preferences, by leaving them with little institutional control 
over the policy in question. Lula was hampered by the institutional structure in his 
state from pursuing his preferences, whereas in Argentina, the institutional structure 
enabled Kirchner to pursue his preferences by increasing his institutional control 
over the policy of privatisation. Kirchner utilised his decree power to establish 
UniRen, and nearly of all the nationalisations that occurred in Argentina during this 
period were initiated by executive decree. Kirchner’s ability was to draw upon his 
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decree power without major opposition was due to his ability to build his own 
support in the legislature and to significantly alter the composition of the Supreme 
Court. Privatisation had never been delegated to an autonomous body as it had in 
Brazil. In fact, in Argentina, privatisation was initially implemented by executive 
decree. As such, Kirchner was able to roll-back these privatisations through recourse 
to the same institutional mechanisms. The next section will analyse the actions of 
Kirchner according to the independent variables identified in chapter two.     
 
Table 6.1: Kirchner’s Privatisation Policy 
Utility (Company Name 
in Brackets) 
Action Outcome 
Airlines  Creation of new enterprise 
Líneas Aerea Federales 
(LAF) 
Will absorb the workers from bankrupt 
carriers LAPA and Dinar 
National mail service 
(Correo Argentino) 
Contract rescinded Nationalised - new state enterprise Corasa 
Radio-electric spectrum 
(Thales Spectrum) 
Contract rescinded Nationalised 
Energy Sector Establishment of new state 
energy company 
Creation of Enarsa - direct competition 
with Repsol YPF 
San Martín rail line 
(Metropolitano San Martín) 
Contract rescinded Nationalised - new state controlled body 
UGOFE 
Satellite licence (Natuelsat 
SA) 
Contract rescinded Nationalised - new state controlled 
enterprise Arasat SA. 
Water provision (Aguas 
Argentinas) 
Contract rescinded Nationalised  - new state enterprise AySA 
Airlines (Aerolineas 
Argentinas) 
State increased its share in 
company to 20 per cent 
State now has a board level veto over 
company actions 
Pension system 
(Administradoras de 
Fondos de Jubilaciones y 
Pensiones) 
Reform of pension system 
and partial nationalisation 
Allow private pension customers to return 
to state system. New employees, unless 
other wise directed, now automatically 
assigned to state system. 
Shipyard (Tandanor) Contract rescinded  Nationalised 
Health (Hospital Francés) Contract rescinded Nationalised - state social welfare system 
for retirees PAMI 
Belgrano rail line 
(Metropolitano Belgrano 
SA) 
Contract rescinded Nationalised – UGOFE 
General Roca rail line 
(Metropolitano General 
Roca SA 
Contract rescinded Nationalised – UGOFE 
  Source: Derived from author’s own analysis. 
 
The Analysis 
6.3 The Political Institutions 
As in Brazil, the Argentine political system is a Presidential system with three 
branches: the Executive, Congress and the Judiciary (Llanos, 2001: 68). The 1853 
constitution defined the political institutions in Argentina and the powers of the 
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political actors in the policymaking-process. This constitution conferred a large 
amount of power to the Executive, and the Executive in Argentina remains at the 
heart of policy-making, to such an extent that the Argentine system has been 
described as ‘hyper-presidentialist’ (see Nino, 1992, 1996).  
 
The Executive 
The Executive in Argentina has two extraordinarily powerful legislative tools at its 
disposal to enable it to implement its preferences by avoiding congressional 
opposition: the decretos de necesidad y urgencia (decrees of urgency and necessity – 
DNUs) and the item veto (De Luca, 2004; Mustapic, 2000, 2002; Peruzzotti, 2001). 
While the 1853 Constitution ‘conceived the Presidency as the motor of the 
government,’ by granting the Executive the power to present its own legislative 
initiatives and the power of veto after congressional approval, it was a succession of 
democratic, semi-democratic and authoritarian regimes that reduced the power of 
checks and balances enshrined in the constitution (Congress and the Judiciary), 
resulting in the ‘accumulation of prerogatives in the office of the Presidency’(Llanos, 
2001: 68-69).  
With the return of democracy in 1983, a subsequent decade of economic and 
social turmoil re-enforced authoritarian conceptions ‘about the proper exercise of 
political authority that lead in the direction of delegative…democracy (O’Donnell, 
1994: 56). The nature of this delegative democracy is a product of historical 
authoritarian legacies and an atmosphere of crisis which acts as a catalyst for its re-
emergence, but the end result is a democracy characterised by an extremely strong 
Executive, with a weak legislature and judiciary (O’Donnell, 1994). Subsequent 
Executives (particularly Menem) used these periods of crisis to cement their own 
power and sideline other institutions in the policy-making process. Since the return to 
democracy, the increasing power of the Executive in Argentina, relative to the 
legislature and the judiciary, to such an extent that it forecloses opportunities for 
opponents to veto policy, has led to the characterisation of the Argentine political 
system as ‘hyper-presidentialist’ (see Nino 1992, 1996; Serrafero, 1993; Kay, 1999). 
It is the item veto and the decrees of necessity and urgency that form the central tenet 
of this ‘hyper-presidentialism.’ 
Decrees of necessity and urgency essentially enable the executive to pass 
legislation and bypass Congress (Mustapic, 2002: 29). The 1853 Constitution did not 
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authorise their usage as everyday legislative tools, because the only exceptional 
measures that it recognised, which would justify the use of such tools, were a state of 
emergency and federal intervention (Rubio & Goretti, 1996: 449; Mustapic, 2000: 
584).406 Consequently, between 1953 and 1989, executives only issued 35 decrees of 
necessity and urgency, with ten of these belonging to Alfonsín alone (Rubio & 
Goretti, 1996: 444; Mustapic, 2002: 585). It was Menem who set the precedent for 
their usage as a common legislative tool and between July 1989 and August 1994 
Menem issued 336 decrees of urgency and necessity in order to implement his own 
legislative agenda (Rubio & Goretti, 1996: 444, 451).407 The strategic values of these 
decrees are clear. The executive issues a decree, and if Congress introduces an act 
that repeals this decree, the executive can simply veto their decision (Mustapic, 
2002: 39). The costs of forming a parliamentary coalition to reverse the executive 
decision are extremely high and require a two-thirds majority. Therefore, the 
executive only needs the support of one third of all legislators to unilaterally impose 
his will upon Congress (Mustapic, 2000: 585). When the executive decides to utilise 
these decrees ‘the Congress becomes a marginal actor’ (Mustapic, 2002: 41).408 
 Coupled with the ability to pass bills and by-pass Congress through the use 
of decrees of necessity and urgency, the Argentine President also has the power of 
total veto or partial veto. The total veto can be used most effectively to protect 
decrees of necessity and urgency, while the partial veto, again under Menem, became 
another strong legislative resource (Llanos, 2001: 72; Mustapic, 2000: 583, 2002: 30-
31). Specifically, the partial veto enables the executive ‘to move forward by 
obtaining a necessary piece of legislation which, after congressional amendments, 
could still be corrected to adjust it to the presidential view, and then promulgated’ 
(Llanos, 2001: 72). Under Alfonsín and Menem, the number of presidential vetoes 
increased significantly compared to the historical average, with Alfonsín issuing 49 
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vetoes and Menem 109 (Peruzzotti, 2001: 151). In fact, the 1853 Constitution did not 
explicitly recognise the partial veto and it was only after the 1994 Constitutional 
Reform that Executives were explicitly allowed to resort to the partial veto 
(Mustapic, 2000: 582; Llanos, 2001: 72).409 Essentially, the veto allows the 
Executive to amend any legislation in order to reflect its own preferences. 
Despite these institutional prerogatives, a number of authors have recently 
challenged the characterisation of the Argentine political system as ‘hyper-
presidentialist,’ arguing that the role of Congress in the legislative process is still 
significant and therefore, the Argentine system could be better characterised as one 
of ‘limited centralism’ (see Llanos, 2001; Mustapic, 2000, 2002; Peruzzotti, 2001; 
Eaton, 2002). Specifically, they suggest that situations in which Presidents issue 
large numbers of decrees and vetoes could actually indicate institutional conflict 
between the Executive and the legislature, with Congress refusing to act as a mere 
rubber-stamp body (Peruzzotti, 2001; Llanos, 2001). They also suggest that such 
scenarios could reflect the lack a governing party majority in either chamber, or 
perhaps in-fighting within the governing party itself (Llanos, 1998, 2001). The 
Executive therefore resorts to these measures to avoid ‘gridlock’ (Mustapic, 2002; 
Llanos, 2001).410  
However, these arguments do not diminish the fact that the balance of powers 
in the Argentine political system is detrimental to the legislature. Even if the 
Executive is facing ‘gridlock,’ he/she still has recourse to decrees of necessity and 
urgency and veto power, enabling the executive, once they can rely upon the support 
of one third of legislators, to effectively impose their preferences upon Congress. 
This extensive executive power was to prove crucial in Kirchner’s ability to 
implement his preferences. Not only did Kirchner make wide use of the powers at his 
disposal, but he also attempted to increase and strengthen these prerogatives, 
resulting in one of the greatest concentrations of power in the hands of a single 
President since 1853.411 When Kirchner arrived in power, as part of his UniRen 
package to deal with public utility contracts, he managed to convince Congress to 
extend the Economic Emergency Law, passed during Duhalde’s tenure to enable him 
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deal with the 2001 crisis, until December 2004. The Economic Emergency Law, 
besides implementing ‘pesification,’ delegated significant powers to the Executive, 
such as the ability to re-arrange by decree the financial, banking and exchange 
sectors, and to renegotiate public utility contracts and set utility tariffs without 
congressional approval.412 In essence, it granted the Executive significant leeway in 
managing the economy without having to concern himself with congressional 
opposition.413 In November 2004, Congress agreed to extend this law for another 
year,414 which was then extended twice more in 2005 and 2006,415 ensuring that 
Kirchner had the use of these delegated powers for his entire presidency.    
Furthermore, Article 14 of the 2004 Budget Act increased the power of the 
executive over the budget,416 by granting special powers to the cabinet chief to 
increase spending above the ceilings set and to re-allocate spending without 
Congressional approval.417 In May 2004, Kirchner significantly increased taxes on 
export revenues, which are exempt from the ‘co-participation’ system under which a 
proportion of federal tax is automatically distributed to the provinces.418 The 
provinces share of tax revenue fell from 39 per cent in 2001, to 34 per cent in 2005, 
increasing the dependence of the governors on Kirchner, leading to five of the 
opposition Radical Party governors allying with Kirchner.419 In July 2006, the 
government managed to have Law 26,122 passed through both houses, which 
although still mandated that decrees of necessity and urgency had to be approved by 
Congress, eliminated any fixed time within which these decrees had to be approved, 
significantly strengthening the Executive’s legislative prowess (Bonvecchi & 
Giraudy, 2007: 36). Finally, in August 2006, Kirchner gained approval for legislation 
that further strengthened Executive discretionary spending powers. This legislation 
allows the cabinet chief virtually unrestricted authority to alter the federal budget 
without Congressional approval (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008: 19; Bonvecchi & 
Giraudy, 2007: 37). The cumulative effect of these initiatives was to ‘contribute, in 
distinct ways, to the fortification of the power of the Executive over Congress, and 
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more generally, the national government over the provinces’ (Bonvecchi & Giraudy, 
2007: 36). 
Kirchner deployed this executive power regularly in order to implement his 
preferences. In fact, Kirchner’s record of issuing decrees of necessity and urgency 
echoed that of Menem. In his first year alone, Kirchner issued 67 decrees of 
necessity and urgency,420 while over his four years in power, as Table 6.2 indicates 
below, Kirchner issued a total of 249 decrees of necessity and urgency, compared to 
just 176 laws introduced by the Executive to Congress over the same period. 
Kirchner was also not reticent when it came to using his veto power.  As Table 6.3 
shows below, Kirchner issued a total of 35 vetoes (full and partial) during his tenure, 
with 77 per cent of these vetoes being promulgated in his first two years, enabling 
him to bring legislation which had passed through Congress back to a position that 
more reflected his preferences.421   
 
Table 6.2 Kirchner and the use of Decree Power 
Type of 
Legislative 
Initiative 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Total 
Decrees of 
Necessity and 
Urgency 
67 73 61 48 249 
Laws 56 43 35 40 176 
Source: La Nación, September 10th, 2007.   
 
Table 6.3 Kirchner and the use of Veto Power 
Type of Veto 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Total 4 8 --- --- --- 
Partial 7 8 3 2 3 
Number 11 16 3 2 3 
Source: Boletín Oficial (various) and Información Legislativa at http://www.infoleg.gov.ar/.  
 
Kirchner also utilised this Executive power to implement his preferences with 
regards to privatisation. He established UniRen through a decree of necessity and 
urgency,422 and as a result of the powers delegated to him by the Economic 
Emergency Law, he was able to conduct all negotiations and re-negotiate contracts 
with the privatised utility companies without Congressional interference. 
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Furthermore, as Table 6.4 indicates below, the majority of his actions in this 
particular policy area were through unilateral executive initiatives. Kirchner used his 
decree power to rescind and nationalise (bar one) the contracts of the privatised 
utility companies. In fact, he only introduced legislation to Congress for his energy 
plan establishing Enarsa and for the partial re-nationalisation of the pension system.  
 As such, in Brazil, the Executive has significant power, but this can be 
checked by the judiciary or by Congress, particularly if the governing party fails to 
form a cohesive coalition, as happened to Lula. In Argentina however, the Executive 
has recourse to even more powerful legislative tools, some of which can enable the 
Executive to sideline an uncooperative legislature. Whereas Lula was prevented from 
utilising his Executive powers to successfully implement his preferences, Kirchner 
was able to utilise the wide array of Executive tools available in Argentina in order to 
implement his preferences.     
 
Table 6.4 Executive Power and Kirchner’s Privatisation Policy 
The Action Legal Norm (source in brackets) 
Airlines: Creation of LAF Decreto 337/2003 
Boletín Oficial, 08/07/2003, No. 30187 
National mail service: Nationalisation of 
Correo Argentino contract 
Decreto 1075/2003 
Boletín Oficial, 20/11/2003, No. 30281  
Radio-electric spectrum: Nationalisation of 
Thales Spectrum contract 
Decreto 340/2004 
Boletín Oficial, 23/03/2004, No. 30366 
Energy Sector: Creation of Enarsa Ley 25,943 
Boletín Oficial, 03/11/2004, No. 30519 
Rail: Nationalisation off San Martín rail line 
(Metropolitano San Martín) 
Decreto 798/2004 
Boletín Oficial, 25/06/2004, No. 30429 
Satellite: Nationalisation of Nahuelsat 
satellite licence 
Resolución 188/2004 
Boletín Oficial, 18/08/2004, No. 30465 
Water provision: Nationalisation of Aguas 
Argentinas contract 
Decreto 303/2006 
Boletín Oficial, 22/03/2006, No. 30871 
Airlines (Aerolineas Argentinas) State increased its share in company to 20 per cent 
Pension system: Reform and partial 
nationalisation of Administradoras de Fondos 
de Jubilaciones y Pensiones 
Ley 26,222, 
Boletín Official 08/03/2007, No. 31111 
Shipyard: Nationalisation of  Tandanor Decreto 315/2007 
Boletín Oficial, 03/04/2007, No. 31128  
Rail: Nationalisation of General Roca rail 
line (Metropolitano General Roca SA) 
Decreto 591/2007 
Boletín Oficial, 23/05/2007, No. 31161 
Rail: Nationalisation of Belgrano rail line 
(Metropolitano Belgrano SA) 
Decreto 592/2007 
Boletín Oficial, 23/05/2007, No. 31161 
Source: Derived from Boletín Oficial (various). Relevant Boletín Oficial listed in brackets. 
 
Legislative Support 
The extensive power granted to the Executive however, does not render the 
legislature impotent (Llanos, 2001; Mustapic, 2000, 2002; Eaton, 2002; Peruzzotti, 
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2001; Corrales, 2000, 2002; De Luca, 2004). The Argentine Congress, ‘while 
certainly more of a reactive blunt veto player than a proactive agenda setter, is 
nevertheless an important actor in the policy process’ (Jones, 2004: 1). As Llanos 
(2001) and Mustapic (2000: 2002) have argued, when an Executive is forced to use 
the full array of powers (DNUs and veto) available to them, this is an indication of 
Executive-Congress tension. It signifies an active Congress that is unwilling to act as 
a mere rubber-stamp body for Executive initiatives, and so the Executive must rely 
heavily upon these powers to impose a legislative agenda (Peruzzotti, 2001: 152). No 
Executive can rule by decree alone. Decrees must be accepted and ratified by 
Congress, and rarely can permanent and lasting decisions be made through decree 
(Mustapic, 2002: 32).423 Furthermore, Congress controls the parliamentary agenda 
and while it gives priority to the initiatives of the Executive, it does not neglect those 
of the legislators themselves (Mustapic, 2002: 43). Congress can therefore thwart, 
delay and prevent an Executive from implementing its preferences.  
 This is where party fragmentation and party discipline becomes relevant. 
Since the return to democracy, the Argentine political system has been dominated by 
two major parties,424 the Partido Justicialista (PJ) and the Unión Civica Radical 
(UCR), while at several times a third party has achieved a degree of national 
prominence (Jones, 2004: 2; 2002; 149).425 Most importantly however, the level of 
party discipline in the Argentine Congress is very high (Jones, 1997; 2002; 2004; 
Molinelli, 1991). In fact, for the four legislative periods between 1989 and 1997, the 
level of relative discipline for the PJ in each period never dropped below 94 per cent 
(Jones, 2002: 156). Indeed, it is extremely rare for a deputy of either of the two main 
parties to vote against his/her party in the Chamber (Jones, 2002: 157).  
 Firstly, deputies are elected via closed party lists (using the d’Hondt divisor 
form of proportional representation), and thus the votes for this office are pooled, 
encouraging deputies to engage in behaviour that enhances the electoral prospects of 
the party (Jones, 2002: 159). Furthermore, legislator’s access to the list is controlled 
by the internal party hierarchy and hence the opportunity for re-election (Jones, 
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2002; 159; Kay, 1999; 415-416).426 Secondly, the career pathways of deputies are 
extremely party-orientated, and those that go against the party line will generally be 
expelled or forced to defect (Jones, 2002, 2004; De Luca, 2004). Thirdly, parties 
resort to the distribution of selective incentives, such as committee positions and 
budgetary resources to engender party unity (Mustapic, 2002: 35).427 Importantly, 
when the party is in power, the national leadership has strong resources at its disposal 
to strengthen the support coalition and conversely, when in opposition, the party 
leadership tends to be weak, due to the lack of these selective incentives (Mustapic, 
2002: 38). 
 The locus of politics in Argentina however, is at the provincial level (Spiller 
& Tommasi, 2003: 295; De Luca, 2004; 3; Jones, 2004; 3). The provincial governor 
is an extremely powerful actor in Argentine politics, and generally tends to dominate 
parties at the provincial level (caudillo) (Jones, 1997, 2004; Spiller & Tommasi, 
2003; De Luca, 2004). The governor’s power is derived from a group of political and 
institutional resources, such as control over jobs in the provincial public sector, the 
provincial budget and the provincial party organisation, and is based upon patronage, 
pork-barrel and clientelism (De Luca, 2004: 3). Because the principal nucleus of 
electoral competition is at the provincial level, the governors exercise strong control 
over access to the lists and in turn, they can then influence representatives’ conduct 
once in office (De Luca, 2004; Jones, 2004; Spiller & Tommasi, 2003).  
In turn, the President has ample discretion over budgetary design and 
implementation (Abuelafia et al., 2005: 4; Spiller & Tommasi, 2003; 292). In fact, as 
Abuelafia et al. (2005: 4) have discovered: ‘the executive power…has a de facto role 
that is much more important than what the laws and institutions of the budget process 
stipulate,’ and given the financial dependence of the provinces (and therefore the 
pork-barrel politics of the governors) on the centre, the Executive engenders 
discipline among the governors by distributing positions in the national government, 
discretionary federal funds, threatening federal intervention in the provinces and 
simply backing a rival candidate for the next gubernatorial election (De Luca, 2004: 
30). The Executive disciplines the governors with federal pork, while the governors, 
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reliant upon the centre for funding, disciplines legislators from their province with 
provincial pork. This engenders party unity and discipline, but the key is for the 
Executive to correctly court and control the governors.   
 When Kirchner was elected, the PJ was highly fragmented as it was the first 
time that the party had contested a general election divided (Sanchez: 2005: 461; 
Vives Segl, 2006: 112).428 Initially, Kirchner was reliant upon Duhalde for support in 
Congress, but as a result of his clever use of the selective incentives available to him, 
and the disciplining effects of the Argentine political system, Kirchner was soon able 
to boast a support base of his own. Kirchner began distributing resources to members 
of the PJ and other left-of centre political parties, in order to cultivate his own 
support base, in a policy that came to be known as the ‘transversal strategy’ or the 
‘concertación plural’ (Bonvecchi & Girudy, 2007: 31; Vives Segl, 2006: 116). 
Kirchner began distancing himself from Duhalde, and following a series of 
staggered gubernatorial and legislative elections during October and November 
2003, Kirchner’s support base was significantly strengthened with most 
gubernatorial candidates (including non-PJ candidates) backed by Kirchner winning 
their elections. The PJ won a total of 69 seats in the lower house out of a possible 
130, 14 seats in the senate out of 24, and 14 governorships out of a possible 22. 
Those gubernatorial candidates that Kirchner backed formed the backbone of his 
own support base, and legislators began drifting towards the Frente para la Victoría 
bloc in order to take advantage of the resources on offer. This strategy proved 
crucial, for it was this support base, coupled with his high levels of popular support, 
which enabled to him to have the Economic Emergency Law and also his energy 
plan passed by Congress and the Senate.429 This early nucleus of support also 
enabled Kirchner to proceed with his reform of the judiciary and to pass the 2004 
Budget Act, which increased the power of the executive over the budget,430 and to 
increase taxes on export revenues.431 This resulted in the provinces’ share of tax 
revenue falling from 39 per cent in 2001 to 34 per cent by 2005, increasing the 
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dependence of the governors on Kirchner, leading to five of the opposition Radical 
Party governors allying with Kirchner.432 Kirchner also managed to pass the Ley de 
Responsibilidad Fiscal, which placed more stringent control on spending by 
provincial governments.433 Kirchner used the ‘transversal strategy’ to build an initial 
coalition in Congress but the transversal movement, while initially successful, did 
not prove to be a viable long-term strategy. Kirchner, who had alienated many of the 
PJ bosses, eventually realised he needed their support to deliver votes and so made 
his peace with the party machine (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008: 21). Also, Kirchner’s 
legislative support strengthened as he slowly saw off the threat of Duhalde. This was 
mainly due to internal PJ party rules. As Levitsky (2003: 157-158) argues, the lack of 
secure tenure patterns and routine career paths within the PJ, forces PJ members and 
leaders who wish to maintain and/or advance their careers to remain on good terms 
with the leadership. So you witness bandwagon effects where party members who 
previously opposed a PJ leader or faction will switch sides when a clear winner 
begins to emerge. The end result was strengthened legislative support, enabling 
Kirchner to call upon this support for initiatives that would strengthen his control 
over the governors, which in turn would serve to widen his support base and 
engender discipline and so on. While Kirchner was establishing this base, he still had 
recourse to his Executive powers should Congress baulk at his initiatives, and he 
used this power widely during this period (see tables 6.2 and 6.3 above).    
When Kirchner first came to power he had no independent support base, but 
as Table 6.5 and 6.6 shows, during the legislative session that spanned the first two 
years of his presidency, Kirchner was able to establish the FpV as the majority bloc 
in the lower and upper house. This, coupled with the discipline of PJ members, the 
support he fostered among non-PJ members (such as the five Radical governors), and 
his return to the party machine and peace with party bosses, ensured that Kirchner 
had a cohesive governing coalition after only a year in power.      
The mid-term legislative elections held in October 2005 resulted in a 
resounding victory for Kirchner, with the Frente Para la Victoria wing of the PJ 
winning 108 of 257 seats in the lower house, and 40 of 72 seats in the upper house.434 
Also, it signalled Kirchner’s definitive victory over Duhalde. Kirchner’s wife, 
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Cristina Fernández, ran as the senatorial candidate for the FpV in Buenos Aires, 
directly competing against Duhalde’s wife, Hilda (‘Chiche’), and her victory 
confirmed Kirchner as the undisputed leader of the PJ.435 The PJ now had a clear 
majority in the lower house, with the FpV alone boasting a majority in the upper 
house (see Table 6.6). This strong cohesive legislative support, comprised of the PJ 
and non-PJ provincial governors, enabled Kirchner to present successful reforms 
aimed at increasing executive discretion over the budget and reducing congressional 
control of decrees of necessity and urgency.436 These moves strengthened his control 
over the governors, which in turn, strengthened his own support base. They also 
highlighted the weakness of the opposition. In terms of privatisation, Kirchner’s 
majority in both houses ensured that he could introduce legislation and pass decrees 
safe in the knowledge that they would be accepted. For example, the lower house 
voted 209-10 in favour of Kirchner’s pension system reforms. 
In Brazil, the electoral rules hampered Lula. The electoral rules in Argentina 
however, engender a high level of discipline and Kirchner used his selective 
distribution of resources carefully, in order to create a cohesive coalition that enabled 
him to strengthen his position over the provincial governors, which in turn, further 
strengthened his legislative support. In fact, by the second half of Kirchner’s 
presidency, he could boast a clear majority in both the upper and lower houses.     
 
Table 6.5 Deputies in the Lower House 2003-2005 and 2005-2007 
No. of Deputies % of Deputies No. of Deputies % of Deputies Party Blocs (2003-2005) (2005-2007) 
PJ Kirchner 88 34.24 114 44.36 
PJ Duhalde 36 14.01 18 7.00 
PJ non- aligned 5 1.95 5 1.95 
UCR 45 17.51 41 15.95 
ARI 11 4.28 13 5.06 
Regional Parties 19 7.39 18 7.00 
Other 53 20.62 48 18.68 
Total 257 100 257 100 
Source: Bonvechhi & Giraudy (2007: 39-40) and Vives Segl (2006:118) 
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Table 6.6 Deputies in the Upper House 2003-2005 and 2005-2007 
No. of Senators % of Senators No. of Senators % of Senators Party Blocs (2003-2005) (2005-2007) 
PJ Kirchner 37 51.39 41 56.94 
PJ Duhalde 1 1.39 1 1.39 
PJ non- aligned 0 0 4 5.55 
UCR 16 22.22 13 18.06 
UCR - Separated 4 5.55 2 2.78 
Other 12 16.67 10 13.89 
Vacant/Suspended 2 2.78 1 1.39 
Total 72 100 72 100 
Source: Bonvechhi & Giraudy (2007: 39-40) and Vives Segl (2006:118) 
 
Judicial Independence 
In Brazil, the judiciary is considered independent of the Executive (see chapter four), 
and for Lula this ensured that it would be nearly impossible for him to pursue a 
policy of re-nationalisation, as concessionaires would have recourse to a judiciary 
that would view the cases purely legalistically. In Argentina however, when Kirchner 
came to power, the judiciary was not considered independent of the Executive 
(Helmke, 2005; Smulovitz, 1995, 2005; Peruzzotti, 2001; Manzetti, 1999). The 
subjugation of the Supreme Court to the Executive was sown by a Court in 1930, 
which submitted to the authority of a government installed by a military coup, 
subsequently legitimising the ensuing acts of government.437Although the 
Constitution includes a provision for tenure protection, in practice this rule has been 
ignored and since 1930, subsequent Executive’s have removed justices for political 
purposes. In fact, between 1946 and 1983, the average tenure of justices was only 
four years (Chávez, 2007: 42). The Supreme Court has endured purges in 1946, 
1955, 1966, 1973 and 1976, with 33 per cent of justices between 1946 and 1983 
having been removed by the politically expedient tool of impeachment (Chávez, 
2007: 42). 
 When Menem came to power, he maintained this tradition of transforming 
the Supreme Court to suit his own political ends. At the beginning of his Presidency, 
he introduced a bill that reformed the Supreme Court, increasing the number of 
justices from five to nine, and filling the bench with his own political supporters 
(Helmke, 2005: 144; Bambaci et al., 2002: 78-79; Goldstein, 1998: 66; Manzetti, 
1999: 93). This granted Menem the now infamous pro-government majority in the 
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Court, known as the mayoría automática menemista (the automatic Menem majority) 
(Chávez, 2007: 37). This majority proved essential in the implementation of 
Menem’s plans, particularly privatisation, and on numerous occasions passed 
dubious judgements enabling privatisation to proceed apace (see chapter five and the 
case of Aerolíneas Argentinas). The judiciary under Menem became such a central 
actor in political processes that this phenomenon was labelled the ‘judicialisation’ of 
politics (see for example Smulovitz, 1995, 2005). The 1994 Constitution, in 
compliance with the Olivos Pact,438 raised the Senate approval for Supreme Court 
justices from a simple majority to two-thirds, and the 1994 reform also mandated for 
the establishment of a Consejo de la Magistratura (Judicial Council), which was 
supposed to reduce Executive interference in the process of appointing lower court 
judges (Chávez, 2007; 40).439        
 So, when Kirchner arrived in office, the Supreme Court provided a major 
obstacle for him to pursue his preferences, particularly as regards privatisation, as 
Menem’s pro-privatisation automatic majority still sat on the bench. In fact conflict 
seemed inevitable, when, shortly after Kirchner assumed power, the court began to 
consider ordering the re-dollarisation of bank deposits converted into pesos by 
Duhalde after the 2001 crisis.440 Not only would this place enormous pressure on the 
Central Bank, but it would also raise issues for the administration with privatised 
utility companies concerning the legality of utility tariffs converted into pesos.441 Not 
surprisingly then, after only a week in office, Kirchner began a process of judicial 
reform. Firstly, in a move to ostensibly bolster a discredited institution and reduce 
Executive interference, Kirchner introduced a decree which altered the manner in 
which Supreme Court justices would be selected. Under the new process, non-
governmental organisations would now have two weeks to voice criticism about the 
Executive’s selection before the Senate vote.442  
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Secondly, he urged Congress to consider the impeachment of judges 
appointed by Menem due to misconduct while on the bench,443 initiating a series of 
congressional investigations into the activities of the Menem-appointed justices, 
beginning with the President of the Court, Julio Nazereno. Before impeachment 
proceedings could begin proper, Nazerno resigned,444 leaving a vacancy on the 
bench, enabling Kirchner to appoint the respected jurist, Eugenio Zaffaroni, as his 
replacement.445 In December, the Senate voted to remove justice Eduardo Moline 
O’Conner, after finding him guilty on two charges of misconduct,446 and in the same 
month, Justice Guillermo Lopez announced his resignation in order to avoid the 
inevitable impeachment hearings.447 Kirchner replaced Lopez and O’Conner with the 
respected jurists, Carmen Argibay and Elena Highton de Nolasco.448 Then, in August 
2004, facing a Senate impeachment hearing, the fourth Menem-appointed justice, 
Guillermo Vazquez, resigned,449 enabling Kirchner to appoint Ricardo Lorenzetti as 
his successor.450  By June 2005, the purge of the court was complete. Justice Antonio 
Boggiano451 was suspended by Congress and subjected to impeachment 
proceedings,452 while the aging Justice Augusto Belluscio retired during the same 
month.453 Of the seven justices now remaining on the bench, Kirchner was 
responsible for the appointment of four of them (see Table 6.3 below).454 Finally, in 
2006, Law 26,183 reduced the number of Supreme Court justices from nine to five, 
finally removing the last vestiges of Menem’s majority once and for all (Bonvecchi 
& Giraudy, 2007: 37).          
 Kirchner’s judicial reform did not stop there however. In December 2005, 
Law 26,080 modified the composition of the Consejo de la Magistratura, established 
as part of the 1994 constitutional reforms (Bonvecchi & Giraudy, 2007: 36). The 20 
member judicial council was established to reduce Executive interference in the 
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appointment and removal of lower court federal judges and regulate judicial power. 
This law however, reduced the number of council members to thirteen, and granted 
the Executive control of 38.5 per cent of the council, enabling Kirchner to deny the 
body a quorum, and effectively providing him with veto power, ensuring that in 
practice, no federal judge can be appointed or removed without the approval of the 
Executive (Bonvecchi & Giraudy, 2007: 36).  
 Initially, Kirchner’s reforms of the judiciary were welcomed, but soon 
questions began to arise over the extent of Executive manipulation in the process. 
Elisa Carrió, the left-of-centre deputy, described the new justices as ‘of poor quality 
and above all agents of the governments,’455 while Alfredo Bisordi,456 the head of the 
Court of Cassation for Criminal Law, accused Kirchner of reforming the judiciary to 
enable the Executive to have ‘overall control of power.’457 However, Kirchner’s 
appointments did improve the quality of the Supreme Court, as most of the new 
judges were well-qualified and well-respected jurists (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008: 21), 
but undeniably, Kirchner’s judicial machinations did increase Executive control over 
the judiciary (Bonvecchi & Giraudy, 2007: 36), and his purge of the Supreme Court 
fashioned a bench that was undeniably more favourable to the government than the 
bench he inherited when he arrived in power.458  
For example, by the time Kirchner had replaced three of Menem’s 
appointees, the Court had ruled in favour of pesification, removing the threat of 
domestic lawsuits from utility companies, whose tariffs had been converted into 
pesos and frozen after the 2001 crisis.459 The Court ruled that the freezing of tariffs 
was a matter of public policy, and by invoking a civil code provision (Article 872), 
they effectively foreclosed the opportunity for utility companies to bring 
compensation cases against the government in Argentine courts.460 Likewise, when 
Kirchner rescinded the contract of Metropolitano to run the San Martín rail line, the 
company obtained an injunction from a Buenos Aires judge suspending the decree.461 
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However, when the government appealed this ruling, the Supreme Court overturned 
the suspension granted by the district judge and the nationalisation of the line was 
able to continue.462   
The independence of the Supreme Court in Brazil effectively ensured that 
nationalisation was impossible once Lula came to power, but in Argentina, Kirchner 
was able to alter the composition of the Court (favourably with respect to the 
composition of the preceding bench) by encouraging the legislature to impeach 
sitting justices, weakening judicial tenure (Levitsky & Murillo, 2008: 19) and 
increasing Executive control over judicial appointments. This ensured that de facto 
judicial independence was further weakened, enabling Kirchner to rescind the 
contracts of privatised utilities and re-nationalise public services, with a greater 
degree of confidence that the Court would support his actions, in comparison to Lula 
in Brazil.    
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Table 6.7 Kirchner’s Supreme Court 
Supreme 
Court Justice 
(May 2003) 
Julio 
Nazareno 
(Appointed by 
Menem) 
Eduardo 
Moline 
O’Conner 
(Appointed by 
Menem) 
Guillermo 
Lopez 
(Appointed by 
Menem) 
Adolfo 
Vazquez 
(Appointed by 
Menem) 
Juan Carlos 
Maqueda 
(Appointed by 
Duhalde) 
Enrique 
Petracci 
(Since 1983) 
Antonio 
Boggiano 
(Appointed by 
Menem) 
Carlos Fayt 
(Since 1983) 
Augusto 
Belluscio 
(Since 1983) 
Event Congressional 
investigation 
begin and 
resigns June 
2003 
Impeached 
and removed 
from office, 
December 
2003 
Congress 
moves for 
impeachment 
proceedings, 
so resigns 
December 
2003 
Impeachment 
proceedings 
begin and 
resigns 
September 
2004 
  Removed 
from office by 
Senate, 
September 
2005 
 Retires at age 
75 
Kirchner’s 
Replacements 
Eugenio 
Zaffaroni 
Elena 
Highton de 
Nolasco 
Carmen 
Argibay 
Ricardo 
Lorenzetti 
Remains in 
office 
Remains in 
office 
Vacant Remains in 
office 
Vacant 
Source: Derived from author’s own analysis 
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Policy Delegation 
In Brazil, the policy of privatisation was initiated within the context of a 
comprehensive legal and institutional framework that delegated this policy to a 
relatively independent body, which could continue to operate without excessive 
Executive interference (see chapter four). In Argentina on the other hand, the State 
Reform Law ensured that privatisation policy was initiated by executive decrees 
rather than law, ensuring that Menem could implement privatisation ‘without major 
institutional interference’ (Llanos, 2001: 7). Indeed, within two months of taking 
office, ‘Menem had established the legal instruments for expediting privatisation 
without any independent oversight’ (Manzetti, 1999: 72-73). While Menem used the 
powers delegated to him to implement the policy of privatisation in Argentina, 
Kirchner in a similar manner, simply utilised the powers delegated to him to reverse 
this policy and sideline the regulatory agencies.  
Regulators were established in various industries such as electricity (ENRE), 
gas (ENARGAS), telecommunications (CNT), and water provision (ETOSS), but the 
early and quick privatisation of some national symbols (telecoms, air transport and 
highways) ensured that these newly privatised industries were left with weak 
regulation, and in some cases, regulators were only created after privatisation and 
often in an ad hoc manner (see Abdala & Spiller, 2000; Bambaci et al., 2002; 
Goldstein, 1998). While ENARGAS and ENRE were established by international 
best-practice, the vast majority of the regulators in Argentina suffered from problems 
of transparency and lack of independence (World Bank, 1997).463  
Most importantly however, by the time Kirchner arrived in power, the 2002 
Economic Emergency Law had halted the effective functioning of all Argentina’s 
regulatory agencies (Laffont, 2005: 9). The establishment of UniRen, and the 
promulgation of the Economic Emergency Law under Kirchner, delegated to him the 
power to re-negotiate all privatised utility contracts unilaterally, essentially vitiating 
any remaining role for the regulatory agencies.  
While in Brazil, the delegation of privatisation to an independent body and 
the design of the regulatory agencies protected this policy from excessive 
interference by subsequent executives thereby preventing Lula from implementing 
his preferences, in Argentina on the other hand, the decision to implement 
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privatisation through executive decrees rather than through a comprehensive legal 
and institutional framework ensured that there was no such protection for this policy. 
This resulted in Kirchner’s ability to reverse privatisations, by employing the same 
tools that Menem utilised in order to implement this policy in the first place.   
 
6.4 Labour support 
Menem’s policy of privatization caused a division within the CGT, Argentina’s main 
union confederation (see chapter five) between 1989 and 1992, and the government 
manipulated the competition among factions by rewarding the loyal segment of the 
union, CGT-San Martín led by Saul Ubaldini, in order to induce defections from the 
rebel CGT-Azopardo, led by Jorge Triaca (Murillo, 2001: 142-150).464 This split in 
the union, coupled with depressed labour market conditions particularly in 
manufacturing, significantly weakened the bargaining position of the unions 
(Goldstein, 1998). The weakening of the unions was exacerbated by political 
developments. Menem, due to the lack of institutionalisation in union-PJ linkages, 
successfully reduced the influence of the unions in the party, transforming the PJ 
from a unionist-based party to a patronage-based political machine (Levitsky, 2003: 
24-25). This weak position and lack of patronage for the CGT-Azopardo led to its 
leaders modifying their demands and they had slowly moved towards the pro-
privatisation position of the CGT-San Martín by the end of 1991 (Murillo, 2001: 
151). Through the usage of carrot and stick tactics, Menem managed to neutralise the 
opposition of the main unions to his policy of privatisation, particularly the re-united 
CGT, and during Menem’s second term, the union movement’s relationship with the 
government shifted towards cooperation and support (Murillo, 2001: 168).  
 In 2000, the CGT split once more over disagreements concerning a proposed 
new labour law that, amongst other things, would increase labour market flexibility 
and a rebel faction, led by Hugo Moyano, left the confederation.465 With the 2001 
crisis, the main unions became discredited due to their support of Menem’s market-
friendly policies and the rise in unemployment, coupled with their replacement as a 
vehicle for social action by piqueteros,466 meant that by the time Kirchner came to 
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power the union movement was discredited, fractured and significantly weakened 
(Grugel & Pia Riggirozzi, 2007: 103).467 ‘The locus of social conflict and labour 
policy debates seemed no longer to reside in the formal working class but in the 
growing informal sectors’ (Etchemendy & Collier, 2007: 364).  
 Once in power, Kirchner established links with many of the piquetero 
movements, who in turn had strong links to the militant Congress of Argentine 
Workers (CTA).468 In particular, Kirchner nurtured relations with the piquetero 
movement, the Federation for Land and Housing (FTV), led by a pro-Kirchner 
deputy, Luis D’Elia.469 The FTV were part of a pro-Kirchner piquetero bloc, which 
included elements of the CTA, but the piqueteros, while an important social force, 
were also highly unpredictable and frequently violent, such as the clashes that 
occurred between rival blocs at the 188th Independence Day Celebrations in 
Tucuman.470 Consequently, Kirchner soon began to court the larger unions, 
particularly the CGT471 in order to find more reliable social organisations to deal 
with.472  
  In March 2004, Kirchner introduced a new labour reform bill, granting more 
power to the unions, increasing the cost of dismissing workers and improving the 
rights of workers with regards to permanent employment,473 and introducing a 
number of initiatives that increased labour’s non-wage social benefits (Etchemendy 
& Collier, 2007: 382). Then in July, it was announced with Kirchner’s support, that 
the CGT was to re-unite, establishing a tripartite leadership consisting of Moyano, 
the leader of the former rebel faction, José Lingeri of the federation of water and 
sanitation workers and Susana Rueda, leader of the gordos474 (the fat ones).475 
                                                                                                                                          
the country. The piquetoros were not part of the traditional union movement, but they were not hostile 
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Kirchner was hoping that a re-united CGT would act to channel the demands of the 
piqueteros movements.476 Kirchner began a process of signing collective wage 
agreements with the CGT and the Minimum Wage Council was re-established, 
combining the government, the CGT and the UIA, in order to establish a consensus 
on a new minimum wage level (Etchemendy & Collier, 2007: 380). Following a 
meeting with the tripartite leadership in September,477 the government announced a 
$34 peso salary increase to the monthly wages of most public and private sector 
workers.478  
 Then, in January 2005, Kirchner announced the establishment of a tripartite 
social agreement between the government, employer organisations and unions, which 
would serve as a guide to future pay negotiations. This has led to what Etchemendy 
& Collier (2007: 366) have defined as ‘segmented neocorporatism.’479 The move was 
motivated by Kirchner’s desire to conduct wage increases in an orderly fashion in 
order to avoid inflationary pressures, but it also significantly increased the power of 
the union movement.480 In April of 2005, both the CGT and the CTA began agitating 
for new wage increases, but while Lavagna categorically said no to these demands, 
Kirchner appeared more willing to accommodate the unions.481 When the gordos 
announced they would support Duhalde in the upcoming legislative elections, 
Kirchner struck a deal with Moyano for his support and in July, Moyano orchestrated 
a coup within the CGT, taking over as sole leader and forcing Rueda to resign.482 
This deal served to further strengthen the ties between the CGT and the Kirchner 
administration. The unions were assured posts on the FpV lists for the October 
elections,483 and Moyano’s union received an increase in government payments to its 
social welfare scheme, while one of its lawyers was named head of a federal credit 
agency with an annual budget of US$110 million.484 This newly strengthened 
relationship was reflected in the decision of rail workers to stop striking in August 
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after a request from Kirchner,485 and also in Kirchner’s desire to continue to meet 
union demands. Following another meeting with Moyano in November,486 Kirchner 
announced an increase in the non-taxable minimum wage that would cost the state 
US$487 million a year, and an increase of 19 per cent for the salaries of public 
administration workers.487   
 Under Kirchner, the unions began to re-gain credibility and as a result of the 
collective wage agreements, favourable labour reform and the tripartite council 
(segmented neocorporatism), the power of the unions significantly increased also. 
Kirchner nurtured and maintained strong links with the CGT and with elements of 
the CTA, and was highly amenable to union demands. Consequently, and hardly 
surprisingly, the unions were also very supportive of Kirchner’s tough stance with 
privatised utilities and his nationalisation initiatives. For example, the pension 
system reform was something the unions had been clamouring for and it received 
their full support.488 Kirchner’s decision to involve the unions in some of the 
nationalisation programmes also increased their support for his administration. For 
example, when Kirchner nationalised Aguas Argentinas, the new state company 
established to assume control over the water service, AySA, was to have a 10 per 
cent stake belonging to the unions.489 Ironically, Menem had used a similar ploy to 
induce union support for privatisations, by offering employees the opportunity to 
purchase 10 per cent of many of the privatised companies. The unions also received 
seats on the board of the re-nationalised postal company (Etchemendy & Collier, 
2007: 383). In May 2006, when Kirchner called for a demonstration celebrating the 
third year of his Presidency, the CGT supplied ‘the bulk of the lower-class support in 
the street demonstrations’ (Etchemendy & Collier, 2007: 391).  
 As a result, the level of left-labour power significantly increased in Argentine 
during Kirchner’s presidency. In Brazil, labour remained fractured and antagonistic 
towards Lula, whereas in Argentina, this high level of labour support contributed to 
Kirchner’s ability to implement his preferences.  
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6.5 Conclusion 
Kirchner was elected in 2003 with a mandate to alter the market-friendly model 
adopted under Menem. Part of this mandate was a categorical pledge to halt all 
privatisations in Argentina. Once in power, not only did all privatisations cease, but 
there were also a number of high-profile re-nationalisations. Whereas in Brazil, Lula 
was unable to implement his policies due to a confluence of institutional factors, 
Kirchner was able to implement his preferences in Argentina due to the configuration 
of institutions in that state. The Executive has extremely strong powers in Argentina 
(stronger than Brazil), and in periods where Congress is hostile, the Executive can 
sideline this institution in the policy process. The electoral system and the high-level 
of party discipline it engenders enabled Kirchner to slowly establish his own power 
base in Congress. He used this power base to support initiatives that would 
strengthen Executive power, which in turn, he then used to further enlarge his 
support base. Kirchner’s ability to control both Chambers in Argentina and the high 
level of Executive power at his disposal meant that he could implement his 
preferences, particularly with regard to privatisation. Privatisation had not been 
delegated to an independent body as it had been in Brazil, so Kirchner could simply 
utilise his Executive power to halt and reverse this policy. The high level of support 
he had in Congress, ensured that they were willing to allow him to do this. The lack 
of de facto judicial independence ensured that Kirchner could rescind contracts with 
a higher level of confidence than Lula in Brazil, that the judiciary would support his 
actions.490 Therefore, as hypothesised in Chapter Two, Argentina would be the 
most likely of the three case studies to halt all privatisations due to the configuration 
of the specific political institutions in place in that country. As in Brazil under Lula, 
policy outcome in Argentina under Kirchner in the area of privatisation was 
primarily a product of the constellation of the political institutions within that state.   
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Chapter Seven – The Evolution of Privatisation in Uruguay 
The last of the three chosen case studies is Uruguay. In October 2004, Tabaré 
Vásquez of the left-wing alliance, Encuentro Progresista - Frente Amplio - Nueva 
Mayoría (EP-FA-NM), became the first left-wing candidate in Uruguay’s democratic 
history to win the Presidency. When Vásquez assumed office, privatisation had not 
been implemented to the same extent in Uruguay as it had been in Argentina and 
Brazil. This was mainly as a result of a specific institutional configuration that 
allowed for mechanisms of direct democracy. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide historical context for the analytical 
narrative of Vásquez’s Presidency. This chapter will trace the evolution of 
privatisation policy in Uruguay until the election of Vásquez in 2004. The first 
section will briefly outline the development and role of public enterprises in 
Uruguay. The second section will discuss the transition to democracy and the first 
attempt at privatisation in Uruguay during the Presidency of Julio Sanguinetti. The 
third section will examine the Presidency of Luis Lacalle and his ill-fated 1992 
privatisation law, while the fourth section will briefly discuss the second Sanguinetti 
Presidency. The fifth section will examine Jorge Batlle’s attempt to introduce 
privatisation in Uruguay, while the final section will outline the legacy of this policy 
in Uruguay by the time Vásquez came to power. 
 
7.1 The Origins and Role of Public Enterprise in Uruguay 
The size and extent of state-owned enterprises in Uruguay was a product of the 
Presidencies of José Batlle y Ordóñez and the first period of batllismo (1903-1916) 
(Nahum, 1993: 12; Yaffé, 2001: 5-6). When Batlle came to power, the growth and 
expansion of the state’s role in the economy accelerated. Batlle, influenced by the 
Liberal reforms of Lloyd George and Joseph Chamberlain, established the state 
banks, the República and Hipotecario, nationalised all foreign insurance firms, 
monopolised the state’s production of electrical energy and the ports service, and 
between 1911 and 1915, he created further state monopolies in alcohol, merchant 
shipping, telephones and refrigeration (Nahum, 1993: 13-17; Yaffé, 2001: 7). 
Batlle’s decision to create a large number of state enterprises was not motivated by 
ideology, but a desire for industrialisation that was simply not forthcoming from the 
Uruguayan populace (Nahum, 1993: 15). The importance of state-enterprises in 
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Uruguay was solidified with the 1917 constitution and the policy of co-participation. 
Co-participation ensured proportional access among the two main political parties to 
public goods and as a result, the state enterprises became integral for the two 
traditional parties, for rents, patronage and clientelism (Bergara et al. 2005: 23; 
Filgueira & Papadópulos, 1997: 374).  
With the 1930s, a new relationship between the state, the economy and 
society began, but the growth of state enterprises continued (Yaffé, 2001: 11; Azar & 
Yaffé, 2003: 3-5; Lanzaro, 2004: 119-120). The numbers employed in state-owned 
companies grew by 22,000, and new state monopolies were created in railways, 
transport, water and sanitation (Nahum, 1993: 65). Despite the economic crisis of the 
mid-1950s, the expansion of the state enterprises did not halt. Instead, the political 
parties used the state to employ any workers that remained unabsorbed by the private 
sector, a practice that continued until the bureaucratic authoritarian regime came to 
power in the 1970s (see Table 7.2 below) (Filgueira & Papadópulos, 1997: 375-376; 
Sondrol, 1997: 110).  
 The end result of this uninterrupted growth of state enterprises for nearly six 
decades was the domination of the Uruguayan economy by public companies. As 
Table 7.1 shows, by the time the military came to power in 1973, the Uruguayan 
state held a monopoly, or near monopoly in a number of strategic areas. Furthermore, 
state enterprises had grown to employ nearly 60,000 workers (see Table 7.2 below) 
(World bank, 1994: 10-11; Bensión, 2006: 40). But, this unbridled growth of the 
public sector produced two major dysfunctions. Firstly, public sector growth led to a 
large middle class dependent upon the state. This group relied upon the public sector 
to maintain their position and would passionately resist any attempt to alter the status 
quo. Secondly, the hyper-politicisation of state enterprises ensured that they were 
crucial for the clientelistic politics practised by the two main political parties.  
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Table 7.1: The Dominance of State Enterprises in the Economy                
Sector Dominance of 
Sector 
Farming ○ 
Fishing ○ 
Pits and Mines ○ 
Rail ● 
Combustibles ● 
Aviation ● 
Manufacturing □ 
Electricity, Gas ● 
Building ● 
Telecoms ● 
Transport, Storage □ 
Financial Institutions and Securities ● 
Ports ● 
Water Supply ● 
● fully or predominantly public sector; □ mixed sector; ○ fully or predominantly private sector 
Source: Bensión (2006: 39) & World Bank (1994: 10) 
 
Table 7.2: The Growth of Public Sector Employment (‘000s) 
Year Population Employees of State 
Enterprises 
1938 1870 7.5 
1941 1970 11.1 
1955 2400 49.7 
1961 2590 55.7 
Source: Nahum (1993: 65) 
 
7.2 The Transition to Democracy and the Election of Sanguinetti 
The beginning of liberalisation in Uruguay can be traced back to the bureaucratic 
authoritarian military regime that took power after the 1973 coup (Bensión, 2006: 14; 
de Sierra, 1992: 248). Between 1974 and 1975, due to severe balance of trade 
problems, all the financial restrictions on imports were lifted and levels of import tax 
reduced, combined with a policy of fiscal austerity and reduced social spending 
(Bensión, 2006: 14-15). Although privatisation was discussed, it was never seriously 
attempted and the government limited themselves to simply reducing the number of 
employees in some state enterprises (de Sierra, 1992: 248). These reforms not only 
managed to address the balance of trade deficit, but also led to rapid growth (World 
Bank, 1994: 3). However, by the early 1980s, Uruguay was suffering a serious 
recession (Blake, 1998: 9) and by the time of the Naval Club pact in 1984 and the 
transition to democracy, Uruguay had witnessed a ‘general restoration of a status quo 
ante: government giganticisism, presidentialism and factionalised party politics’ 
(Sondrol, 1997: 114). 
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 In 1980, the military government attempted to institutionalise their rule 
through a highly repressive constitution, which was resoundingly rejected by the 
Uruguayan electorate in a referendum held in the same year. This defeat, coupled 
with the military’s inability to rectify the country’s economic ills, set in motion the 
process of democratic transition (Blake, 1998: 9; Sondrol, 1997: 114). Eventually, in 
March 1984, after nearly four years, the military offered to hold democratic 
elections, and in the six months before the elections, the main political parties and 
the major interest groups established the Concertación Nacional Programmática 
(CONAPRO), which designed a shared platform for the Uruguayan government that 
would be implemented regardless of who won the actual election (Molano, 1997: 71; 
Blake, 1998: 9).491 In this manner, a framework for co-operation was established 
between the two major Uruguayan political parties, the Partido Colorado (PC – 
Colorado Party) and the Partido National (PN – National Party),492 and in the 
November 1984 elections, Julio Sanguinetti of the PC became the first civilian 
Uruguayan President in over 12 years (Molano, 1997: 71).       
 After the election, Sanguinetti attempted to forge the government envisioned 
by CONAPRO, but the PN and the left-wing Frente Amplio refused to co-operate 
(Blake, 1998: 9-10). Although unemployment had fallen, it still remained high at 10 
per cent and inflation was now running at an annual average rate of 84.1 per cent 
(World Bank, 1994: 3; Blake, 1998: 10). The new government’s main economic 
objective was to reduce the fiscal deficit and bring the public finances to order, 
mainly through reduced spending on social welfare and privatisation (Filguiera & 
Papadópulos, 1997: 364; Molano, 1997: 69). By the early 1980s, widespread 
clientelism and patronage in the state enterprises had rendered many of these 
companies highly inefficient. These enterprises had become a significant burden on 
the state, with the deficit generated by Uruguayan state companies representing 18.4 
per cent of GDP by 1982 (Molano, 1997; 69).  
 Sanguinetti’s initial attempt at privatisation occurred in September 1986, 
when he sent to the legislature a bill to partially privatise the national airline, 
Primeras Líneas Uruguayas de Navegación Aérea (PLUNA). However, mainly as a 
result of opposition from the trade unions and from all three political parties, not only 
was the bill rejected, but the legislature even refused to debate the issue (Bensión, 
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 The Partido Nacional is also known as the Blancos.  
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2006: 44; Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997: 377). Despite this initial failure, 
Sanguinetti remained undeterred and one year later he turned his attention to the 
national railroad operator, Administración de los Ferrocarriles del Estado (AFE). 
The company was re-organised, the number of personnel was reduced and certain 
services previously offered by AFE, such as large cargo transport, the restaurant in 
the general station and medical assistance services, were privatised (Bensión, 2006: 
43).493  
The lack of political support for privatisation ensured that Sanguinetti’s initial 
foray in this direction had petered out by 1988. In fact, not only were there 
practically no privatisations during the first Sanguinetti administration, the state 
actually ended up assuming control over a number of private companies. As a 
consequence of the banking crisis of 1982, the state, between 1985 and 1987, 
through the Banco de la República and the Corporación Nacional para el Desarrollo 
(CND),494 assumed control of three private banks that had fallen into insolvency: the 
Banco Pan de Azúcar, the Banco Comercial and the Caja Obrera (Bensión, 2006: 
40).  
Furthermore, Sanguinetti’s attempts to reduce social spending also proved 
futile. The retiree organisation, the Organización Nacional de Jubilados y 
Pensionistas del Uruguay (ONJPU), blocked a 1987 social spending reform favoured 
by the World Bank, by sponsoring a plebiscite on a constitutional reform that would 
incorporate an automatic indexation of benefits (Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997: 
365). The plebiscite, which ran concurrently with the general election in 1989, was 
approved by 82 per cent of voters, significantly raising the fiscal burden on the state 
(Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997: 376; Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 12).  
Although Sanguinetti attempted to alter the state’s role in the national 
economy, his initiatives were limited to only minor changes ‘that did not 
significantly trim the state apparatus, nor lead to significant institutional reforms’ 
(Narbondo & Ramos, 1999: 38). There are a number of important points to note. 
Firstly, in Brazil under Sarney and in Argentina under Alfonsín, privatisation was 
driven by fiscal constraints and the need to control inflation. Uruguay however, did 
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 In the same year, Sanguinetti did mange to have a law passed allowing for the de-concentration in 
the health care system (Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 29). 
494
 The CND was established in 1985, in order to provide finance and advice to private enterprises so 
as to stimulate their growth. It was also responsible for assuming control of businesses that were in 
financial trouble (see Bensión, 2006: 40). 
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not suffer the hyperinflation experienced by Brazil and Argentina during the same 
period and the inflation rate, albeit a rate of nearly 80 per cent, actually remained 
relatively constant for most of the 1980s (Blake, 1998: 10; Molano, 1997: 69). Also, 
Uruguay did not experience a single recessionary year in the first six years following 
the transition to democracy.  
 Secondly, the Sanguinetti administration experienced practically no external 
pressure to privatise. Uruguay had signed a standby agreement with the IMF in 1985, 
and while this agreement stipulated that the government must reduce spending to 1.5 
per cent of GDP, it did not mention privatisation (Molano, 1997: 70). Thirdly, 
opposition from well-organised interest groups to any proposed privatisation was 
fierce. The attempt to partially privatise PLUNA was derailed mainly as a result of 
strident union opposition, allied not only with the two main left-wing parties, the 
Frente Amplio and the Nuevo Espacio, but also with members of the two traditional 
political parties (Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997: 377)  
Finally, during the democratic transition, the military intentionally weakened 
the new civilian government and they remained a constant threat to the new 
democracy. The military continued to harangue the administration, limiting the 
policy options available to Sanguinetti in his first years in office. It was only with the 
1986 Ley Caducidad, which granted a military amnesty, that the threat began to 
recede. As such, ‘with political issues absorbing most of the administration’s 
resources and focus, it was unable to implement many economic reforms’ (Molano, 
1997: 71).      
 
7.3 The Election of Luis Alberto Lacalle 
With the election of Luis Alberto Lacalle of the Partido Nacional in 1989, 
privatisation once again appeared on the political agenda. By the late 1980s, the 
fiscal deficit had grown to nearly 5.5 per cent of GDP, triggering a resurgence of 
inflation (Bergara et al. 2005: 59; Molano, 1997: 69). The 1989 election therefore, 
was primarily concerned with economic issues, and Luis Lacalle campaigned on a 
platform of market-orientated reform that proposed privatisation (Filguiera & 
Papadópulos, 1997: 378; Blake, 1998: 10). Lacalle, once in power, faced a legislature 
that was controlled by the opposition Colorados. However, the worsening economic 
situation convinced Jorge Areco and Jorge Battle of the Colorados, to sign a bi-
partisan pact with the Blancos, the Coincidencia Nacional, that committed 
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congressional support for Lacalle’s economic reforms (Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 
15; Molano, 1997: 72). This alliance set three major goals for economic reform: 
reform of the social security system, fiscal reform and the privatisation of state-
owned enterprises (Molano, 1997: 72).  
 The new Economy Minister, Enrique Braga, and Lacalle sent a privatisation 
initiative to Congress in the form of Resolution no. 1122, and after a period of 
intense negotiations, Law 16,211, the Privatisation of National Public Services, was 
passed in October 1991 (Molano, 1997: 72; Blake, 1998: 12; Filguiera & 
Papadópulos, 1997: 378). This law attempted to create a legal and institutional 
framework within which a policy of privatisation could operate.  Law 16,211 
proposed the partial privatisation of PLUNA, the closure of the state fishing firm, 
ILPE, while most importantly, articles 10 to 14 allowed for the partial privatisation 
of the flagship telecommunications firm, ANTEL.495 
 Once this law was passed, Lacalle moved quickly to begin the sale of 51 per 
cent of ANTEL. However, opposition to the sale soon began to ferment. These 
disparate groups, led by the left-wing Frente Amplio and comprising the public 
sector trade unions, factions of the traditional political parties, and the powerful 
pensioner associations that had successfully thwarted Sanguinetti and initiated the 
1989 plebiscite, came together to form a united front against privatisation through the 
establishment of the Comisión de Defensa del Patrimonio Nacional y Reforma del 
Estado (de Sierra, 1992; 253; Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997: 378; Bensión, 2006: 
46). This group managed to collect enough signatures to hold a referendum on 
articles 10 to 14 (Bensión, 2006; 46). This vote was also publicly supported by 
Sanguinetti and the Foro Batllista faction of the Colorados, and on December 13th 
1992, the sale of ANTEL was overwhelmingly rejected by nearly 70 per cent of the 
electorate (Panizza, 2004: 10; Bensión, 2006: 46; Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997: 
378).  
 Although the result of the plebiscite only prevented the privatisation of 
ANTEL, it was to sap the momentum, not only for economic reform during Lacalle’s 
remaining two years, but also for any future attempts at privatisation (Sondrol, 1997: 
117). The legacy of this plebiscite ensured that Lacalle and future administrations, 
not only had to consider the chance of any state reform legislation being accepted by 
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 Ley 16,211 available at 
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Congress, but also the likelihood that opposition groups would mobilise and 
campaign for a public vote against it (Panizza, 2004: 10).  
Privatisation during Lacalle’s tenure did continue, but it was now limited to 
peripheral public services and bankrupt state-enterprises. The state-owned fishing 
company, Industria Lobera y Pesquera del Estado (ILPE), was closed and in July of 
1994, 49 per cent of PLUNA was sold to a consortium of Uruguayan and Argentine 
investors.496 The Lacalle administration also oversaw the re-privatisation of the 
Banco Comercial and the Banco Pan de Azúcar, two of the three banks that fell into 
state hands due to insolvency during Sanguinetti’s tenure (Bensión, 2006: 44-47).   
Law 16,211 also allowed concessions for certain services to be offered to the 
private sector, but the threat of opposition to any major privatisation ensured that 
Lacalle could do little but offer concessions for services that were relatively 
peripheral to the functioning of the state. Consequently, only five such concessions 
were offered during his tenure in areas such as roads, hostelry, sanitation and the 
management of passenger terminals (see Table 7.3 below). In August 1990, Lacalle 
also introduced a bill that provided for the abrogation of the legal state monopolies in 
alcohol, insurance, port services, telecommunications and casinos. Due to the 
unfavourable political climate towards state reform, Lacalle only dismantled the 
state’s monopolies in two sectors: port services and insurance (Bensión, 2006: 51-
52). 
Lacalle’s attempts to rectify the fiscal deficit by reducing social spending 
were also severely hampered, mainly because the opposition framed any of Lacalle’s 
social security proposals as covert privatisation (Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 15). 
Lacalle submitted five different social spending bills to the legislature between 1992 
and 1994 and all five bills were quickly rejected (Filguiera & Papadópulos, 1997; 
367; Coelho, 2002: 52). The Frente Amplio successfully portrayed all these 
initiatives as the first step towards privatisation and as a consequence, very few of 
the political party factions were willing to be associated with any legislation that 
resembled privatisation of the social security system. The failure of Lacalle’s social 
security bills testify to the incredibly hostile atmosphere that existed at this time 
towards any type of privatisation in Uruguay.        
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 Further souring the public perception of privatisation, the sale of PLUNA was considered highly 
unsatisfactory, as until 2005, the state had to continue subsidising the airline to prevent it from 
becoming insolvent (see Bensión, 2006: 45).  
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Table 7.3: Lacalle’s Concessions to the Private Sector 
Concession Details Date Cost 
Casino at Punte 
de Este 
20 year concession to construct and 
manage a five star hotel and casino at 
Punte de Este 
Aug 
1992 
Initial cost of US$217 million, 
followed by a fee of US$3.2 
million upfront, $3.3 million 
between 1998 and 1999 and $6.5 
million by 2016. 
Water and 
Sanitation in 
Maldonado 
25 year concession to provide water 
and sanitation to the tourist zone of 
Maldonado 
Sep 
1993 
Aguas de la Costa S.A. obliged to 
invest US$9 million in service. 
Motorway 
between 
Montevideo and 
Punte de Este 
13 year concession to build and 
manage a motorway from 
Montevideo to Punte de Este. 
Sep 
1993 
Cost of US$65 million. 
Airport Laguna 
del Sauce 
16 year concession, with the support 
of World Bank, to run and expand 
the airport at Laguna del Sauce 
Dec 
1993 
Initial US40 million investment, 
followed by yearly fee 
Maritime 
Passenger 
Terminal in 
Montevideo 
10 year concession to manage 
maritime passenger terminal in 
Montevideo, and also to build and 
manage a duty free shop within the 
terminal  
Sep 
1994 
Initial investment of US$9 million, 
and 30% tax on profits from 
terminal and 7.5% on profits from 
the duty-free 
Source: Bensión (2006: 60-65) 
  
 By the end of Lacalle’s term in office, he had failed to substantially reform 
the public sector. Again, there are a number of important points to note. Firstly, as 
during Sanguinetti’s term, the international financial institutions played little or no 
role in encouraging Lacalle to adopt a policy of privatisation. Uruguay was not 
dependent upon the World Bank or the IMF for financial assistance as most of the 
country’s borrowing was conducted with other institutions such as the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), and as Molano (1997: 70) notes, the IADB 
‘was mainly interested in promoting social programmes, not the type of structural 
reforms pursued by the IMF and World Bank. Hence, the major multilateral lending 
organisations had little impact on Uruguayan privatisation policies.’  
 Secondly, while part of Menem’s success at implementing privatisation in 
Argentina was predicated upon his ability to build a diverse coalition in support of 
such measures, part of Lacalle’s failure to implement privatisation in Uruguay, was 
based upon his inability to build a similar winning reformist coalition (Filguiera & 
Moraes, 1999: 7). In theory, Lacalle should have found it easier than his predecessor 
to build a coalition in favour of privatisation, mainly as a result of the propitious 
evolution of the system of co-participation. As a result of the emergence of the 
Frente Amplio, the two traditional parties could no longer legitimately utilise state 
enterprises as mass patronage tools, and so political resistance to privatisation should 
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have diminished somewhat by Lacalle’s Presidency (Panizza & Philip, 2005: 673; 
Bergara et al. 2005: 23).497 However, the opposite was actually the case. 
The opposition of the Colorados was not based upon any ideological grounds 
or defence of the system of co-participation, but rather on worries over political 
competition. The law stipulated that the proceeds of the sale of ANTEL be spent on 
social security and welfare, and the opposition were worried that the Blancos would 
use this money in order to build support for their party through the distribution of 
favourable resources (Molano, 1997: 73).  
Furthermore, business organisations were weak and poorly organised in 
Uruguay, and the Camara de Industrias del Uruguay only supported Lacalle’s 
privatisation initiative after the government promised to slow down the pace of tariff 
cuts in the Mercosur. Also, as a result of Lacalle’s attempt to reduce the fiscal deficit, 
he had significantly curtailed the military budget, and therefore was forced to placate 
a temperamental and recalcitrant military that refused to support any of his economic 
reforms (Molano, 1997: 73-76).        
Compounding Lacalle’s lack of support, the anti-privatisation coalition 
appeared to be growing in strength and numbers. In 1992, a strike by ANTEL’s 
workers in opposition to privatisation paralysed the telecommunications industry. 
This strike was then followed by a 72 hour general strike (Filguiera & Papadópulos, 
1997: 370-371; Molano, 1997: 68). Workers in state enterprises earned nearly double 
that of their counterparts in the private sector and in other parts of the public 
administration, providing a major incentive for public sector union mobilisation 
against privatisation (Bensión, 2006: 42).  
The emergence of powerful pensioner associations, which had been created 
during the Sanguinetti Presidency, also played an important role in resisting the 
privatisation of ANTEL. Pensioner associations viewed privatisation as part of larger 
reform efforts to dismantle the state’s role in the economy, justifying their 
participation in the anti-privatisation coalition (Molano, 1997: 75; Filguiera & 
Papadópulos, 1997; 363-368). While all these different groups had an interest in 
opposing privatisation, it was the leadership of the Frente Amplio that forged these 
disparate groups into a unified and mobilised anti-privatisation coalition (Filguiera & 
Papadópulos, 1997: 378; de Sierra, 1992: 253; Molano, 1997: 75-76). The 
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establishment of the Comisión de Defensa del Patrimonio Nacional y Reforma del 
Estado provided a clearly identifiable political movement that served as a rallying 
point for all those interest groups opposed to privatisation in Uruguay. 
 Finally, it was the specific institutional mechanism of direct democracy that 
allowed these interest groups access to a major veto point in the Uruguayan political 
system, providing them with the ability to derail privatisation policies. When 
Congress passed Law 16,211, the Frente Amplio and the anti-privatisation coalition 
utilised the mechanisms of direct democracy to hold a plebiscite proposing the 
derogation of articles 10 to 14 of this law. The success of this plebiscite was to sap 
the momentum, not only for economic reform during Lacalle’s remaining two years, 
but also for any future attempts at privatisation. Future administrations, not only had 
to consider the chance of any state reform legislation being accepted by Congress, 
but also the likelihood that opposition groups would mobilise and campaign for a 
public vote against it. This institutional mechanism ensured that as long as the 
electorate did not support privatisation, any future privatisation attempt could be 
vetoed by recourse to a referendum sponsored by organised interest groups.     
          
7.4 The return to power of Sanguinetti 
The 1994 election witnessed Julio Sanguinetti, the leader of the largest faction within 
the Partido Colorado, the Foro Batllista, returned as President for a second time. 
Sanguinetti, who campaigned on a platform of state reform that attempted to distance 
himself from the ‘scorched earth policies’ employed by other Southern Cone leaders, 
failed to capture a majority in either the upper or lower house. In order to ensure 
governability, Sanguinetti crafted a well-structured Colorado-Blanco coalition by 
allocating 50 per cent of all cabinet seats to the opposition Blancos (Panizza, 2004: 
14; Panizza & Philip, 2005: 678; Sondrol, 1997: 120). The Colorado-Blanco 
coalition had developed a programmatic agenda of reforms that was drafted by 
working groups comprised of technocrats and politicians from the two parties 
(Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 17; Panizza & Philip, 2005: 678). This agenda consisted 
of major state administrative reform, reform of public education, the alteration of the 
regulatory system for the electricity sector, the modernisation of state-owned 
enterprises and social security reform (Narbondo & Ramos, 1999: 39; Panizza & 
Philip, 2005: 678; Coelho, 2002: 52-53).        
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 Privatisation of state-owned enterprises appeared to be off Sanguinetti’s 
policy agenda, mainly because of Lacalle’s failed attempt to privatise ANTEL, but 
Sanguinetti was proposing the partial privatisation of the social security system. 
Lacalle, and Sanguinetti in his first term in office, had both attempted social security 
reform, and both had been prevented from doing so as a result of the mobilisation of 
organised interest groups and their recourse to mechanisms of direct democracy. 
Despite the certainty of fevered opposition, Uruguay’s pay-as-you-go single pillar 
pension system was approaching a fiscal meltdown, lending an urgent imperative to 
Sanguinetti’s attempt at reform. The disbursements of the social security system 
administrator, el Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), had grown from 10.4 per cent of 
GDP in 1990 to 15.1 per cent of GDP by 1994 (Forteza et al. 2005: 10; Bensión, 
2006: 33).  
Shortly after assuming power, Sanguinetti sent his proposals for social 
security reform to congress in the form of Law 16,713, which was passed on the 3rd 
of September 1995.498 This law mandated for the partial privatisation of the pension 
system in Uruguay, through the creation of a mixed, public and private system 
(Luján, 2002: 97; Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 18). Workers under the age of 40 would 
now have the option of contributing half of their taxes on earnings to a private 
pension fund administered by an Administradora de Fondos de Ahorro y Previsión 
(AFAP). Retired persons were left in the existing pension pillar and the 1989 
constitutional amendment remained in force (Bensión, 2006: 35-36; Filguiera & 
Moraes, 1999: 18; Kay, 1999: 408-409). The reform did not exclude anyone from 
contributing to the state pay-as-you-go system, and while AFAPs can be in the hands 
of private agents, the state was also represented in the AFAP pillar.499 In order to 
reduce opposition to the initiative, the military, police, notaries, bank-workers and 
university professionals were exempted from the reform (Luján, 2003: 97-99; 
Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 18-19; Kay, 1999: 408-409).500         
Although Law 16,713 partially privatised the social security system, 
Sanguinetti had replaced the privatisation of state-owned enterprises on the policy 
agenda, with the modernisation of these enterprises. The defeat of Lacalle’s 1992 
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Filgueira & Moraes (2000).  
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privatisation law had significantly raised the political cost of attempting to 
implement privatisation in Uruguay, and so the focus had shifted from privatisation 
to modernisation (Traversa, 2004: 43; Bergara, 2005: 56). The focus was now on 
new forms of management within the public sector, and maximising transfers to the 
treasury from the state companies, rather than on the overall size of the state 
(Traversa, 2004: 43; Bergara, 2005: 56).  
Nonetheless, Sanguinetti did continue to offer concessions on minor public 
services as provided for by the 1992 privatisation law, and he also continued the 
process of dismantling the state’s legal monopolies begun by Lacalle. The public 
services offered to the private sector were limited to the construction and 
management of three motorways; one between Montevideo and Libertad, one 
between Montevideo and Mendoza, and one between Pando and Minas (Bensión, 
2006: 63). Sanguinetti also ended the legal monopoly of the state in the alcohol and 
drinks market. What was to prove more controversial however, was Sanguinetti’s 
legislation to reform the regulatory framework of the electricity industry.  
 Law 16,832 of June 1997, allowed for the possibility of private investors to 
compete in the electricity generating market.501 However, the state electricity firm, 
Usinas y Teléfonos del Esatdo (UTE), would retain a monopoly in the distribution 
and transmission of electrical energy. This law never contemplated the privatisation 
of UTE, but it did allow for both private competition in the generation market and for 
UTE to associate with private firms (Bergara et al. 2005: 55; Bensión, 2006: 55-56). 
Despite the fact that this law only proposed de-monopolisation in one aspect of the 
electricity market, opposition groups began mobilising to hold a referendum to 
derogate the law (Bergara et al. 2005: 55). Eventually, this attempt was abandoned 
and the law was ratified, although the regulations did not actually come into force 
until 2000, when the new regulatory agency, the Unidad Reguladora de la Energía 
Eléctrica (UREE) was established (Bergara et al. 2005: 55; Bensión, 2006: 55-56). 
As of 2006 however, UTE remained the only company operating in the generation, 
distribution and transmission of electricity in Uruguay (Bensión, 2006: 56).502    
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 The state actually ended up taking over private enterprises teetering on the brink of insolvency. In 
1996, the Central Bank was forced to take control over the Banco Pan de Azúcar (BPA) and the 
Banco Crédito (Bensión, 2006: 47). 
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 Sanguinetti’s other major endeavours to reform the state included an attempt 
to reform the public health care system that was eventually rejected by Congress, and 
a wide-ranging civil service re-structuring law, ‘La reforma administrative del 
estado’ (administrative reform of the state) (see Panizza & Philip, 2005; Panizza, 
2004; Narbondo & Ramos, 1999). The civil service reform was only supported by 
the political parties because it exempted state-enterprises and left untouched the 
practice of appointing political supporters to high-level posts within the civil service 
(cargos de particular confianza) (Panizza, 2004: 20).  
 So, by the end of Sanguinetti’s second term in office, no state enterprises had 
actually been privatised. Sanguinetti concentrated on state reform and modernisation 
rather than privatisation. During this period, the legacy of Lacalle’s failed 
privatisation law and the subsequent opposition referendum can be clearly witnessed. 
Now, not only an actual referendum, but also the threat of a referendum to derogate a 
government law acted as a major veto point. The potential of opposition groups to 
derail any government attempt at privatisation through mechanisms of direct 
democracy had significantly raised the political cost of attempting to implement this 
policy. Consequently, Sanguinetti shifted the political focus from the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises, to the modernisation of these enterprises (Traversa, 2004: 
43; Bergara, 2005: 56). 
The potential for mass interest group mobilisation and the threat of a 
subsequent public referendum was also evident throughout Sanguinetti’s 
preparations for the partial privatisation of the social security system. Ironically, 
social security privatisation was given a major political impetus by the rise in 
popularity and success of the left-wing Frente Amplio in the 1994 elections (Luján, 
2002: 104; Forteza et al. 2005; 15; Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 8). This imminent 
threat to the traditional parties’ duopoly on power led the Colorados and the Blancos 
to realise that ‘coalitions to pass broad reforms and sustain them were needed if the 
traditional parties wanted to hold on to their hegemony over the political system for 
the last 150 years’ (Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 8). For the first time since the return 
to democracy, a significant reform could occur under the wing of a stable, 
programmatic political coalition between the two major parties.503 
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 In fact, the threat of the left also encouraged the two traditional parties to sponsor a reform of the 
electoral system. If the electoral system remained unchanged, the FA would have most likely come to 
power in the 1999 elections. On December 8th 1996, a plebiscite was held that approved the 
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When a referendum petition was actually issued, the electoral court dictated 
that such a move was unconstitutional, since the Executive had a legal monopoly 
over social security legislation. Such an argument could not be used to prevent the 
1989 plebiscite, as this referendum proposed an amendment to the constitution rather 
than the derogation of an existing law (Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 20). Opponents 
would now only have recourse to a constitutional amendment by means of a 
plebiscite to derail the reform. However, plebiscites can only be held alongside 
national elections and Sanguinetti, by pushing the reform through in his first year in 
office, was assured ‘of more than four years in which to organise the new system 
before it can be put to the test of a plebiscite’ (Forteza et al. 2005: 16). The struggle 
to have the social security reform passed as early as possible in 1995 was based on 
this rationale (Forteza et al. 2005: 16; Bergara et al. 2005: 52). Consequently, by 
1999, the new two-pillar system had created new stakeholders in the reform; nearly 
half a million people had signed up to an AFAP, diminishing the potential support 
for a plebiscite (Filguiera & Moraes, 1999: 20).   
  
7.5 The Election of Jorge Batlle 
Although the first round of the 1999 elections was won by the left-wing Frente 
Amplio candidate, Tabaré Vásquez, with 39 per cent of the vote, the 1996 electoral 
reform promoted by the Colorado and Blanco parties (see footnote 481 above), 
forced a second-round run-off that witnessed the two traditional parties allying with 
each other in the face of the leftist threat.504 Consequently, the run-off returned Jorge 
Batlle of the Partido Colorado as the new President, who promptly forged a coalition 
government of the Colorados and Blancos. Although inflation in 1999 was at its 
lowest point in fifty years and the Uruguayan economy had grown over the last three 
years, the early contagion effects of the Real devaluation in Brazil and the deepening 
recession in Argentina were beginning to widen cracks in the Uruguayan economy. 
505
 Batlle had run on a free-market ticket that promised to further reduce the role of 
the state in the economy.506    
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 Within a few months of assuming office however, Batlle was facing the 
prospect of a serious economic downturn, as the widespread fears about the negative 
effects of contagion appeared to become reality. Low prices for agricultural exports 
and Argentina’s economic woes were slowly driving the Uruguayan economy into 
recession.507 The budget deficit amounted to 4.2 per cent of GDP in 2001 and 
Uruguay lost its investment-grade rating, raising the cost of borrowing for the 
state.508 Uruguay’s economic slide was accelerated by the financial collapse of 
Argentina in 2001. Argentines with money in Uruguayan banks began rapidly 
withdrawing their deposits. The country’s foreign reserves fell by US$200 million a 
month and Uruguayans, witnessing the actions of the Argentines, began a run on the 
banks.509 With reserves slowly disappearing, Uruguay was forced to abandon its 
currency-band system and let the peso sink freely.510 As the value of the Uruguayan 
peso slowly slid downhill, the value of Uruguay’s debt, denominated in dollars, 
steadily rose uphill and by the start of 2002, the debt represented 52 per cent of 
GDP.511 The economy shrank by 11 per cent in 2002 and the rate of unemployment 
hit 20 per cent.512 The return of the fiscal deficit led to the resurgence of inflation, 
which was soon back in double figures, reaching 14 per cent in 2002 and 20 per cent 
in 2003.513 
 The government response to this crisis was a fiscal squeeze involving tax 
rises and spending cuts, but disagreement remained as to where the axe should fall.514 
These disagreements intensified and in October 2002, four ministers from the 
minority Partido Nacional quit, leaving Batlle with the prospect of a minority 
government in the middle of one of the worst economic crises the country had ever 
faced.515 With the debt increasing steadily, default began to appear highly likely,516 
prompting the IMF to eventually step in with a US$3.8 billion rescue loan in August 
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2002.517 In return for this loan, the IMF insisted that the government widen the tax 
base, cut pension fund deficits, offer certain public services to the private sector and 
end the state monopolies in energy and telecoms.518  
Unable to initiate any outright privatisations due to the likelihood of intense 
public opposition, but subscribing to the argument that privatisations would boost the 
economy by attracting foreign investment, aiding the fiscal deficit and lowering 
costs, Batlle began offering concessions to the private sector for public services, as 
provided for by Law 16,211 (see Table 7.4 below).519 Batlle’s strategy of offering 
concessions to the private sector did not lead to wide repercussions politically 
because the concessions tended to be a localised phenomenon and because most of 
these concessions did not require a sectoral law (except for Carrasco and ANP), 
mechanisms of direct democracy could not be utilised to halt their sale (Bergara et al. 
2005: 58).520  
 
Table 7.4: Batlle’s Concessions to the Private Sector  
Concession Details Date Cost 
Drinking Water 
in Maldonado 
30 year concession offered by state 
enterprise OSE to Uruagua SA, to 
invest in and provide drinking water 
for Maldonado 
Oct 
2000 
US$12 million investment required 
Container 
Terminal in 
Montevideo 
30 year concession to operate and 
manage the 80% of the container 
terminal in Montevideo 
June 
2001 
US$17.1 million paid for 
management contract 
National race 
track in Maroñas 
A 30 year concession for the 
operation and management of the 
betting shops in the Maroñas race 
track. 
May 
2002 
Annual fee of US$500,000 to be 
paid to the state. 
Radio electric 
spectrum  
20 year concession to maintain and 
operate the radio electric spectrum 
Oct 
2002 
Abiatar paid US$6 million for 
concession 
Carrasco Airport 20 year concession, to repair, operate 
and manage carrasco airport terminal 
Aug 
2003 
A fee of US$34 million paid to the 
government for operating 
company. 
Source: Bensión (2006: 64-67)      
 
Following the success of the early public service concessions and with the 
necessity for fiscal severity, Batlle turned towards the more politically risky subjects 
of further dismantling the state’s legal monopolies and the partial privatisation of 
state-enterprises. In February 2001, the legislature passed a law that allowed Spanish 
investors to operate and run the port of Mbopicuá on the Río Uruguay. By 2005, 
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foreign investors were also operating with the co-operation of local government in 
two other ports (Bensión, 2006: 49). In the same month, the legislature also passed a 
law that ended ANCAP’s legal monopoly in the production and sale of asphalt in 
Uruguay (Bensión, 2006: 57). Neither of these laws generated much opposition, but 
this was to change when Batlle turned his attention to the state telecommunications 
firm ANTEL.        
 In 2000, Batlle, through Articles 612 and 613 of the national budget, Law 
17,296, attempted to dismantle the monopoly of the state firm ANTEL in the 
provision of mobile phone services and long-distance calls (Bergara et al. 2005: 55; 
Forteza, et al. 2005: 25; Bensión, 2006; 57-58). These articles re-iterated ANTEL’s 
monopoly in the provision of basic telephone services, but they also allowed for the 
partial privatisation of ANCEL, ANTEL’s mobile phone division, and for private 
competition in the long-distance market.521 Following the introduction of this law, 
the telecommunications union, the Sindicato Único de Telecomunicaciones (Sutel), 
and the Comisión de Defensa del Patrimonio Nacional, led by the Frente Amplio, 
began the process of collecting signatures to hold a referendum on Articles 612 and 
613 and in January 2001, they announced that they had collected enough signatures 
to hold a referendum on the issue.522 Batlle and his government announced in March 
2002 that they themselves would derogate Articles 612 and 613 in order to prevent a 
referendum.523 The law that Batlle sent to congress to derogate these articles, re-
affirmed ANTEL’s monopoly in the provision of basic telephone services.524 
However, in the intervening period before Batlle repealed this law, ten private 
companies had entered the long-distance market, and although new firms could no 
longer enter the market, Batlle’s administration successfully argued that the licences 
already granted to these firms while the law was in place were still valid (Forteza et 
al. 2005: 25; Bergara et al. 2005: 55).   
 In 2001, Batlle turned his attention to the state oil company, ANCAP, and its 
legal monopoly in the area of combustibles. Following intense negotiations that even 
involved members of the Frente Amplio, the legislature agreed to pass Law 17,448 in 
December 2001 (Forteza et al. 2005: 25; Bergara et al. 2005: 55). This law proposed 
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to allow ANCAP to associate with private investors in the refining, distribution and 
sale of oil, and also to dismantle ANCAP’s monopoly on the importation of 
combustibles into Uruguay.525 Unsurprisingly, the main umbrella union organisation, 
the PIT-CNT, quickly began to voice opposition to this proposed initiative, and with 
the support of the Frente Amplio, they began to collect signatures to hold a 
referendum to repeal this law in March 2002.526 With the leader of the Frente 
Amplio, Tabaré Vásquez, insisting that reform of ANCAP was needed rather than 
any type of privatisation,527 over 60 per cent of the electorate voted to repeal this law 
in December 2003 (Bensión, 2006: 51).  
 During Batlle’s term in office, the need for fiscal austerity and price 
stabilisation, combined with pressure from the international financial institutions, 
placed privatisation once again on the political agenda. However, despite these 
external and macro-economic pressures, it was ultimately the institutional structure 
that allowed for mechanisms of direct democracy that shaped the policy outcome. 
While Batlle did succeed in introducing foreign firms into the long-distance 
telephone market, in order to avoid an imminent referendum on the issue, he was 
force to derogate his own law and in doing so, re-iterated ANTEL’s monopoly in the 
provision of telephone services in Uruguay. His attempt to dismantle ANCAP’s 
monopoly in the combustibles market and allow the company to associate with 
foreign investors was resoundingly defeated in a referendum on the issue. As long as 
interest groups who opposed privatisation could mobilise public support, any major 
attempt at privatisation would be vetoed through recourse to institutional 
mechanisms.  
 
7.6 The Legacy of Privatisation in Uruguay 
After numerous attempts at privatisation, Uruguay had failed to divest itself of any 
significant state enterprises. By 2004, only 13 public service concessions had been 
offered to the private sector, one bankrupt state enterprise had been closed and 
another partially privatised. The state’s monopolies in a number of areas had been 
dismantled and the social security system had been partially privatised, but all major 
privatisation attempts had failed. Lacalle’s attempt to partially privatise ANTEL was 
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repealed by referendum, the legacy of which was to overshadow any of Sanguinetti’s 
attempts at state reform. Batlle’s attempt to allow ANTEL to associate with private 
investors eventually resulted in him derogating his own law in order to prevent a 
referendum on the issue, while his attempt to partially privatise ANCAP was also 
struck down by public referendum.  
 Privatisation policy in Uruguay for these two decades therefore, has been 
primarily shaped by the institutional structure that allows for mechanisms of direct 
democracy. Well-organised interest groups, under the leadership of the Frente 
Amplio, managed to forge a militant anti-privatisation coalition that consistently 
opposed any attempts to introduce privatisation in Uruguay. The historical 
development of the Uruguayan state produced an electorate that was hostile to any 
attempt at state reform or privatisation. Each time an administration attempted 
reform of this kind, the anti-privatisation coalition mobilised public opinion on this 
issue and by exploiting mechanisms of direct democracy, they simply vetoed these 
initiatives.          
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Chapter Eight – Privatisation under Vázquez 
The 2004 Uruguayan elections were held against the backdrop of a country slowly 
beginning to regain its feet after the crippling effects of economic depression. Social 
unrest and economic turbulence as a result of the 2002 crisis, prompted the electorate 
to reject the duopoly on power held by the two traditional political parties, who 
turned to the candidate of the left-wing coalition, Encuentro Progresista - Frente 
Amplio - Nueva Mayoría (EP-FA-NM), Tabaré Vázquez. Vázquez was elected 
President of Uruguay in October 2004, marking the first time in Uruguay’s 178-year 
history that a candidate from a party other than the Partido Colorado or Partido 
Nacional had won a national election (Panizza, 2008: 178; Arocena, 2005: 147). 
Vázquez, like his counterparts in the Southern Cone, Kirchner and Lula, campaigned 
on a platform that attacked Neoliberalism and the primacy of the market-model for 
engendering much of the social and economic turmoil in the state. Vázquez proposed 
a model that was predicated upon greater state involvement in the economy and that 
specifically rejected all privatisations. Like Kirchner and Lula, Vázquez’s entire 
campaign was centred upon the idea of change and transformation. Campaign 
materials referred to an EP-FA-NM government as ‘El Gobierno del Cambio’ (the 
government of change) (Frente Amplio, 2004a, 1), while the motto of the left’s 
campaign was the simple ‘cambiemos’ (let’s change) (Altman & Castiglioni, 2006: 
150). 
This chapter is the analysis of privatisation policy during Vázquez’s 
Presidency. It will attempt to determine if there was any major change in 
privatisation policy once Vázquez came to power. It is divided into two main parts. 
The first part takes the form of a narrative and briefly outlines the 2004 election. This 
section will establish the motivations and preferences of Vazquez’s government. The 
second section of the narrative actually examines the policy of privatisation once 
Vazquez is in power. The second part of this chapter is the analysis, and this analysis 
is grouped around the independent variables identified in chapter two. The final 
section will present the conclusion. 
 
The Narrative 
8.1 The 2004 Election 
 209 
The 2002 crisis had nearly precipitated the collapse of the Uruguayan economy (see 
chapter seven), but by the time of the national election in October 2004, the economy 
had already begun the slow path towards recovery. The peso had appreciated in 
value, inflation had fallen to below 8 per cent, bank deposits had risen, the country’s 
risk premium had been reduced and growth was now exceeding 10 per cent.528 But 
this recovery was tempered by persistently high unemployment and indigence, and a 
public debt that had jumped from 41 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 111 per cent of GDP 
by the end of 2003 (Banco Central del Uruguay, 2005: 69). The winner of the 2004 
election would be presented with the immediate task of having to refinance US$2.1 
billion of maturing debts, an amount equivalent to 14 per cent of GDP.529 
 The grim reality of this economic situation encouraged voters to become 
increasingly disillusioned with the two traditional political parties and their 
mismanagement of the economy (Altman & Castiglioni, 2006; Arocena, 2005; Luna, 
2004). The left-wing EP-FA-NM coalition in contrast,530 having never been in 
government, remained untainted by the country’s economic woes (Queirolo, 2006: 
43). Offering the dissatisfied electorate an alternative set of economic proposals and 
buoyed by their support for the successful 2003 referendum rejecting the partial 
privatisation of the state oil firm ANCAP (see chapter seven),531 the left-wing 
coalition began the 2004 campaign as favourites to win the election.532 Indeed, for 
Panizza (2008: 181), the EP-FA-NM: 
[w]as in an ideal position to capitalise on popular opposition to 
the programme of neoliberal economic reforms implemented by 
successive Blanco and Colorado governments during this period. 
It did so by presenting itself as the guardian of the Batllista state, 
which had allegedly been dismantled by the traditional parties’ 
neoliberal reforms.      
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The EP-FA-NM’s position was re-enforced by the unity of the coalition, with Tabaré 
Vázquez emerging as their sole uncontested Presidential candidate at the party 
primaries in June 2004.533 Vázquez, a member of the Partido Socialista, was a 
respected oncologist and formerly mayor (1990-1994) of the Frente Amplio 
administration of Montevideo (Winn & Ferro-Clérico, 1997: 450).534  
The Frente Amplio had emerged at the beginning of the 1970s to contest the 
1971 election, as a coalition of communists, socialists and Christian democrats with 
strong links to the union movement, opposed to the authoritarian and conservative 
government of the time.535 Their 1971 programme advocated bank nationalisation 
and agrarian reform (Yaffé, 2002: 41; Panizza, 2008: 179), and although they had 
moderated their stance in the intervening years, their economic programme for the 
2004 election still sought to ‘limit the role of market forces. It favoured a more 
interventionist, protectionist and socially orientated state, with a bias towards the 
working class and those working in the state sector’ (Panizza, 2008: 1983).    
 The EP-FA-NM’s election manifesto, Grandes Líneas Programáticos, agreed 
at their fourth congress in Montevideo in December 2003, was focused upon 
increasing the role of the state in the economy and addressing the pressing issues of 
inequality and indigence (Frente Amplio, 2004b). It was harshly critical of the 
market model adopted by subsequent Blanco and Colorado governments, claiming 
that ‘the structural legacy of neoliberalism has left our country with hundreds of 
thousands of our compatriots in situations of poverty, inequality, emigration’ and 
‘unemployment’ (Frente Amplio, 2004b: 1). The economic chapter of the manifesto 
had an entire section, entitled ‘Otorgue un rol activo y orientador del Estado’ 
(granting an active and directive role for the state), that outlined a new role for the 
state in the economy and argued that ‘to develop the country’s productive potential 
and to distribute the results with social justice, requires an active state, able to orient 
this process’ (Frente Amplio, 2004b, 11). State enterprises were to be essential for 
this new role, with the manifesto promoting ‘a strong and efficient public bank’ and a 
crucial role for state enterprises in the development of infrastructure and tourism 
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(Frente Amplio, 2004b: 12). What is more, the document explicitly stated that ‘the 
state-owned enterprises, in that they have a strategic role, will be reformed to protect 
the national patrimony and the state management’ (Frente Amplio, 2004b: 12). The 
manifesto further proclaimed that ‘the state will assume economic activities where 
the private sector is reluctant to take risks, and will rescue firms facing closure, when 
there exists a positive social and/or economic evaluation of their activities’ (Frente 
Amplio, 2004b: 12). In fact, not once was the word privatisation mentioned in the 
entire document. 
 During the election campaign, although Vázquez tried hard to avoid been 
drawn on substantive economic issues (Panizza, 2008: 183),536 he continued to 
criticise the neoliberal model and his antagonistic stance towards privatisation 
remained unequivocal.537 In an interview with the weekly Búsqueda he stated that 
‘we have received a horrific legacy as a consequence of the politics of neoliberalism, 
which is the cause and maintenance of this crisis.’538 He continued to focus on the 
theme of transformation suggesting that ‘the winds of change are blowing…to totally 
destroy the neoliberal model,’539 and he promoted ‘another model’ that ‘would not 
privilege finance over the productive model.’540 As regards the state-owned 
enterprises, Vázquez declared that ‘we have a very clear position vis-à-vis 
privatisations. The strategic sectors should remain in the hands of the state,’541 and 
instead argued for the ‘professionalisation and reform of the structures’542 of the 
state-owned companies. 
The position of Vázquez and the EP-FA-NM as regards privatisation was 
further illustrated through their support for the referendum on water provision that 
was due to be held concurrently with the national election in October 2004. In March 
2003, Jorge Batlle submitted a bill to congress entitled ‘Regulación de los Servicios 
de Agua Potable y Saneamiento,’ that aimed to open up the water provision sector to 
private entities. Immediately, resistance to this initiative began to build and by 
January 2004, over 280,000 signatures calling for a referendum on the bill had been 
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collected.543 This opposition was spearheaded by the Comisión Nacional en Defensa 
del Agua y de la Vida, comprising members of the water services union, Ffose, the 
national trade union movement and over twenty other national social 
organisations.544 The referendum proposed amending Articles 47 and 188 of the 
Constitution.545 Article 47 would be altered to classify water as ‘a natural resource 
essential for life,’ where ‘access to drinking water and sanitation, constitute 
fundamental human rights.’546 Furthermore, the management and operation of water 
services in Uruguay would be ‘exclusively conducted by state-owned entities.’547 
From the beginning, the referendum campaign was supported by Tabaré Vázquez 
and the EP-FA-NM coalition.548 Members of the EP-FA-NM were involved in 
launching the campaign for a public plebiscite,549 and when questioned about the 
upcoming plebiscite, Vázquez stated: ‘We support this referendum and the attempt to 
change the constitution. We will vote for it. We feel that water is a public good and 
absolutely essential for a decent standard of living.’550         
 Vázquez’s support for the plebiscite caused some concern among 
international investors, specifically as the proposed constitutional amendment would 
raise questions over the positions of two multinational firms, Uragua and Aguas de 
al Costa, already operating water provision services in Uruguay.551 Vázquez, while 
on a tour to Spain, asserted that the referendum would not be retroactive and that his 
administration would respect private contracts already in place.552 In order to further 
soothe the nerves of the capital markets, he also announced that Daniel Astori,553 a 
respected economist with moderate views from the Asamblea Uruguay, would be his 
new Economics Minister.554 Astori, while critical of the policies adopted by his 
predecessors, infused his economic rhetoric with a more moderate tone (Astori, 
2004).  
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 These moves broadened Vázquez’s appeal to include disillusioned centre-left 
supporters of the traditional parties and on Election Day on October 31st 2004, 
Tabaré Vázquez was elected President of Uruguay with 50.5 per cent of the vote, 
defeating his closest rival, Jorge Larrañaga of the Partido Nacional, by nearly 17 
percentage points (Altman & Castiglioni, 2006: 148).555 More importantly, Vázquez 
won the election outright with over 50 per cent of the vote, therefore avoiding a 
second-round run-off. This victory was further bolstered by the overwhelming 
success of the referendum that Vázquez had endorsed and supported throughout the 
election campaign, proposing to establish water as a basic human right and 
definitively preventing the privatisation of water provision services in Uruguay.556 
The EP-FA-NM also won 52 of the 99 seats on offer in the Chamber of Deputies, 
and 16 of the 30 seats in the Senate, providing the coalition with a narrow majority in 
both houses.557 In fact, not since 1966 had an elected Uruguayan president enjoyed a 
majority in Congress (Altman & Castiglioni, 2006: 148). 
 
8.2 Privatisation with Vázquez in Power     
Tabaré Vázquez was inaugurated as President of Uruguay on March 1st 2005 and his 
comprehensive outright victory in the first round of the election and the majority he 
could now boast in both houses placed, Vázquez in a stronger political position than 
any other administration since the return to democracy in 1985 (Panizza, 2008: 185; 
Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005: 148). Since 2002, the economy had slowly begun to 
regain its feet, with GDP growing by a remarkable 12.3 per cent in 2004, inflation 
stabilising at 8 per cent and unemployment falling to just over 12 per cent from a 
high of nearly 20 per cent in mid-2002 (Banco Central del Uruguay, 2005: 13-16). 
However, there were dark clouds hovering on the horizon. Although Vázquez 
held a majority in both houses, it was a very narrow one and he did not have the 
necessary three-fifths majority to appoint supporters to key posts in the 
administration, let alone the two-thirds majority needed for constitutional reform, 
heightening the potential importance of party discipline (Altman & Castiglioni, 2006: 
153; Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005: 147-150). The buoyancy and optimism in the 
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economy also masked some serious structural problems. The numbers of those living 
in poverty in Uruguay had increased from 18 per cent in 2001 to nearly 32 per cent 
by 2004 (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2006), while Uruguay’s debt had climbed 
alarmingly from 41 per cent of GDP in 1999 to 101 per cent of GDP by the end of 
2004 (Banco Central del Uruguay, 2005: 69). In order to manage this debt, Vázquez 
was facing the prospect of prolonged fiscal rectitude. The economy and national 
infrastructure were also desperately in need of investment, but domestic savings 
would not suffice and Vázquez and the Frente Amplio558 had explicitly expressed 
their opposition to privatisation, ensuring that the administration would have to 
attract foreign capital in some other manner.559  
 Once in power, Vázquez’s main concerns therefore were maintaining a 
disciplined party in the legislature, addressing the inequality in Uruguayan society, 
dealing with the unwieldy public debt and attracting much-needed investment. His 
choice of cabinet reflected his desire to maintain unity within his left-wing party.  
His new ministers consisted of two main groups: those that were leaders of the main 
factions within the FA and those that were Vázquez’s close confidants (Buquet & 
Chasquetti, 2005: 150). The leaders of the main factions within the coalition 
comprised 43 per cent of the cabinet posts and 88 per cent of the legislative weight of 
the FA (Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005: 150).560 The remaining eight posts were shared 
out among members of his own Partido Socialista and trusted independents (Buquet 
& Chasquetti, 2005: 150).561  In spreading the cabinet posts among the leaders of the 
major factions, Vázquez hoped to inspire unity and discipline within the FA.562 To 
tackle the issue of indigence, Vázquez established the Ministry for Social 
Development (MIDES), and launched an emergency social fund, Programa de 
atención nacional a la emergencia social (Panes), targeted at families living in 
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extreme poverty (Filgueira & Lijenstein, 2006: 64; Panizza, 2008: 189; Chasquetti, 
2007; 250).563    
 In order to deal with the public debt, Vázquez was forced to come to an 
agreement with the IMF and this was to place pressure on state enterprises and public 
services. After the crisis of 2002, the previous Batlle administration had made the 
decision to avoid default at all costs, and in order to do so, they negotiated a re-
restructuring of the debt with private bondholders (Panizza, 2008: 185). As a 
consequence of this agreement, the government was left with a heavy interest and 
principal debt burden, necessitating further support from the IMF. The tacit 
acceptance of this deal by the FA while in opposition, generated a ‘path-dependent 
trajectory,’ that required the FA to come to agreement with the IMF once in power 
(Panizza, 2008: 186). Negotiations with the IMF for a stand-by loan had begun as 
soon as the election was over, and two months after assuming office in May 2005, 
the IMF accepted the administration’s letter of intent detailing their economic 
programme for the next three years (Luján, 2007: 184; Panizza, 2008: 187; Arocena, 
2005: 154).564 The Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies proposed 
economic stability and a ‘comprehensive structural reform agenda’ that committed 
the government to a primary fiscal surplus of 3.5 per cent of GDP (International 
Monetary Fund, 2005a: 3). Although privatisation was not mentioned in the 
document, the FA administration did aspire towards ‘improving the efficiency of the 
public enterprise sector,’ and ‘preparing them for competition with the private 
sector,’ through the expansion of ‘private sector activities in public utilities and 
infrastructure’ (International Monetary Fund, 2005a: 3, 8).  
 However, while privatisation was not mentioned, the letter of intent did 
commit the government to the re-privatisation of the Nuevo Banco Comercial (NBC) 
(International Monetary Fund, 2005a: 7). NBC was created by the state in the wake 
of the 2002 banking crisis with the assets of three insolvent private banks, the 
Comercial, Montevideo and Caja Obrera (Bensión, 2006: 49). Concurrent with the 
release of the letter of intent in May 2005, Astori announced that NBC was to be re-
privatised and by September, an agreement was reached with a consortium headed by 
investment fund Advent International.565 Following the approval of the Uruguayan 
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banking superintendent 8 months later,566 Advent assumed control of NBD in a deal 
worth US$167 million, out of which the state made a profit of US$67 million to be 
spent on the development of infrastructure.567 The state was also to continue to 
participate in the decision-making process at the bank, through their seat on the 
bank’s fiscal commission.568  
 To attract much-needed investment, the government was keen to signal 
stability and continuity to private capital and immediately after the election, Vázquez 
announced that he would be abandoning his proposal to revise the public service 
concessions of the previous Batlle government, while also announcing that he would 
respect all previous contracts signed by private entities with the state (Ibarra, 2006: 
152). In fact, on May 20th and contrary to the wishes of a number of powerful interest 
groups, Vázquez issued a decree stating that: ‘The non-state entities that have the 
capacity to provide public service sanitation or water for human consumption, and 
have signed contracts before 31st October 2004, can continue to administer the above 
services until expiration of the original agreed contract date.’569 This decree proposed 
negating the retroactivity of the October referendum and respecting the concessions 
of Uragua and Aguas de al Costa. Inevitability, the decree generated opposition, 
particularly from workers of the state water and sanitation company, OSE, radical 
elements of the FA and from the Comisión de Defensa del Agua, who collected over 
3,000 signatures demanding that Vázquez revoke the decree and return all private 
water and sanitation concessions to state hands.570 
 The conservative economic strategy however, adopted by Vázquez and 
Astori, significantly reassured international investors. The marked improvement in 
relations between Uruguay and investors was confirmed when the government 
successfully issues some US$300 million in sovereign bonds, covering the country’s 
financing requirement for the whole of 2005.571 
Despite the decree, the state water company, OSE, had already commissioned 
a report that recommended rescinding the contract of Uragua and penalising the 
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company for breach of contract, including work delays and lack of investment.572 
Ironically, for its part, Uragua, a subsidiary of Aguas de Bilbao, argued that the 
constitutional referendum of October was retroactive and as such, it was illegal for 
the firm to continue to provide water and sanitation services in Uruguay.573 The firm, 
realising that the referendum had essentially ended any possible future expansion 
plans in Uruguay, wished to exit the market and hoped that the government would 
nationalise the contract, thereby ensuring that Uragua could leave Uruguay with all 
its assets and the US$20 million in contractual guarantees. So, two weeks after 
Vázquez had issued the decree respecting the water and sanitation concessions 
signed before the October referendum, a notice appeared on the website of the OSE 
followed by a government press conference announcing that the state had decided to 
rescind the contract of Uragua for incompletion of the terms of the concession.574 
What is more, in rescinding the contract, Vázquez decided to hold on to the valuable 
contractual guarantees much to the chagrin of the Spanish-owned firm.575  
In response, the company launched a legal action against the state and lodged 
a case with the World Bank’s arbitration tribunal, ICSID. Following failed attempts 
at conciliation, the company remained steadfast in its demand for an indemnity of 
US$24 million576 and eventually, nearly a year after the constitutional reform, 
Uragua and the Vázquez government finally came to an agreement enabling OSE to 
assume control of the company577 and absorb all 115 former employees of 
Uragua.578 In exchange for all operations and assets of Uragua in Uruguay valued at 
US$15 million, the Spanish firm would, in return, get to keep the contractual 
guarantees worth US$20 million. In addition, Uragua was to pay invoices to 
creditors worth US$2.8 million and the concession fees to OSE for April and May 
(US$1.5 million).579 After the state assumed control of this concession, 97.1 per cent 
of all water and sanitation services in Uruguay were now in state hands.580 When 
asked to comment on the remaining 2.9 per cent of services in the hands of Aguas de 
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la Costa, Mariano Arana, the minister responsible, stated: ‘Aguas de la Costa has a 
contract until 2018 and as long as they fulfil the terms of their accord, there will be 
no problems.’581  
   Ironically however, the company in question did not quite share this 
optimistic outlook. In September 2005, reports began to appear in the Madrid daily, 
CincoDías, that the Spanish firm Aguas de Barcelona (Agbar), who owned 60 per 
cent of Aguas de la Costa, was interested in ending their operations in Uruguay and 
Argentina.582 Their desire to leave the Argentinean market was driven by the 
growing acrimony between the company and Néstor Kirchner,583 while in Uruguay, 
the company, similar to Uragua, believed that the referendum in October not only 
threw doubts on the sustainability of their existing contract, but that it definitively 
paralysed the water and sanitation privatisation process in Uruguay, and in doing so, 
dashed any future hopes the company may have harboured for expansion in this 
market.584 Two weeks later, OSE announced that they would be interested in buying 
Agbar’s share of Aguas de la Costa and with the support of Vázquez,585 by February, 
OSE had reached an agreement to purchase Aguas de la Costa for US$3.4 million to 
be paid in two instalments of US$1.7 million each.586 Vázquez’s administration was 
motivated to purchase Agbar’s share of Aguas de la Costa, firstly, as this would 
enable the government to level all tariffs for water services across the country and 
secondly, as this would complete the constitutional reform of 2004587 as all water and 
sanitation services would now be in state hands.588       
 Legislative approval for the purchase of Aguas de la Costa was necessary as 
the other 40 per cent of the company was owned by a number of local businessmen, 
who refused OSE’s offer to purchase their share. OSE therefore needed to legally 
create a new mixed-ownership enterprise in order to manage the concession with 
private actors until 2018.589 The Executive sent a bill to the legislature proposing the 
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transaction in April590 and despite the opposition of the Herrerismo faction of the 
PN, who could do little in the face of the FA majority in both houses, OSE assumed 
control of the operations and assets of Aguas de la Costa in September 2006 and 
received permission from Mariano Arana to lower the water and sanitation tariffs of 
the homes in Maldonado previously served by this concession.591  
 Following an announcement in March 2006 that the government was 
planning to pay off ahead of schedule debts of US$130 million and US$300 million 
with the World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank,592 and in the midst of a 
fractious and controversial tax reform (Traversa, 2006: 148),593 the government, still 
desperately in need of infrastructural investment, approved plans for two concessions 
to be offered to the private sector. In June, the government advertised for 
concessionaires to manage a landfill in Cañada Grande in order to handle the 
municipal waste of Montevideo,594 while the following month, Vázquez approved 
plans to tender out the construction and management of a new US$300 million port 
at Puntas del Chileno.595 Astori favoured the idea of using public-private concessions 
to develop infrastructure596 due to a lack of domestic savings and high levels of 
public debt, combined with the fact that these concessions were not privatisations 
and did not therefore require any specific legal approval.597 Vázquez also agreed to 
let the state oil firm, ANCAP, operate in a joint venture with the Brazilian and 
Venezuelan state energy companies, PETROBAS and PDVSA.598 This decision was 
questionable as it could be interpreted to have contradicted the results of the 2003 
referendum prohibiting ANCAP from associating with private enterprises.599  
 By the end of 2006, Astori’s growth-orientated policies appeared to be a 
success. GDP growth was an impressive 7 per cent of GDP in 2006, while fixed 
capital formation represented 16 per cent of GDP in the same year, its highest level 
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since 1998 (Banco Central del Uruguay, 2007: 4-5). The economy’s growth, 
combined with Vázquez’s social programmes, also contributed to reductions in 
poverty and by the end of 2006, the number of those living in poverty had been 
reduced from a high of 31.8 per cent of the population in 2004 to 25.2 per cent of the 
population (Instituto Nacional de Estadística, 2006). Astori’s fiscal rectitude had also 
ensured that the total public sector deficit for 2006 was only 0.8 per cent of GDP and 
this stringency enabled Uruguay to officially cancel its entire debt to the IMF at the 
end of the year, an amount of US$2.6 billion (Banco Central del Uruguay, 2007: 7-
9). Uruguay’s last Letter of Intent to the IMF in December 2006 stated: ‘…we have 
paid off all outstanding obligations to the Fund. We do not intend to make any 
further drawings under the current agreement’ (International Monetary Fund, 2006: 
1). 
 However, not everything was bright for the Vásquez administration. 
Vázquez, as a result of increasing disillusionment with the Mercosur, had pursued a 
trade and investment framework deal with the United States in early January 2007, a 
move that had generated widespread public opposition and had threatened to split the 
FA down the middle (Chasquetti, 2007: 253).600 Part of the motivation for this 
decision was the result of an increasingly ugly dispute with Uruguay’s larger 
Mercosur partner and neighbour, Argentina, over two proposed paper mill plants on 
the Río Uruguay, that had witnessed Argentina bring the dispute to the International 
Court in The Hague (Chasquetti, 2007: 252).601 Compounding these problems was 
the very real threat of an upsurge of inflation at the beginning of 2007. Uruguay’s 
complete dependence on foreign energy sources meant that the risk of higher 
inflation was correlated closely with higher international oil prices and initial 
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estimates suggested that inflation in 2007 could exceed the target of the Central 
Bank.602  
 Amidst these troubles at the beginning of 2007, Vázquez oversaw the second 
re-privatisation of his administration.603 In 1994, during the Lacalle Presidency, 49 
per cent of the state airline, PLUNA, had been privatised (see chapter seven). 
However by 2006, the Brazilian airline Varig, who owned the majority stake in 
PLUNA, were in dire financial trouble and consequently neglected the management 
of PLUNA, even refusing to pay the necessary US$1 million payment to the 
International Air Transport Association to continue operating.604 Following a failed 
attempt by Varig to extricate themselves from PLUNA by selling their share to the 
Venezuelan state airline Conviasa,605 the company found itself on the brink of 
bankruptcy, requiring an immediate cash injection of at least US20 million.606 After 
Varig flatly refused to inject US$10 million into the floundering airline,607 the 
national treasury was forced to provide PLUNA with a US$4 million bailout to 
continue operating and in September 2006, the Uruguayan government increased its 
share of the airline to 90 per cent in order to prevent the company from going 
bankrupt.608 The Vázquez administration immediately began actively seeking a 
partner to rescue the beleaguered airline and by early January, the re-privatisation of 
the airline was complete, when the Argentine consortium, Leadgate Investment, 
agreed to purchase 75 per cent of PLUNA.609 Leadgate would now own 45 per cent 
of the airline directly, whilst also owning 40 per cent of Sociedad Aeronautica 
Oriental, a group controlled by the Uruguayan Raul Rodríguez that owned a further 
30 per cent of PLUNA. The reason for this convoluted ownership structure was to 
ensure that at least 51 per cent of the company remained in Uruguayan hands as 
dictated by the law.610 The Argentinean consortium agreed to invest US$177 million 
in the company over two years and the Uruguayan government, who now owned 23 
                                                 
602
 Global Insight, Uruguay: Quarterly Review and Outlook, First Quarter 2007, p. 114.   
603
 Some of Vázquez’s problems were offset by internal elections within the FA at the end of 2006 
that acted as a plebiscite on Vázquez’s government. The results were highly favourable to the 
administration. See Chasquetti (2007: 254-256).  
604
 El País, May 2nd, 2006 
605
 El Observador Económico, July 4th, 2006 
606
 El País, August 10th, 2006 
607
 El País, August 1st, 2006 
608
 El País, September 14th, 2006   
609
 El Observador Económico, January 9th, 2007 
610
 El Observador Económico, June 18th, 2007 & El Cronista, February 16th, 2007 
 222 
per cent of the company, agreed to immediately inject US$18 million in order to 
ensure that the national airline remained solvent.611  
 As the state was rescuing PLUNA, Uruguay’s state rail association, UFE, 
announced the creation of two new public-private enterprises. Tenders were 
announced for private investors interested in participating in the Corporación 
Ferroviaria de Uruguay (CFU), a company that would be responsible, in conjunction 
with AFE and the Corporación Nacional para el Desarrollo (CND) (see chapter 
seven), for the development and repair of 940 km of railway lines612 at a cost of 
US$90 million, a third of which would come from the new private partner.613 The 
second company would be a public-private association, active for 15 years that 
would be responsible for marketing, planning and coordinating cargo and logistics 
services in order to increase Uruguayan rail cargo capacity from 1.4 million tons to 
3.5 million tons per annum.614 AFE would remain solely responsible for the cargo 
trains themselves, and none of AFE’s existing operations or responsibilities would be 
affected.615 The association of AFE with private investors in the areas of cargo 
transport and railroad repair was first proposed by the Vázquez administration as 
early as 2005, as the rail network in Uruguay was in need of investment to the tune 
of US$90 million, a sum beyond the resources of the state (International Monetary 
Fund, 2005b: 5).616 The Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF) was hired to 
develop the models for these public-private partnerships and by June,617 four 
companies were actively negotiating with the government to invest US$50 million in 
a company that would operate Uruguay’s rail cargo transport,618 whilst four bids had 
been received for the contract to recondition the 940 km of railway by September.619 
The Executive officially approved the creation of these mixed enterprises, in which 
the private partner would hold the majority share, at the end of February 2008, and 
all that remained was for the CND to select appropriate private partners for both 
enterprises from among the bids received.620 
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 In response to the initiative to create two new mixed ownership enterprises in 
the rail sector, the PIT-CNT, at the behest of their communist wing, resurrected the 
Comisión en Defensa del Patrimonio.621 The communist sector of the union believed, 
along with some sectors of the MPP, that there was a danger of future privatisations 
looming on the horizon in Uruguay. However, the resurrection of the Comisión did 
not generate much support among the majority of the PIT-CNT, with Juan Silveira, 
the co-ordinator of the socialist wing of the PIT-CNT, dismissing the fears of his 
communist counterparts and asserting that ‘an association is not a privatisation,’ a 
sentiment echoed by the co-ordinator of the PIT-CNT, Fernando Pereira.622     
 Vázquez, like Lula in Brazil and Kirchner in Argentina, had contested the 
Presidential election on a platform that criticised the market-friendly policies of his 
predecessors and like Lula and Kirchner, during the election campaign had rejected 
the possibility of privatisation in Uruguay. In Brazil, although privatisations 
significantly slowed, they did not stop. In Argentina, not only did they not stop, but 
there were also a number of instances of re-nationalisation. In Uruguay in contrast, 
once in power, the preferences of Vázquez remained constant623 and by the end of 
Vázquez’s first three years in power, there had been no actual privatisations, 
although there had been two instances of re-privatisation: the Banco Nuevo 
Comercial, a re-privatisation encouraged and supported by the IMF; and the re-
privatisation of the national airline PLUNA, which the state took control of in order 
to prevent the company from falling into insolvency. The Vázquez administration 
had also offered concessions in infrastructure to the private sector and had allowed 
the state rail operator, UFE, to associate with private partners in the maintenance and 
repair of rail lines and the management of cargo services in Uruguay. However, the 
state also reassumed control of two water and sanitation companies; one through 
reluctant re-nationalisation and the other through formal purchase.  
So, of our three cases, Uruguay appears to lie somewhere between the 
outcome in Brazil under Lula and the outcome in Argentina under Kirchner. So what 
explains this? This thesis argues that the political institutional structure in each state 
will either enable a partisan government to implement their preferences, by 
increasing their institutional control over policy, or to inhibit a partisan government 
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from implementing their preferences, by leaving them with little institutional control 
over the policy in question. Chapter four and chapter six demonstrated that the 
outcomes in Brazil and Argentina were due to the configuration of their political 
institutions. In Uruguay, it was primarily the institutional device that allowed for 
mechanisms of direct democracy that shaped the outcome of privatisation policy. 
The referendum on water and sanitation services in Uruguay in 2005 ultimately 
forced Vázquez to re-nationalise the two private companies operating in this sector, 
despite the fact this was contrary to his initial preference. Once the decision had 
eventually been made to assume control of these firms, it was his executive power 
and the discipline of his legislative support that enabled the nationalisation and 
purchase to succeed, despite opposition. There were no actual privatisations, an 
outcome that was primarily due to the fact that by the time Vázquez came to power, 
the threat of referenda had nearly completed removed the idea of privatisation from 
the policy agenda. The next section will analyse the actions of Vázquez in 
accordance with the independent variables identified in chapter two.     
 
The Analysis 
8.3 The Political Institutions 
As in Brazil and Argentina, the Uruguayan political system is a Presidential system 
with three branches: the Executive, Congress and the Judiciary. In Uruguay, as in 
other Latin American Presidential systems, the Executive has a number of powerful 
constitutional prerogatives. However, as in many of these other Presidential systems, 
these powers are heavily dependent upon the ability of the Executive to craft a 
cohesive and disciplined majority in the legislature (Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997: 
394-396). In Uruguay, the Executive does not have the ability to by-pass the 
legislature as in Argentina and the independence of the Judiciary and the ability of 
organised interest groups to sponsor popular votes on government initiatives, act as 
further checks on the initiatives of the Executive (Bergara et al. 2005: 39).  
 
The Executive 
In the Uruguayan political system, the Executive, as in Argentina and Brazil (and 
many other Latin American Presidential regimes), has a number of powerful 
constitutional prerogatives that places the Executive in a potentially dominant 
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position in the policy-making process (Chasquetti, 2004: 45).624 Since 1930, ‘the 
Executive branch has gained substantive power vis-à-vis the legislative branch’ 
(Bergara et al. 2005: 16), a process that continued with the 1996 constitutional 
reform (Buquet, 1997, 1998: 11, 4; Lanzaro, 2001: 299). The potential of the 
Executive to control the legislative process is derived from a combination of 
prerogatives including exclusive initiative, veto power and urgent legislation. The 
Executive has the right to exclusively initiate legislation in areas related to the 
budget, tax exemptions and minimum wages or prices and also has recourse to a full 
or item veto in all policy areas (Bergara et al. 2005: 16, 36; Chasquetti, 2004: 45; 
Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997: 458). Added to this, is the right to amendatory 
observations, a process whereby the President can make counter-proposals or last 
ditch alterations to an already vetoed piece of legislation (Tsebelis & Aleman, 2005: 
411). Legislators then have 30 days to override these amendatory observations and 
should they fail to do so, the bill, with the Executive’s alterations, then becomes law 
(Tsebelis & Alemán, 2005: 411).625  The president may also set the legislative 
agenda by categorising any Executive initiative as a proyecto de urgente 
consideración (project of urgent consideration), thus propelling this legislation to the 
top of the agenda and providing Congress with a short window within which to reject 
or amend the bill before it automatically becomes law (Chasquetti, 2004: 45; 
Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997: 458).626  
However, despite ‘the centrality’ of the President in political life in Uruguay 
(Lanzaro, 2001: 293), the Executive is far from omnipotent. The successful function 
of Presidentialism is conditioned, again as in many other Latin American Presidential 
regimes (see Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997), upon the institutional and legislative 
position of the Executive, i.e. the degree of cohesiveness within the executive’s 
legislative support (Chasquetti, 2007, 2006, 2004; Buquet, 1998). As Daniel Buquet 
(1998: 7) notes: in Uruguay, ‘the relationship between the executive and the 
legislative is the fulcrum upon which the process of government is blocked or 
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enabled to run fluidly.’ With the emergence of the Frente Amplio and the shift from a 
bi-partisan to a multi-party system, since 1971 every Uruguayan President has 
presided over a minority government and so has been forced to forge multi-party 
coalitions to pass legislation. As such, since the return to democracy, Uruguayan 
executives have been institutionally powerful, but generally political weak (Bergara 
et al. 2005: 17; Chasquetti, 2006; 71; 2004: 45; Buquet, 1998; 7).  
Most importantly, in Uruguay, even when congressional support is not 
forthcoming, ‘executives never by-pass the legislature’ (Bergara et al. 2005: 39).627 
The Executive simply does not have the institutional ability to do so, such as 
recourse to strong decree power as in Argentina. Decree power in Uruguay is 
negligible: allowed only in specific policy areas and only relating to legislation that 
has already been accepted by Congress (Bergara et al. 2005: 39, Chasquetti, 2007: 
257). In addition, while laws of urgent consideration could potentially set the agenda 
in the legislature, they are rarely invoked. In fact, since the return to democratic rule, 
legislation has only been deemed necessary of urgent consideration four times.628 
Furthermore, the independence of the judiciary and the existence of popular 
initiatives provide major veto points for Executive initiatives (Bergara et al. 2005: 
36).629 Indeed, the ability of organised interest groups to promote mechanisms of 
direct democracy has, on a number of occasions, supplanted the preferences of the 
Executive. 
 However, the results of the 2004 election signalled a major shift in 
Uruguayan politics, as Tabaré Vázquez became the first President since 1966 to 
enjoy a majority in both houses. Vázquez would not be forced to forge a multi-party 
coalition, ensuring that he was a genuine ‘institutionally and politically strong 
President’ (Chasquetti, 2006: 73). However, Vázquez’s narrow majority in both 
houses brought the importance of party discipline to the fore (Altman & Castiglioni, 
2006: 153; Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005: 147-150). Despite this, without the burden of 
attempting to satisfy fractious coalition partners, Vázquez’s ability to dominate the 
policy-making process and implement his preferences would be vastly improved. In 
fact, the ability of Vázquez to dominate the legislative agenda vis-à-vis the 
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 Not since Pacheco in 1968 has an executive attempted to bypass the legislature (Bergara et al. 
2005: 39).  
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 Sistema de Información Parlamentaría available at  
http://www.parlamento.gub.uy/websip/Default.asp  
629
 In fact, in order to avoid political stalemate during the policy-making process, the Executive will 
generally send bills that are ‘far from its best policy position’ (Bergara et al. 2005: 36).  
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legislature in his first three years in power can be clearly witnessed from Table 8.1 
below. During this period, Vázquez succeeded in shepherding 76 per cent of all his 
legislative initiatives into law. The legislative power on the other hand only managed 
to have 21 per cent of their legislative projects approved within the same period. The 
majority Vázquez boasted in both houses and his ability to dominate the policy 
process, rendered many of Vázquez’s constitutional prerogatives redundant. As 
Table 8.2 below shows, on only five occasions in his first three years did Vazquez 
have to resort to the use of his veto power in order to bring legislation closer to his 
preferences (and none of this legislation related to public enterprises).630 In contrast, 
within the first three years of Battle’s tenure, he was forced to wield his veto power 
17 times.631 Likewise, only twice did Vázquez classify legislation as in need of 
urgent consideration.632  
 
Table 8.1 Dominance of Executive in Legislative Process 2005-2007 
 Executive Power Legislative Power Total 
Total projects (2005-07) 350 600 950 
2005 Approved 105 67 388 
2006 Approved 95 40 326 
2007 Approved  66 21 255 
Total Approved (2005-07) 267 128 395 
Total Pending (2005-07) 102 472 574 
Rate of Effectiveness  76% 21%  
Source: Sistema de Información Parlamentaría 
Note: Modelled on 2005 analysis by Chasquetti (2007), but data updated and revised by author 
 
Table 8.2 Vázquez’s use of the Executive Veto 
Type 2005 2006 2007 
Full Item 1 1 --- 
Partial 1 1 1 
Total 2 2 1 
Source: Sistema de Información Parlamentaría 
 
 
Clearly then, Vázquez was able to stamp his preferences upon the policy 
process, something that was also evident with regards to the policy of privatisation. 
Vázquez, desperately in need of investment in infrastructure, favoured associations 
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with private enterprise and minor concession contracts. There were no actual 
privatisations and Vázquez had the institutional power to oppose any suggestion of 
such. In fact, the Herrerismo faction of the Partido Nacional introduced their own 
legislation proposing the privatisation of state enterprises, but Vázquez was able to 
draw on his legislative support to prevent this law being approved (Ibarra, 2006: 
153). Indeed, when Vázquez eventually decided to re-nationalise and purchase Aguas 
de la Costa from Aguas de Barcelona, he needed to introduce legislation to authorise 
the purchase. Luis Lacalle and his conservative Herrerismo faction of the PN 
opposed this legislation, with Lacalle stating in a congressional debate that such 
legislation was ‘unconstitutional,’ and any claims that ‘it would lower tariffs were 
nothing but a decoy.’633 However, despite this opposition, Vázquez could rely upon 
his majority support in the legislature and this law was duly approved and the 
purchase of Aguas de la Costa completed. 
 Interestingly however, despite this dominance in the policy process, it was 
another institutional mechanism, the constitutional referendum declaring water a 
human right that supplanted the preferences of the Executive and drove the 
nationalisation of the two water concessions. Vázquez, desperate for investment and 
wishing to send signals of continuity to the capital markets, issued a decree after the 
success of the referendum protecting the two existing water contracts in Uruguay.634 
However, Vazquez was confronted with the unusual situation whereby the loss-
making company running one of the concessions, Uragua, was calling for the re-
nationalisation of the firm in order to enable its graceful exit from the Uruguayan 
market with assets and contractual guarantees intact.635 Powerful interest groups who 
supported and sponsored the referendum also placed enormous pressure on Vázquez 
to rescind the contracts and even legally challenged the government decree. 
Eventually, Vázquez, in the face of this pressure, was forced to rescind the contract 
of Uragua.636 A similar situation occurred with Aguas de la Costa. Despite the 
preferences of the government for Aguas de la Costa to continue to administer their 
concession, the company, believing that the referendum in October not only threw 
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 Luis Lacalle, Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Representantes, Segundo Período Ordinario de la 
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doubts on the sustainability of their existing contract, but also that it dashed any 
future hopes they harboured for expansion in this market, announced they wished to 
sell637 and Vázquez eventually arranged for the state to purchase the firm.    
 In Argentina, nationalisations under Kirchner were primarily driven by the 
Executive branch, but in Uruguay in contrast, the two nationalisations during 
Vázquez’s tenure were mainly driven by the institutional structure that allowed for 
mechanisms of direct democracy. 
 
Legislative Support 
While the executive branch may have the potential to dominate the legislative branch 
in Uruguay, the ability of the President to do so, as in many other Latin American 
Presidential systems (see Mainwaring & Shugart, 1997), is dependent upon the 
institutional and legislative position of the Executive (Chasquetti, 2007, 2006, 2004; 
Buquet, 1998). The legislature, for its part, has a number of constitutional powers 
that can stymie the initiatives of the Executive, including the power to censure 
Ministers and decide upon the distribution of posts within the state enterprises 
(Chasquetti, 2004: 45). As such, the ability of the Executive to implement its 
preferences is determined by the degree of fragmentation within the governing party 
and/or coalition. That is, the exercise of Executive power in Uruguay rests upon the 
President’s ability to rely upon cohesive and disciplined support within the 
legislature. 
 Traditionally however, this has not always proved easy for Uruguayan 
Presidents to do. Uruguay has one of the few institutionalised party systems in Latin 
America (Bergara et al. 2005, Mainwaring & Scully, 1995) and since the emergence 
of the Frente Amplio, this system has evolved from a bi-partisan to a multi-party 
system. As a consequence, the last election in which a party received a majority in 
parliament was in 1966, forcing successive administrations to forge frequently 
unstable inter-party coalitions in order to generate simple legislative majorities to 
govern (Altman, 2000: 279; Bergara et al. 2005: 17; Chasquetti, 2007: 260; Buquet, 
1998; 7). To compound matters, the Uruguayan party system is also highly 
factionalised (see Table 8.3 below). In other countries with factionalised party 
systems, such as Japan and Italy for example, party factions tend to be ‘informal 
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actors,’ but in Uruguay in contrast, factions ‘are institutionalised agents within 
parties and the whole political system’ with ‘their own leaders and organisations’ 
(Bergara et al. 2005: 16). This is primarily because the factionalised party system in 
Uruguay is a direct consequence of the electoral system (Piñeiro, 2004: 17; Andrés 
Moraes, 2004: 5; Morgenstern, 2001: 236; Bergara et al. 2005: 17).  
 
Table 8.3 Party Factionalisation in Uruguay  
 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 2005-10 
Frente Amplio 2.6 2.3 3.5 4.8 4.5 
Partido Colorado 2.3 2.5 1.9 2.0 1.9 
Partido Nacional 1.8 2.9 4.2 1.7 2.7 
Source: Buquet & Chasquetti (2005) and Chasquetti (2004) 
 
 The Uruguayan electoral system is based upon Double Simultaneous Vote 
(DSV) and closed-list Proportional Representation (PR). DSV was introduced in 
1910 by the leaders of the Colorados and Blancos in order to prevent the advent of a 
multi-party system (Piñeiro, 2004: 17; Andrés Moraes, 2004: 4-5; Morgenstern, 
2001: 239). In a nutshell, ‘DSV restrains defections that could hurt the electoral 
performance of parties by allowing intra-party competition. Basically, it allows 
national elections to operate as party primaries,’ (Andrés Moraes, 2004: 5) and this 
has led to the emergence of the factionalised party system in Uruguay (Piñeiro, 2004: 
17; Andrés Moraes, 2004: 5; Morgenstern, 2001: 236; Bergara et al. 2005: 17). The 
electorate cast their vote firstly for a party (lemas) and that party’s presidential 
candidate. They must then select among factions (sublemas) within parties (Andrés 
Moraes, 2004: 5; Morgenstern, 2001: 240). The ‘faction lists are hierarchies’ with 
leaders (senate candidates) at the top, followed by national and local deputies (Andés 
Moraes, 2004: 5).638 Upper and lower house seats are assigned among parties on the 
basis of proportional representation (d’Hondt formula) and then seats are distributed 
among the factions within the party (again on basis of PR) (Bergara et al. 2005: 17; 
Andrés Moraes, 2004: 7). It is here that competition occurs among factions within a 
single party for these factions must compete with each other for seats within districts 
(Andés Moraes, 2004: 7). 
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 Before the 1996 constitutional reform, voters had to choose a party and then a presidential 
candidate from one of the factions within the party. By choosing a candidate, you also choose this 
faction list. However, the 1996 reform required that parties select a single Presidential candidate at 
mandatory primaries to be held on the same day by all parties. For more details on all aspects of the 
1996 reform see Buquet (1997).    
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 Despite the fact that the electoral rules promote factionalised party politics, 
these same rules also engender very high levels of discipline among factions and 
parties in Uruguay (Morgenstern, 2001; Andrés Moraes, 2004; Chasquetti, 2004; 
Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005). The PR-closed and blocked list system that Uruguay 
employs requires that aspirants to the legislature be linked to national senators 
(usually faction leaders) on the same ticket (Andés Moraes, 2004: 8). This means that 
faction leaders can control the selection of candidates and their order on the lists, 
engendering loyalty to the faction leader and consequently discipline, since those 
legislators that do not respect factions decisions will be punished when the next list is 
created (Altman & Chasquetti, 2005: 239-240; Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005: 150; 
Andés Moraes, 2004: 8-9; Chasquetti, 2004: 48).639 In fact, since the 1996 
constitutional reform, which prohibited multiple faction lists in a single district, 
power has been even more centralised in the hands of faction leaders (Andés Moraes, 
2004 11).640 In turn, the reform also increased party cohesiveness and discipline, as 
each party can now only present one Presidential candidate (Buquet, 1998: 7). Party 
unity is encouraged as the President can satisfy faction leaders through the 
distribution of cabinet posts and budgetary concessions (Morgenstern, 2001: 244) 
and it is this complicated electoral system that results in the high levels of party 
discipline witnessed in Uruguay since the return to democratic rule (see Table 8.4 
below).      
 
Table 8.4 Discipline in the Uruguayan Legislature (Rice Index)641 
 1985-90 1990-95 1995-00 2000-05 Average 
Frente Amplio 100 100 92 96 97 
Partido Colorado 91 87 99 100 94 
Partido Nacional 94 90 99 94 94 
Source: Buquet & Chasquetti (2005) and Chasquetti (2004) 
 
 The victory of the FA and Tabaré Vázquez in the 2004 elections was 
significant as it left Vázquez as the first President since 1966 to have a single party 
majority in both houses. However, this majority was an extremely narrow one and so 
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 See Altman & Chasquetti (2005: 240) who argue that ‘intra-party competition softens the rigidity 
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members of the same party for the same bill. A score of 100 represents perfect discipline, while a 
score of 0 represents complete division.  
 232 
consequently, party discipline became a key variable for Vázquez (Altman & 
Castiglioni, 2006: 153; Buquet & Chasquetti, 2005: 147-150). The FA however, is 
the most factionalised party in Uruguay (see Table 8.3 above), but paradoxically, it is 
also the most disciplined (see Table 8.4 above).642 This is mainly because the party 
has ‘the highest level of routinisation in its internal decision making-process’ with a 
unique leader and ‘solid mechanisms for making decisions beyond factions’ (Bergara 
et al. 2005: 21).643    
 Vázquez’s cabinet was designed with the objective of developing centralised 
decision-making and engendering party discipline in the FA (Chasquetti, 2004: 53), 
by giving each of the main faction leaders a cabinet post. The leaders of the main 
factions within the coalition comprised 43 per cent of the cabinet posts and 88 per 
cent of the legislative weight of the FA (see Table 8.5 below). Legislators are 
extraordinarily loyal to faction leaders and by providing all the faction leaders with 
cabinet posts, legislators become loyal to the government, therefore engendering 
discipline across the party.644  
 
Table 8.5 Engendering Discipline through the Cabinet 
 Ministries Percentage Seats % Seats of FA 
Ministers (Leaders of 
Factions) 
6 43% 61 88% 
Ministers (Loyalists) 7 50% --- --- 
Extra portfolio for largest 
fraction (MPP) 
1 7% --- --- 
Total 14 100%  88% 
Source: Buquet & Chasquetti (2005) 
 
 This tactic proved successful and the unity and cohesiveness of the FA during 
Vázquez’s first term enabled the Executive to dominate the legislative agenda as can 
be clearly seen from Table 8.1 above. Three incidents did threaten to fracture the 
party; Astori and Vázquez came to blows over the five-year budget proposal after 
Vázquez attempted to force Astori to ensure that at least 4.5 per cent of the budget 
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2008: 394).   
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would go towards education;645 the reform of the taxation system caused divisions 
between those who favoured Astori’s significant decrease in corporate tax and those 
who favoured a more gradual reduction;646 while the announcement of a potential 
free trade agreement with the US angered Communist elements of the FA.647 On 
each occasion, Vázquez, in order to maintain the unity of his governing party, opted 
for compromise and conciliation and this legislative discipline enabled Vázquez to 
implement his preferences as regards privatisation. The FA majority was able to 
successfully oppose the Herrerismo faction’s proposal for privatisation (Ibarra, 2006: 
153), and approve the purchase of Aguas de la Costa from Aguas de Barcelona, 
despite opposition from Lacalle and his Herrerismo faction.  
In brief then, the unity and discipline of the FA majority was a consequence 
of the electoral rules and a number of strategic decisions made by Vázquez. In turn, 
this majority enabled Vázquez to dominate the legislative agenda and successfully 
implement the majority of his preferences.  
 
Judicial Independence 
In Uruguay, the Judiciary has a long history of professionalism and independence 
and there exists a clear separation of powers between the executive branch and the 
judicial branch (Aloisio & Arboleda, 2006: 97; Bergara et al. 2005: 27). A two-thirds 
majority in the Senate is needed for judicial appointments and given the nature of the 
multi-party system in Uruguay, this isolates the institution further from political 
discretion and manipulation (Bergara et al. 28). However, the Uruguayan Judiciary is 
not without its problems and foremost among these is the issue of financing. 
Members of the Judiciary earn very low salaries hampering the quality of the 
institution (Aloisio & Arboleda, 2006: 95; Bergara et al. 2005: 29). Furthermore, the 
judiciary does not have complete financial independence. According to the 
constitution, the Judiciary elaborates its own budget, but in reality depends upon the 
budget office, which in turn is dependent upon the Executive, and this issue has 
served as one of the major points of contention between the Executive and Judiciary 
since the return to democratic rule (Aloisio & Arboleda, 2006: 96-97; Bergara et al. 
2005: 29).     
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Despite these shortcomings, the independence and professionalism of the 
institution have earned them widespread respect among the Uruguayan populace 
(Aloisio & Arboleda, 2006: 95; Bergara et al. 2005: 28). Citizens, unhappy with 
government legislation, have recourse to the Tribunal de la Contencioso 
Administrativo (TCA) as well as to the Supreme Court. In fact, most claims against 
government decisions are submitted to the TCA648 and while the independence of 
this organisation is not in question, its procedures are notoriously slow (Bergara et al. 
2005: 28).649 The Supreme Court does not have the ability to question the 
constitutionality of certain legislation once it is under consideration in the legislature, 
but it can veto a government initiative once it has been approved by Congress and a 
citizen has challenged its constitutionality (Bergara et al. 2005: 29). Crucially, 
particularly with regards to privatisation, the Judiciary has the ‘ability to make policy 
reversals when the Executive or the Legislative promote unconstitutional bills’ 
(Bergara et al. 2005: 29). In real terms, this means a policy of nationalisation (unless 
under exceptional circumstances), would be impossible to pursue in Uruguay. A 
concessionaire whose concession was nationalised for no apparent reason would 
have recourse to the Supreme Court and the Court would, in all likelihood, uphold 
the contract as it views cases purely legalistically.  
In fact, when the state did nationalise the water and services concession of 
Uragua and decided not to pay the firm any of the contractual guarantees, the 
company immediately filed suit with the Supreme Court. Ironically, the company had 
urged the government to renationalise the concession in the hope that they could exit 
the Uruguayan market with their contractual guarantees and assets intact,650 but when 
Vázquez finally did decide to assume control over the firm, he refused to pay any of 
the guarantees (his argument was centred upon their breach of contract).651 It was 
only after a year of negotiations, when Uragua and the Vázquez administration came 
to a satisfactory agreement, that the case was eventually dropped.652 This one 
instance of nationalisation was an exceptional circumstance and due to the fact that 
the company and state reached an amicable agreement, the Judiciary was sidelined in 
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this process. The other company that was returned to state ownership during 
Vázquez’s tenure, the water and sanitation firm Aguas de la Costa, was returned 
through a commercial transaction.  
In general then, the independence and professionalism of the Judiciary 
ensured that a general policy of nationalisation without remuneration in Uruguay was 
simply not a viable policy option, as this institution had the potential to veto any 
unconstitutional government initiatives.    
 
Policy Delegation 
In Brazil, the policy of privatisation was delegated to an autonomous body but in 
Uruguay in contrast, because subsequent administrations failed to successfully 
introduce privatisation as policy, there was no necessity for such a body. Also, due to 
the fact that most state enterprises have retained their respective monopolies, few 
regulatory bodies have been established, although there has been a move to create 
regulatory agencies in water and sanitation services and electricity distribution. 
Sanguinetti did oversee the creation of the Corporación Nacional para el Desarrollo 
(CND), which was established in 1985 in order to provide finance and advice to 
private enterprises so as to stimulate their growth. It was also responsible for 
assuming control and re-privatising private businesses facing imminent financial 
collapse but that were considered vital to the national interest (see Bensión, 2006: 
40). During Vázquez’s presidency, it was the CND that was responsible for re-
privatising the Nuevo Banco Comercial and PLUNA, and the CND was also at the 
helm in the search for private partners in the new companies to be partly owned by 
AFE (see section 8.2 above).   
There is however, another institutional mechanism that must be examined in 
the context of Uruguay. It is not strictly delegation, as in the sense of delegating 
responsibility for a particular policy to a technocratic body, but it does delegate to the 
general electorate an important role in the policy process. This institutional 
mechanism is the constitutional device that allows for two distinct types of direct 
democracy: constitutional plebiscites and referendums on existing legislation 
(Bergara et al. 2005: 19). A constitutional amendment can be introduced by 
reformers with the support of 10 per cent of the electorate, while 25 per cent of the 
electorate can vote to revoke a law previously passed by Congress (Bergara et al. 
2005: 19). As Altman (2002: 620) notes: ‘any analysis of the Uruguayan period of 
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re-democratisation that does not take into account this powerful institutional 
arrangement ignores a crucial aspect of the country’s political reality.’ The first 
application of direct democracy in Uruguay was in 1917 when the country officially 
decided upon the separation of the church and state and among the ‘stable 
democracies, Uruguay is one of the most prodigious users of direct democratic 
devices at the national level’ (Altman, 2006: 2). 
 In fact, with regard to privatisation, it has primarily been this institutional 
arrangement that has shaped this policy in Uruguay, not only during the tenure of 
Tabaré Vázquez, but since the return to democratic rule. Mechanisms of direct 
democracy have been invoked frequently since 1989 and as can be clearly seen from 
Tables 8.6 and 8.7 below (in bold), those concerned with the privatisation of public 
enterprises or services have all been successful, with Vázquez and the FA supporting 
each one of these initiatives.653 It was the 1992 referendum on the privatisation of 
public enterprises that prevented Lacalle from privatising state enterprises at a time 
when other Southern Cone states were selling their state companies, and the success 
of this initiative rendered any attempt at privatisation too politically costly. So, 
privatisation remained off the policy agenda not only for the remainder of Lacalle’s 
term, but also for Sanguinetti’s second term in office. When Jorge Batlle ill-
advisedly turned his attention to ANTEL and ANCAP, once again it was this 
institutional mechanism that shaped the policy outcome. Batlle, fearing a referendum 
was inevitable in the case of ANTEL, derogated the articles of his own legislation, 
while his attempt to de-monopolise the market of ANCAP failed at the ballot box 
(see chapter seven). The success of Vázquez’s preference for no privatisations in 
Uruguay was primarily as a result of this institutional mechanism. By the time 
Vázquez came to power, the threat of referenda had rendered the idea of 
implementing privatisation among the body politic as nearly unthinkable. As long as 
interest groups, and in the case of the FA, political parties who oppose privatisation, 
could mobilise public support, any major attempt at privatisation would be defeated 
through recourse to institutional mechanisms.654  
 In fact, it was the legacy of the constitutional plebiscite on the right to water 
and sanitation services in 2004 that ultimately led to the two instances of 
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nationalisation during Vázquez’s tenure (see Table 8.7 below). Shortly after the 
plebiscite, Vázquez, in order to send positive signals to the market, issued a decree 
protecting the existing water concessions in the state. However, the legacies of the 
popular vote had left both concessionaires eager to exit the Uruguayan market and 
Vázquez, facing legal challenges and under vociferous pressure from an array of 
interest groups who had supported the plebiscite, eventually agreed to take over the 
two water firms (see section 8.2). This institutional mechanism supplanted the 
preferences of the Executive and essentially forced the state to take over these two 
companies. Mechanisms of direct democracy have undoubtedly been one of the main 
institutions shaping the outcome of the policy of privatisation in Uruguay. 655  
 
Table 8.6 Popular Referendums in Uruguay 
Subject Year Law Result 
Revoke amnesty to military 1989 Law 15,848 35% - failed 
Prevent privatisation of public firms 1992 Law 16,211 79%-  succeeded 
Opposing deregulation of transmission 
of electrical energy 
1998 Law 16,832 22.4% - did not achieve minimum 
turnout necessary (25%) 
Opposing the restriction of the period 
of time available to employees to make 
claims against employers 
1998-
99 
Law 16,906 4.7% (1998) & 9.3% (1999) - did 
not achieve minimum turnout 
necessary (25%)  
Opposing improvement of public and 
private services and public security 
(emergency law)  
2001 Law 17,243 20.7% - did not achieve minimum 
turnout necessary (25%)  
Oppose partial privatisation of 
ANCEL and end of ANTEL’s 
monopoly 
2002 Law 17,296 Signatures were collected to hold 
a referendum and government 
decided to derogate law 
themselves rather than face a 
referendum 
Oppose ending of monopoly of 
ANCAP 
2003 Law 17,448 62% - succeeded 
Source: Moreira (2004: 30), Altman (2002: 619; 2006: 12) and author’s narrative (chapter 7) 
 
Table 8.7 Constitutional Plebiscites in Uruguay 
Subject Year Result 
Link pensions to salary fluctuations 1989 72% - approved 
Prohibitions on altering pension benefits through budget 1994 54% - approved 
Establish a constitutionally fixed budget for education 1994 28% - not approved 
Constitutional reform 1996 50.5% - approved 
Financial independence for the judiciary 1999 43% - not approved 
Prevent directors and managers of state entities from engaging in 
political activity 
1999 38% - not approved 
Enshrine the right to water and the provision of water services 
as a constitutional human right to be provided only be the state 
2004 64% - approved 
Source: Moreira (2004: 30), Altman (2002: 619; 2006: 12) and author’s narrative (chapter 7) 
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8.4 Labour support 
Since its emergence at the beginning of the 1970s to contest the 1971 election, the 
Frente Amplio has had strong links to the main umbrella union movement in 
Uruguay, the Plenario Intersindical de Trabajadores-Convención Nacional de 
Trabajadores (PIT-CNT).656 This was mainly as a result of the hegemony of the 
Communist Party within the PIT-CNT and also their dominance within the FA well 
into the 1990s, preserving union and leftist unity and overcoming partisan splits 
(Winn & Ferro-Clérico, 1997: 447; Filgueira & Papadópulos, 1997: 373).657 As a 
result, the trade union movement in Uruguay ‘became part of a true party system, 
linked to the left, in which corporatist aspects and political capital constantly 
intermingle’ (Filgueira & Papadópulos, 1997: 372). With the advent of the military 
government in 1973, all trade union activities were declared illegal and it was not 
until 1984, with the re-establishment of the Consejo de Salarios (Wage Councils) 
and tripartite negotiations, that the central union movement, reunited as the PIT-
CNT, once again became a significant political actor (Cassoni, 2000: 1; Panizza, 
2008: 179; Casacuberta et al. 2004: 10).658     
 However, with the election of Lacalle and his drive towards liberalisation, 
this was soon to change. Lacalle proposed creating a flexible labour market and 
radically altering the Uruguayan trade union movement through three measures: 
regulating their right to strike, regulation of trade union activity and the abandonment 
of wage negotiations (Filgueira & Papadópulos, 1997: 371). Lacalle only managed to 
implement the last of these measures. In 1991, the government announced an end to 
the tripartite wage councils in all sectors bar construction, health care and 
transportation (Cassoni, 2000: 3). This decision provided an incentive for 
negotiations between firms and workers at more decentralised levels and the end 
result was a significant decline in membership of the central union (Cassoni, 2000: 3; 
Casacuberta et al. 2004: 10), a situation exacerbated by de-industrialisation and high 
un-employment (Panizza, 2008: 179). By 1997, membership of the PIT-CNT 
numbered only 165,000 (15 per cent of the labour force) in comparison to 250,000 in 
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1985 (Cassoni, 2000: 6). As a consequence, the movement’s ‘synchronisation, co-
ordination and political bargaining power deteriorated’ (Cassoni, 2000: 3). Despite 
this, during this period, ‘the unions played a significant role in blocking privatisation 
of public utilities through the promotion of referenda’ and ‘they also maintained 
strong links with the FA’ (Panizza, 2008: 179). The union movement in Uruguay, 
through recourse to mechanisms of direct democracy, and allied to the FA, proved to 
be the major veto player during every attempt at privatisation.659  
 The PIT-CNT actively supported Vázquez’s electoral campaign in 2004 and 
once elected, the most significant and controversial political and economic changes 
Vázquez introduced were related to labour policy (Panizza, 2008: 189; Zurbriggen, 
2006: 106). Firstly, Vázquez re-instated tripartite negotiations with the establishment 
of the Consejo Superior Tripartito and the Consejo Superior Rural. Wage councils 
were also re-introduced in 20 sectors and discussions were also begun between 
employer organisations and trade unions for the purpose of long-term planning in the 
labour market (Senatore, 2006: 146-147; Panizza, 2008; 189-190). One of the most 
controversial initiatives was the decision by the government to repeal a decree passed 
by a previous administration that allowed police to evict workers who occupy a 
workplace as part of an industrial action (Panizza, 2008: 190; Senatore, 2006: 147). 
When questioned about this issue, Eduardo Bonomi, the Minister of Labour, stated: 
‘Occupations are a part of striking.’660 Vázquez introduced a Trade Union Rights 
Act,661 comprehensively protecting trade union activities (Senatore, 2006: 147) and 
extended labour rights to domestic workers and sub-contracted workers (PIT-CNT, 
2007: 20),662 while also proposing legislation to establish a national system of 
collective bargaining.663 
 These initiatives attracted much ire from employer organisations who accused 
Vázquez of bias towards the unions, while opposition parties attempted to derail his 
labour related legislative initiatives (Zurbriggen, 2006: 106; Panizza, 2008: 190). 
Despite this opposition, Vázquez’s clear support for the unions significantly 
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increased their importance and by 2007, membership of the PIT-CNT had returned to 
250,000 workers.664 More importantly, the bargaining and political weight of the 
unions and left-labour power in general in Uruguay was strengthened considerably 
by these actions.  
 The relationship of the FA with the union movement was not all bright during 
Vázquez’s tenure. The political stance of the PIT-CNT remained closer to the more 
radical elements within the FA who questioned central elements of the economic 
programme and international relations of the state (Zurbriggen, 2006: 107). The PIT-
CNT staged a number of general strikes during Vázquez’s first three years in power 
over opposition to a proposed free trade agreement with the US665 and in response to 
some of Astori’s economic decisions.666    
 However, in general, the union movement was supportive of Vázquez. The 
PIT-CNT was highly supportive of the social emergency fund Panes667 and in 
response to a potentially devastating strike by truck drivers,668 the PIT-CNT called a 
general walkout in support of the government, forcing the truck drivers to back 
down.669  
 In terms of privatisation, the PIT-CNT actively supported the referendum on 
water and sanitation services with the Frente Amplio in October 2004 and trade 
unions were among the most vocal advocates of nationalising the two existing 
private water concessions in Uruguay.670 It was partly as a result of pressure and 
opposition from this direction that Vázquez finally relented and made moves to take 
over both these companies (Ibarra, 2006: 153).671 When the communist wing of the 
union proposed re-establishing the Comisión en Defensa del Patrimonio, in response 
to the decision to establish two new mixed-ownership enterprises in the rail sector, 
the PIT-CNT supported the position of the government.672 The resurrection of the 
Comisión did not generate much support among the majority of the PIT-CNT, with 
Juan Silveira, the co-ordinator of the socialist wing of the PIT-CNT, dismissing his 
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communist counterparts and asserting that ‘an association is not a privatisation,’ a 
sentiment echoed by the co-ordinator of the PIT-CNT, Fernando Pereira.673     
 As a result, the level of labour support significantly increased in Uruguay 
during Vázquez’s presidency. In Brazil, labour remained fractured and antagonistic 
towards Lula, whereas in Argentina and in Uruguay, this high level of labour support 
contributed to Kirchner’s and Vázquez’s ability to implement their preferences. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Vázquez was elected in 2004 on a platform that rejected the market-friendly model 
of his predecessors and during the election campaign, Vázquez was explicit in his 
rejection of privatisation. By the end of his first three years in power, there had been 
no actual privatisations, although there had been two instances of re-privatisation: the 
Banco Nuevo Comercial and the national airline PLUNA. Some concessions to the 
private sector had also been offered and the administration had allowed the state rail 
operator, UFE, to associate with private partners. However, the state had also 
reassumed control of two water and sanitation companies; one through reluctant re-
nationalisation and the other through formal purchase.  
 The Executive branch has significant power in Uruguay (although not as 
much as the Executive in Argentina), but this power is primarily a product of the 
unity and discipline of the President’s support base in the legislature. The electoral 
rules in Uruguay engender very high levels of party discipline and this, combined 
with his single party majority, ensured that Vázquez dominated the legislative 
agenda during his first three years in power. However, it was another institutional 
device, the mechanisms of direct democracy that primarily shaped the outcome of 
privatisation policy in Uruguay. The referendum on water and sanitation services in 
Uruguay in 2005 ultimately forced Vázquez to re-nationalise the two private 
companies operating in this sector, despite the fact this was contrary to his initial 
preference. Once the decision had eventually been made to assume control of these 
firms, it was his executive power and the discipline of his legislative support that 
enabled the nationalisation and purchase to succeed, despite opposition. These 
instances of nationalisation were exceptional and primarily driven by the 
constitutional plebiscite. A wide-ranging policy of nationalisation would have been 
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impossible in Uruguay mainly due to the independence of the judiciary. There were 
no actual privatisations and Vázquez was able to implement his preferences in this 
regard due to a combination of his executive power and disciplined party support, but 
this outcome was primarily due to the existence of mechanisms of direct democracy. 
By the time Vázquez came to power, the threat of referenda had nearly completed 
removed the idea of privatisation from the policy agenda.   
As hypothesised in Chapter Two, Uruguay would be more likely than Brazil 
and yet less likely than Argentina to halt all privatisations due to the configuration of 
the specific political institutions in place in that country. As in Brazil under Lula and 
Argentina under Kirchner, policy outcome in Uruguay under Vázquez in the area of 
privatisation was primarily a product of the constellation of the political institutions 
within that state.   
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Conclusion 
The purpose of this final chapter is to summarise and draw together the main 
insights, findings and arguments of this research. Firstly, the main argument of this 
study will be re-iterated, followed by the summation of the findings of each case 
study in the context of this argument. These findings will then be drawn together and 
presented in a comparative context. The implications and context of this research and 
how this project ‘contributes’ to the literature on globalisation and partisan politics 
will be explored. Finally, some potential future avenues of exploration, based on the 
findings of this study will be considered.     
 
Economic Globalisation and Partisan Politics 
Globalisation, the general term used to describe increasing integration at the 
international level, has undoubtedly altered the practice of politics and economics at 
both the international and national levels. Our understanding however, of the extent 
of this alteration and the mechanisms through which it may occur, still remain 
contested. One particular aspect of this phenomenon, increasing economic 
integration, has, it has been suggested, potentially significant ramifications for 
political actors within states. Again, our understanding of the causal relationship 
between economic globalisation and domestic political actors, particularly partisan 
political actors, remains under-developed. 
 Initial attempts at deciphering the relationship between economic 
globalisation and left-wing politics in particular, treated economic globalisation as 
the sole determining explanatory variable. The increasing mobility of capital as a 
result of economic integration forced states to compete for this capital if they wish to 
remain competitive in international markets. Capital prefers a specific policy mix and 
if governments, regardless of their political orientation, fail to implement this mix, 
the highly mobile capital will simply move elsewhere, precipitating a policy 
convergence along lines that internalise the preferences of capital. The preferences of 
capital are considered to be congruent with the preferences of the political right, 
rendering left-wing politics somewhat meaningless in the contemporary era. 
 Those that rejected this argument also rejected the focus on economic 
globalisation as the sole explanatory variable. Early studies contesting the concept of 
policy convergence contended that left-wing politics were far from meaningless in 
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today’s world. In fact, they treated left-wing politics as an independent variable and 
found that, where governments were of the left, the effects of convergence, in areas 
such as social welfare spending and taxation reform, were lessened or even reversed. 
The means by which left-wing politics resisted this convergence remained unclear, 
but it was thought that the answer lay in the relationship of these parties with labour. 
Later, more sophisticated studies attempted to untangle this relationship and so began 
the incorporation of institutions as an independent variable into this debate. The 
focus now shifted to labour market institutions and it was convincingly argued that 
where left-wing governments were allied with broad and encompassing labour 
movements, the effects of convergence, again in the areas of social welfare spending 
or taxation reform, would be either significantly slowed or even reversed. So, the 
general thrust of the riposte to those initial studies above: left-wing governments can 
implement their preferences. They matter.  
 Attention has turned to the domestic-level mechanisms by which left-wing 
governments resist the pressures of convergence, but the focus still remains on 
exogenous variables to the detriment of a more complete understanding of the effects 
of domestic-level variables. In particular, the role of political institutions in 
mediating convergence warrants further attention. Some studies have incorporated 
institutional variables such as democracy, party fragmentation, or labour market 
institutions. Swank (1998b; 2002) has suggested that the institutional access to 
decision-making, provided to those opposed to the policies of convergence or 
materially harmed by globalisation, is important. Pierson (1996, 2004) and Campbell 
(2004) have highlighted the importance of institutional design and path dependence 
in shaping outcomes. In these studies, specific institutional configurations have 
mediated or nullified the effect of convergence. Swank (2002: 34) captures the 
general argument: ‘The impacts of international capital mobility should vary 
substantially across specific configurations of national institutions.’674  
This research built upon these studies by further contributing to our 
understanding of the mechanisms by which left-wing governments can resist 
convergence and implement their preferences. It examined how the different 
configuration of specific institutional structures impacted the control of partisan 
actors over decision-making and resulted in different path dependent effects.  
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 Previous studies emphasising the continued ability of left-wing governments 
to implement their preferences have also iterated the importance of labour 
institutions. Left-wing governments allied with strong and encompassing labour 
movements can resist the pressures of convergence.675 The role of labour, and labour 
market institutions, in enabling partisan governments to resist convergence has been 
well established in this literature. This thesis was interested, not only in the role of 
labour market institutions, but also political institutions in mediating the pressures of 
economic globalisation. So, the main research question of this thesis was concerned 
with what conditions, if any, enable left-wing governments to implement their 
preferences in the face of increasing economic globalisation.  
Which leads us to the main hypothesis of this research: while strong and 
encompassing unions allied with the left-wing party in power will be important for 
demanding and providing support for specific policy outcomes, the ability of a left-
wing government to achieve this policy outcome will also be predicated upon the 
institutional control a government has over a particular policy. By institutional 
control, we are referring to the decision-making power of the government, embodied 
by a combination of executive power, control over the legislature etc; the ability of 
important players to veto initiatives, e.g. the judiciary; and the institutional design of 
policies and their path dependent effects.  
So, the central contention of this thesis was simple. The configuration of the 
political institutions in each state will mediate the effect of economic globalisation 
on policy outcomes. Where the level of institutional control over policy is high and 
the union movement is cohesive and well-organised, a left-wing government with 
close links to labour will have a greater ability to implement their preferences, than 
one with low-levels of institutional control and weak links to a fragmented and 
disorganised labour movement.  
 
The Findings 
This argument, hypothesis and institutional framework were applied to three left-
wing governments in the Southern Cone of Latin America. Latin America has 
recently witnessed the continent-wide resurgence of left-wing political parties at the 
polls. The revival of left-wing politics in Latin America provides us with a good 
                                                 
675
 In fact, capital may even prefer the left-leaning policies produced by the coherence of left-
governments allied with encompassing unions (see Garrett, 1998a).   
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opportunity to examine the relationship between economic globalisation and partisan 
politics. Latin America has been exposed to international capital and foreign direct 
investment to a far greater degree than the advanced industrial democracies and 
generally, it is assumed that the impact of economic globalisation will be magnified 
in the developing world. So, choosing three Latin American states should provide a 
more rigorous test of the argument outlined above. These three states have all 
recently elected to power left-wing governments with similar preferences as regards 
privatisation. These three states are the most ‘developed’ in Latin America and their 
geographical proximity acts a natural control. What is more, they all have similar 
levels of exposure to economic globalisation and all three should be under similar 
levels of influence from the IFIs. This enabled all exogenous variables to be held 
constant across the three cases, providing the research with greater analytical 
leverage over the main explanatory variable. Finally, these three states varied across 
this main explanatory variable, the political institutions, and this enabled us to 
hypothesise on expected outcomes in order to test the central argument.   
Privatisation was chosen as the dependent variable. Previous empirical 
studies in this literature have focused upon social welfare spending or taxation 
shifting. Choosing privatisation widens the scope of this literature. Also, the 
globalisation literature provides a clear set of expectations regarding the relationship 
between privatisation and globalised markets. Increasing trade competition and the 
multinationalisation of production place downward pressures on the size of the 
public economy and this leads to the privatisation of state assets. Privatisation is also 
an effective means for developing world states to attract FDI and to ‘signal’ stability 
and orthodoxy to capital markets.   
 So, why have three left-wing governments, from the same geographical area, 
with similar preferences as regards privatisation, elected within the same period and 
with similar exposure to economic globalisation, exhibited three different policy 
outcomes? The findings of this research appear to confirm the central argument – the 
left does matter, but this is dependent upon the configuration of domestic political 
institutional variables that include access to decision-making and path dependence. 
In Brazil under Lula, while privatisations did slow significantly, they did not cease. 
More to the point, privatisations continued in sectors (banking and electricity) where 
Lula had specifically stated his intention to halt all sales of state assets. Labour was 
fragmented and disorganised and failed to provide cohesive support for Lula, while 
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the confluence of institutional variables left Lula with little power to exert his 
authority over the policy of privatisation. 
 Cardoso had implemented privatisation within a legal and institutional 
framework and while Lula’s strong executive power had the ability to curb the power 
of these institutions, this was only functional if he could form a cohesive coalition, 
but electoral rules and his inability to achieve the required equilibrium as regards 
pork-barrel prevented him from doing so. The path dependent effects of Cardoso’s 
policy design ensured that privatisation could continue (albeit at a much slower 
pace). The judiciary could veto any attempts to overhaul these institutions or engage 
in a policy of nationalisation, even if Lula had of wanted to do so. So cumulatively, 
these variables left Lula with little institutional control over the policy of 
privatisation in Brazil.  
In Argentina, Kirchner oversaw the uniting of the labour movement and 
established strong links between the central union and his Frente Para la Victoria 
faction. Their support and Kirchner’s institutional power ensured that in Argentina, 
not only did all privatisations cease, but there were also a number of high-profile re-
nationalisations. The Executive has extremely strong powers in Argentina and during 
periods when Congress is hostile, the Executive can sideline this institution in the 
policy process. The electoral system and the high-level of party discipline it 
engenders enabled Kirchner to slowly establish his own power base in Congress. He 
used this power base to support initiatives that would strengthen Executive power, 
which in turn, he then used to further enlarge his support base. Privatisation had not 
been delegated to an independent body as it had been in Brazil. Menem had 
instigated this policy by widely employing his executive powers. So, somewhat 
ironically, Kirchner could simply utilise his Executive power to halt and reverse this 
policy. The high level of support he had in Congress, ensured that they were willing 
to allow him to do this. His erosion of de facto judicial independence also enabled 
Kirchner to rescind the contracts of public utilities and re-nationalise public services, 
with a greater degree of confidence than Lula in Brazil, that the judiciary would 
support his actions.    
Finally, in Uruguay under Vázquez, although there were no actual 
privatisations, there were two instances of re-privatisation, but the state also 
reassumed control of two water and sanitation companies. Labour was united, 
cohesive and well organised and was an integral player in the re-nationalisation of 
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the water contracts. The Executive branch has significant power in Uruguay, but this 
power is primarily a product of the unity and discipline of the President’s support 
base in the legislature. The electoral rules in Uruguay engender very high levels of 
party discipline and this, combined with his single party majority, ensured that 
Vázquez dominated the legislative agenda. However, it was another institutional 
device, the mechanisms of direct democracy that primarily shaped the outcome of 
privatisation policy in Uruguay. Frequent recourse to this mechanism throughout the 
1990s had effectively removed privatisation from the policy agenda. This 
institutional structure has served to repeatedly constrain Executive preferences. For 
example, the referendum on water and sanitation services in Uruguay in 2005 
ultimately forced Vázquez to re-nationalise the two private companies operating in 
this sector, despite the fact that this was contrary to his initial preference. Once the 
decision had eventually been made to assume control of these firms, it was his 
executive power and the discipline of his legislative support that enabled the 
nationalisation and purchase to succeed, despite opposition. A wide-ranging policy 
of nationalisation without remuneration would have been impossible in Uruguay, 
mainly due to the independence of the judiciary. The lack of privatisations, while 
congruent with Vázquez’s preferences, was not a product of his institutional control 
over this policy, as demonstrated by the case of the two re-nationalisations. The lack 
of privatisation was primarily a product of the frequent use of mechanisms of direct 
democracy in the 1990s.  
Holding all exogenous variables constant, variation in policy outcome can 
also be explained by the configuration of political institutions within each state. A 
left-wing government will have the ability to implement their preferences in 
situations where the institutional configuration is favourable enabling them to exert 
influence over the desired policy outcome, and where labour is united and organised. 
This is what occurred in Argentina under Kirchner. Where the institutional 
configuration prevents a government from exerting their influence over policy, and 
where labour is fragmented and disorganised, a left-wing government will not have 
the ability to implement their preferences – they will be blocked. This is what 
occurred in Brazil under Lula. Where labour is united and organised, but where the 
institutional configuration inhibits a government from exerting their influence over a 
policy, they will not have the ability to fully implement their preferences, nor will 
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their preferences be entirely blocked – they will be constrained. This is what 
occurred in Uruguay under Vázquez.  
From the analysis of these three case studies then, the variation in policy 
outcome can be primarily explained by the configuration of the political institutions 
within each state. This is best illustrated by returning to the typology presented in the 
introduction (see figure 2 below).       
 
Figure 2: A typology of domestic-level variables – the results 
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Implications for the Literature on Economic Globalisation and Partisan Politics 
While it is difficult to make universal generalisations on the basis of three case 
studies from a distinct geographical area, nonetheless, the findings of this research 
have implications for the literature on economic globalisation and policy 
convergence. 
 Firstly, the findings of this research suggest that the proponents of the 
globalisation thesis have over-exaggerated the decline of the contemporary left. 
Increasing economic globalisation and the disciplinary effects of mobile capital have 
not, it appears, consigned distinct left-wing policies to the dustbin of history. Despite 
the increasing economic integration of the international system continuing to place 
pressures on governments to converge along a specific policy mix, left-wing 
governments can, under certain conditions, implement policies congruent with their 
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preferences, even if these preferences contradict the policy-mix prescribed by the 
convergence thesis. For example, in Argentina, Kirchner not only halted all 
privatisations, but he also re-nationalised a number of high-profile public services 
and previously privatised state companies. By any reading of the globalisation thesis, 
nationalisation should be nigh on impossible. While there is a case to be made for 
increased welfare spending funded by progressive taxation actually proving attractive 
to mobile asset holders, there is no logic which supports the argument that a climate 
of expropriations will be in any way attractive to mobile asset holders. Yet, even in 
this era of increasing economic globalisation, a left-wing government in Argentina 
re-nationalised a number of entities, while, it must be added, continuing to maintain 
economic growth. So, left-wing governments can still implement policies congruent 
with their preferences. In capitalist democracies, they can matter.  
Secondly, this research adds to those studies that highlight the importance of 
including political institutional variables in any attempts to understand the 
mechanisms that mediate the effects of economic globalisation in the contemporary 
era. The first wave literature, in condemning the left to an early grave, stressed the 
effect of exogenous variables on left-wing politics. More sophisticated studies have 
since incorporated various domestic variables and highlighted the continued 
relevance of partisan politics. Some scholars have highlighted the importance of 
institutions in mediating or nullifying convergence in the advanced industrial 
democracies. This research built upon these studies by further contributing to our 
understanding of the mechanisms by which left-wing governments can resist 
convergence and implement their preferences. It examined how the different 
configuration of specific institutional structures impacted the control of partisan 
actors over decision-making and resulted in different path dependent effects. It has 
shown that the structure of institutions and their independent effects are crucial in 
either providing opportunities for left-wing governments to implement their 
preferences or constraining them from doing so.  
 This can be witnessed across the three cases. In Argentina, the high level of 
executive power, lack of policy delegation and the ability to manipulate the judiciary 
all combined to enable Kirchner to implement nationalisation, even when congress 
was hostile. In Brazil, Lula’s strong powers were negated by the instability of his 
ideologically diffuse, unruly and undisciplined coalition. As he was hampered 
imposing his preferences upon congress, privatisation continued to trundle slowly 
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along because of the path dependent effects of Cardoso’s policy design. Uruguay 
proved even more interesting. As the rest of Latin America converged around 
privatisation in the 1990s, Uruguay bucked this trend, mainly because of the specific 
institutional configuration that allowed for mechanisms of direct democracy. By the 
time Vázquez came to power, successive referendums had essentially removed 
privatisation from the political agenda. In fact, this institutional mechanism drove the 
nationalisations in Uruguay, even though initially, this was contrary to Vázquez’s 
preferences.  
 However, it would be naïve to completely deny the effect of exogenous 
variables, in particular globalisation. In fact, during the election campaign, all three 
moderated their stance and all three announced the appointment of economic 
conservatives to their future cabinet, in order to prevent turmoil in the financial 
markets. When Lula arrived in power, the financial markets in Brazil had suffered 
serious fluctuations, and there was widespread concern regarding the economic 
direction Lula would follow. Following the devaluation of the Real in 1999, Brazil 
was desperately in need of foreign investment and Lula was desperate to soothe the 
nerves of potential investors. His conservative economic policy was awarded with an 
increase in Brazil’s investment rating, precipitating a return of foreign capital to the 
Bovespa, and by the end of Lula’s first term in office, there was widespread 
international demand for Brazilian IPOs and corporate bonds.    
Amidst fears that Kirchner was instigating a widespread policy of 
nationalisation, Gaz de France, France Telecom and Vivendi all left the Argentine 
market. Furthermore, the decision of the World Bank’s ICSID in May 2005, to award 
an American Gas company compensation for pesification, forced Kirchner to adopt a 
more conciliatory tone with privatised utilities. Also, Kirchner was only able to avoid 
IMF pressure by securing Venezuelan interest in Argentine sovereign bonds. 
Although the MerVal did rally during Kirchner’s tenure, this is hardly surprising 
given the veritable meltdown it had suffered in 2001. Furthermore, although the 
Argentine economy continued to grow, the bond rating agencies refused to 
significantly upgrade Argentina’s credit rating, further placing pressure on Kirchner 
to come to an agreement with privatised utility companies and secure an agreement 
from Venezuela for the purchase of Argentine bonds.  
In fact, for Uruguay, the pressures of globalisation on such a small, trade-
dependent economy can be clearly witnessed. In Uruguay, the letter of intent 
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Vázquez signed with the IMF in May 2005, committed the government to 
dismantling the state’s monopolies in a number of sectors and also to the 
privatisation of the Nueva Banco Comercial (NCB). In order to attract much-needed 
investment, the government was keen to signal stability and continuity to private 
capital and immediately after the election, Vázquez announced that he would be 
abandoning his proposal to revise the public service concessions of the previous 
Batlle government, while also announcing that he would respect all previous 
contracts signed by private entities with the state, including a proposal to negate the 
retroactivity of the October referendum and respect the concessions of Uragua and 
Aguas de al Costa. Furthermore, the reliance of Uruguay on international trade is 
also clearly evident. Initially, Vázquez was highly supported of the Mercosur, but 
following an acrimonious dispute with Argentina, Vázquez, contrary to Mercosur 
rules and enormous domestic opposition, pursued a trade and investment framework 
deal with the US. Nonetheless, it was the political institutional structures that drove 
the state take-over of the two water companies, while the re-privatisation of PLUNA 
proved unnecessarily complicated due to constitutional limits on foreign ownership. 
Globalisation did undoubtedly have an impact upon policy outcomes, but this thesis 
has attempted to demonstrate that the institutional structure in each state also shaped 
these outcomes.676 Even in this current globalised era, it would appear that 
institutions still matter.   
 Thirdly, this research has extended this avenue of inquiry to a new policy 
area: privatisation. The focus of much of the empirical work in this literature has 
remained primarily on social welfare spending and taxation reform. However, 
according to the logic of the ‘globalisation’ or ‘race to the bottom thesis,’ the effects 
of convergence should be witnessed in other policy areas. Examining privatisation 
broadens the applicability of this debate and in doing so, it has provided, if anything, 
a more rigorous test of the argument presented above. While there is a case to be 
made that capital may be attracted to situations characterised by increased welfare 
spending, funded by progressive taxation, implemented by a left-wing government 
allied with an encompassing labour union, no such case could realistically be made 
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 A recent study by Jensen & Schmith (2005) proves that Lula’s election had no effect on stock 
prices in Brazil. Rather, plummeting stock prices at this time were a product of the slumping world 
economy This may suggest, as others have done (see Campbell, 2004; Hay, 2000), that ideas about 
economic globalisation have an impact almost equal, if not greater to, the impact of economic 
globalisation itself.  
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for re-nationalisation. In the current era of globalisation, nationalisation should prove 
even more difficult to implement than progressive taxation or social welfare 
increases, but nonetheless, we have evidence of nationalisation in two of our three 
cases, albeit if in Uruguay, these nationalisations were related to one specific issue.  
 Fourthly, the three case study countries chosen for this research were all from 
the developing world. The vast majority of previous empirical studies in this 
literature have focused on the advanced industrial democracies, but the mechanisms 
by which left-wing governments resist convergence in the developing world remain 
by and large, unexplored. The constraining impact of economic globalisation is 
assumed to be magnified in the developing world and some recent empirical studies 
(see Wibbels & Arce, 2003; Kaufman & Segura-Ubiergo, 2001, Rudra, 2002) appear 
to confirm this. These studies have all suggested the importance of partisanship, but 
how partisanship matters remains unexplored. This research suggests that not only do 
left-wing governments matter in the developing world, but institutions matter also.    
This has implications for the literature. Ironically, it was in situations where 
the political institutions were weakest or where power was concentrated in the hands 
of the government, as in Argentina, that left-wing politics appeared to matter most. 
In Argentina, the government’s room for manoeuvre seemed to be largely rooted in 
institutional weakness. This means the political rules of the game are easily violated 
or changed. Brazil’s institutions are stronger and so policy does not shift so radically. 
So, institutional weakness provides left-wing governments with more space for far-
reaching policy change. This is not a new claim, especially in relation to Latin 
America (see O’Donnell, 1994; Levitsky & Murillo, 2005). In fact, a whole body of 
literature argued that the ability of Latin American governments to implement 
neoliberal reforms in the first place back in the early 1990s, was a product of 
executive power, executive dominance over the legislature, judicial independence etc 
(see Haggard & Kaufman, 1992; Shugart & Carey, 1992; Ames, 2001). Is it any 
surprise then, that the ability to reverse these reforms with partisan changes in 
government should be a product of the same institutional weaknesses?       
 So, what does all this mean? There are two important points to draw from this 
discussion. First, it may actually be in the developing world where we will still see 
distinctive left-government policies despite their increased exposure to economic 
globalisation. If the ability of a left-wing government to implement policies 
congruent with their preferences and resist convergence is a product of institutional 
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weakness, then in countries where the political institutions are stronger and better 
developed, such as the advanced industrial democracies, then, as in Brazil, it should 
prove more difficult to alter existing policy. This leads to the second point. If 
convergence is predicated upon partisanship combined with institutional strength or 
weakness, then this brings us, in rather a round-about-way, back to the original point. 
Policy outcome then, is also a product of institutional structures and partisanship, 
rather than a single exogenous economic imperative. Left-wing politics matter. 
Institutions matter. 
Finally, the findings of this research also have important implications for 
Latin America at this particular juncture in its history. The ability of left-wing 
governments to purse distinctive supply-side partisan policies in the region suggests 
that the recent repeated victory of left-wing political parties at the polls, the so-called 
‘shift to the left,’ is an important political phenomenon, and may lead, at least in 
some countries, to a roll-back of the market-friendly reforms of the 1990s. What is 
more, it also appears as if many of the leaders of this ‘new left’ are well aware of the 
potential of political oppositions to prevent them from implementing their 
preferences. Witness the efforts of Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa to 
hold constituent assemblies in order to re-cast the political institutions in their 
respective states. If institutions did not matter, then why would they bother?   
 
Future Research 
As stated above, while generalisations from three case studies are difficult, the 
findings of this research could serve as a starting point for further work. This type of 
study could be replicated in other small-n comparative case studies in Latin America 
or, with minor changes, in other parts of the world. It could also be applied in many 
different policy areas thought to be impacted by the pressures of economic 
globalisation. More in-depth comparative case studies of this sort in other policy 
areas, in other countries, will further elucidate the role of political institutions in 
mediating or nullifying the effects of economic globalisation.  
 While qualitative studies allow us to trace the effect of institutions across 
specific policies, large-n, cross-country econometric studies are needed to generalise 
the argument presented here. A number of scholars have included institutional 
variables in their econometric studies in this literature, but perhaps other large n-
studies could benefit from utilising some of the datasets that already have developed 
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excellent measures of political institutional variables (see for example Beck et al. 
2001; Henisz, 2000).  
 Econometric studies that employ political institutional variables of the type 
presented here, or in the datasets above, could test the role of partisanship and 
political institutions in the face of increasing globalisation, firstly in the presidential 
regimes of Latin America in the policy areas of social welfare spending, taxation 
shifting and privatisation, and then depending upon the results, this model could be 
extended to the rest of the world. Large global samples could also attempt to 
decipher the effect of partisanship in resisting convergence across different 
institutional structures. So, for example, is a left-wing government more likely to 
resist convergence in a Presidential regime, than one say, in a parliamentary regime 
or semi-Presidential regime?  
Finally, the findings presented could also act as a building block for scholars 
specifically interested in Latin America. Much has been made of the bifurcation of 
the ‘new left’ in Latin America,677 but as yet, we have no real understanding of this 
phenomenon. Part of the answer may lie in the varying levels of institutional 
weakness across the continent. Where members of this ‘new left’ have fewer 
institutional constraints, as in Argentina, it is likely that their policies may be more 
radical. Those that are institutionally constrained, as in Brazil, will be more 
moderate. Obviously the bifurcation of the left cannot simply be explained by 
institutional differences, but future research, either qualitative or quantitative need to 
incorporate the varying levels of institutional strength (or weakness) as a possible 
explanatory variable.        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
677
 That is, the radical populist left and the formerly radical, reformist left (see Panizza 2005; 
Castañeda 2006). 
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